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Full text of "Congress and foreign policy"

\/fS^ *//* '•*- S&/977 



COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 



Congress and 
Foreign Policy 

1977 







U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



29-972 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON : 1978 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



COMMITTEE OX INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 



[ENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman 



L. n. FOUNTAIN. North Carolina 
DANTE B. FA8CELL, Florida 

CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan 
ROBERT N. C. XiX. Pennsylvania 
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota 
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York 
LEE II. HAMILTON, Indiana 
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York 
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York 
GU8 YATRON, Pennsylvania 
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts 
LEO J. RYAN. California 
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois 
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York 
HELEN S. MEYNER. New Jersey 
DON BONKER, Washington 
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts 
A N D Y I R E L AN D , Florida 
DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio 
ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California 
WYCHE FOWLER. Jr., Georgia 
E (KIKA) DE LA GARZA, Texas 
GEORGE E. DANIELSON, California 
JOHN J. CAVANAUGH, Nebraska 



WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan 
EDWARD J DERWINSKI, Illinois 
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois 
JOHN II. BUCHANAN, JR., Alabama 
J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida 
CHARLES W. WIIALEN, Jr., Ohio 
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas 
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio 
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California 
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania 
SHIRLEY N. PETTIS, California 



Johk J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Staff 
Margaret Goodman, Staff Consultant 

(II) 



FOREWORD 



House of Representatives, 
Committee on International Relations, 

Washington, D.C., September 6, 1978. 

With the resurgence of congressional activity in foreign affairs, the 
need has arisen for a document which summarizes the activities of the 
Congress in this area. 

The Committee on International Relations provides summaries of 
its own activities in documents such as the annual "Survey of Activ- 
ities" and the biannual "Legislative Review Activities" report. These 
documents, however, do not provide information in any comprehensive 
way about foreign affairs related activities of other House committees, 
the Senate or the Congress as a whole. For this reason, since 1974 the 
International Relations Committee has requested that the Foreign 
Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Serv- 
ice, Library of Congress, prepare annual reports of actions taken by 
Congress which impact on American foreign policy. 

It is hoped that this report will be of assistance to the committee 
and its members in undertaking a review of the committee's legislative 
and oversight responsibilities in the area of foreign affairs, and that 
it will also prove helpful to other committees and Members of Con- 
gress, as well as to scholars, the press, and the public. 

This report is the work of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense 
Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, and 
does not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Committee 
on International Relations. 

Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman. 

(in) 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2013 



http://archive.org/details/congressfo1977unit 



LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 



The Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, 

Washington , B.C. 
Hon. Clement J. Zablocki, 

Chairman, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Rep- 
resentatives, Washington, D.C 
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to transmit "Congress and 
Foreign Policy — 1977," a report detailing congressional contribu- 
tions to the shaping of U.S. foreign policy in 1977 and summarizing 
the role of the 95th Congress in foreign policy. 

In addition to examining congressional action on specific foreign 
policy problems, the report attempts to analyze the larger role of 
Congress and its relation to the executive branch in the formulation 
of U.S. foreign policy. 

This report was prepared by members of the Foreign Affairs and 
National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, and 
edited by Dr. Joel M. Woldman, Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy. 

Gilbert Gude, Director. 

(V) 



CONTENTS 



Page 

Introduction 1 

Defining Congressional and Executive Roles in Foreign Policy- 
making 3 

Introduction 5 

Increasing the congressional role in the foreign policy process 7 

Treaties, executive agreements, and war powers 7 

Congressional and executive organization for foreign policy/ 

reorganization 15 

Intelligence oversight 20 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 37 

Congressional Involvement in Major Foreign Policy Issues 43 

Introduction 45 

Relations with the great powers 47 

U.S. relations with the Soviet Union 47 

Relations with China 53 

Foreign policy implications of political/military policy 57 

Foreign policy implications of the defense budget 57 

Overseas commitments and bases 67 

Conventional arms transfers 70 

Nuclear nonproliferation 83 

Arms control impact statements 89 

Strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) 92 

International economic assistance 97 

Bilateral foreign economic and food assistance 97 

Multilateral assistance 103 

The international econom} 7 117 

Congress and north-south negotiations 117 

Congress and U.S. international food policy 123 

U.S. international energy policy 129 

Global institutions and issues 133 

U.S. participation in the United Nations system 133 

Human rights 142 

Congress and U.S. international oceans policy 153 

Space 167 

Congressional impact on regional issues 173 

Africa 173 

Latin America 180 

Asia: Korea and Vietnam 190 

Middle East 196 

"Western Europe 205 

Conclusion 211 

The 95th Congress (1st session) and foreign policy: A summing up. 211 

(vn) 



INTRODUCTION 

Congress and Foreign Policy — 1977 is the fourth annual summary 
and analysis of the role of Congress in the foreign policy process 
prepared for the Committee on International Relations by the Foreign 
Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research 
Service. 

Congress has continued to play an active role in the making of 
foreign policy with regard to certain issues, especially in the areas of 
foreign arms sales and foreign aid expenditures. The advent of a new 
administration in January 1977 and the development of new styles 
and priorities in foreign policy, notably a conscious emphasis on 
human rights and related humanitarian concerns, prompted vigorous 
congressional responses and initiatives. Based on the experience of 
recent years, Congress continues to assert its more active role in 
foreign policy matters. 

As noted in the preceding edition of Congress and Foreign Policy, 
there is continuing controversy over the division of responsibility 
between Congress and the executive branch on questions of policy 
management. 1 

This was especially apparent in the way in which Congress asserted 
its policymaking role in the controversy over U.S. troop withdrawals 
from South Korea by inserting legislative language declaring the need 
for regular consultation with Congress on this process. Congress dis- 
regarded President Carter's request and applied statutory limitations 
on U.S. representatives to the international financial institutions 
requiring that they oppose loans to human rights violators. The in- 
ability of Congress to act quickly on the two new Panama Canal 
treaties submitted in September resulted from both the lateness in 
the congressional year of the transmittal and the confusion that had 
arisen over key provisions of the neutrality treaty, precipitating a 
second meeting between President Carter and General Torrijos to 
clarify U.S. rights. 

The debate over whether or not to fund production of additional 
B-l bombers, as well as most other defense issues, has been seen as 
part of the broader controversy over the administration's efforts to 
achieve a new strategic arms limitation (SALT II) agreement with the 
U.S.S.R. This was reflected in the difficult connrmation process for 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Paul Warnke in 
the Senate and requirements imposed by both Houses for coordination 
of any new agreement with Congress. Moreover, the President was 
forced to withdraw his first nomination for Director of Central 
Intelligence after members of the Senate indicated the unacceptability 
of that candidate. 



1 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Congress and Foreign Policy— 1976; 
Committee Print, 1977, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. p. 1. 

(1) 



As in previous years, Congress in 1077 continued to enact Legislative 
provisions requiring further congressional consideration of particular 
iss ues. Examples during 1977 include oversight provisions for strategic 

arms limitation, U.S. troop withdrawals from South Korea, and bi- 
lateral and multilateral economic assistance to nations with poor 
human rights records. 

The interrelationships between foreign polic} 7 issues and domestic 
economic concerns continued to create problems for Congress during 
the session. Domestic economic interests influenced congressional con- 
sideration of such issues as international food and energy policies. 
The inability of Congress to move forward on legislation to reduce 
and conserve domestic energy consumption and the resulting growth 
in oil imports has had far-reaching political and economic repercus- 
sions. Thus, for the second consecutive year, Congress has not enacted 
comprehensive food or energy legislation. 

Congress and Foreign Policy — 1977 attempts to analyze the con- 
gressional contributions to the making of foreign policy in 1977, with 
special attention to the relationship between Congress and the exe- 
cutive branch. Primary attention is devoted to the role of the House 
International Relations and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees. 
However, pertinent activities of other committees and of the House 
and Senate as a whole are also discussed. The report does not attempt 
to cover all congressional activities relating to foreign policy or to 
present complete legislative histories of foreign policy -related measures. 



Defining Congressional and Executive Roles 
in Foreign Policymaking 



Page 

Introduction 5 

Increasing the Congressional Role in the Foreign Policy Process 7 

Treaties, executive agreements, and war powers 7 

Congressional and executive organization for foreign policy/ 

reorganization 15 

Intelligence oversight 20 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 37 



(3) 



INTRODUCTION 

The relationship between the legislative and executive branches of 
Government in foreign policy has never been well-defined. In recent 
years, there has been movement toward a position of greater congres- 
sional involvement in policymaking. This trend continued during the 
first session of the 95th Congress. At the same time, congressional 
initiatives have been uneven, reflecting the hesitancy that often 
develops when a new administration takes office, particularly when 
the President is of the same party as the majority in each House. 
Moreover, there was little progress toward enactment of any of the 
legislative proposals discussed in the 94th Congress to enhance the 
role of Congress in the area of executive agreements. 

Congressional oversight of the intelligence function, a subject of 
intense debate and discussion during the 94th Congress, moved per- 
ceptibly forward. A Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was 
established in the House in July, while the select committee in the 
Senate was engaged during the year in a wide range of inquiries and 
activities. In both cases, the year was one of movement and of begin- 
nings, with both committees anticipating a full and difficult legislative 
agenda in the year to come. Both bodies are charged with enacting 
statutory charters and guidelines for the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) in the foreign policy 
area. The Senate Committee for the first time reviewed annual appro- 
priations for intelligence, including covert activities. Many problems 
remain, not the least of which is the handling of sensitive information 
and the jurisdictional conflicts resulting from the number of com- 
mittees of both Houses — seven in the House and at least five in the 
Senate — with some responsibility in the intelligence field. 

Reorganizations in both the legislative and executive branches in the 
foreign policy field were planned and/or implemented during 1977. 
While the House International Relations Committee restructured its 
subcommittees, the Senate reorganized its over-all committee struc- 
ture. The reorganization of the Foreign Relations Committee's sub- 
committee system was less far-reaching than that in the House. The 
Administration took steps to implement its campaign promises to 
reorganize parts of the executive branch, including a number of 
agencies dealing with various aspects of foreign affairs. 

Reorganizations implemented under the Reorganization Act of 1977 
must be submitted to Congress, which can disapprove Presidential 
plans. Only one foreign affairs function — international information and 
cultural exchange programs — was slated for restructuring during 1977. 
Under the President's second Reorganization Plan of 1977, he re- 
commended that the activities of the U.S. Information Agency 
(USIA) and the State Department's cultural exchange program be 
united under a new International Communication Agency (ICA). 
Neither House disapproved the plan, so it was scheduled for imple- 
mentation on April 1, 1978. 

(5) 



Since the role of the intelligence community remained an issue during 
1977, the administration, with the cooperation of the two Select 
Committees on Intelligence, drafted an Executive order including 
new charters, guidelines, and restrictions. Although the expected 
changes were not implemented during 1977, the President did take 
steps to centralize certain national intelligence functions and mprove 
their control and direction. In addition, the committee structure of the 
National Security Council (NSC) was reorganized to emphasize 
policy coordination, rather than policy formulation. 

A joint congressional-executive foreign policy body, the Com- 
mission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, originally chartered 
by Congress in 1976, continued to function as an instrument for 
direct legislative participation in the foreign policy process. Congres- 
sional-executive relations with respect to the Commission seem to have 
become more harmonious under the Carter administration than during 
the previous year. This may result from the new emphasis by the ad- 
ministration on human rights as an important factor in foreign policy. 



INCREASING THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN FOREIGN 

POLICYMAKING 

Treaties, Executive Agreements, and War Powers* 

overview 

Congressional initiative in 1977 with respect to the balance of 
power between the legislative and executive branches on treaties, 
executive agreements, and war powers was uneven, reflecting the 
hesitancy which frequently exists in Congress when a new President 
takes office, particularly when he is from the same party as the major- 
ity in each house. Congress' activities included : 

— amendment of the Case-Zablocki Act to improve the reporting 

requirement; 
— rejection of proposals for congressional approval by both Houses 

of U.S. ratification of the Panama Canal treaties; 
— Senate review and subsequent authorization of the SALT I 

extension ; 
— Foreign Relations Committee hearings — though no action — on 

possible amendment of the War Powers Resolution, and 
— redefinition of the President's powers to regulate international 
economic transactions in future times of war or national 
emergency. 
No effort was made to move forward on any of the legislative pro- 
posals discussed in the 94th Congress intended to increase the role 
of Congress in the development of commitments through executive 
agreements. 1 

discussion 

Treaties and executive agreements 

General practice. — During 1977, according to figures compiled by 
the Department of State, the United States concluded 17 treaties 
and 424 international agreements other than treaties (executive 
agreements). For the same period, 14 treaties were submitted to the 
Senate for approval of U.S. ratification, but only five treaties were 
approved. Detailed statistics on Senate treaty action are as follows: 

SENATE ACTION ON TREATIES— 1977 

Approved No action 

by Senate pending Total 



Treaties submitted in 1977 

Treaties concluded in 1977 

Treaties concluded before 1977. 

Treaties submitted before 1977 

Total... 



4 
(2) 
(2) 

1 



10 
(4) 
(6) 

24 


14 
(6) 
(8) 

25 


34 



* Prepared by Marjorie Ann Browne, Analyst in International Relations. 

1 See Congress and Foreign Policy— 1975, pp. 45-47; and Congress and Foreign Policy— 1976, pp. 11-15. 



(7) 



8 

At the start of the second session of the 95th Congress, there were 
34 treaties pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 

In response to the Case-Zablocki Act (Public Law 92-403), the 
Secretary of State during 1977 transmitted to the Congress 454 un- 
classified and 32 classified agreements. Thus, since August 22, 1972, 
when the act was signed, through the end of 1977, 1,819 agreements 
other than treaties have been transmitted to the Congress. 

Case-Zablocki Act amendment. — During 1977 Congress modified the 
Case-Zablocki Act to require that — 

Any department or agency of the United States Government which enters into 
any international agreement on behalf of the United States shall transmit to the 
Department of State the text of such agreement not later than twenty days after 
such agreement has been signed. 3 

This change was intended to -insure that the State Department, 
which is required by law to transmit the agreements to Congress, is 
aware of and has copies of all such agreements, including those made 
by agencies other than the Department and its officers. The Depart- 
ment's difficulty in acquiring such knowledge and texts was identified 
by the General Accounting Office in 1976 as a major problem. 3 

This amendment may have a substantial quantitative impact, 
depending on the number of agreements being made by other agencies 
which have not been transmitted on a regular basis to the Department 
of State. This impact would include: 

— increasing the number of agreements transmitted to State De- 
partment and ultimately to Congress; 

— increasing the numbers of agreements tabulated as being con- 
cluded ; and 

— increasing the number of agreements published and thus available 
to the American public. 

In addition, the comprehensive acquisition of all agreements could 
better assist those in Congress and in the executive branch in identi- 
fying more accurately the developing trends in U.S. relations with 
other nations. Certainly, its effectiveness will depend on the extent 
to which all agencies expeditiously and comprehensively transmit such 
agreements to the State Department. Its effectiveness will also depend 
on the adequacy of the Department's staff to review such agreements 
expeditiously and to transmit appropriate agreements to the Congress 
under the act. 

Congressional concern with specific agreements 

At least two sets of agreements — the Panama Canal treaties and the 
SALT I extension — provoked concern in Congress over its role in 
their development and approval. Presidential submission of the Pan- 
ama Canal treaties to the Senate brought into conflict two provisions 
of the U.S. Constitution: the treatymaking power of the President 
and the Senate and the congressional power to dispose of U.S. ter- 
ritory and property. Some in Congress asserted that both Houses of 

1 Sec. 5, Public Law 95-45, 91 Stat. 244, approved June 15, 1977. This amendment was recommended 
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its report to the Senate on H.R. 5040, authorizing additional 
appropriations tor the Deparlment of Slate for fiscal year 1977 (S. Rept. 95-99). It was accepted by the 
Senate on May 11, 1977, without debate, and on May 26, 1977, by the House without debate. 

1 A legislative proposal similar to that enacted in 1977 and requiring transmittal to the State Department 
within 20 days after entry into force had been approved by the Senate but dropped in conference during 
1970 (see Congress and Foreign Policy— 1976, p. 12). 



9 

Congress should participate in the approval of U.S. ratification. 4 
The executive branch maintained that the treatymaking power could 
be used to dispose of U.S. territory and property and it would appear 
that this position has been accepted by the Congress. 5 

The second set of agreements related to the extension of the 1972 
SALT I agreement after its expiration on October 3, 1977. 6 The United 
States and the Soviet Union each issued unilateral statements, 
declaring the intention of each not to take any action inconsistent 
with the provisions of the Interim Agreement, conditioned on similar 
inaction by the other nation. The executive branch asserted that the 
statement did not legally obligate the United States by binding inter- 
national agreement and did not require authorization under section 33 
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Some Senators argued that 
the U.S. and Soviet statements, "whether ornot described as unilateral, 
in fact constitutes a binding international agreement" which would 
"be in effect for so long as both parties perform according to the 
terms." 7 The Senate adopted a concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 
56) authorizing the President to proceed in accordance with the 
unilateral statement. It would appear, however, that in spite of the 
Senate resolution, the central issues between the two branches rela- 
tive to appropriate implementation of section 33 of the Arms Control 
and Disarmemant Act and the possible de jacto agreement status of 
the U.S. and Soviet declarations remained unanswered. 

War powers: Amendment of the resolution 

While the provisions of the War Powers Resolution did not come 
into use during 1977, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under- 
took a review of the resolution and its effectiveness. 8 Pending for 
comment was draft legislation to amend the resolution. The purpose 
of the amendments was twofold: (1) to return the resolution to the 
original intent of its sponsors and (2) to strengthen and clarify some 
of the weaknesses revealed during its operation on four occasions. 
These amendments, as published in the committee hearings, 
included the following: 

— a listing of the situations when, in the absence of a declaration of 
war by Congress, the President may introduce U.S. Armed Forces; 
— prohibited the obligation or expenditure of funds for any use of 
the U.S. Armed Forces prohibited by Congress or not authorized 
by the resolution ; 
— reduced time limit within the congressional procedures for con- 
current resolution from 6 calendar days to 48 hours; 
— included executive agreements and concurrent resolutions as 
among those items which may not be used as authority for the 
introduction of U.S. Armed Forces unless such introduction is 
specifically authorized; 
— defined the circumstances under which U.S. Armed Forces shall be 
considered to have been introduced into hostilities. 



* It would follow from this line of argument that the treaties should be handled either (1) as executive 
agreements subject to a joint resolution of Congress or to passage of a bill or (2) as treaties subject to further 
congressional approval of the disposal of property provisions. 

5 A review of congressional action related to the Panama Canal may be found in the section on Latin 
America elsewhere in this volume. (Ed.) 

8 Also see the discussion of SALT on pp. 92-96. (Ed.) 

i S. Rept. 95-499, pp. 11-12. 

8 The committee's hearings on the operation and effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution (Public 
Law 93-148) were held on July 13, 14, and 15, 1977, and are cited at the end of this section. In addition to 
testimony from three Members of the Congress, the committee heard the views of the State Department's 
Legal Adviser on behalf of the administration and of four legal scholars. 

29-972— 7S 2 



10 

Senator Thomas F. Eagieton, as one who favored amendment of 
the Resolution, observed that it was "tragically flawed' 1 and urged 
that "the original legislation which twice passed the Senate 1><> passed 
again." Thomas M. Franck, another witness, characterized the War 
Powers Resolution as "a healthy redress of the adversary or balance- 
of-power system that informs our democracy," but Franck agreed 
with Eagieton that it has "in practice proven to have severe flaws." 

Senator Eagieton also observed that the War Powers Resolution was 
"expanding, not limiting Presidential, war-making powers." On this 
issue, Abraham I). Sofaer noted that, 

•u>ns that it grants the President nothing, it can l>e construed as 
perhaps the most sweeping delegation ever made of the power to use force. 

Myron P. Curzan agreed with Sofaer that the resolution "tends to 
provide the President with more. power than the Constitution origi- 
nally contemplated he should have." 

On the other hand, Senator Barry M. Goldwater argued against the 
War Powers Resolution: 

The Resolution is a very dangerous tampering by Congress. * * * Far from 
seeing any need for strengthening the present law, I would prefer to see it stripped 
of all its mandatory provisions and replaced with a "Sense of the Congress" 
declaration. * * * I not only believe the War Powers Resolution is a potentially 
dangerous obstacle to the national security, I believe it is unconstitutional. 

Monroe Leigh, State Department Legal Adviser during 1975 and 
1976, also testified against the Resolution: 

I believe that a large measure of the friction between the President and the 
Congress over war powers could be removed if the Congress were to adopt a con- 
current resolution detailing what it expected from the President in situations 
where the armed forces might be introduced into hostilities. Although such a 
resolution would not have binding legal effect, if it were developed in close con- 
sultation with the President, it could lay the groundwork for fruitful cooperation 
between the two branches of government. 

On the final day of hearings, Herbert J. Hansell, the State Depart- 
ment's Legal Adviser, pledged that "the Administration will follow 
the provisions of the * * * Resolution." He noted "that conscientious 
observance of the procedures set forth in the Resolution, including 
effective consultation and timely reporting, will assure that both the 
executive and legislative branches possess the means to exercise their 
full and proper constitutional responsibilities." 9 At the same time, 
however, Hansell urged that the consideration of amendments be 
"deferred." He recommended that Congress establish procedures to 
facilitate consultation. 10 

While those arguing in support of the amendment urged that action 
be taken now, before a crisis develops, it would appear that this sug- 
gestion was not heeded. Legislation amending sections 5 and 8(a) of 

9 Hansell indicated that a review process had been established by the administration to assure timely 

executive branch reports pursuant to section 4 of the Resolution. The Legal Adviser to the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of StafT informs the Department of Defense General Counsel of all troop deployments 

through the Chairman's olliee which could rai.se a question whether a report to the Congress is 

required. The General Counsel then advises the Secretary of Defense 1 as to a recommendation 1 o l Ik Pr< i- 

dent that a War Powers report be submitted. The Legal Adviser of the Department of State al*o receives 

the information supplied to the DOD General Counsel and brings to the attention of the Secretary of State 

in which the submission of a report should 1)0 recommended to the President. 

lf > Asm itanl Secretary of State Douglas Bennet, Jr., who aceomnanied Legal Adviser Hansell, suggested 

• i House of the Co lesignate one person as an initial point of contact for executive branch 

officers In the evenl of a crisis and 1 2} establish procedures for creation oi an a 1 hoccommittee, consisting of 

no more than 8 to 10 members of ( longress, with whom the executive branch would consult. Bach committee 

might 9erve to represenl a form of collective judgment as the exit Is develops. Its membership might consist 

of both permanent and ad hoc members. 



11 

the resolution was introduced in the House by Rep. Stephen J. Solarz 
on July 14, 1977, the day after he testified before the Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee, but no action was taken by the House International 
Relations Committee to consider it. Moreover, legislation to amend 
the War Powers Resolution was not introduced in the Senate in 1977. 
The Committee did not issue a report giving its views on the recom- 
mendations made during the hearings. 

War powers: Wartime or national emergencies 

On December 28, 1977, legislation redefining the power of the Presi- 
dent to regulate international economic transactions in future times 
of war or national emergency became law (Public Law 95-223). Ac- 
cording to the House International Relations Committee report on 
H.R. 7738, the law separated "war and nonwar authorities and proce- 
dures, preserving existing Presidential powers in time of war declared 
by Congress, and providing somewhat narrower powers subject to 
congressional review in times of 'national emergency' short of war." n 
The legislation was a response to the requirement of section 502 of the 
National Emergencies Act (Public Law 94-412) for the appropriate 
committees to study section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act 
and report any recommendations and proposed revisions. 12 

During House floor consideration of the bill, Representative 
Charles W. Whalen, Jr. linked it to the War Powers Resolution, 
observing : 

The committee has tried to create a necessary analog to the war powers legisla- 
tion passed by this committee and the Congress in 1973. Congress is as much at 
fault as any administration if it allows a President to carry out policies, wise or 
unwise, under blanket authority granted by defective legislative statute. This bill 
will, I hope and expect, in conjunction with the War Powers Act, call the President 
to task before the Congress and produce the policy justifications Congress has the 
right to expect. This will restore an organic relationship between the two branches. 13 

The House had included in H.R. 7738 a section which provided for 
congressional review, including disapproval by concurrent resolution, 
of regulations to be issued by the President under the legislation. 
The Senate, following the recommendation of its Committee on Bank- 
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, deleted this section from the legisla- 
tion, 14 and the House subsequently concurred in the Senate amendment. 
Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham, in bringing this matter to the attention 
of the House on November 30, observed: 

According to Senator Stevenson, manager of the Senate bill, the Senate felt 
strongly that the congressional veto [already] provided in the National Emergencies 
Act over future declarations of national emergency, which would trigger the in- 
ternational economic regulatory authority spelled out in this bill, constitutes a 
sufficient congressional check on the use of these authorities and makes unneces- 
sary the additional congressional veto of regulations contained in the House bill. 
It was the concern of the House committee in considering this legislation that the 
congressional veto over national emergencies might provide too blunt and impre- 
cise a congressional check — that a future Congress might concur with the need for 
a declaration of national emergency, but disagree with the use of a particular 
authority available to the President in light of a declared national emergency. 15 

While the provision providing for concurrent resolution disapproval 
of regulations was deleted from the legislation, section 207(b), pro- 
viding for the termination of national emergencies by concurrent 
resolution pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act, 

" H. Kept. 95-459, p. 1. 

i* See Congress and Foreign Policy— 1976, pp. 40-41. 

11 Congressional Record, vol. 123, July 12, 1977: H6872. 

" S. Rept. 95-468; Congressional Record, vol. 123, Oct. 11, 1977: S16912. 

»» Congressional Record, vol. 123, Nov. 30, 1977: H12559. 



12 

remained. In signing H.R. 7738 on December 28, 1977, President 
Carter referred to section 207(b), noting his "serious concern" over 
the constitutional questions raised by the concurrent resolution pro- 
vision and declaring that he would: 

Treat the provision as requiring only that I "notify and wait" with respect to 
national emergencies covered by Section 207(b) of this act. 19 

Future congressional concerns 

Impact of diplomatic recognition on U.S. treaty commitments. — The 
Question of possible termination of U.S. treaty and/or agreement 
commitments with the Republic of China (ROC) as a condition of 
U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was raised 
in both the House and the Senate during 1977. While the timing and 
final conditions for such recognition remain open to negotiation, the 
possibility of negative impact on U.S. relations with the government 
on Taiwan remains a subject of concern. 17 Senator Barry Goldwater, 
as one opposed to U.S. recognition of the PRC government, on Sep- 
tember 8 presented to the Senate a detailed analysis of the proposition 
that: 

No President acting alone can abrogate, or give notice of the intention to abrogate, 
existing treaties with the government on Taiwan unless he obtains the advice and 
consent of the Senate or the approval of Congress. 18 

On October 20, 1977, Representative Paul Simon expressed doubt 
as to the advisability of unilaterally terminating treaties with the 
Republic of China. While Simon did not oppose U.S. recognition of the 
PRC — and in fact seemed to favor a two-China or China/Taiwan 
policy — he observed: 

This is a major issue of political controversy in the United States and it should be 
settled through procedures assuring the full constitutional role of the Congress. 19 

Simon inserted a study from the Congressional Research Service 
which he argued, showed that "there is no clear constitutional or 
historical justification for unilateral Presidential action." 

When the President, acting for the United States, does extend 
diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, the sub- 
stance of the agreement will have an impact paralleling or over- 
shadowing the 1933 Hull-Litvinov agreement 20 extending diplomatic 
recognition to the Soviet Union. The potential ramifications are 
already under study within Congress, and this issue, as well as the 
broader implications of the normalization question will undoubtedly 
be of increasing importance to the two international relations com- 
mittees in the next several years. 

1977 analysis of executive branch regulations and practices. — In 
March 1977 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee published a 
report which described and analyzed the procedures and practices by 
which international agreements are formulated and entered into by the 
United States. The study identified several avenues for possible 
legislative proposals. One group of options would primarily improve 



i' Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Jan. 2. 1078: 1941. 

the discussion of relations with China on pp. 53-56 for detailed coverage of U.S. relations with 
both Chinas (FA.) 

" China, the Abrogation of Treaties and the Constitution. Congressional Record, vol. 123, Sept. 8, 1977: 
SI 4427, S 14433. 

i» Who Is Empowered to Terminate a Treaty? Congressional Record, vol. 123, Oct. 20, 1977: II 11400-1 1403. 

»° This was an executive agreement concluded by the President solely on his constitutional authority. 



13 

Congress information about international agreements and included 
the following points : 

(1) Review Executive use of existing prior legislative grants 
of authority to enter into international agreements other than 
treaties; 

(2) Require precise citation of any prior legal authority (stat- 
utory and/or treaty) for all international agreements other than 
treaties at the time they are reported to Congress; 

(3) Require codification and annotation of international 
agreements ; 

(4) Establish a format of precise impact-oriented data to be 
supplied with all international agreements submitted to the 
Congress ; 

(5) Require prompt establishment of a written record of any 
agreement entered into orally and intended or likely to be per- 
ceived as obligating any agency or ranking official of the United 
States government; and 

(6) Make State Department Circular 175 binding upon all 
Executive agencies and departments and upon the State Depart- 
ment itself. 21 

A second group of options would enable Congress to influence the 
terms of international agreements : 

(1) Reinforce and clarify the treaty mechanism, 

(2) Supplement the treaty mechanism with a statutory pro- 
cedure for congressional veto or approval of some or all interna- 
tional agreements other than treaties, or 

(3) Combined approaches 1 and 2. 22 

The study also identified nine areas which have raised special prob- 
lems affecting both congressional information and action on inter- 
national agreements. They include : 

— agency-to-agency agreements 

— secret agreements 

— joint commissions with foreign nations 

— emergencies and disasters 

— "non-binding" agreements 

— patterns of agreement and inferred commitments 

— commercial involvement 

— the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Senate action 

— a comprehensive statutory system. 23 

In all likelihood, the extent to which Congress responds to the above 
mentioned problems and proposals depends on its perceptions of 
executive branch actions in the development of commitments through 
executive agreements and on the extent of executive branch/legisla- 
tive branch cooperation in this field. It appears unlikely that Congress 
will, in 1978, enact legislation implementing any of these proposals. 

CONCLUSION 

_ Congress and Foreign Policy — 1976 included the following observa- 
tions relative to treaties and executive agreements: 

It may be that future congressional efforts relative to executive branch activities 
in the treaties/executive agreements area will continue to be directed towards 



21 International Agreements: An Analysis of Executive Regulations and Practices, March 1977, pp. 35-38; 
See end of section for full citation to study. 
« International Agreements: An Analysis of Executive Regulations and Practices, March 1977, pp. 39-40. 
« International Agreements: An Analysis of Executive Regulations and Practices, March 1977, pp. 40-47. 



14 

ove r sight in special instances and that attempts to Legislate broad cooperation 
procedures with the executive branch will diminish in favor of more effective 
administration ot the Case-Zablocki Act and of the already enacted provisions 
for congressional review of foreign relations activities.* 

Congressional activities in 1977 did, in general, follow that predic- 
tion. In addition to attending the Case-Zablocki Act, Congress ap- 
proved several governing international fishery agreements pursuant 
to the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of H)70 and imple- 
mented the procedures for congressional review of arms sales, as they 
were amended in 1976. 

It is anticipated that Congress will take little action in 197S that 
would affect the relationship between the executive and legislative 
branches on treaties, executive agreements, and war powers unless, 
as indicated above, a significant- crisis in the foreign policy/national 
commitments area produces sufficient concern for the development of 
a congressional consensus. 

References 

congressional publications 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. International agree- 
ments : an analysis of executive regulations and practices. March 1977. Washing- 
ton, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 73 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. 
Committee Print). Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library 
of Congress, 1974-75, by R. Roger Majak. 

Committee on Foreign Relations. War powers resolution. Hearings, 95th 



Cong., on a review of the operation and effectiveness of the War Powers 
Resolution. July 13, 14, and 15, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 525 pp. 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

Executive Agreements and the Congress [by Marjorie Ann Browne]. Issue Brief 
No. IB75035. (Periodically updated.) 



u Congress and Foreign Policy— 1976, p. 18. 



Congressional and Executive Organization for Foreign 
Policy/Reorganization* 

overview 

During 1976, studies were undertaken in both Houses on Congress 
role in foreign policy and its own organization for dealing with these 
issues. 1 In 1977 Congress undertook a number of organizational 
modifications designed to better meet changing needs and demands. 

Further congressional activity was perhaps stimulated by the in- 
auguration of a new administration, one committed to reorganization 
of the Government in general. Thus, Congress was also faced with a 
large number of nominations as well as reorganization proposals 
affecting various Executive departments and agencies. 

The complexity of foreign relations, comprising as it does issues of 
diplomacy, defense, aid, economics, arms control and intelligence, 
makes it difficult for either the Executive or Congress to arrive at 
any final organizational structure that will assure effective legislative 
mechanisms and meaningful oversight. As issues change, so has the 
organization of both branches to deal with these issues. 

discussion 
Congress 

Congressional organization. — At the beginning of the 95th Congress 
there were reorganizations of a number of committees responsible for 
different aspects of national security policy. 

The House International Relations Committee reorganized its 
subcommittee structure, going from a purely functional arrangement 
to one in which there are both functional and regional subcommittees. 
There are now 9 subcommittees, down from 10 in the 94th Congress; 
of these 9 subcommittees 4 are regional and 5 are functional. 2 

In the Senate the entire committee structure was reorganized for 
the 95th Congress, including that of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, although the reorganization of this committee was less 
far-reaching than that in the House. There are now 9 subcommittees 
instead of 10; 6 of them have been carried over from the 94th Con- 
gress, 1 with a change of title but not jurisdiction. The remaining 
3, all functional subcommittees, represent a redistribution of subject 
areas. 3 



• Prepared by Mark M. Lowenthal, Analyst in National Defense. 

1 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Congress and Foreign Policy— 1976. 
(Committee Print). Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. pp. 35-42. 

2 The subcommittees of the House International Relations Committee in the 95th Congress are: Africa; 
Asian and Pacific Affairs; Europe and the Middle East; Inter- American Affairs; International Development; 
International Economic Policy and Trade; International Operations; International Organizations; and 
International Security and Scientific Affairs. 

3 The subcommittees of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the 95th Congress are: Foreign 
Economic Policy; Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment; International Operations; Foreign 
Assistance; African Affairs; European Affairs; East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs; and Western Hemisphere Affairs. 

(15) 



16 

In addition, the House voted to create a Select Committee on 
Intelligence, by a vote of 227-171 on July 14, 1977 (H. Res. 658). 
This new committee has exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence, 
and shared sequential jurisdiction over other intelligence agencies. 4 

Executive nominations. — With the inauguration of the Carter 
administration, Congress had to consider a number of nominations 
in the foreign policy area. The nominations of Cyrus Vance to be 
Secretary of State, Harold Brown to be Secretary of Defense, John 
Gilligan to be Administrator of the Agency for International Develop- 
ment (AID), and John Reinhardt to be Director of the U.S. Informa- 
tion Agency (USIA) were all confirmed without controversy. 5 

However, President Carter's nominees for the Director of Central 
Intelligence, Theodore C. Sorensen, and Director of the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Paul C. Warnke, were very 
controversial, and Sorensen's nomination was ultimately withdrawn. 

Opposition to Sorensen arose over a number of issues, including 
his background and qualifications, his draft status as a conscientious 
objector, the role of his law firm and its connection with certain 
multinational corporations and foreign governments, and his use of 
classified materials for his memoirs. In the face of growing opposition, 
Sorensen withdrew his nomination after answering these various 
allegations and charges before the Senate Intelligence Committee. 8 In 
February 1977 President Carter nominated Adm. Stansfield Turner 
to be Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Although some con- 
cern was expressed over Admiral Turner's remaining on active duty 
while serving as DCI, his nomination received unanimous approval 
from the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Senate. 7 

The choice of Paul Warnke to be Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA), with the rank of Ambassador and 
chief SALT negotiator during his tenure, aroused great controversy. 8 

It is unusual for Congress to raise such critical questions about 
Presidential nominees, expecially for an incoming administration and 
one of the same party as the majority in Congress. The vote on Warnke 
and the anticipated rejection of Sorensen both signaled an increasingly 
active congressional role in the direction of national security policy, 
as well as an increased desire on the part of Congress to take part in 
policy decisions throughout their evolution. 

Executive reorganization 

President Carter made executive reorganization one of his campaign 
themes, and in 1977 the new administration took steps to reorganize a 
number of agencies and departments dealing with different aspects of 

* For greater details on the creation of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and intelligence 
oversight in general see the discussion of intelligence oversight on pp. 20-36 in this volume. (Ed.) 

4 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Vance Nomination. Hearings, 95th Cong., 
1st sess. Jan. 11, 1977. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 126 pp.; and U.S. Congress. 
Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Nominations of Harold Brown and Charles W. Duncan, Jr. Hearings, 
95th Cong., 1st sess. Jan. 11, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 87 pp. 

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the Gilligan and Reinhardt nominations were 
not printed. 

• U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Nomination of Theodore C Sorenen. Hear- 
ings, 9.">th Cong., 1st sess. Jan. 17, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 43 pp. 

See also Naughton, James M., et al. The Rejection of Sorensen: A Drama of Human Failing. New York 
Times. Feh. 2, 1977. p. Al. 

7 U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Nomination of Adm. Stansfield Turner. 
Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Feb. 22 and 23, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
1977. 98 pp. 

8 For greater details on the Warnke nomination see the discussion of SALT on pp. 92-96 in this volumej 
(Ed.) 



17 

foreign policy. Some of these plans required congressional action while 
others took place solely within the executive branch and without 
reference to Congress. 

The President's authority to submit reorganization plans was 
granted under Public Law 95-17, April 6, 1977, the Reorganization 
Act of 1977. 9 Under the provisions of this act the President can submit 
to Congress up to three reorganization plans at one time. Either House 
of Congress then has 60 days of continuous session to pass a dis- 
approval resolution after a plan is submitted ; the plan goes into effect 
after the 60-day period if such a resolution has not been passed. 

Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977. 10 — Reorganization Plan No. 2 
was submitted by President Carter on October 12, 1977, under the 
authority granted him by Public Law 95-17. This plan proposed the 
abolition of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and a separate 
State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU), 
and the consolidation of their programs in a new agency associated 
loosely with the State Department, to be called the International Com- 
munication Agency (originally entitled the Agency for International 
Communication). General policy direction would be handled by the 
Secretary of State. This plan also proposed the abolition of the two 
advisory commissions for USIA and CU, and the creation of a new 
combined seven-member Advisory Commission on International 
Communication, Cultural and Educational Affairs. 11 

In his message of transmittal President Carter gave some indication 
of the reasons behind this reorganization. The new arrangement was 
intended to unify in Washington the administration of programs which 
have always had unified administration abroad. The message also 
indicated a shift away from programs and activities which might be 
considered prop agandis tic in nature and towards those emphasizing 
the mutual exchange of cultural and educational efforts and inter- 
national communication. 12 

Congressional critics of the plan noted that there were few details 
on the proposed reorganization, especially in terms of the relationship 
of the new agency to the State Department, the independence of the 
Voice of America, and expected efficiencies. Ten minority members of 
the House Government Operations Committee found that the plan 
complied with the letter but not the spirit of the Reorganization Act. 13 

Motions of disapproval were introduced in both Houses, House 
Resolution 827 and Senate Resolution 293. House Resolution 827 
was defeated on November 29, 1977, 357-34; Senate resolution was 
not considered by the full Senate and Reorganization Plan No. 2 
was thus approved on December 11, 1977. 

• Public Law 95-17 ; 91 Stat 29 ; 5 U.S.C. 901-902. 

10 Reorganization Plan No. 1 reorganized the Executive Office of the President, and affected agencies 
concerned with domestic policy areas or responsibilities. The only parts of the plan dealing with foreign 
policy organizations stated that the National Security Council staff would be slightly reduced, and that 
the Intelligence Oversight Board should be retained. This plan went into effect on Oct. 19, 1977. Changes 
were made in the National Security Council, but not through this Reorganization Plan. These changes 
are discussed below. 

" U.S. President, 1977 (Carter). Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977. Oct. 12, 1977, Washington, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Doc. No. 95-243. 9 pp. This plan was amended twice 
after submission, on Nov. 1, and Nov. 2, 1977. 

12 Ibid. 

1 3 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977: 
Report to Accompany H. Res. 827. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. (95th Cong., 1st 
sess. H. Rept. No. 9.5-818) pp. 36-37. 

See also the view of Senator Charles A. Percy in U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. 
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977. Report to Accompany S. Res. 293. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. (95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. No. 95-606) pp. 19-21. 



18 

Intelligence reorganization. — The organization, functioning, and 
proper role of the intelligence community remained issues in 1977 
and were the subject of much attention, little of it in public. The 
Carter administration, with the cooperation of the two Select Com- 
mittees on Intelligence, drafted an Executive order containing new 
charters and guidelines and restrictions on certain activities for the 
various components of the intelligence community. Although the 
charters were reportedly completed by the end of the year they were 
not put into effect, pending final adjustments which would attempt to 
strike an adequate balance between national security and civil 
liberties. 14 Executive Order 12036 was enacted on January 24, 1978. 
S. 2525, introduced February 9, 1978, would enact many of these 
changes and other reforms into law. Thus, Congress had a role in 
shaping the evolving charters, albeit not a public one. 15 

However, the Carter administration did make some changes in ad- 
vance of the Executive order and legislative charters. On August 4, 
1977, the President announced that the Director of Central Intelli- 
gence (DCI) would have budget authority over all national intelligence 
activities, including those of the State and Defense Departments; his 
budget decisions could, however, be appealed to the President. The 
DCT was also given tasking authority for the missions of the intelli- 
gence agencies, to be handled through the new National Intelligence 
Tasking Center. A similar function was formerly carried out, on a less 
centralized basis, by the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NF1B), 
and its predecessor, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). The 
DCI also retained his primary authority for the production of national 
intelligence. 16 

This reorganization, which was a major part of Executive Order 
12036, was designed to centralize national intelligence functions and 
to improve control and direction by the President through the National 
Security Council and the DCI. The administration contends that 
intelligence requirements, individual agency tasking to meet those 
requirements, budgetary needs and final intelligence products can be 
handled in a more coherent manner under this new arrangement. 
Some critics have felt that this gives too much central authority to 
the DCI, and there have been questions about the subordination of 
certain aspects of Defense intelligence to the DCI. A fuller and more 
judicious analysis must await the further development and actual 
working of this new arrangement, as well as further possible changes 
in the expected legislation. 

National Security Council. — By Executive Order 11985, May 13, 
1977, President Carter reorganized the seven, committees of the Na- 
tional Security Council (NSC) into two. The President also noted 
that the NSC's role would emphasize policy coordination rather than 
policy formulation, this latter role being more closely vested in the 
Cabinet. 

The two new NSC committees are the Policy Review Committee, 
which handles long-term projects and issues, and intelligence priorities 
and requirements; and the Special Coordinating Committee, which 
deals with crisis situations, covert operations and issues transcending 



14 Arguments over Civil Liberties Delay Order on Intelligence Work. New York Times, Dec. 20, 1977, 
p. 12. 

15 See the section on intelligence oversight on pp. 20-36 in this volume for details of congressional activity 
in that area. (Ed.) 

19 White House Press Release, Aug. 4, 1977. 



19 

departmental lines. These changes were also part of Executive Order 
12036. 

CONCLUSION 

By the end of 1977, most of these committees and agencies had 
been functioning as reorganized for less than a year, making it difficult 
to make any final judgments as to the effectiveness or efficiency of 
these changes. 

While Congress has sought a stronger role in the formulation of 
policy and the related question of organization, its role remains some- 
what limited, as shown by the number of changes made in 1977 solely 
on the authority of the Executive. 

References 
congressional publications 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Defense Department 
Executive Reorganization. July 21, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 197G. 14 pp. (95th Cong., 1st (sess. H. Rept. No. 95-519). 

House. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on H.R. 6582 and H.R. 

8247. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 29 pp. 

House. Committee on Government Operations. Legislation and National 



Securitjr Subcommittee. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977 (Agency for Inter- 
national Communication). Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. 398 pp. 

House. Committee on Government Operations. Reorganization Plan No. 2 



of 1977; Report to Accompany H. Res. 827. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. (95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. No. 95-818) 37 pp. 

House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Inter- 



national Operations. Public Diplomac}^ and the Future. Hearings, 95th Cong., 
1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 691 pp. 

Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Disestablishing one of the posi- 



tions of Deputy Secretary of Defense and establishing an Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policjr. May 27, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 19 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. No. 95-234). 

Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Reorganization Plan No. 2 



of 1977. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Oct. 25, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 249 pp. 

Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977; Report to Accompany S. Res. 293. 



Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977 (95th Cong., 1st sess. 
S. Rept. No. 95-106) 93 pp. 
U.S. President, 1977 (Carter). Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977. October 12, 
1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977 (95th Cong., 1st 
sess. H. Doc. No. 95-243). 9 pp. 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Defense Department 
Reorganization, [by] Mark M. Lowenthal [Washington] 1977, Issue Brief 
77028. 

Executive Reorganization: A Historic Review, [by] Ronald C. Moe. 

Washington, Jan. 6, 1977. 65 pp. 

Intelligence Community: Congressional Oversight, [by] Hugh Wolff. 



[Washington] 1977, Issue Brief 77079. 

Intelligence Community: Reform and Reorganization, [by] Mark M. 



Lowenthal. [Washington] 1976, Issue Brief 76039. 

Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977: A Critique from the Congressional 



Perspective, [by] Joel M. Woldman. Washington, Nov. 22, 1977. 23 pp. 



Intelligence Oversight * 
overview 

As he prepared to relinquish the chairmanship of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence near the end of 1977, Senator Inouye 
wrote that "the intelligence community is now in a state of transition." l 
The same could be said of Congress in its oversight of the intelligence 
agencies. In the House, the most noteworthy development in 1977 was 
the establishment in July of a Permanent Select Committee on In- 
telligence. In the Senate, the Select Committee on Intelligence, which 
had been established in 1976 (See Congress and Foreign Policy — 
1976, pp. 25-30), was engaged in a broad range of inquiries and ac- 
tivities, but with little specific legislation to show for it as the year 
ended. 

Nevertheless, the committee's first Annual Report to the Senate 
(Senate Report No. 95-217, May 18, 1977) and the chairman's end- 
of-session report are important documents in the history of U.S. 
intelligence operations and congressional-executive relations in this 
field. The Annual Report is particularly useful for its description of 
the committee's first year of activities and its agenda for the future. 
The two reports indicate that the Senate Committee has only just 
begun its work and faces some difficult and sensitive problems in the 
months ahead. 

The most important task, according to Chairman Inouye, was the 
enactment of statutory charters and guidelines for the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), 
and, on the domestic side, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 2 
This would involve (a) reconciling the need for secrecy of intelligence 
operations with the citizenry's right to know what the Government 
was doing and (b) striking a balance between laws and regulations, 
on the one hand, and maintaining the necessary flexibility to enable 
the intelligence community to do its job. The proposed legislation 
would also attempt to define more clearly the relationship of the in- 
telligence community to the press and to academia and would involve 
measures designed to enable the courts to deal more effectively with 
cases involving information classified for national security purposes. 

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence will also 
be grappling with many of the same problems. Under their charters 
both committees were directed to study and report upon various 
aspects of U.S. intelligence operations and their management and 
control, such as the quality of intelligence analysis, the authorization 
of funds, the conduct of covert and clandestine activities, and the need 
to revise laws, regulations and congressional rules to improve the 
protection of intelligence secrets and to provide for disclosure where 

* Prepared by Hugh W. Wolff, Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy. 

1 Inouye, Daniel K. Report to the Senate on the Work of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 
I ional Record [daily ed.] vol. 123, Dec. 15, 1977: S19845. 

I Ibid. 

(20) 



21 

such action would be consistent with security. They were instructed 
also to look into the desirability of establishing a joint congressional 
committee on intelligence or of having joint briefings and coordinating 
their policies on safeguarding intelligence information. 

Thus, to a considerable degree the 1978 agendas for the two In- 
telligence Committees are already established. Furthermore, any 
legislative proposals that they put forward will almost inevitably be of 
concern to the committees on Armed Services, Judiciary and Foreign/ 
International Relations, which continue to have jurisdiction over 
some of the intelligence agencies. In the pages that follow, this paper 
discusses first the measures taken to date to develop and to exercise 
more effective congressional oversight of intelligence, and then 
describes the major problem areas to be considered and the view- 
points likely to be expressed as Congress moves ahead in this important 
and sensitive field. 

DISCUSSION 

New Developments in Congressional Oversight 
Senate 

As a result of the Senate's approval, on February 4, 1977, of Senate 
Resolution 4, to reorganize the committee system, the membership 
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was increased from 
15 to 17, with 9 majority and 8 minority members. Accordingly, 
Senators Moynihan (Dem., N.Y.) and Wallop (Rep., Wyoming) 
were added to the committee. In the general reshuffling of committee 
assignments, four new Republicans (Mathias, Pearson, Chafee and 
Lugar) were appointed to positions on the Intelligence Committee 
formerly held by Senators Thurmond, Baker, Hatfield, and Stafford, 
and Senator Goldwater became vice chairman in place of Senator 
Baker. 

In addition to the four original subcommittees — Charters and 
Guidelines; Budget Authorization; Collection, Production and Quality 
of Intelligence; and Rights of Americans — two new ones were estab- 
lished: one on Investigations, chaired by Senator Morgan, and the 
other an Ad Hoc Group on Secrecy and Disclosure, chaired by Senator 
Biden. The latter was instructed to study the Nation's secrecy laws 
and regulations and, if necessary, to recommend new legislation or 
executive action in order "to strike a more workable balance between 
the necessary secrecy and the right of the people to be informed of the 
activities of governmental agencies." 3 

The Sorensen nomination. — Even before the 95th Congress con- 
vened, the Senate Intelligence Committee was confronted with a 
controversial issue, the nomination of Theodore C. Sorensen to be 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). According to press reports, 
Sorensen had been recommended to President-elect Carter by Prof. 
Richard Neustadt of Harvard, apparently on the grounds that the 
CIA was in trouble and would require rebuilding by a person who was 
both sensitive to issues of civil liberties and familiar with the Presi- 
dency and the need for reliable intelligence. 4 Sorensen's previous 
experience in the Kennedy administration and his reputation for keen 
analytical capabilities and independent judgment also commended 

* U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Annual Report to the Senate. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. (95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. No. 95-217, May 18, 1977) p. 21. 
Henceforth referred to as "Annual Report." 

* Kraft, Joseph. Sorensen at the CIA. Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1977. 



22 

him to Carter. Opponents of the nomination argued that Sorensen 
larked administrative experience, knew Little about national security - 
affairs in general and intelligence in particular, and had indicated 
too casual an attitude toward classified information in affidavits 
relating to the publication of the Pentagon papers. 

By the time the Senate Intelligence Committee held its hearing on 
the Sorensen nomination, on January 17, it was apparent that the 
nominee faced strong opposition from conservatives and from some 
liberals as well. A.1 the hearing committee members of both p; 
expressed concern about the affidavits and cited the need for a DCI 
who could command the confidence of the intelligence community. 
Although committee disapproval was by no means assured, Sorensen, 
after entering a vigorous defense of his record and integrity, an- 
nounced that he was asking Governor Carter to withdraw his nomina- 
tion on the ground^ that "to continue fighting for this post * * * would 
only handicap the new administration if I am rejected, or handicap 
my effectiveness as Director if I am confirmed." 5 

About a month later, Adm. Stansfield Turner appeared before 
the same committee 6 and, after responding to extensive oral question- 
ing and to written interrogatories, was recommended for approval as 
DCI. On February 24 his nomination was confirmed by the Senate. 

The forced withdrawal of Sorensen was a shock to the White House 
and an early indication of the strained relationship between Congress 
and the Executive that was to recur in various ways throughout the 
year. It also served to highlight the continuing controversy over the 
role of intelligence in this country. To the extent that Sorensen was 
seen by senators and others as a man critical of undue secrecy in 
government and of some of the intelligence operations of the past, this 
episode seemed to indicate that congressional opinion was swinging 
away from the zeal for reform of recent years and toward a greater 
concern for maintaining the morale of the intelligence community. 
By appointing Admiral Turner as DCI, the President avoided having 
to deal with this issue a second time. A military man with excellent 
credentials as a scholar and administrator, Turner was nevertheless an 
"outsider" to the intelligence agencies but not to global strategy and 
the use of national intelligence. 

Investigation of CIA surveillance of Micronesian officials. — In May 
the Senate Intelligence Committee released a brief summary of its 
findings after a 4-month investigation of allegations that the CIA 
had conducted electronic surveillance and other clandestine collection 
efforts against Micronisian officials beginning in 1973, when authori- 
ties of the Territory of the Pacific Islands (for which the United 
States had responsibility under a U.N. trusteeship) had been nego- 
tiating for their independence. The committee found that the re- 
sponsible U.S. officials had "failed to differentiate between intel- 
ligence techniques appropriate for use against an armed adversary and 
those proper for use against a people under U.S. administration and 
protection." 7 

; 0.8. Congress. Benate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Nomination of Theodore C Sorensen. Hearings, 
95tli Cong., i 17, L977. Washington, CS. Government Printing Office, 1977. p. 34. 

Select Committee on Intelligence. Nomination of .Vim. Stansfield Turner, 
• . 95th Cong., 1st sess. Feb. 22 and 23, 1977, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, 
98 pi). 

Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. News Release: Statement and Summary 
Finding:; of Investigation into CIA Involvement in Micronesia. [Undated] p. 4. 



23 

The committee criticized the Executive for failure to seek opinions 
from the Departments of State and Justice as to the legality of the 
clandestine operations, which had been deemed lawful by the CIA's 
General Counsel and had been approved by Dr. Kissinger as Assistant 
to the President for National Security Affairs. The committee also 
reported that in the only instance when microphone surveillance was 
used no one outside the CIA was informed and that "it was not the 
practice at that time to report such activities to congressional com- 
mittees." 8 In its findings the committee urged that in the future the 
use of "such a highly intrusive technique as microphone surveillance 
* * * should warrant appropriate congressional consultation. * * *" 9 
The committee also expressed the belief that none of the information 
obtained by the CIA had had any effect on the negotiations for in- 
dependence or on any agreements reached to date. 

Intelligence Committee's first annual report. — The most compre- 
hensive and enlightening description of the activities and future plans 
of the Senate Intelligence Committee is to be found in its first Annual 
Report, which was published May 18, 1977 (Senate Eeport No. 
95-217). The report acknowledged that Congress was responsible in 
part for past abuses committed by intelligence agencies because of its 
failure to exercise proper oversight. It set forth in considerable detail 
the processes developed thus far to improve oversight and to insure 
proper accountability. Ongoing activities and some planned for the 
future were also described. A separate chapter was devoted to each 
of the six subcommittees, with discussion of major concerns in each 
case. For example, the Subcommittee on Collection, Production and 
Quality of Intelligence was engaged on a series of case studies of U.S. 
intelligence estimates in such key areas as Soviet strategic weapons 
developments, China, Portugal in 1973-75, increases in oil prices by 
Arab countries in 1973-74, the energy question in general, and the 
problem of monitoring a possible U.S. -Soviet agreement on strategic 
arms (SALT). 10 Of equal significance was the work of the Budget 
Authorization Subcommittee, which for the first time in history was 
reviewing, evaluating and setting limits on the annual appropriations 
for all aspects of intelligence, including a detailed examination of 
covert action programs. 

These covert action programs were the subject of a special chapter 
outlining new oversight procedures worked out between the committee 
and the executive branch. In accordance with the "sense of the Senate" 
provision in section 11 of Senate Resolution 400, the committee was 
notified by the CIA whenever the President certified (as provided in 
section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act) that a proposed covert 
action operation was important to the national security. Such notifica- 
tion was made prior to implementation of the proposal and included 
not only a summary of the proposal, its origin, justification, and risks 
but also its estimated cost, timing, duration, etc. Subsequently, the 
committee received semiannual reports on the status of all covert 
action projects plus interim reports in some instances. According to the 
Annual Report, the committee had "complete access to relevant 

s Ibid. p. 3. 

» Ibid. p. 4. 

10 On Dec. 20, 1977, the first such study was released by the committee. It was a sanitized "statement 
of findings" drawn from a 66-page classified staff study entitled, "U.S. Intelligence Analysis and the Oil 
Issue, 1973-74." This study was critical of the work of the CIA in predicting and evaluating the role of 
Saudi Arabia during and following the oil embargo. 



24 

Agency files and personnel" and, in the budget authorization process, 
had reviewed and voted upon every individual covert action project. 
The report commented: 

Thus it is clear that the Senate, through its delegated committee, has been 
able to review, consider and act on the record in conformity with Constitutional 
processes even in so difficult and secret an area as covert action. If the procedures 
established during the past year are continued, there is every reason to believe 
that whatever covert action is undertaken by the United States will reflect the 
national will as expressed by both the Legislative and executive branches and 
not by just the executive branch alone. 11 

With reference to the question of establishing a joint congressional 
committee on intelligence, the report found that "for the foreseeable 
future a joint committee does not seem desirable or possible." How- 
ever, it noted that efforts were then under way to establish a counter- 
part committee in the House. 12 

Other problem areas that were studied by the Select Committee 
included counterintelligence, the activities of foreign intelligence 
services in this country, and the major forms of intelligence collection, 
some of which involve highly sophisticated technology, costly research 
and development, and systems which are to some extent redundant. 
Overall, the Report reflects dramatic improvements in the state of 
intelligence oversight. It includes this important assessment: "* * * it 
is this committee's judgment that the intelligence agencies are now 
functioning under the control of the President, the Director of Central 
Intelligence, and the heads of the various intelligence entities, and 
that they are now fully and properly accountable to the Congress." 13 

Chairman Inouye's report. — In November, Chairman Inouye made 
an end-of-session report to the Senate in which he supplemented and 
updated the material in the Annual Report. Notably, he reported 
that since July the committee had been working closely with the 
Executive on the reorganization of the intelligence community. As an 
interim measure an executive order was being prepared which would 
serve also as a blueprint for permanent legislation setting forth the 
principal missions and purposes of the intelligence agencies and pro- 
viding for more effective control over their activities. 14 

Senator Inouye saw the forthcoming work on statutory charters and 
guidelines as the "most important" task of the committee to date, one 
that required achieving a balance "between detailed specifications of 
what may or may not be done, and the need on the part of the intelli- 
gence agencies for a degree of flexibility to meet exigent circum- 
stances." ia 

According to Inouye, various problem areas were to be explored by 
the committee. One was the relationship between the intelligence 
community, on the one hand, and the press and academia on the other. 
The chairman had "come to the conclusion that no intelligence agency 
should be involved with working journalists." He did not explain what 
constituted "involvement" other than to say that he was concerned 
about "the flowback of propaganda to the United States" which could 
result from the planting of stories in the foreign press by the CIA. 16 

11 Annual Import, p. 19. 
i2 [bid., p. 87. 

11 Ibid., p. 13. 

11 Inouyo, op. cit., p. S19854. This report, although not published in the Record until Dec. 15, was distrib- 
uted 1o members of the committee on Nov. 18, 1977, and released to the press shortly thereafter. 
"Ibid, 
>« Ibid. 



25 

Another fundamental problem confronting the committee was the 
need to balance secrecy in intelligence matters against the public's 
right to know what its government was doing. The Senate resolution 
establishing the Select Committee on Intelligence declared it to be the 
sense of the Senate that the committee be kept "fully and currently 
informed with respect to intelligence activities, including any 
significant anticipated activities * * *." 17 As Chairman Inouye pointed 
out, 

The necessity for a large and extensive secret intelligence system imposes great 
demands upon our democratic constitutional society. Secret intelligence activities, 
by their very nature, require that only a delegated few in the government, in both 
the Executive and the Legislative branches, have detailed knowledge of the overall 
activities of our intelligence agencies. I am convinced after my period of first-hand 
observation that much of the information produced by our intelligence system is 
not only useful but necessary to the nation's security and well -being. 18 

He noted that, "No other legislature in the world has this right to 
secret information." It meant, for one thing, that the Select Committee 
must be representative of the Senate as a whole and must have its 
confidence. Senator Inouye stressed that his was a nonpartisan com- 
mittee and that its membership of nine Democrats and eight Repub- 
licans "reflects the full spectrum of Senate views from left to right." 19 

The sharing of secret, highly sensitive information also meant that 
those members and staff people who had access to such information 
had an obligation to protect it and to disclose it only in accordance 
with accepted procedures. Chairman Inouye was satisfied with the 
committee's performance in this respect: 

We have met the challenge of proving that Congress can and will * * * keep the 
valid secrets entrusted to its care. 20 

He proposed the application of those same procedures to all classi- 
fied information made available to the Senate. 21 

In this report Senator Inouye announced his decision to resign the 
chairmanship at the end of the session because, in his view, the chair- 
man of this committee should not hold the office for more than 2 
years. Rotating the chairmanship should help to maintain "the com- 
bination of close detailed work with the agencies and a vigilant atti- 
tude toward their activities." He hoped that his action would "estab- 
lish a precedent which would be reflected in an amendment to Senate 
Resolution 400," requiring such rotation on a regular basis. 22 

Although Chairman Inouye's report was frank in mentioning 
several unresolved issues facing the committee and the Congress, it 
said nothing about the diffusion of responsibility that resulted from 
having legislative jurisdiction over intelligence divided among several 
Senate committees. Nor did the report give any indication of serious 
concern over the effect of the Hughes-Ryan amendment (section 662) 
to the Foreign Assistance Act, which requires the President to report 
"in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such [covert action] 
operation to the appropriate committees of Congress, including the 
Committee on Foreign Relations * * * and the Committee on Foreign 

17 S. Res. 400, sec. 11(a), 94th Cong., 2d sess. 

18 Inouye, op. cit., p. S19844. 

19 Ibid. 

20 Ibid., p. S19845. 
2i Ibid. 

22 Ibid., p. S19846. The selection of Senator Birch Bayh to succeed Senator Inouye as committee chairman 
was announced on Jan. 27, 1978. 

29-972—78 3 



26 

Affairs (now Internationa] Relations). * * *" Other "appropriate 
comm bti ee ,J include the Appropriations, Armed Services, and [Intelli- 
gence Committees of both Bouses. Thus, notification is presumably 
given to eight committees, a situation running counter to the tl 
of the recommendations of both the Church and Pike commit 
which urged the establishment of permanent intelligence commit 
in each Bouse in order to strengthen and consolidate congressional 

iS indicated below, President Carter had also v< 
concern over the number of committees involved in intelligence 

Lght and had urged the formation of a single joint comm 
for this purpose. 13 

House 

X w Committee on Intelligence established. — The fact that the House 
had taken no action to establish an intelligence oversight committee 
comparable to that in the Senate became a source of concern to the 
new administration. At a press conference on February 23 and in an 
informal address to State Department employees 1 day later, 
President Carter expressed the hope that the two Houses of Congress 
would form a joint committee on intelligence. Then, apparently 
becoming aware that a joint committee was unlikely until the House 
had its own intelligence committee, President Carter, accompanied 
by Vice President Mondale and Stansfield Turner, Director of Central 
Intelligence, met on May 12 with Speaker O'Neill and other House 
leaders to urge early action in this respect. 24 

The leadership took vigorous action. House Resolution 658, closely 
patterned on Senate Resolution 400, was pushed through the Rules 
Committee after a 1-day hearing on July 12 and referred to the House 
July 13 under a rule barring any amendments. The floor debate on 
July 14 was heated, with minority members objecting in particular to 
the membership ratio of 9 to 4, which they considered inappropriate 
for a supposedly bipartisan committee even though it reflected the 
ratio of Democrats and Republicans in the House at the time. (The 
counterpart committee in the Senate has a more balanced membership 
of 9 Democrats and 8 Republicans.) The minority also objected vigor- 
ously to the leadership's refusal to permit amendments from the floor 
and to provisions of the resolution relating to safeguarding classified 
information, which they considered inadequate. 25 

Opposition was also expressed by members who took issue with a 
provision authorizing the new committee to write its own regulations 
relating to access to classified information. In the debate it became 
clear that such rules would have to include a "need-to know" clause 
which would prevent disclosure to some members under certain 
circumstances. Although such a provision would run counter to Rule 
XI, which gave every member access to anything in a committee's 
files, the leadership argued that intelligence was too sensitive to be 
open to all, and without such a limitation the new committee could 
not expect to gain the confidence of the intelligence community. 

The vote on House Resolution 658 was surprisingly close, 227 to 171, 
with the opposing Republicans joined by more than 30 Democrats who 

" Views on this point expressed In tlio House debate on the establishment of the Permanent Select Com- 
mltteeon intelligence are dl cussed below. 

m Barro, I I 'onsiders Intelligence Panel. Washington Star, May 12, b)77: 13. 

m An Rules of the House of Representatives and Establish [sicja Permanent Select Committee 

on intelligence. [Debate andjvoto in the House] Congressional Record [daily ed.l vol. 123. July 14, 1977: 
117101-20. 



27 

wanted changes in the resolution and protested that it was being 
rushed through the House without sufficient debate. 26 

The effect of the House Resolution 658 was to add to the House 
Rules a new Rule 48, establishing a Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence consisting of 13 members, with at least 1 member from each 
of the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, International 
Relations, and Judiciary. The majority and minority leaders are 
ex officio members without vote, and no member is to serve on the 
committee for more than 6 years, exclusive of service during the 
95th Congress. Four subcommittees were formed: Program and 
Budget Authorization, with Representative Bill Burlison as chairman; 
Legislation, under Representative Morgan Murphy; Oversight, under 
Representative Les Aspin; and Evaluation, under Representative 
Charles Rose. 

The new committee's charter, like that of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, gives it exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the CIA 
and DCI. Jurisdiction over the Defense Intelligence Agency (D1A), 
the National Security Agency (NSA), and other elements of the 
intelligeuce community is shared sequentially with other committees, 
such as Armed Services, International Relations and Judiciary (with 
respect to the FBI's role in foreign intelligence). As in the Senate, the 
new committee is also given specific responsibility for authorization 
of appropriations for all agencies and activities of the intelligence 
community. In the case of authorizations for the CIA and the DCI, 
the committee has exclusive jurisdiction; for other agencies, jurisdic- 
tion is shared sequentially. 

Handling of classified information. — On the controversial issue of 
the handling of classified information and procedures for its disclosure, 
the charter is virtually identical to Senate Resolution 400. The new 
committee is given the power to determine whether or not other Mem- 
bers of the House should have access to such information, and in its 
Rules of Procedure the committee subsequently provided that such 
access must be requested in writing and "each such request" must be 
decided by a record vote of the committee, taking into account "such 
considerations as the sensitivity of the information sought to the 
national defense or the confidential conduct of the foreign relations of 
the United States, the likelihood of its being directly or indirectly dis- 
closed and such other concerns — constitutional and otherwise — 
as affect the public interest of the United States." 27 

The committee is given the power to disclose classified information 
upon a determination that such disclosure would serve the public 
interest but only after the matter has been referred to the Executive 
and the President has been given 5 days to object in writing. In the 
absence of such objection, setting forth the reasons therefore and 
certifying that "the threat to the national interest of the United 
States posed by such disclosure is of such gravity that it outweighs 
any public interest in disclosure," the committee could make the 
disclosure. However, if the President does object "personally, in 
writing" and so certify, the committee is required either to drop the 
matter or, by a majority vote, to refer it to the House with a recom- 
mendation. The House is to go into closed session for no more than 
2 hours of debate and then to vote on the matter in open session 

» Ibid. 

27 U.S. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Rules of Procedure. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. pp. 6-7. 



28 

without revealing the information at issue. 28 If the committee's 
recommendation is not approved, the question is to be considered as 
"recommitted to the select committee for further recommendation." 

Thus, under the new rule, only a vote by the House can override 
a Presidential objection to the proposed disclosure. By contrast, 
Senate R solution 400 provides that the Senate may approve the dis- 
closure of any or all of the informal ion in question, disapprove of such 
disclo refer the matter back to the committee, ''in which case 

the committee shall make the final determination with respect to the 
public disclosure of the information in question. " 29 

In both House and Senate any unauthorized release of classified 
intelligence information by a member or staff employee is prohibited, 
and violations are subject to investigation and penalties, including 
possible censure or expulsion, in the case of a member, and dismissal 
or punishment for contempt, in the case of an employee. 

No singlt otH /sight coram Utee. — During the floor debate. House Reso- 
lution 65S was criticized because it failed to centralize jurisdiction over 
the intelligence agencies in one committee of the House. The sharing of 
responsibility with at least three other committees (Armed Services, 
International Relations, and Judiciary) was viewed as simply adding 
to the oversight problem and making it difficult for the Executive to 
maintain necessary secrecy. The point was made that seven House 
committees were being kept informed of various aspects of CIA's 
activities. 30 

The administration and both the Rockefeller and Murphy Com- 
missions 31 had found congressional oversight to be too diffused and 
had recommended forming a single joint committee on intelligence. 
During the debate House leaders, as well as some of those speaking 
in opposition, voiced the hope that the two Houses could work to- 
gether to form such a committee. 32 Meanwhile, there are likely to be 
continuing doubts in Congress and in the executive branch about the 
sharing of jurisdiction among so many committees, which means that 
in the House alone highly sensitive information on the intelligence 
budget and programs could be available to more than 90 menbers, plus 
staffs, of three key committees — Intelligence (13 members), Armed 
Services (41 members), and International Relations (37 members) — 
not to mention the Appropriations and Budget Committees. 

Legislative Issues 

Disclosure of intelligence budget. — Both oversight committees were 
required by their enabling resolutions not only to consider all legislation 
relating to authorizations for appropriations for the Intelligence 
agencies but also to study and report on "the authorization of funds 
* * * and whether disclosure of any of the amounts of such funds is in 



28 The ability of the House to handle suoh classified information in closed session has been questioned. 
On June 28, 1977, in floor debate on the Defense Appropriation bill fcr fiscal 1978. Rep. Burlison said that 
the House Parliamentarian had counseled against holding a closed session to debate certain amendments 
relating to the CIA because the House was "not equipped to deal with this procedure." The Parliamentarian 
had pointed out, for example, that the officers of the House, reporters, clerks, pages, and others did not have 
clearances to handle such information. (Congressional Record, vol. 123, June 28, 1977: H6619). 

» S. Res. 400, sec. 8(b)(5)(C). 

*> Boland. Edward P. Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives and Establish [sic] a Per- 
manent Select Committee on Intelligence. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record [daily ed.] vol. 
123, July 14, 1977:H7119. 

■ The President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, headed by Vice President 
Rockefeller, was appointed in January 1975 and made its report in June of that year. The (Murphy) 
Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, which was 
established by Public Law 92-352 and was chaired by the late Robert D. Murphy, also reported in June 1975, 

n Boland. op. cit., H7119; also, Boiling, Richard, p. 117106, and Rhodes, John J. p. H7109. 



29 

the public interest. * * *" The House Intelligence Committee came into 
being too late to address itself to the fiscal 1978 budget request, but 
toward the end of the year it began closed hearings on the fiscal 1979 
request. 

The Inouye committee held public hearings April 27 and 28 to 
deal with the question of disclosure of the total amount appropriated 
for intelligence for fiscal 1978. The committee was told by Admiral 
Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, that the President would 
not oppose the disclosure of such an aggregate figure for the entire 
intelligence community. However, three former DCI's, William 
Colb}^, Richard Helms, and George Bush, were opposed to such 
action. 

The committee's report on this matter (Senate Report No. 95-274, 
June 16, 1977) revealed that after a thorough examination of both the 
constitutional and national security aspects of the problem the com- 
mittee remained closely divided, voting 9 to 8 to recommend dis- 
closure. Two minority members, Senators Case and Mathias, who 
voted in favor of release, were balanced by two Democrats, Senators 
Hathawa}^ and Moynihan, who voted against. 

On June 27 Chairman Inouye reported Senate Resolution 207, 
which expressed agreement with the committee's recommendation and 
directed him as chairman to disclose the aggregate amount of funds 
appropriated for national foreign intelligence activities immediately 
after the appropriation bill had been enacted into law. The lattei 
legislation, the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, l$'t8,. 
was signed September 21, 1977 (Public Law 95-111), but Senate 
consideration of Senate Resolution 207 was put off until 1978. 

Those advocating release of the information argued that "even if 
the Constitution does not specifically require such disclosure, such 
disclosure should take place in the absence of convincing evidence that 
it would damage the national security." 33 None of the witnesses 
who testified before the committee had claimed that "this one-time 
disclosure * * * would be damaging to the national security." Further- 
more, the majority held that such disclosure: 

Would serve a number of public interests. The public would be able to weigh 
the Government's priorities as seen in its spending, and should have increased 
confidence in the operations, and the legitimacy of the intelligence community. 
Moreover, if such a figure were disclosed, the public would be able to serve as 
a check on both the executive branch and the Congress, and should therefore 
have increased confidence in the mechanisms for oversight of intelligence 
activities. 34 

Opposing committee members argued that disclosure would be a 
dangerous and unnecessary precedent, "reversing 2 centuries of 
sound congressional practice. It would overturn a decision made by 
the Senate by a vote of 55-33 on this same subject just 3 years ago. 
And it could well constitute the first in a series of disclosures which 
would wholly undermine the effectiveness of our entire intelligence 
apparatus." 35 They claimed that annual disclosures would enable 
hotile nations "to detect trends in our intelligence operations," 
such as the development of the U-2 aircraft, which would not have 

^ 3 !.Y*?"^°^ ess ; ?u nat T e T- Select Committee on Intelligence. Whether Disclosure of Funds for the Intelli- 
95 274 JuTmi$7%^nlV ta c e * iS in %?ul>lic Interest. (95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Kept. No. 
m fb"d Washington, Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 9. 

35 Ibid] p. 13. 



30 

been possible, according to former DC! William Colby, if the CIA 
budget had been a matt< i- of public knowledge. 36 Both Colby and Helms 
particularly concer b, since tl e total figure meant little 

by itself, such disclosure would inevitably lead to the release of further 
Is of the intelligence budget that could do serious damage to 
the program. Under questioning by Senator Inouye, Admiral Turner 
said that to his knowledge no other nation in the world followed such 
a practice. 

The disclosure resolution is to be brought before the Senate early 
in 197S if the leadership approves. 

Senate r< vii W of budget request. — Although the disclosure issue 
attracted tiie attention of the media, it was in fact a relatively minor 
aspect of the overall budget review process, the full significance of 
which is difficult to ascertain because it was carried on almost entirely 
in closed committee meetings. Nevertheless, it seems clear that under 
the new procedures established in 1977 by both the executive and the 
legislative branches the budget proposals of U.S. intelligence agencies 
will be subject to more thorough review than ever before. 

On the legislative side, the establishment of two new oversight 
committees with the power to authorize funding for national intelli- 
gence operations and to monitor the use of such funds represented an 
entirely new approach by the Congress. As Senator Huddleston 
pointed out during the debate on S. 1539, the Intelligence Authoriza- 
tion Act of 1978, this was not only the first time that the Senate was 
able to authorize funds for all intelligence operations but also "the 
first time that every Member of this body has had the opportunity 
to review an extensive report detailing the various activities for which 
these funds are sought." 37 The committee's classified report had been 
made available to any Senator wishing to examine it. 

In addition, the committee published a brief unclassified report 
(Senate Report No. 95-214, May 16, 1977), stating it to be the com- 
mittee's intent that the classified report, which described "in detail the 
full scope and intent of the committee's actions and the specific 
amounts authorized for each of the major U.S. intelligence activities/' 
should have the force of a Senate authorization bill. The executive 
agencies were enjoined to "comply fully with the guidelines and limi- 
tations contained therein." 38 

Although Chairman Inouye circulated a letter on May 17 to all 
Senators advising that the subcommittee's classified report was avail- 
able for examination, according to the Washington Post only three 
Senators asked to see the report. 39 On the other hand, some Senators 
were reported to be disappointed that this first authorization bill was 
brought to the floor "with only slightly more than an hour's notice 
* * *" at the dinner hour and with few Senators other than members 
of the Intelligence Committee in attendance. 40 

The only budget figures mentioned in S. 1539 were $35.1 million for 
the CIA's Retirement and Disability System and $8.95 million for the 
Intelligence Community Staff (ICS), which was to assist the DCI "to 



* Ibid, p. 14. 

57 Huddleston, Walter. Intelligence Authorization Act, 1978. Remarks in the Senate. Congressiona 
Record, vol. 123, June 22, 1977: S10502. 

3* U.S. Coneress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 
1978 for Intelligence Activities of the United States Government * * * and for Other Purposes. Report to 
accompany S. 1539. (95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. No. 95-214) p. 2. 

39 Lesoaze, Lee. A Spooky Milestone in Senate. Washington Post, June 24, 1977: Al. 

« Ibid. 



31 

fulfill his responsibility for directing the substantive functions and 
managing the resources of the Intelligence Community." 

As approved by the Senate on June 22, the bill maintained the 
existing ceiling of 170 positions for the ICS, a reduction of 26 from 
the number requested by the administration. Similarly, the authori- 
zation of $8.95 million for the ICS was about $1.5 million less than 
had been requested but $437,000 more than the revised budget for 
fiscal 1977. 

House action on budget request. — The House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence came into being too late to take part in 
the congressional review of the fiscal 1978 intelligence budget. This 
responsibility remained in the hands of a subcommittee of the Armed 
Services Committee, and whatever action was taken on the authori- 
zation of funds for the intelligence agencies by the subcommittee and 
its parent committee is not apparent from the unclassified report of 
the latter. 

However, the House Appropriations Committee, reporting out the 
Defense appropriation bill, H.K. 7933, recommended cuts of $204.8 
million in intelligence programs and $218.2 million in "intelligence- 
reiated" activities. Details of the proposed reductions were given only 
in classified documents, but the committee report (H. Rept. 95-451, 
June 21, 1977) was particularly critical of the failure of the Defense 
Department and the Director of Central Intelligence to meet similar 
criticisms by the committee last year concerning the definition and 
management of intelligence-related activities. 

During floor debate of H.K. 7933, the House approved an amend- 
ment, proposed by Kepresentative Burlison (D. -Missouri), reducing 
by approximately $15 million the appropriation for "Other Procure- 
ment, Air Force." Representative Burlison said that the purpose of 
this reduction was to reduce the CIA "Reserve for Contingencies" 
from $35 million to $20 million and to discourage the secret transfer 
of funds into the account by the Executive without consulting Con- 
gress. He was concerned because the transfer mechanism enabled: 

The Agency * * * to carry out projects that have not been approved by Congress — 
acting through its Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations on highly classified 
and sensitive matters. * * * It is true that the * * * Subcommittee. * * * must be 
given "notice." It has been ruled, however, that this can properly be given before 
or after the fact. Two prominent examples of projects carried on with this fund 
were the Laos war in Southeast Asia and the Angola war in Africa — before Con- 
gress found out and cut off the funds. 41 

Furthermore, the CIA was exempt from a requirement that Federal 
agencies must: j 

Expend their procurement appropriations within 3 years and R&D within 2. 
If the funds were not obligated within that time frame they reverted to the 
Treasury. The CIA, however, puts all such funds into its reserve [for contin- 
gencies] * * * Money appropriated by Congress for a specific purpose can be — and 
is — thus diverted to whatever use the Executive chooses. Again, Congress need 
only be given "notice." 42 

Representative Burlison had argued originally that either the CIA 
Reserve for Contingencies should be terminated or the CIA should be 
required to return unobligated funds to the Treasury just as other 
government agencies did. An amendment having the latter effect had 

41 Burlison, Bill D. Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1978. Remarks in the House. Congressional 
Record, vol. 123, June 28, 1977: H6619. 
« Ibid. 



32 

in fact been offered by Chairman Mahon and approved by the Appro- 
priations Committer 
Arguing on behalf of the CIA's reserve fund, Representative Sikes 

contended t lint the CIA hud a special need for such reserves to meet 
contingencies for "unanticipated and often emergency requirements." 
Use of the fund was subject to approval by the Office of Budget and 
Management and "at policy levels of the executive branch." In addi- 
tion, both Appropriation ( Committees were notified ''within 48 hours of 
the authorization of the release." Representative sikes said that the 
fund should he continued and that although the $15 million cut might 
be too severe it represented "a compromise which may be best under 
the circumstances." " The Burlison amendment was adopted by the 
House on June 28, but whether the $15 million cut, which was hidden 
in I e Air Force appropriation, remained in the bill as finally passed 
is not specified in the unclassified conference report. 

As enacted into law (Public Law 95-111, September 21, 1977), the 
Defense Appropriation Act included the following provisions openly 
limiting the CIA: 

Section 857. None of the funds appropriated in this Act for programs of the 
Central Intelligence Agency shall remain available for obligation beyond the cur- 
rent fiscal year. 

Section 859. None of the funds provided by this Act may be used to pay the 
salaries of any person or persons who authorize the transfer of unobligated and 
deobligated appropriations into the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central 
Intelligence Agency. 

In conference the amount appropriated for intelligence programs had 
been reduced by just over $222 million. This compared to cuts of over 
$422 million proposed by the House and nearly $159 million proposed 
by the Senate. The reductions, which were spread throughout various 
appropriations, were explained in a classified annex to the conference 
report, House Report No. 95-565, August 4, 1977. 

Legislation on electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes 

During 1977 a bipartisan group of congressional representatives 
worked with the administration to revise draft legislation that would 
require the executive to obtain a court order in order to conduct elec- 
tronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. This was a contin- 
uation of a similar effort which had gained considerable impetus during 
the 94th Congress. Both endeavors were stimulated in large measure 
by the concern over evidence of warrantless surveillances that came to 
light in the Watergate investigation and in the report of the Church 
committee indicating that the intelligence agencies had been wire- 
tapping without warrants since the 1930's. While Federal law required 
that a warrant be obtained before using electronic surveillance in a 
criminal investigation, there was no such provision for cases involving 
foreign intelligence investigations. 

The proposed legislation was introduced into both Houses on May 
18, 1977. Senators Kennedy, Bayh and Mathias sponsored S. 1566, 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977, and Chairman 
Rodino of the House Judiciary Committee introduced the companion 
bill, H.R. 7308. On the same day President Carter met with congres- 



m IWd. 

** Sikes, Robert L. F. Congressional Record, vol. 123, June 28, 1977: 116619-20. 



33 

sional leaders and hailed the proposed bill as successfully resolving 
the inherent conflict between the need for intelligence and the preser- 
vation of civil rights. Despite these auspicious beginnings, the bills 
made slow progress. At the end of the session S. 1566 was still under 
consideration by the Select Committee on Intelligence, having been 
reported favorably, with amendments, by the Judiciary Committee 
on November 15, 1977. 45 In the House, neither the Judiciary nor the 
new Intelligence Committee had completed action on H.R. 7308 
when the session ended. 

The issues raised by the proposed legislation on electronic surveil- 
lance relate primarily to the degree to which governmental authority 
is to be used within this country for national intelligence purposes. 
Most significant in this respect is the provision repealing the Execu- 
tive's "inherent power" disclaimer, now found in section 2511(3) of 
title 18 of the U.S. Code. 46 The new bill would provide instead that 
its procedures and those in chapter 119 of title 18 (Wire Interception 
and Interception of Oral Communications) "shall be the exclusive 
means" for authorizing electronic surveillance in this country. 

While these issues are extremely important, they relate mainly to 
the domestic impact of U.S. intelligence operations. From the point of 
view of the intelligence agencies, the principal concern over this bill 
is that the FBI, CIA and NSA not be so circumscribed by statutes and 
regulations as to be unable to operate effectively against legitimate 
threats to the national security. The continuing debate on legislation 
relating to electronic surveillance, which has been in progress since 
1973, exemplifies the kind of issues likely to arise when Congress con- 
siders the proposed charters and guidelines for the intelligence agen- 
cies. These proposals, which are expected to be the subject of hearings 
by the Senate Intelligence Committee early in the second session of 
the 95th Congress, are discussed below. 

Proposed statutory charters and guidelines 

Since it was established in May 1976, the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence has been working on draft legislation to establish new 
charters and guidelines for the intelligence agencies. A special sub- 
committee under Senator Walter Huddleston of Kentucky, in close 
consultation with the executive branch, former officials of the intelli- 
gence agencies and legal experts, has been drafting legislation that 
would spell out the authorities and the limitations applicable to the 
Director of Central Intelligence and to such agencies as the CIA, 
NSA, and FBI. According to the committee's Annual Report, 

The basic assumption of the committee's charter work is that intelligence ac- 
tivities are necessary for the security and well-being of the country. Clear statutory 
guidelines are needed, however, to confer legitimacy on them, and to assure their 
accountability and conformance with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States. 47 



45 U.S. Coneress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977. 
Report together with minority tviews to accompany S. 1566. Nov. 15, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. S. 
Kept. No. 95-604. p. 9. 

46 Enacted in 1968 as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, this reads in part as follows: 

Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1143: 47 
U.S.C 605) shah limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems neces- 
sary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to 
obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect 
national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this 
chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems 
necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other clear 
and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. 

47 Annual Report, p. 27. 



34 

The report devotes more than 8 pages to a discussion of the need 
for statutory eh -nters not only to protect the rights of Americans 
but also to help "rectify the organizational problems that have not 
been resolved because of bureaucratic battles within the executive 
branch." 4S Whether Congress can indeed enact legislation that would 
give greater authority to the DCI and at the same time put an end to 
interagency rivalries remains moot. The administration, for its part, 
initiated a reorganization in August 1977 designed to give the DCI 
enhanced authority over intelligence budgets and programs. In so 
doing, it precipitated a conflict between the DCI and the Secretary 
of Defense, which was apparently resolved by giving the DCI less 
control in certain areas than lie had originally requested. As a conse- 
quence of this and oilier problems, the drafting of an Executive order 
giving effect bo the August 4 reorganizat ion announcement took much 
longer than had been anticipated and, as indicated above, was not 
issued until January 1978 (Executive Order 12036). 

As the year ended, there were indications that a debate was already 
under way between civil libertarians and the committee staff, on the 
one hand, and the intelligence agencies and their supporters, on the 
other. According to The New York Times, controversy had arisen as 
to whether the domestic activities of the CIA would be sufficiently 
restricted under the proposed Executive order, and public interest 
groups had written to the President urging him to make the order 
public before signing it so that it could be studied and debated. Com- 
mittee staffers were reported as having found "civil liberties loopholes 
'you could drive a truck through.' " However, a senior intelligence 
official was quoted to the effect that, although the committee staff 
might have problems with the order, the members would be more 
reasonable. 49 

With the publication of Executive Order 12036 in January 1978, 
there was no further impediment to the introduction of the Senate In- 
telligence Committee's proposed legislation on charters and guide- 
lines, and on February 9, 1978, such a bill was introduced with the 
support of committee members of both parties. The proposed Na- 
tional Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978 (S. 2525) 
sets forth in 263 pages the organizational framework of the U.S. In- 
telligence system and specifies both the authorities and limitations 
applicable to the various intelligence agencies. If there is to be a great 
debate on how to control the intelligence community, this bill will 
provide the occasion and give it focus. As Chairman Bayh remarked 
in introducing the bill, 

None of us who are sponsors of the bill agree fully with every part of it. There 
must and will be public hearings to explore alternatives. We need to test the 
language of the bill carefully, because it must provide firm standards and pro- 
cedures for years to come. 

On some questions there are policy differences among us, just as there are 
differences in opinion among the American people. We shall seek to reconcile 
these differences wherever possible. * * * so 



« Ibid. 

« Arguments Over Civil Liberties Delay Order on Intelligence Work. New York Times, Dec. 20, 1977: 12. 
60 Bayh, Birch. National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978. Remarks in the Senate. 
Congressional Record [daily ed.] vol. 124, Feb. 9, 1978: S1723-4. 



35 

Thus, 2 years after the original select committees to investigate 
the intelligence community had completed their work, both Houses of 
Congress were in a position to move ahead on detailed legislative 
measures legitimizing and controlling U.S. intelligence operations. A 
difficult period of transition was coming to an end, but the issues 
remaining to be resolved were nonetheless formidable. 

References 

congressional publications 
Hearings 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on 

International Organizations. Investigation of Korean- American Relations. 

Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Part 1, June 22, 1977. Part 2, July 28 and Aug. 

3, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Nomination of Theodore 

C. Sorensen. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Jan. 17, 1977. Washington, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1977. 43 pp. 
Nomination of Adm. Stansfield Turner. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. 

Feb. 22 and 23, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 98 pp. 
Whether Disclosure of Funds Authorized for Intelligence Activities Is in 



the Public Interest. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Apr. 27 and 28, 1977. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 475 pp. 

Committee on Human Resources. Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program 



of Research in Behavioral Modification. Joint Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. 
Aug. 3, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 171 pp. 

Committee on Human Resources. Subcommittee on Health and Scientific 



Research. Human Drug Testing by the CIA, 1977. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st 
sess. Sept. 20 and 21, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 219 pp. 

Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Pro- 



cedures. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977. Hearings on S. 1566, 
June 13 and 14, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
159 pp. 

Re-ports 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense 
Appropriation Bill, 1978. Report together with Separate and Additional 
Views to accompany H.R. 7933. 95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. No. 95-451, 
June 21, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 387 pp. 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Rules of Procedure. Wash- 
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 8 pp. 

Committee on Rules. Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives 

and Establish [sic] a Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Report to 
accompany H. Res. 658. 95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. No. 95-498. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 11 pp. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Annual Report to the 
Senate together with additional views. 95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. No. 95-217, 
May 18, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 43 pp. 

News Release: Statement and Summary Findings of Investigation into 

CIA Involvement in Micronesia, [undated] 

Whether Disclosure of Funds for the Intelligence Activities of the United 



States Is in the Public Interest. Report together with Additional and Minority 
Views. 95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. No. 95-274, June 16, 1977. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 18 pp. 

Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 for Intelligence Activities 



of the United States Government, The Intelligence Community Staff, the CIA 
Retirement and Disabilitv System (CIARDS), and for other purposes. Report 
to accompany S. 1539. 95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept, No. 95-214, May 16, 1977. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 5 pp. 



36 

Committee on the Judiciary. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977. 

Report together with Minority Views to accompany S. 1566. 95th Cong., 1st 
S. S. Rept. No. 95-604. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

84 pp. 
U.S. Congress. Conference Committee. Making Supplemental Appropriations for 

the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 1977. Conference Report to accompany H.R. 

4877. 95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. No. 95-166. Washington, U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1977. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations: An 

Uncertain Future. Report of the Comptroller General of the Uuited States. 

[Washington] 1977. (GGD-78-10, Nov. 9, 1977) 95 pp. 
Inouye, Daniel K. Report to the Senate on the Work of the Senate Select Com- 
mittee on Intelligence. Congressional Record [daily ed.] vol. 123, December 15, 

L977: S19844-19S47. [Also available as a reprint.] 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

U.S. Library Of Congress. Congressional Research Service. To Create A Select 
Senate Committee on Intelligence: A Legislative History of Senate Resolution 
400. [by William Raiford.] [Washington] 1976. 189 pp. 

Intelligence Community: Congressional Oversight, [by Hugh W. Wolff.] 

Issue Brief No. 77079. [Periodically updated.] 



Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe* 

overview 

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe x was 
established by Congress inl976 to monitor the implementation of the 
Helsinki accords, which had been signed in 1975 by the heads of state 
of 35 countries of Europe and North America. 2 The Commission, con- 
sisting of six senators, six representatives, and three officials of the 
executive branch, was an unprecedented instrument for direct con- 
gressional participation in the foreign policy process. 3 It was estab- 
lished at a time when Congress demonstrated considerable skepticism 
over the administration's degree of dedication to insuring the imple- 
mentation of the accords, particularly their human rights provisions. 4 

In 1977, the Commission became a significant actor in international 
and domestic events related to the Conference and the process of 
implementing its results. It played a substantial role in formulating 
and carrying out U.S. policy at the Belgrade follow-up meeting to 
CSCE. The evidence pointed to an increasingly cooperative relation- 
ship between the Commission and the executive branch. The perform- 
ance of the Commission seemed to meet with geneial approval in the 
United States and its Western allies. At the same time, it remained 
a source of friction between the United States and the countries of 
the Soviet Bloc. 

General interest in the performance of the Commission centered in 
two areas: 

(1) Its role as an instrument of congressional participation in 
the foreign policy process and as a mechanism for coordinating 
administration and congressional positions on a specific issue; and 

(2) Its impact on a continuing series of international negotia- 
tions that could substantially influence East-West relations. 

* Prepared by Francis T. Miko, Analyst in International Relations. 

1 The initials CSCE create some confusion in that they are used to denote both the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe and the U.S. Commission, established to monitor the implementation of its 
results. For purposes of this report, CSCE is used only in reference to the Conference. The U.S. monitoring 
body is referred to in abbreviated form as "the Commission." 

1 The Helsinki accords were formally titled the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE). The Final Act, so designated to indicate that it was a legally nonbinding agreement 
was signed at the end of 3 years of negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki. It included provisions on Euro- 
pean security, economic cooperation, human rights and the freer movement of people and information 
between East and West, as well as cultural and educational cooperation. Furthermore, the 35 signatory na- 
tions agreed to future negotiations to continue the process initiated at the Conference. The first follow up 
meeting was held in Belgrade in 1977-1978. Preliminary talks were conducted in the summer of 1977 and the 
formal meeting began on October 4 and was expected to continue into March 1978. 

3 The members of the CSCE Commission currently include Representative Dante B. Fascell (chairman) 
Senator Claiborne Pell (Co- Chairman), Senators Dick Clark, Patrick J. Leahy, Richard Stone, Clifford P. 
Case, Robert Dole, Representatives Jonathan B. Bingham, Paul Simon, Sidney R. Yates, John Buchanan, 
and Millicent Fenwick, as well as Patricia H. Derian (Dept. of State), David E. Mc Griffith (Dept. of De- 
fense) and Frank A. Weil (Department of Commerce). 

* Also see the discussion of Human Rights on pp. 142-152. (Ed.) 

(37) 



38 



DISCUSSION 



Commission activity in 1977 

Belgrade Conference-related activity. — The Belgrade Conference 
was the major CSCE-related event of 1977. Prior to the Conference, 
a series of meetings were held between relevant agencies of the execu- 
tive branch and the Commission to map out U.S. strategy. The Corn- 
on participated actively in the preliminary round of the Belgrade 
negotiations which took place in the summer of 1977. The U.S. delega- 
tion to the actual Conference (October 1977-March 1978) was headed 
by former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg. Commission 
Chairman 1 )ante B. Fascell was named deputy chief of the U.S. delega- 
tion. The other Commission members were appointed to the delegation 
and the Commission staff were included among the U.S. representa- 
tives on three working groups of the Conference. 

1977 ended with the Belgrade Conference in a virtual stalemate. 
The United States and many Western participants insisted that the 
Con Terence focus on a thorough review of each country's record in 
implementing the CSCE Final Act's human rights and other pro- 
visions and that the document which emerged from the Conference 
should reflect the findings of that review. The Soviet Bloc countries, 
not wanting to be called to account for their post-Helsinki performance, 
sought to review only the positive results of the earlier Helsinki accords 
and to concentrate attention on new initiatives to further security 
and cooperation in Europe. Given the deadlock based on East Bloc 
refusal to engage in a thorough review and the U.S. refusal to agree to 
any new proposals in the absence of such a review, it was generally 
felt that the most that could be expected to emerge from Belgrade was 
a brief document indicating that the meeting had taken place, that 
participants would meet again in Madrid (1980) and that despite 
some progress, much remained to be done to implement the Helsinki 
accords. 

Hearings. — In 1977, the Commission held hearings, issued and 
received reports on implementation of the Helsinki accords and partic- 
pated actively in the work of the U.S. delegation at the Belgrade 
follow-up meeting. On January 6, 1977, the Commission held an open 
session in which it received testimony from exiled Soviet dissident 
Andrei Amalrik on the Soviet record of compliance with the CSCE 
accords. 5 

The Commission also conducted hearings on the economic provisions 
("Basket 2") of the Helsinki accords on January 13 and 14. Then 
Secretary of Commerce Elliot Eichardson and several leading econo- 
mists testified. Some of the witnesses urged that the United States 
place greater emphasis on the economic portions of CSCE, on the 
grounds that they held the best prospects for meaningful implementa- 
tion in a manner beneficial to all participating states. 

On February 23, exiled Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky testified 
before the Commission, arguing for continued firmness by the United 
States on human rights and for patience in awaiting results in the 
Soviet Union. The Commission held hearings on family reunification 
problems involving the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (March 15, 
1977). On April 27 and 28 the Commission conducted hearings on 

e Also see the discussion of U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union on pp. 47-52. (Ed.) 



39 

religious and minority rights. Hearings on CSCE's impact on public 
opinion in the Communist countries were held on May 9. Three more 
days of hearings were held on information, cultural and educational 
exchange between East and West (May 19, 24 and 25). 

The series of 1977 hearings was concluded on June 6, when Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance testified before the Commission on the admin- 
istration's view of the record of implementation of CSCE and on U.S. 
strategy at the upcoming Belgrade meeting. He indicated that the 
United States would insist at Belgrade on a thorough review of the 
implementation of CSCE and that the administration was less than 
fully satisfied with the record of implementation to date by most 
Communist countries. 

Reports. — On June 6, 1977, the President transmitted his Second 
Semiannual Report to the Commission on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe. The report, required by law, was the new administration's 
first assessment of the results of the Helsinki Conference. The report 
contained a strong indictment of the Soviet Union and some East 
European countries for failing to live up to the spirit of the accords. 
The criticism of the record of Communist countries was generally 
consider harsher than that contained in the first report of 1976. 

The Commission released its own assessment of the implementation 
of the Final Act on August 5, 1978. The report underlined the short- 
comings as well as the progress that had been achieved since Helsinki 
and recommended further specific steps to achieving fuller compliance. 
It was also critical of the record of performance by several of the 
Communist governments. 

The Third Semiannual Report of the President to the Commission, 
transmitted on December 5, echoed the Commission view that while 
the Helsinki accords offered significant potential for improving 
East-West relations, much of that potential remained unfulfilled. 

Legislation. — Legislation related to the Commission concerns in 
1977 included a section 502 of Public Law 95-105, the Foreign Rela- 
tions Authorization Act of 1978, urging the United States to take up 
the cause of individual human rights violations at Belgrade, and 
specifically the case of Soviet political prisoner Anatoly Shcharansky. 
In another action related to CSCE, Congress repealed a provision of 
Public Law 82-414, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, restricting the 
entry of foreign Communists into the United States. The Commission 
had considered this provision of the statute to be contrary to the 
Helsinki accords. 

Relations between the Commission and the executive branch 

From its inception, the Commission was recognized as an unusual, 
if not unprecedented, creation. It brought the executive branch 
through its three representatives into an organization numerically 
dominated by its 12 congressional members. While it was not the 
first Commission to include both executive and legislative branch 
representation, it was the first to include only members from those 
two bodies with such a clear congressional majority and involved 
directly in the diplomatic process. 

The Ford administration voiced strong reservations about the 
establishment of such a Commission. Both the White House and State 
Department sent letters to Congress stressing that the monitoring 
of the CSCE accords was properly an executive branch function. 



40 

Under the Carter administration relations between the Commission 
on the one hand, the administration and State Department, on the 
other, seem to have become more harmonious. Cooperation is facili- 
tated by the apparent shared emphasis of participants from both 
branches on human rights in East-West relations. 

The Commission has had to balance its desire to work with the 
executive branch in a constructive fashion, against its need to maintain 
an independent identity. At Belgrade, representatives of the Com- 
mis8ion are subordinate to the head of the U.S. delegation. While this 
close collaboration has raised questions in the minds of some observers 
about the constitutionality of the arrangement (in terms of separation 
of powers) it has actually served to strengthen congressional support 
for U.S. policy on CSCE, in turn placing the U.S. delegation in a 
stronger position at Belgrade. According to former Supreme Court 
Justice Arthur Goldberg, the head of the U.S. delegation, his own 
initial doubts about the constitutionality of the Commission-executive 
relationship were removed by recent court decisions. 

There appears to be little serious opposition within Congress to the 
Commission or the relationship it has developed with the executive 
branch. The fact that U.S. policy on CSCE and its strategy at Bel- 
grade have enjoyed a high degree of bipartisan congressional support, 
in marked contrast to congressional suspicions over U.S. policy in 
previous rounds of CSCE negotiations, may in part be due to the 
( On i mission's role in formulating that policy. Outside Congress, there 
has been some criticism of the Commission role, particularly among 
special interest groups which feel the United States should be exerting 
even stronger pressure on the East Bloc countries at Belgrade and by 
others who feel the U.S. is jeopardizing detente by adopting too ag- 
lve a position at the Conference. Representatives of the first 
group have suggested that a more independent Commission could 
perform a more aggressive watchdog role and do more to press the 
administration to take a harder line at Belgrade. Neither of these 
positions seems to enjoy wide support. 

Commission impact on the CSCE process 

The extent to which the activity of the Commission has shaped the 
course of CSCE is difficult to measure, particularly since its period of 
existence has coincided with a significant change in U.S. human 
rights policies. But it has been involved in formulating and carrying 
out a U.S. Belgrade strategy that has generally been followed by 
Western nations in demanding a detailed review of the record of all 
countries in implementing the Final Act. Ambassador Goldberg had 
praised the contribution of the Commission to the work of the U.S. 
delegation. In the pre-Helsinki rounds of CSCE, the United States has 
allowed its Western allies to take the leadership on most issues and 
had received considerable criticism for its alleged disinterest. 

Although the Final Act of CSCE dealt with a wide range of issues, 
the focus of Commission attention has been on the human rights, 
human contacts, and information sections of the accords, and to 
some extent the provisions on economic, cultural, and educational 
cooperation. The Legislation establishing the Commission (P.L. 94- 
304) directed it explicitly to focus on these areas. This congressional 
emphasis seems to reflect the common United States and Western view 



41 

that the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki aceords were among 
the most significant results of the Conference. It also results from the 
widely held view within and outside Congress that U.S. policy under 
Secretary of State Kissinger did not attach sufficient priority to the 
implementation of the humanitarian provisions by Communist coun- 
tries. Congressional proponents of the Commission seemed to feel that 
Congress, through the Commission, could fill the perceived gap in 
official U.S. interest. 

The geographic focus of Commission inquiry has been on the record 
of compliance by the Soviet Union and the Communist countries of 
Eastern Europe, although it has also studied U.S. performance and 
encouraged moves to more fully implement the accords in the United 
States. The emphasis on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has 
been explained on the grounds that while the United States and West- 
ern countries could improve their performance in some areas, the 
Communist countries have been primarily responsible for erecting 
the barriers to the flow of people and information between East and 
West which the accords seek to remove. 

Foreign assessments of the Commission. — The governments of 
Western and neutral European countries have not reacted publicly 
to the establishment of the Commission. They have demonstrated 
acceptance of its legitimacy by their willingness to work with its 
representatives. The W T estern press, for the most part, has welcomed 
the creation of the Commission as a demonstration of U.S. interest 
and concern on CSCE. The response of the Soviet Union and most 
East European countries to the Commission has been far more nega- 
tive. The governments of these countries have depicted it as a tool 
for unwarranted U.S. interference in the internal affairs of Communist 
countries and have charged that its creation is itself a violation of the 
Helsinki accords. Furthermore, Eastern spokesmen have charged 
that the emphasis by the Commission on certain aspects of the CSCE 
accords amounts to a serious distortion of what has been carefully 
constructed as a balanced document. They have also claimed that the 
Commission's emphasis on Eastern performance impedes rather than 
advances the goal of implementing the accords since it places un- 
necessary strains on East-West relations. The Soviet position has been 
that signatory states and their organizations such as the Commission 
can legitimately monitor only their own record of compliance with the 
accords. In conjunction with their denunciations of the Commission, 
the Soviet and East European governments have barred its repre- 
sentatives from visiting their countries. 

Domestic role of the Commission. — A significant activity of the 
Commission has been to hear the views of ethnic Americans and other 
individuals and groups most interested in and affected by the pro- 
visions of the CSCE accords. As such the Commission has provided a 
channel for these concerns to be considered in the formulation of 
policy. The Commission acts as a clearinghouse for individual cases 
and problems addressed by provisions of the Helsinki accords. This 
appears to be a Commission function that is valued by both the 
Congress, as a service for its constituents, and by the administration. 
Some observers have criticized what they view as an overemphasis on 
domestic political considerations on the part the Commission. How- 

29-972 — 78 4 



42 

ever, this domestic role seems clearly to serve the interests of Con- 
- and is unlikely to be reduced. 

JTu ( -omnrission m 197S 

year 1978 will not bring any now round of CSCE negotiations, 
once the Belgrade Conference is concluded. The Commission can be 
expected to incus on its role of monitoring trends in the CSCE process 
and tracking individual actions by signatory states that indicate 
compliance or noncompliance with the Final Act. It will continue to 
report to Congress on its findings in preparation for the expected 
19S0 Madrid CSCE Conference. D the Communist countries were to 
e their policy and allow Commission representatives to make 
in ling visits, this could add a new dimension to the Commission's 
monitoring activity. 

References 

congressional publications 

Hearings 

U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Basket Three: Imple- 
mentation of the Helsinki accords. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Feb. 23- 
June 6, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 4 pp. 

Basket Two: Helsinki Final Act. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Jan. 13 

and 14, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 143 pp. 

Reports 

lommission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. R,eport to the Congress 
of the United States on implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and recommendations two years 
aft^r Helsinki. (95th Cong., 1st sess.) Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Aug. 1, 1977. 2 v. 

Reports of Helsinki accords monitors in the Soviet Union: 

Documents of the public groups to promote observance of the Helsinki agree- 
ments in the U.S.S.R. Vol. II. (95th Cong., 1st sess.) Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, June 3, 1977. 80 pp. 

Reports of the Helsinki Accord monitors in the Soviet Union: 



Documents of Public Groups to Promote Observance of the Helsinki agreements 
in the U.S.S.R. A partial compilation. (95th Cong., 1st sess.) Washington, U.S. 
eminent Printing Office, Feb. 24, 1977. 123 pp. 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. First semiannual 
report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, Dec. 1976. 62 pp. 
At head of title: 95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print. 

Second semiannual report by the President to the Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
June 1977. 45 pp. 

At head of title: 95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print. 
U.S. ( Songress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Third semiannual report 
of the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1977. 34 pp. 
At head of title: 95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print. 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Detente with the 
Soviet Union [by Joseph Whelan]. Issue Brief No. IB 74120. [Periodically up- 
dated]. 

Helsinki Final Act: Congressional Oversight [by Francis T. Miko]. Issue 

Brief No. IB 76068. [Periodically updated]. 

iet- American Relations: Human Rights [by Joseph G. Whelan]. Issue 



Brief No. IB 77031. [Periodically updated]. 



Congressional Involvement in Major Foreign Policy 

Issues 



Pagr« 

Introduction 45 

Relations With the Great Powers 47 

U.S. relations with the Soviet Union 47 

Relations with China 53 

Foreign Policy Implications of Political/Military Policy 57 

Foreign policy implications of the defense budget 57 

Overseas commitments and bases 67 

Conventional arms transfers 70 

Nuclear nonproliferation 83 

Arms control impact statements 89 

Strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) 92 

International Economic Assistance 97 

Bilateral foreign economic and food assistance 97 

Multilateral assistance 103 

The International Economy 117 

Congress and North-South negotiations 117 

Congress and U.S. international food policy 123 

U.S. international energy policy 129 

Global Institutions and Issues 133 

U.S. participation in the United Nations system 133 

Human rights 142 

Congress and U.S. international oceans policy 153 

Space 167 

Congressional Impact on Regional Issues. 172 

Africa 172 

Latin America 179 

Asia: Korea and Vietnam 189 

Middle East 195 

Western Europe 204 



(43) 



INTRODUCTION 

The congressional role in the making of foreign policy varies greatly 
from issue to issue, with certain recent developments allowing Congress 
the potential for significantly influencing policy and monitoring im- 
plementation. Since the end of World War II, the major congressional 
vehicles for legislating foreign policy have been foreign aid authoriza- 
tion and appropriation measures. This legislation remains an impor- 
tant mechanism for Congress, both in setting general guidelines for 
U.S. economic and military assistance programs, and in making and 
influencing policy toward specific countries and regions. The congres- 
sional impact on U.S. policy toward the Middle East, for example, 
is reflected in large part by the amounts of military assistance made 
available to countries in the region. Another important congressional 
tool in foreign policy is annual approval of the defense budget, which, 
has an impact on the world balance of power, and on U.S. commit- 
ments and relations with treaty partners. 

This section of Congress and Foreign Policy — 1977 covers a wide 
variety of difficult issues. They range from U.S. political and economic 
relations with the major Communist powers, various other foreign 
policy aspects of political/military relations including the significant 
policy debates on arms transfers and nuclear proliferation — and a broad 
range of bilateral and multilateral relationships in which the United 
States finds itself involved with allies and adversaries. The growing 
complexity of international problems, especially those arising from 
the so-called "North-South" confrontation and the related issues of 
economic and development assistance and global food and energy 
policy, find an important political forum in the Congress domestically 
and in the United Nations and its agencies internationally. 

U.S. domestic political and economic concerns, especially as ex- 
pressed in congressional treatment of many of these issues, have re- 
sulted in a number of interesting developments during the 1977 
session. The confluence of politics, economics, and moral values has 
been especially complex in the case of human rights. This is an area 
in which both the legislative and executive branches have had particu- 
lar interest during 1977. As many chapters of the following section 
clearly indicate, varying interpretations of the relative importance of 
human rights and humanitarian policy concerns in relation to U.S. 
ties with a wide variety of foreign countries have caused lively dif- 
ferences of opinion and strategy between Congress and the President, 
and among various schools of thought within Congress. 

A number of the contentious foreign policy concerns of the past 
session — notably the Panama Canal Treaties, Soviet and Cuban 
involvement in Africa, the role of Communist Parties in Western 
Europe, and U.S.-Soviet discussions on a second Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty — remain unresolved and will receive continued 
congressional attention during the second session of the 95th Congress. 
This is equally true of several of the intractable problems relating to 
food and energy shortages, to mention two of the most prominent 
global issues which have sometimes been causes of bilateral confronta- 
tion in the past year. 

(45) 



RELATIONS WITH THE GREAT POWERS 

U.S. Relations With the Soviet Union* 
overview 

To many Members of Congress, the United States relationship 
with the Soviet Union is the most important aspect of American 
foreign policy. Thus, throughout 1977, congressional concern was 
evident in many areas relating to the Soviet Union (e.g., Soviet 
military growth, trade, human rights and Soviet actions in the Third 
World) and legislative initiatives reflected an ongoing desire to be an 
active participant in determining the direction and pace of Soviet- 
American relations. 

The complexity and importance of these issues is reflected in the 
diversity of congressional views. For example, regarding strategic 
arms limitation (SALT) negotiations, many Members indicated that 
they favored a new agreement only if it did not jeopardize U.S. 
national security. There were, of course, many different views regard- 
ing what constituted a threat to U.S. national security, and these 
differences were not restricted merely to party positions but were 
equally dramatic within both major parties. Soviet-American trade 
was another area where congressional interest was high but a con- 
sensus for action was largely lacking. Even in the case of detente, 
accepted by most Members in at least abstract terms, there was 
disagreement on the question of substantive implementation. 

Despite such differences, there were some issues in Soviet-American 
relations on which there was at least general congressional agreement, 
the most prominent of which was human rights. Consequently, con- 
gressional support for this issue remained extremely strong and unified. 
Congressional commitment to maintaining a strong defense posture 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was also unwavering. And finally, regarding 
Soviet actions in the Third World, Congress refrained from involve- 
ment, a position some observers argued was forced upon Congress by 
the general unwillingness of the American public to become involved 
in any new "Vietnam type" situation. 

DISCUSSION 

Detente in Soviet-American relations 

While most Members of the 95th Congress endorsed detente as an 
abstract concept, they held widely divergent views on measures for 
its implementation. Some Members felt that the United States should 
lead the way by making unilateral gestures of good will in such areas 
as SALT and East-West trade. They argued that such gestures might 

♦Prepared by William B. Inglee, Research Assistant in Soviet and East European Affairs. 

(47) 



48 

encourage the Soviets to take similar actions. But a large segment of 
Congress disagreed with this approach, arguing that such unilateral 
actions would be harmful to the United States and would offer the 
Soviet Union opportunities to enhance its own position. Many other 
Members fell that a position somewhere between these two approaches 
would be in the best interests of the United States. They felt that 
the United States and the Soviet Union must move in concert if 
relations between the two countries were to be improved. The advo- 
cate- of this approach claimed that it would foster the spirit of detente 
while still insuring U.S. national security. 

In October 1977, the House International Relations Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East held hearings on the current state of 
Soviet-American relations. 1 During the course of these hearings Dr. 
Marshall Shulman, Special Adviser to Secretary of State Vance, testi- 
fied on many of the most important issues in Soviet-American rela- 
tions: SALT and other arms control-related issues, areas of political 
petition, economic relations; exchanges and scientific cooperation; 
and the issue of human rights. 

>'. I L T and the military balance 

During its first session the 95th Congress acted upon a number of 
SALT related issues. First, the Senate approved the nomination of 
Paul Warnke as head of the United States SALT II negotiating team 
and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Second, 
the Senate passed a resolution supporting the Carter administration's 
unilateral extension of the SALT I Agreement, although not without 
considerable debate. 2 

The role of Congress in the SALT process was given further recog- 
nition by the Carter administration when in mid-1977 the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency announced that it was asking 14 
House Members and 25 Senators to act as congressional advisers to 
the SALT II negotiations. The Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency made it clear that the congressional advisers would not be 
directly involved in the negotiating process. 3 Rather, congressional 
participation was viewed as a means of bringing Congress informally 
into the process of negotiating with the Soviets. 

The 95th Congress approved a record high military budget for 
fiscal year 1978 (approximately $117 billion), thus reaffirming the 
commitment of Congress to maintaining a strong U.S. defense posture 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The relative ease with which the 1978 
military appropriations were approved was believed to be the result 
of a growing belief among many Members that the Soviet Union's 
military strength had grown steadily in recent years. 

In order to aid Congress in assessing the Soviet-American strategic 
balance, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sponsored hearings 
in early 1977 on "U.S. /Soviet Strategic Options." Among the experts 
called upon to testify were: Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham (retired), 
former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Fred C. Ikle, then 
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Paul H. Nitze, 

i 0.8. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Europe and the 
Middle East. The Soviet Union: Internal Dynamics of Foreign Policv, Recent and Future. Hearings, 
P.^tti Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 27; Oct. 11, 13, 18, and 26, 1977, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
..? pp. 
* For a more detailed discussion of this isme see the chapter on SALT elsewhere in this volume. (Ed.) 
3 Letter date! May 9, L977, from ACDA Director Paul C. Warnke to the Speaker of the House of Repre- 
sentatives, Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. 



49 

former Deputy Secretan r of Defense and member of the SALT nego- 
tiating team. 4 The hearings contributed additional insights to the 
ongoing congressional debate concerning Soviet strategic capabilities 
and intentions. 

Soviet-American trade 

Most of the legislation passed during the first session of the 95th 
Congress affecting Soviet-American trade was of an administrative 
nature, geared toward improving the efficiency of the export control 
system. From the standpoint of Soviet-American trade, the most 
important piece of legislation passed was the extension and amend- 
ment of the Export Administration Act of 1969 (Public Law 95-52) . 5 
The 1977 amendments attempted to make the export licensing proc- 
ess more efficient and appropriate to the present day realities of 
East-West relations. 

A major change contained in the Export Administration Act amend- 
ments was the elimination from consideration of a country's Com- 
munist or non-Communist status. Instead, the country's present rela- 
tionship with the United States, its relationship with other countries 
friendh r or hostile to the United States, and its ability to control the 
transfer of U.S. exports to third countries became the main criteria 
for determining U.S. export control policy. Whereas past U.S. export 
control policy had been based on the premise that all Communist 
countries (with the exception of Yugoslavia), were an equal threat 
to U.S. security, the new legislation permits each country to be dealt 
with individually. The proponents of this approach argued that the 
Soviet Union, Albania, the People's Kepublic of China, and Romania 
are all Communist nations, yet each espouses and exhibits a differing 
ideology and foreign policy; indeed, at times they are more hostile 
to one another than to the United States. 

However, despite these revisions of the U.S. export control 
mechanism, there were also other related legislative actions taken 
during the first session that appeared to run at cross purposes. Many 
Members of the 95th Congr-ss continued to believe that political 
considerations such as human rights and the free emigration of Soviet 
Jews should be linked to Soviet-American trade. Congress reflected 
this view by : 

(1) passing an amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act 
of 1945 that linked human rights to the extension of loans; 6 

(2) not repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade 
Act of 1974 which linked Jewish emigration to Soviet-American 
trade; and, 

(3) continuing to consider the possibility of linking trade to 
Soviet observation of human rights. 

Thus, the main dilemma facing Congress in the area of Soviet- 
American trade — how to increase trade with the Soviet Union while 
still remaining consistent with our policy of support for human rights 
and protecting national security — remained unresolved in 1977. While 
many Members wished to expand Soviet-American trade, others 

4 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Anns Control, Oceans and 
International Environment. United States/Soviet Strategic Options. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 
Jan. 14, 19, and Mar. 16, 1977, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 187 pp. 

5 Public Law 95-52, Export Admi lustration Act Amendments of 1977, signed into law by President 
Carter on June 22, 1977. 

« Public Law 95-143, Amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, signed into law by President 
Carter on Oct. 26, 1977. 



50 

iter emp o political and security consid- 

ms in determining the level of this trade — a linkage which ham? 
bh. 
, Ight8, Jewish cm '/(/rat "ion and the Commission on Security 
and Coo j" Europe 

lie t\w Carter administration made support for human rights 
an officially recognized guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy in 
inuea to place strong emphasis on human rights 
of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union — a 
( of the prese unistration. 

in March, both the House and the Senate approved a resolution 
(S. Con. Res. 7) prot ibuse of human rights in the Soviet 

3sed it ]>y-a vote of 91-0, while the House passed 
it 400-2. sional concern for human rights in the Soviet Union 

i expressed during that same month when the Senate pre- 
i a letter to President Carter supporting his human rights policy 
on the eve of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's departure for Moscow 
to meet with Soviet leaders. 7 

Closely related to the general issue of human rights was the contin- 
ued work of the Congressional-Executive Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. 8 The Commission was very active, holding 
numerous hearings on economic, political, and military relations 
between East and West, and Commissioners themselves were members 
of the U.S. delegation at the Belgrade CSCE followup meetings. 
The issue of most importance to its congressional Members, however, 
was that of human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 

The Soviet Union and the Third World 

In 1975 and 1976, Congress and the Ford administration had been 
unable to agree on a suitable American response to Soviet and Cuban 
involvement in Angola. Congress and the Carter administration 
experienced similar difficulties in 1977, in dealing with Soviet actions 
in the Horn of Africa. 9 The problem in both cases was essentially the 
same. Though many Members felt the need to respond in some way 
to Soviet involvement, there was no agreement on the form this 
response should take. The legacy of Vietnam largely precluded Ameri- 
can military involvement on a large scale, and diplomatic pressure 
on the Soviet Union appeared ineffective. The Carter administration 
seemed committed to a policy of restraint. A small number of Members 
advocated U.S. involvement, generally limited to military assistance 
to Somalia at least to partially counterbalance massive Soviet military 
assistance to Ethiopia. But the majority of Members, while voicing 
concern and displeasure over Soviet actions, were unwilling to support 
U.S. involvement at almost any level. 

Issues for the second session 

Many of the issues relating to Soviet-American relations that 
dominated congressional foreign policy thinking during the first 
ion of the 95th Congress are likely to continue to be of great inter- 
est and concern during the second session. 



.'or Howard M. Metzonbaum, letter to President Carter. Insertion in record. Cong. Rec. 
I.), vol. 12.'5. Mar. 2.">, 1977, p. 84915. 

Ion of this issue elsewhere in this volume. (Ed.) 
• Soe discussion of Africa issues elsewhere in this volume. (Ed.) 



51 

If the Soviet Union and the United States sign a SALT II Agreement 
in 1978, as many observers are predicting they will, there will probably 
be a long and heated debate in the Senate regarding its ratification. 
Although the House of Representatives has no official role in the 
treaty ratification process, it is likely that a new SALT agreement 
will be a topic of discussion in the House as well. 

In the area of Soviet-American trade, the second session will be 
faced with essentially the same problem that confronted the first 
session; namely, how to reconcile pressures for increased trade with 
countervailing pressures such as the linkage of human rights to 
Soviet-American trade. The growing U.S. foreign trade deficit may 
emerge as an important factor in bringing pressure to bear on Congress 
to loosen constraints inhibiting Soviet-American trade. 

With regard to the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, 
congressional concern can be expected to remain high. The Jewish 
emigration question can be expected to receive special consideration. 

The debate on the current state of the Soviet-American military 
balance and Soviet strategic intentions will be still another area of 
ongoing interest which will affect the congressional position on many 
defense issues such as authorization of new weapon systems and the 
size of the U.S. defense budget. 

Finally, Soviet activity in the Third World, particularly its present 
involvement in the Horn of Africa, will no doubt remain a focal point 
of congressional attention. For while the mood of the first session 
tended toward noninvolvement, increasing Soviet and Cuban 
involvement in the Horn of Africa has heightened consideration of 
more activist options in both Congress and the administration. 
There are indications that many Members are becoming increasingly 
concerned with Soviet actions, as is the Carter administration, 
and therefore may be reassessing their thinking on this issue. 

References 
congressional publications 

U.S. Congress. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Implementa- 
tion of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: 
Findings and Recommendations 2 Years After Helsinki. Committee Print, 
95th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 23, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977, 194 pp. 

House Committee on International Relations. The Soviet Union and the 

Third World: a Watershed in Great Power Policy? by Joseph G. Whelan and 
William B. Inglee. Committee Print, 95th Cong, 1st sess., May 8, 1977. Wash- 
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 186 pp. 

House Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Inter- 



national Security and Scientific Affairs. Technology Transfer and Scientific 
Cooperation Between the United States and the Soviet Union: A Review, 
prepared bv the Congressional Research Service. Committee Print, 95th Cong., 
1st sess., May 26, 1977, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office 1977, 
183 pp. 

House. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. United States Socialist 



Republics' Interruption of the United States Mail. Committee Print, 95th 
Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 21, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 16 pp. 

Joint Economic Committee. East European Economics Post-Helsinki. 



Edited by John P. Hardt; Joint Committee Print, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Aug. 25, 
1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 1,427 pp. 



52 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

Bell, Robert, Implications of extending the SALT I Interim Agreement. May 16 r 

1 *77. 76 pp. I U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Multi- 

lithed Report 77-124F). 
Bresnick. Ronda and John Hardt. Soviet agriculture and the grain trade. 

[asue Brief No. IB 75070. [Periodically updated.] 
Soviet economic performance ana plan. Issue Brief No. IB 76070. 

[Periodically updated.] 

Soviet energy: production and exports. Issue Brief No. IB 750.59. 



[Periodically updal 

Collin-, John. Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II): U.S. strategic force 

options, [ssu . LB 77046. [Periodically updated.] 

Hardt, John and Holliday, George. East-West commerical relations. Issue Brief 

Number IB 74110. [Periodically updated.] 

Export controls, [ssue Brief No. IB 75003. [Periodically updated]. 

Export-Import Bank. Issue Brief No. IB 74108. [Periodically updi 

Holliday, George. U.S. trad.' and payments with Communist countries: an over- 
view. July 17, 1977, 33 pp. (U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research 

vice, Multilithed Report 77-167E), 
! , William B. Soviet-American relations in 1976: a chronological summary 

and brief analysis. July 26, 1977, 135 pp. (U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional 

Research Service, Multilithed Report 77-1GGF). 
Soviet Union and the Third World. Issue Brief No. IB 77101. [Periodically 

updated.] 
Gellner, Charles. Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II) : problems and 

prospects. Issue Brief Number IB 77030. [Periodically updated.] 
Miko, Francis. Helsinki Final Act and the Belgrade Meeting: congressional 

oversight. Jan. 1, 1978. Issue Brief No. IB 76068. [Periodically updated.] 

Yugoslavia after Tito. Jan. 25, 1977, 43 pp. (U.S. Library of Congress, 

Congressional Research Service, Multilithed Report 77-2F). 

Pregelj, Vladimir. Most-favored-nation policv toward Communist countries. 

Jan. 1, 1978. Issue Brief No. IB 74139. [Periodically updated.] 
"VVhelan, Joseph. Detente with the Soviet Union. Issue Brief No. IB 74120. 

[Periodically updated.] 

Soviet- American Relations: human rights. Issue Brief No. IB 77031. 

[Periodically updated.] 



Relations With Chixa* 
overview 

No major legislation dealing with China was passed by Congress 
during 1977, but congressional leaders continued to demonstrate an 
active interest in the problems and prospects of improved U.S. rela- 
tions with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Highlighting the 
congressional role in this process over the past year were the visits 
of 12 Members of Congress to Peking, and several congressional 
proposals to change laws that restrict U.S. trade with the PRC. In 
addition, hearings on United States-China relations were conducted 
by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Inter- 
national Relations Committee. The hearings clearly reflected a pre- 
vailing view among those testifying that favored an improvement 
in U.S.-PRC relations, but they also noted with equal clarity a lack 
of consensus on what steps the United States should take in order 
to improve relations with Peking. 

Congressional activity on China policy over the past year has 
occurred against a backdrop of heightened U.S. and world interest 
in Sino-American relations following the start of formal bilateral 
negotiations between the Carter administration and the post-Mao 
Tse-tung leadership in China. Thus far, no appreciable movement 
in U.S.-PRC relations has resulted from these talks. Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance's August 22-26 visit to Peking — the first high- 
level Carter administration contact with the PRC — reportedly re- 
sulted in a useful exchange of views with Chinese Communist Party 
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, but 
had no noticeable effect on U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations. 1 Earlier 
in the year, low-level U.S.-PRC talks were held on resolving bilateral 
financial claims, but no results were noted. 2 The Carter administration 
has also reportedly debated the pros and cons of selling military 
technology to China, but has decided — at least for the time being — 
against such sales. 3 

discussion 
Normalization 

Commentaries by congressional leaders during the past year, and 
debates during hearings on United States-China relations which were 
conducted in September and October by the Subcommittee on Asian 
and Pacific Affairs of the House International Relations Committee, 
have focused on the problem of "normalization" — the establishment 
of full diplomatic relations — as the chief impediment to improved 
U.S.-PRC relations. Statements on China policy by Les AuCoin, 
Robert Dole, Barry Goldwater, Edward Kennedy, Charles Percy, 

* Prepared by Robert G. Sutter, Analyst in Asian Affairs. 

i New York Times, Aug. 26, 1077; Washington Post, Aug. 26, 1977. 

2 New York Times, May 1, 1977. 

s New York Times, June 23, 1977. 

(53) 



54 

William Roth, Lester Wolff and other congressional leaders, 4 and 
opinions voiced by 22 expert witnesses who testified at the above- 
mentioned hearings, reflected widely differing points of view as to 
how the Unit k3 States should approach the question of normalization. 
• hearings and subsequent analyses drawing on them have, 
rver, contributed to the identification of two important schools 
of thought on this issue. 

One group of American observers lias maintained that prompt 
progress toward iblishment of formal U.S. diplomatic relations 

with the PRC is needed in order to maintain and enhance the friendly 
Sino-American relationship begun during President Nixon's Febru- 
ary 1072 visit to Peking. They have presented arguments showing 
that normalization will assist important U.S. strategic, economic, 
moral, and other interests in international affairs, and they have 
warned that further delay in establishing U.S. -PRC diplomatic rela- 
tions may lead to a major reversal in Sino-American relations. 

Other U.S. observers doubt that substantial benefits would accrue 
to the United States and argue that normalization with the PRC 
could endanger the security of the people of Taiwan, U.S. investments 
there, and American interests elsewhere in Asia. These spokesmen have 
argued that normalization in accord with Peking's conditions could 
require an abrupt U.S. break with Taiwan which would seriously com- 
plicate U.S. interests in East Asia. 5 

Congressional visits, trade, and human rights 

Visible evidence of the congressional role in improved relations 
with China was seen in the visits of Members of Congress to the 
PRC over the past year. A congressional delegation led by Represent- 
ative John Brademas and Senator Richard Schweiker visited China 
during April. 6 It was the 13th U.S. congressional delegation to travel 
to the PRC since President Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972. Also, 
Senator Howard Metzenbaum traveled privately to the PRC in 
August, and Senator Edward Kennedy made a similar trip in Decem- 
ber. Although Peking has not reciprocated by sending members of its 
National People's Congress to the United States, a high-level delega- 
tion from the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, led by 
Ambassador Hao Te-ching, held talks with congressional and adminis- 
tration leaders during a 3-week tour of the United States in June anil 

Legislative proposals dealing with China have focused during the 
past year on issues of U.S.-PRC trade. 7 Thus, for example, Senator 
Robert Dole proposed on April 28 (S. 1415) that the Trade Act of 
1974 be amended to authorize certain credits or credit guarantees 
for the sale of agricultural products to nonmarket economy countries — 
a change that presumably would serve to expedite U.S. grain sales 
to the PRC. Representative Les AuCoin and 22 cosponsors introduced 
two bills on 11 July that were designed to ease U.S. credit restrictions 
in regard to trade with the PRC. One bill (H.R. 8197) proposed to 
amend the Trade Act of 1974 to permit the PRC to paticipate in 

< Bee, for example, Washington Post, Aug. 17, 1 ( J77; Cong. Rec, May 9, 1977, p. S7255; Asia Mail, March 

\-ia Mail. A i :.-- 1977. 
5 For an analysis of recent opinion in the CongreSB and elsewhere in the United States regarding the 
normalization question, see U.S. Library of Cong ssional Research Service. U.S.-PRC Nor- 

:ation: Arguments and Alternatives. Multilith 77-182 F, August 3. 1977. 
e other members of the group were Representative Silvio Conte, Senator William Roth, Representative 
Murk Andrews, Senator John Culver, Representative Jack Edwards, Senator John Durkin, Representative 
■' Danielson, and Repre rbara .Vikulski. 

: Pot further discussion of the East-West trade issue, see also the preceding chapter. (Ed.) 



55 

U.S. programs which extend credits, credit guarantees, or invest- 
ment guarantees. The other (H.R. 8198) proposed to amend the 
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 in order to open the bank's lines of 
credit for use by American exporters in transactions with the PRC. 
Proposed congressional resolutions (H. Con. Res. 32, H. Con. Res. 
332) stressed the importance of continued close U.S. relations with 
the Republic of China (ROC). An amendment proposed by Senator 
Goldwater to Senate Concurrent Resolution 60, and a congressional 
resolution (H. Con. Res. 395) proposed by Congressman Mathis, con- 
demned the state of human rights in the PRC. The condition of human 
rights in the PRC was also treated tangentially during hearings, con- 
ducted on June 14, 1977, by the Subcommittee on International Orga- 
nizations of the House International Relations Committee, which 
dealt with the condition of human rights in Taiwan. Most notably, 
Senator Goldwater submitted a statement to the subcommittee favor- 
ably comparing the condition of individual liberties in the ROC with 
what he claimed was "the denial of all recognized civil liberties by the 
PRC." 8 

Prospects 

Congressional concern regarding U.S. relations with China will 
probably focus next year — as it has in the past — on the issue of U.S.- 
PRC normalization. At present, it appears that U.S. -PRC relations 
are at an impasse and have few prospects for a quick breakthrough 
which would lead to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. 
Over the next year, the Congress will probably have occasion to con- 
sider whether the status quo in U.S. relations with Peking is satis- 
factory for U.S. strategic, economic, and other interests in the region, 
or whether the United States should take steps to improve ties with 
the PRC. Prominent among measures to improve relations, which 
will generate some attention from Congress, are the recent proposals by 
Senator Dole, Representative AuCoin, and others to amend laws re- 
stricting U.S. trade with China. Meanwhile, official contacts between 
congressional Members and Chinese leaders — especial!} 7 these made 
during the visits of congressional delegations to the PRC — are likely 
to remain a significant feature of U.S. -PRC relations during 1978. 

Two other issues concerning China — human rights and possible 
U.S. arms sales to China — may require congressional attention next 
year. Thus, for example, congressional Members may be called upon 
to consider the recently proposed resolutions condemning the status 
of human rights in the PRC, and Congress may follow the hearings 
this year on human rights in Taiwan with an examination of condi- 
tions in the PRC. Regarding arms sales, PRC officials have recently 
expressed an interest in purchasing arms from Western countries, 
although they are not known to have expressed a specific interest in 
U.S. weapons. U.S. military sales to China — if they occur — would 
probably prompt debate in Congress on the pros and cons of selling 
U.S. military hardware to Peking. Congress may play a more direct 
role in regulating such sales, inasmuch as the International Security 
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 gives Congress the 
right to reduce or end arms sales to a country found to be seriously 
violating human rights. 

» U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Orga- 
nizations. Human Rights in Taiwan. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. p. 73. 



56 
References 

CONGRESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS 

U.S. ( House. Committee on International Relations. China's Birth 

Elate, Death Rate, and Population Growth: Another Perspective. Report, 
•.'.". Ii Cong., Lsl Bess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 31 pp. 

Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Normalization of Relations 

with the People's Republic of China: Practical Implications. Hearings, 95th 
Coi 38. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977 394 pp. 

Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development. 



United . v t Union-China: The Great Power Triangle. Summary of 

Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st Bess. \\ a-hington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
L977. 52 pp. 

Subcommittee on Internationa] Organizations. Human Rights in Taiwan. 



Hearings, !>"th Cong., lsl Bess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 119 pp. 

House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on Domestic 



and Internationa] Scientific Planning, Analysis and Cooperation. The Role of 
Science and Technology in China's Population/Food Balance. Committee 
Print, !>~>th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
56 pp. 

Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy 

in Government. Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China — 1977. 
Hearings, 95th Cong. 1st sess. Parts 1 and 2. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. 93 pp. 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

China-U.S. Relations. Issue Brief Number IB76053. [Periodicals updated]. 

China-U.S. Trade. Issue Brief No. IB75085. [Periodically updated]. 

U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Major U.S. Foreign 
and Defense Policy Issues. A compilation of Papers prepared for the Commission 
on the Operation of the Senate by the Congressional Research Service. Wash- 
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. "Policy Issues in Asia: Sino-U.S. 
and Sino-Soviet Relations." pp. 200-206. 

U.S.-PRC Normalization: Arguments and Alternatives. Multilith 77-182 F, 
Aug. 3, 1977. 59 pp. 



FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF POLITICAL/ 
MILITARY POLICY 

Foreign Policy Implications of the Defense Budget* 

overview 

Action by Congress on the defense budget during 1977 confirmed 
the still tenuous nature of the link between U.S. military posture 
and foreign policy. The requirement, imposed on the Department of 
Defense by section 812, Public Law 94-106, that the relationship 
between foreign policy and military posture be explained and justified 
in the annual report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 continued to be 
honored more in the breach than in reality. Moreover, Congress, 
itself, showed little more clarity on how foreign policy objectives 
and defense posture were related. Debates on defense spending legis- 
lation continued to reflect generally particularistic concerns, rather 
than more broadly conceived foreign and defense policy objectives. 

Notwithstanding the difficulty of explicitly linking defense spending 
decisions to stated foreign policy objectives, it cannot be said that 
action by Congress on the defense budget was without significant 
foreign policy implications. On the contrary, during action on the 
defense budget in 1977 Congress dealt with a number of foreign policy- 
related defense issues. These included: NATO standardization and 
interoperability; spending and forces for European contingencies: 
funding for enhanced radiation artillery warheads for deployment 
in Europe; and the B-l bomber and strategic cruise missile programs. 
Few of these issues were resolved conclusively during 1977 congres- 
sional action, and most will likely remain issues for 1978 and beyond. 

U.S. military posture and foreign policy 

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld's annual report covering 
the fiscal year 1978 defense budget request continued to reflect a 
basic disagreement with the premises of section 812 of the fiscal year 
1976 Department of Defense Appropriations Authorization Act. That 
section, it may be recalled, stipulates that: 

The Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State, shall 
prepare and submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House 
of Representatives a written annual report on the foreign policy and military 
force structure of the United States for the next fiscal year, how such policy 
and force structure relate to each other, and the justification for each. 2 

In responding to this requirement Secretary Rumsfeld noted "as 
this Report set forth last year, the U.S. defense posture does not and 
cannot be made to relate directly to the short-term objectives and 



* Prepared by Richard P. Cronin, Analyst in National Defense. 

1 See Richard P. Cronin and Joel M. Woldman, "U.S. Foreign Policy Issues and Goals and the Defense 
Budget," Congress and Foreign Policy, 11)75. Committee Print. House Committee on International Rela- 
tions. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. pp. 7-8. 

* Section 812, Public Law 94-106, Oct. 7, 1975. 

29-972—78 5 

(57) 



58 

strategies of foreign policy decisionmakers, although it can and does 
contribute in a fundamental way to the environment in which such 
decisions are made." While conceding that "the size and composition 
of U.S. Armed Forces should not be insulated from what happens in 
the world," the basic thrust of the Defense Secretary's argument was 
that changes in U.S. foreign policy or the work! situation would have 
to have proven long-term significance before basic realinements in U.S. 
forces and defense posture could safely take place. 3 

DISCUSSION 

The administration budget request for fiscal year 1978 

January 1!)77 request and February budget amendments. — The initial 
fiscal year 1978 request submitted by the Ford administration totaled 
$122.9 billion in budget authority and $112.3 billion in outlays for 
the total national defense functional category. 4 This represented 
increases, respectively, of $14.4 billion in budget authority and $12.2 
billion in outlays over the estimates for fiscal year 1977. The February 
budget amendments submitted by the Carter administration reduced 
the budget request to $120.1 billion in budget authority and $111.9 
billion in outlays over the prior year. Most of the Carter administra- 
tion's amendments to the budget, which amounted to a net reduction 
of about $2.7 billion, were derived from slowdowns, pending revalua- 
tion, of weapons development and procurement programs. 

Foreign policy aspects of the defense budget request 

In presenting its revised budget the Carter administration sought 
to portray the image of a reorientation of the focus of U.S. defense 
spending toward possible NATO contingencies. This was presented as 
the obverse side of proposed slowdowns in strategic weapons develop- 
ment programs and the announced decision to withdraw U.S. ground 
forces from Korea over the next 5 years. Thus total net reduction 
of about $3.4 billion from the Ford budget request included the ad- 
dition of about $400 million to meet immediate requirements relating 
to the readiness of U.S. forces in Europe. The additional funds for 
aircraft shelters and ammunition storage facilities in Europe, however, 
were small in comparison with reductions in weapons development and 
procurement programs which were also relevant to U.S. capabilities 
in Europe. 5 

Subsequent budget amendments 

Subsequent budget amendments in mid-1977 reduced the Carter 
administration request for fiscal year 1978 by another $818.6 million. 
These included several changes having a potentially important effect 
on U.S.-Soviet negotiations on a new Strategic Arms Limitation 



* U.S. Department of Defense. Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Congress on 
the fiscal year 1978 budget, fiscal year 1979 authorization request and fiscal years 1978-82 defense pro- 
grams. Jan. 19, 1977, p. 11. 

* The national defense function of the budget includes regular Department of Defense military appro- 
priations (Including retired pay), foreign military assistance, atomic energy defense activities of the Energy 
Research and Development Administration (now tlie Department of Energy) and miscellaneous defense- 
related activities such as the Selective Service System. 

5 For example, d( velopmenl slowdowns, program reductions or cancellations amounting to $1,060 million 
involving the folic wing weapons systems: Nonnuclear Lance missile (proposed cancellation); Hawk anti- 
aircraft missile; advanced attack helico] ter; CH63E heavy-lift helicopter; F-15 air superiority fighter; 
advanced tanker-cargo aircraft; Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS); and A-7E attack 
aircran. Department of Defense. Statement of Secretary of -Defense Harold Brown to 1 he Congress on tha 
amendments to the fiscal year 1978 1 udget and fiscal year 1979 authorization request, Feb. 22, 1977. 



59 

Treaty (SALT-II) ; namely, the decision to terminate the B-l bomber 
program and the related decision to accelerate the development of air- 
launched cruise missiles. This decision involved the reduction of about 
$1.5 billion from the B-l program and the related SRAM-B (short- 
range attack missile) program, and the addition of about $500 million 
for the air-launched cruise missile development program and to up- 
grade and extend the life of the B-52 bomber force. Other amendments 
added $5 million for a classified intelligence program and $193.8 
million in long-lead funds for the first of four nuclear powered, AEGIX 
air defense system-equipped, Virginia-cldLSs cruisers. 

Congressional action on the defense budget and foreign policy implica- 
tions/overall budget reductions 

The congressional budget process. — The new congressional budget 
process which followed from passage of the Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-344) provides 
for the setting of overall spending limits for each functional category 
of the budget, within which all appropriations and other spending 
authority must be accommodated. In effect. Congress establishes the 
relative priorities of each budget function with respect to other Fed- 
eral programs. Senate Concurrent Resolution 19, the first concurrent 
resolution on the budget, which received final approval in the Senate 
on May 13 and the House on May 17, 1977, provided defense spending 
targets of $118.5 billion in budget authority and $111.0 billion in 
outlays. These targets were $1.6 billion lower in budget authority than 
the administration's Februan^ budget request and $0.9 billion in lower 
estimated outlays. Controversy over the proposed spending targets for 
the national defense function and the overall balance of defense and 
nondef ense spending was a key factor in the initial failure of the House 
to agree on a first budget resolution. The final resolution was a compro- 
mise between revised (upward) House spending targets and Senate 
targets that were nearly identical to the administration's request. 

The second concurrent resolution on the budget, House Concurrent 
Resolution 341, which passed the House and Senate on September 15, 
1977, provided ceilings of $116.4 billion in budget authority and $110.1 
billion in outlays for the national defense function for fiscal year 1978. 
These changes reflected expected or completed actions by the Congress 
on defense spending legislation, including the deletion of the B-l 
bomber program and the requested increases in funding for the air- 
launched cruise missile program. 

Defense spending legislation. — Action to date on fiscal year 1978 
appropriations is shown in table 2. This table does not include an 
annual cost-of-living pay increase supplemental that will be sub- 
mitted in the spring of 1978. 

Foreign policy implications of congressional action 

Congress dealt with a number of issues having foreign policy 
implications during action on defense spending legislation. Some of 
the more important issues, and the results of congressional action, 
include the following: 

NATO standardization and interoperability 

Background. — In the past several years both Congress and the 
executive branch have expressed increasing interest in improving the 



$112,532 
3,016 


i $109, 752 
2,978 


95-111 
95-101 


972 
449 


926 
424 


95-148 
S5-240 


142 

2,382 

13 


130 
2,242 
12 ... 


95-81 
95-96 



60 

TABLE 2.-NATIONAL DEFENSE FUNCTION APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1978 
[Dollar amounts in millions! 

Revised 
Appropriation act request' Enacted Public Law 

Department of Defense (H.R. 7933) 

Military construction and family housing (H.R. 7589) 

Foreign assistance and related programs (H.R. 7797) — (foreign military 

assistance 

Supplemental (H.R. 9375— cruise missile supplemental) 

Treasury, Postal Service and other agencies (H.R. 7552— Civil Defense 

and Defense Production Act) 

Public Works— ERDA (H.R. 7553— atomic energy defense activities) 

Miscellaneous 

Total 119,505 116,463 

i Totals reflect July 22, 1977, Presidential recision o.f the B-l bomber program, July 1, 1977 0MB revised estimates and 
previous budget amendments. 

» Excludes funds in bill for Office of Federal Procurement Policy (functional category 802) Act totals $109,752,776,000 
with these funds. 

Source: House Committee on Armed Services, fiscal year 1978 National Defense function (050) Budget, Resolution, 
Authorization and Appropriation, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, 2 pp. 

degree of standardization and interoperability of the weapons of the 
Q.S. forces and its NATO allies. 6 One milestone in the growth of 
concern about this issue was the passage, during 1976, of section 
802, Public Law 94-361 (Department of Defense Appropriations 
Authorization Act, 1977). Section 802 stated that "it is the policy of 
the United States that equipment procured for the use of personnel of 
the Armed Forces of the United States stationed in Europe under the 
North Atlantic Treaty should be standardized or at least interoperable 
with equipment of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- 
nization." The section went on to specify considerations and procedures 
to be used by the Department of Defense in deciding standardization 
and interoperability issues when procuring military equipment, and to 
specify reporting requirements for cases involving the decisions to 
acquire equipment manufactured outside the United States or the 
initiation of procurement actions on new major systems that are not 
standardized or interoperable with NATO equipment. 7 

1977 action affecting NATO standardization and interoperability 
objectives. — During 1977, Congress continued to provide funds for the 
two weapons systems commonly viewed as showpiece examples of 
standardization and interoperability, the French-German Roland air 
defense missile system and the XM-1 main battle tank. Action by 
Congress on both systems, however, highlighted the pitfalls that lie 
in the path of standardization objectives. Moreover, the paucity of 
significant weapons systems programs meeting standardization and 
interoperability objectives illustrates the still limited commitment to 
these goals in the face of other objectives such as national self-suffi- 
ciency, domestic defense employment and lowest unit cost objectives. 

In its report on Defense Appropriation Authorization Bill for fiscal 
year 78 (H.R. 5970), the House Armed Services Committee expressed 
serious impatience with seeming runaway cost growth in the Roland 



• Also Me the discussion of SALT on pp. 92-96 in this collection. (Ed.) 

7 Sec. 803 of the samp act. which is a broadened form of language added to the authorization bill during 
107".. stresses the common development of weapons systems for employment in the NATO theater, greater 
empha^i* on licensing and coproduction, accelerated inter-European development and production pro- 
grams and the "two-way street" concept of cooperation between Europe and North America. 



61 

development program. Most of this cost growth stemmed from the 
Army's insistence on " Americanizing" the entire system. Faced with 
development cost growth on the order of 100 percent during the past 3 
years, the committee put restrictive language in the bill as reported 
(sec. 203) that would establish a minimum field replaceable sub- 
systems interchangeability objective of at least 350 subsystems 
(versus an Army objective of 500 subsystems) and a ceiling of $265 
million on the entire development program. 8 Subsequently, the House 
and Senate conferees agreed to delete the restrictive provisions from 
the bill itself, but the conferees went on record as supporting the 
development of the Roland system within guidelines indicated by the 
House committee. "The conferees," the report (S. Rept. 95-282) 
noted, "support increased standardization but in the long run a 
program with excessive cost overruns and questionable performance 
would do more to delay standardization than to aid it. Therefore, it is 
crucial that the Roland system meet cost and performance goals." 
(p. 37) Having stipulated guidelines for the continued development of 
the system, the conferees agreed that "The Secretary of the Army 
shall inform the Committees on Armed Services of the House and 
Senate within 60 days of the date of this report whether these con- 
ditions can be satisfied." (p. 38.) 

The Congress also came into conflict with Department of Defense 
over another major standardization objective, that of putting the 
same engine, gun and other principal systems on the new American 
and German (and, perhaps, British) main battle tanks. 9 This was a 
compromise goal after the U.S. seemingly backed down from an earlier 
indication that it would test the German Leopard II tank against the 
winner of the U.S. prototype competition for the XM-1 main battle 
tank, and at least consider the German tank for acquisition if it proved 
superior to the U.S. prototype. It was widely believed that agree- 
ment to adopt the German 120mm gun for the XM-1, instead of the 
American 105mm gun, was to be a quid pro quo for German} T, s willing- 
ness to contribute to NATO's acquisition of the American AW ACS 
radar surveillance system and as a salve for German irritation at 
being denied an opportunity to sell the Leopard II tank to the U.S. 
Army. 10 

Enhanced radiation warheads ("Neutron Bomb") 

The budget request for atomic energy defense activities conducted 
by the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) 
contained a classified amount of funds for the initiation of production 



« H. Rept. 95-194, pp. 76-77. 

9 Also see the discussion of Western Europe on pp. 205-210 in this collection. (Ed.) 

l0 Tn a report on the XM-1 tank program the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services 
Committee noted: 

"It has come to the attention of the subcommittee that there appears to be a curious but, nonetheless, per- 
vasive interrelationship between the fate of the Leopard/XM-1 agreement and the purchase of A WACS. 
Leading members of the German Bundestag have been quoted on several occasions as saying that a failure 
on the part of the United States to select the German 120-millimeter gun for its XM-1 tank would mean the 
FRG would decline to purchase the AW ACS. 

It has been suggested on a number of occasions that acceptance of the FR G's 120-millimeter gun is. to our 
European allies, the symbol of U.S. commitment to the principle of standardization, and as such has become 
the necessary condition for Federal Republic of Germany participation in the AWACS program. The com- 
mittee, however, found no evidence to indicate that AWACS and the tank negotiations have ever been 
officially linked as a package deal either by the United States or the FRG Government." 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Report of the Oversight Hearings on the Status 
of the Army XM-1 Tank Program before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed 
Services, Oct. 18, 1977. Washington; 1977 (H.A.S.C No. 95-35), pp. 11-12. 



62 

of an enhanced radiation warhead for the Lance tactical missile and 
the development of new nuclear warheads for the 8-inch howitzer and 
the 155mm artillery shells. 11 The basic objective of enhanced radiation 
warheads, which are intended for the European theater, is to sub- 
stitute lethal, relatively narrowly confined radiation for concussion 
and heat characteristics in nuclear warheads, thereby limiting col- 
lateral damage to structures and noncombatants. 

While the principles involved in these weapons are not new, the 
reports that the ERDA budget request contained funds for their 
development and production touched off a heated and often emotional 
debate in Congress. Proponents of the enhanced radiation warheads 
argued that these weapons could stop massive Soviet armor assaults 
without causing catastrophic damage and civilian deaths in heavily 
populated areas such as the - border regions between East and West 
Germany. It was argued that this would thereby make the nuclear 
deterrent more credible and would consequently reduce the likelihood 
of such weapons having to be used. Opponents of the warheads criti- 
cized the fact that outside the immediate blast area they killed by 
means of a relatively lingering death from radiation overdose, and 
maintained that the weapons were therefore inhumane. Opponents of 
the weapons noted the seemingly higher value placed on buildings 
than people. Perhaps more crucial, opponents of the warheads argued 
that such devices, because they reduced collateral damage, would be 
more tempting to use in a crisis and would therefore lower the nuclear 
threshold. 

During action on the ERDA authorization bill (H.R. 6566) the 
House rejected an amendment to stop further work on the weapons by 
a margin of 109 yeas to 297 nays, and the final bill passed by a margin 
of 330-78. Since the Senate had attached no restrictions on the en- 
hanced radiation warheads the final bill left the administration's 
proposed program intact. 

A more serious challenge arose during consideration of H.R. 7553, 
the public works for water and power development and energy 
research appropriation bill, 1978. Considerable debate occurred in 
both the House and Senate on the enhanced radiation warhead issue, 
with opposition relatively stronger in the latter body. An amendment 
to bar any funds in the bill for the production of enhanced radiation 
warheads failed by a margin of 38-58, but the Senate adopted, by a 
vote of 74-19, an amendment barring the production of enhanced 
radiation weapons unless the President certified to the Congress that 
such a step was in the national interest. The amendment also provided 
that, within 45 days of such certification, Congress could disapprove 
the President's decision by a concurrent resolution. This was a 
compromise amendment offered by the Senate Majority Leader 
Robert Byrd following a filibuster led by Senator Mark O. Hatfield. 
The conference report was approved by both the House and Senate 
on July 25 with the Senate amendment intact, and the President 
signed the bill into law as Public Law 95-96 on August 7, 1977. 

The B-l bomber I cruise missile decision 

Background and congressional action. — A third issue with potentially 
large foreign policy implications was the President's decision, sub- 



« A report in the Washington Post of June 24, 1977 (p. Al) alleged that these new warheads would be of the 
enhanced radiation type. 



63 

sequently endorsed by Congress after a hard fight, to cancel the 
B- 1 strategic bomber program and focus on the long-range version of 
the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) as the most cost-effective 
way of maintaining the " triad" of manned strategic bombers, land- 
based ICBM's and sea-launched ballistic missiles. The object of this 
decision was to prolong the useful life of the B-52 bomber beyond the 
time when it will be incapable of penetrating Soviet air defenses 
and thereby avoid the necessity of spending some $20 billion to acquire 
a fleet of 244 B-l bombers. Instead, the administration proposed to 
build an unspecified number of low-flying, subsonic cruise missiles 
to be launched from existing B-52 bombers and, perhaps, modified 
civilian-type wide-body aircraft. 

Congress ratified the decision to cancel the B-l bomber production 
program during final action on H.R. 7933, the Department of Defense 
Appropriation Act (Public Law 95-111). The issue was closely con- 
tested in the House, however, with agreement coming by a narrow 
margin of 202-199. The Congress more readily agreed to add nearly 
$500 million in a supplemental appropriation (H.R. 9375) to accelerate 
development of the air-launched cruise missile and upgrade the B-52 
fleet, but final action on this measure was delayed until February 
by a House-Senate dispute over the proposed cancellation of the fiscal 
year 1977 B-l production program, involving some $462 million in 
unobligated funds. A Senate amendment that would have rescinded 
fiscal year 1977 funds was defeated in the House on December 6, 1977, 
by a margin of 166 yeas to 191 nays. The Senate voted to uphold its 
position on February 1, 1978. The House receded from its disagree- 
ment to the Senate amendment on February 22, 1978. 12 

Foreign policy implications. — The B-l bomber/cruise missile decision 
seems to have affected the SALT II negotiations, but in a still un- 
predictable way. The B-l aircraft itself was not a significant factor in 
the Vladivistok Accord of November, 1974, since it was designed as a 
replacement for the B-52 force. The Soviets, however, had shown 
early resistance to the cruise missile. Considerable acrimony arose 
between the U.S. and the Soviets oyer whether cruise missiles were 
to be counted in the tentative ceiling of 2,400 strategic missile 
launchers. 13 

By canceling the B-l bomber and seeking reliance on the cruise 
missile, therefore, the U.S. traded a relatively noncontroversial 
system for one which would likely encounter strong Soviet resistance 
at the SALT II bargaining table. 

While the U.S. previously planned to deploy the cruise missile in 
conjunction with the B-l bomber, the terms which the U.S. achieves 
for cruise missiles are now much more critical. Reportedly, the United 
States has agreed to sign a 3-year protocol limiting the range of cruise 
missiles to 1,500 nautical miles, with extra range allowances for flying 
a diversionary flight path. The Soviets, however, have balked at 



12 Proponents of completing aircraft 5 and 6, which would have been additional test aircraft instead of 
production models, argued that this course would preserve the option to build the aircraft for perhaps 2 
years longer and thereby offer a hedge against unforeseen developments, including a breakdown in the 
SALT II talks. Opponents of the fiscal year 1977 program argued that this would be a waste of money since 
Congress had already confirmed the President's decision to cancel the program; 

is "The ABC's of the Arms Controversy," Time, Apr. 11, 1977, p. 13. 



64 

agreeing to the deployment of cruise missiles in civilian-type wide- 
body aircraft on grounds that the total numbers of U.S. cruise missiles 
and launchers would not be verifiable. 14 

The B-l decision may also make it more difficult for the adminis- 
tration to gain Senate approval of a SALT II agreement. Most 
observers agree that the B-52 bomber has a limited future as a pene- 
trating bomber. Without the B-l as a follow-on manned penetrating 
bomber it will probably be more difficult to meet criticisms of certain 
asymmetries in U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic forces, especially the heav- 
ier and more numerous Soviet ICBM's. Moreover, while a 3-year 
protocol limiting cruise missile ranges would not have much practical 
effect on the planned development program, critics of the reported 
protocol terms may be expected to argue that it will be very difficult 
to drop the limitations at the end of the protocol period without 
seeming to take a backward step in strategic arms control. 

Issues for 1978 

Due to the inconclusive results of 1977 action on defense budget 
issues having foreign policy implications, most issues discussed in this 
chapter will likely carry over into 1978. Congress may or may not be 
presented with a SALT II treaty in 1978, but if a treaty is offered for 
ratification any restrictions on the testing and deployment of long- 
range cruise missiles will almost certainly generate a heated debate. 
The issue of NATO standardization is an open-ended issue that will 
likely last as long as the alliance. During 1978 Congress will have an 
opportunity to review the decision to adopt the German 120mm gun 
for the XM-1 tank and a variety of other weapons systems issues 
having standardization and interoperability implications. The issue 
of a major military assistance program for South Korea, postponed 
this year due to the adverse political climate, may be taken up in 
1978. Finally, there will be the issue of the continued reorientation of 
U.S. defense posture toward European contingencies and, more re- 
recently, toward threats to the Persian Gulf oilfields. Congress may 
want to consider these plans in the context of the implications for U.S. 
military posture and foreign policy worldwide. 

References 
congressional publications 

The various parts of the defense budget request are the subject of hearings 
before a number of committees, including the Budget Committees, the Armed 
Services Committees, and the Appropriations Committees, the House Committee 
on International Relations and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the 

Department of Defense. Department of Defense appropriations for 1978. 

Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1977. 647 pp. Part 1 — Budget Overview. 
Senate. Committee on the Budget. First concurrent resolution on the 

budget — fiscal year 1978. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1977. 741 pp. 
National defense: Mar. 3, 1977 — Mission budgeting and Navy shipbuildings. 

programs; Mar. 4, 1977 — Mission budgeting: a view from DOD; Mar. 8, 1977 — 

Defense Manpower costs. 



M "Soviets Express Concern Over SALT Progress," Washington Post, Feb. 12, 1978, p. 1; 



65 

U.S. Congressional Budget Office. Budget options for fiscal year 1978: a report to 
the Senate and House Committees on the Budget (as required by Public Law 
93-344). Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 202 pp. 

U.S. Congress. Conference Committees, 1977. First concurrent resolution on the 
budget fiscal year 1978; conference report to accompany S. Con. Res. 19. Wash- 
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, 18 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. 
House. Report. No. 95-291). Also issued as 95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. 95-134. 

Second concurrent resolution on the budget, fiscal year 1978; conference 

report to accompany H. Con. Res. 341. [Washington, U.S. Government Printing 

Office] 1977. 16 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. No. 95-601) 

Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1978; Conference 

report to accompany H.R. 5970. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office 
1977. 59 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rept. No. 95-282) 

Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1978; con- 



ference report to accompany H.R. 5970. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office 1977. 59 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. 95-446) 

Military Construction Authorization Act, 1978; conference report to 



accompanv S. 1474. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office 1977. 37 pp. 
(95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. No. 95-494) 

Military construction appropriations; conference report to accompany 



H.R. 7589. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 12 pp. (95th 
Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. No. 95-560) 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Authorizing Appropria- 
tions, Fiscal year 1978, for military procurement, research and development, 
and civil defense; and prescribing strengths for active-duty and reserve military 
training student loads; and for other purposes: Report together with individual, 
additional, and dissenting views to accompany H.R. 5970. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. 160 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. No. 
95-194) 

Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriation Authorization Act, 

1978; report together with dissenting views to accompany H.R. 8390. Washing- 
ton, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 30 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. 
H. Rept. No. 95-614) 

Military construction Authorization Act, 1978; report to accompany 



H.R. 6990. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 72 pp. (95th 
Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. No. 95-290) 

Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriation bill 



1978; report together with separate and additional views to accompany H.R. 
7933. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 387 pp. (95th Cong., 
1st sess. H. Rept. No. 95-451) 

Committee on Appropriatons. Military construction appropriation bill, 



1978; report together with additional views to accompany H.R. 7589. Washing- 
ton, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 51 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. 
H. Rept. No. 95-388) 

Committee on the Budget. First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget — 



Fiscal Year 1978; Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 195, setting for the 
congressional budget for the U.S. Government for fiscal year 1978 together 
with additional, supplemental, and minority views. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 181 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. No. 95-189) 
First concurrent resolution on the budget — fiscal year 1978: report to 



accompany H. Con. Res. 214. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 23 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. No. 95-239) 

Views and estimates of Standing Committees of the House, Joint Com- 



mittee on Internal Revenue Taxation, and Joint Economic Committee (to- 
gether with separate, minority, additional, dissenting, and supplemental views) 
on the congressional budget for fiscal year 1978 submitted pursuant to section 
301 of the Congressional Budget and Control Act of 1974. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. 883 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. House) 

Second Concurrent Resolution on the Budget — Fiscal Year 1978; report to 



accompany H. Con. Res. 341, together with supplemental, additional, and 
minority views. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 160 pp. 
(95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. No. 95-582) 



66 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Authorizing appropria- 
tions for fiscal year 1978 for military procurement, research and development, 
active duty, selected research, and civilian personnel strengths, civil defense, 
and for other purposes; report to accompany H.R. 5970 together with additional 
Views. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 163 pp. (95th Cong., 
lstsess. S. Rept. No. 95-129) 

Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense appropriation bill, 

1978; report to accompany H.R. 7933. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 295 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. No. 95-325) 

Department of Defense appropriation bill, 1978, report to accompany 



H.R. 7933. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 295 pp. (95th 
Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. No. 95-325) 

Committee on the Budget. First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget, 



Fiscal Year 1978, report to accompany S. Con. Res. 19 together with supple- 
mental and minority views. ^Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 131 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. No. 95-90) 

Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1978; report to accom- 



panv S. 1474 together with additional views. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. 88 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. No. 95-125) 

First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget, Fisal Year 1978; report to 



accompany S. Con. Res. 19 together with supplemental and minority views. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 131 pp. (95th Cong., 
1st sess. S. Rept. No. 95-90) 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. The National defense 
functional category of the fiscal year 1978 budget by Richard Cronin. Wash- 
ington, Mar. 23, 1977. 38 pp. Multilith 77-38F 
See also the following periodically updated Issue Briefs: 

IB73001— Trident Program 

IB74088 — Defense Manpower Costs 

IB75052— XM-1 Main Battle Tank Program 

IB76018 — Cruise Missile Programs 

IB77013— Navy Shipbuilding 

IB77097— U.S. Arms Sales Debate 



Overseas Commitments and Bases* 

overview 

Although it was anticipated that President Carter would submit 
legislation to implement the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) 
with Turkey early in 1977, he did not do so. The issues related to the 
Turkish DCA remain, however, and are likely to resurface in 1978. 
Congress may be faced with the further requirement of considering 
similar defense arrangements with Greece and with the Philippines 
during 1978. 

DISCUSSION 

Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement 

When the Congress chose not to resume military assistance and sales 
to Turkey in late July 1975 (due to its concern with the Turkish 
military intervention in the 1974 Cyprus crisis), the Turkish Govern- 
ment announced that the Defense Cooperation Agreement of July 3, 
1969, governing "common defense cooperation between Turkey and 
the United States and all other related agreements had lost their va- 
lidity.' ' This action by the Turks had the eventual effect of suspending 
activities at certain key intelligence-collecting installations maintained 
by the United States in Turkey. 

On October 28, 1975, the United States Government and the 
Government of Turkey began formal negotiations in the hope of re- 
solving the base use controversy. On March 26, 1976, Secretary of 
State Henry A. Kissinger and Turkish Foreign Minister Ihsan S. 
Caglayangil signed a new four-year Defense Cooperation Agreement. 
The proposed agreement, if approved, would replace the 1969 U.S.- 
Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement and its annexes (a classified 
executive agreement) and would permit the United States to resume 
the activities at United States installations in Turkey suspended by 
the Turkish Government in July 1975. The document was submitted 
to the Congress by the President accompanied by a draft joint reso- 
lution on June 16, 1976. 1 

Implicit in the language and concept of the March 26, 1976, United 
States-Turkish DCA is the separation of the Cyprus issue from 
consideration of U.S. military aid to Turkey, at least for the 4-year 
life of the agreement. Since implementing legislation would have 
to be passed by Congress to waive the provisions of section 620 (x) 
(the Turkish arms embargo provision) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
and approve the military aid package in the accord, a full discussion 
of these issues will likely occur when the DCA is finally submitted for 
congressional action. It was unclear in December 1977 when the 
President would submit the necessary implementing legislation for the 

•Prepared by Richard F. Grimmett, Analyst in National Defense. 

> U.S. Congress. House. Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey. H. Docj No. 94-351. June 16, 
1976. 94th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 

(67) 



68 

Turkish DCA. In 1977 the Carter administration chose only to endorse 
the DCA "in principle' 1 during congressional hearings. However, it is 
possible that 1978 will see the final submission of an agreement for 
congressional consideration. 2 

Anticipated Defense Cooperation Agreement with Greece 

As a result of the bitterness created in Greece by the successful 
Turkish military intervention in the Cyprus civil conflict of 1974, 
coupled with the belief by the Greeks that the United States had not 
acted effectively to restrain Turkey's action, the Greek Government, 
in the summer of 1974, made known to the United States Government 
its desire to renegotiate existing agreements relating to U.S. military 
facilities in Greece. After initial discussions on this subject were held 
between the two governments, the United States agreed on April 29, 
1975 to terminate the homeporting of the U.S. Sixth Fleet at Elefsis 
[Athens]. Certain U.S. military facilities "which contribute to Greek 
defense needs" were to continue to operate at the Greek Air Force 
Base at Hellenikon [Athens]. It was also determined on April 29 that 
a review by the two governments of the status and conditions of opera- 
tions at the remaining U.S. military facilities in Greece will continue 
in an effort to achieve agreement on "elimination, reduction and con- 
solidation" of such facilities. 3 

On April 15, 1976 representatives of the United States and Greece 
approved a statement outlining the principles which will guide future 
United States-Greece Defense Cooperation. This statement noted 
that the United States and Greece would seek to complete "as soon as 
possible" a new Defense Cooperation Agreement that will replace the 
agreement on United States-Greek military facilities signed in 1953 
and other related agreements. The statement further indicated that 
the new agreement would be designed to reflect the "traditionally 
close association" between Greece and the United States and the 
"mutuality of their defense interest in the North Atlantic Alliance." 
In addition, the new agreement, would "define the status and set 
forth the terms for operations of military installations in Greece where 
United States personnel are present." 4 

Negotiations to conclude a new United States-Greek Defense 
Cooperation Agreement based upon the above stated principles 
began in early May 1976. 

On July 28, 1977, the Greek and United States Governments 
initialed a draft agreement. This agreement has not yet been formally 
signed by the two governments, however, and until this signing occurs, 
the text of the final United States-Greek Defense Cooperation Agree- 
ment cannot be made public and submitted to Congress for imple- 
mentation. State Department officials have indicated that the basic 



J U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. Hear. 

Ings on Security Assistance Authorization, Apr. 21, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. pp. 9, 13, 31-36; and U.S. 

Congress. Rouse. Committee on International Pvelations, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 

Hearings on Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1978 (Part 5) (Apr. 21, 1977) 95th Cong. 1st 

Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977 pp. 276-281, 286-289. 

» U.S. Department of State. Press release No. 219. Apr. 29, 1975. 

* U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 74. May 17, 1976: 629-630. 

Note.— Since the Turkish DCA was signed, only 1 day of formal hearings has been held on it, with no 
action resulting from this hearing. See hearing of Sept. 15, 1976, before the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. United States-Turkey Defense Coopera- 
tion Agreement. Hearings on S.J. Res. 204, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Sept. 15, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 



69 

framework of the Greek DCA follows that of the April 15, 1976 
statement of principles on the subject signed by both governments.* 

It is not clear when the Greek DCA will be signed and submitted 
to Congress for consideration. But it is possible that this could occur 
in 1978. 
Anticipated military bases agreement with the Philippines 

On April 12, 1976 the United States and the Philippines formally 
opened negotiations on a new agreement to govern the use of two 
major military bases and associated facilities that the United States 
currently maintains there. Detailed negotiations on this bases agree- 
ment have continued off and on since June 15, 1976. In 1977 U.S. 
officials held talks with President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines 
and key officials of his government on a wide variety of issues relating 
to the bases. These discussions and negotiations continue and at some 
point may lead to the most fundamental redrafting of the United 
States-Philippines Military Bases Agreement since the original basic 
accord entered into force on March 26, 1947. 6 

Among the key questions reportedly under discussion between the 
United States and Philippine Government are the terms under which 
the United States will be permitted to use the naval station atSubicBay 
and Clark Air Force Base — the largest military base the United States 
utilizes in Asia. The Philippine Government is seriously interested in 
reasserting its sovereign t}^ and jurisdiction over the installations 
maintained b}^ the United States in the Philippines, as well as obtain- 
ing greater compensation or "rent" from the United States for use 
of these military facilities. The Philippine Government is also in- 
terested in reducing the size of U.S. base holdings there. Clark Air 
Force Base alone consists of over 131,000 acres, while the Subic 
Bay installation covers nearly 62,000 acres of land and sea. The 
Philippine Government is further interested in securing legal juris- 
diction over U.S. military personnel assigned there, and obtaining 
an effective role in determining the uses to which the military bases are 
put. 7 

In view of the many significant issues involved in the current 
negotiations between the two governments, talks have proceeded 
slowly and carefully. The date that the new agreement will be signed 
cannot be predicted at this time. However, pending the final res- 
olution of the talks, under the existing agreement, the United States 
retains its current rights until the year 1991. 



5 Information supplied bv Department of State, January 1978. Also see Washington Post, Julv 29, 1977, 
p. 14; Los Angeles Times, July 29, 1977, p. 4. 

6 11 U.S.T. [Bevins] 55-77 contains the text of the original U.S. -Philippines Military Bases Agreement. 

7 For press accounts of the private, ongoing negotiations, and related details concerning the U.S.- 
Philippines Military Bases Agreement see: New York Times, June 11, 1976; p. 3; Washington Post, June 15, 
1976, p. 20; Washington Post, June 16, 1976, p. A20; New York Times, June 16, 1976, p. 8; New York Times, 
June 26, 1976, p. 4; Washington Post, July 11, 1976, p. 15; Los Angeles Times, Aug. 15, 1976: IX-1; Wall Street 
Journal, Sept. 10, 1976, p. 30; Los Angeles Times, July 11, 1977, p. 1; New York Times, Aug. 14, 1977, p. 14; 
Washington Post, Sept. 25, 1977, p. A27; Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 23, 1977, p. 4; Washington Post,. 
Nov. 17, 1977, p. A26; Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 16, 1977, p. 1; Washington Post, Dec. 7, 1977, A23. 



Conventional Arms Transfers* 

overview 

Other than an increased emphasis on human rights, there were few 
now legislative initiatives concerning U.S. security assistance and 
arms transfer programs in 1977. The emphasis rather was on institu- 
tionalizing and extending reforms and legislative restrictions in the 
program which had been enacted in 1976. Certain restrictions were 
modified so as to ease burdensome administrative problems which 
had been encountered in implementing the 1976 legislation. On May 
19, 1977, the President announced the policy of his administration 
concerning arms transfers. The Congress closely observed and com- 
mented on subsequent administration efforts at implementation of 
that policy during the remaining months of 1977. 

DISCUSSION 

Legislation 

Military assistance. — The first order of business concerning security 
assistance which occupied the Congress in 1977 was a request by the 
Carter administration in late February to authorize an additional 
$30 million in supplemental military assistance to Portugal for fiscal 
year 1977. This amount was designed to provide a C-130 aircraft and 
priority ground force equipment to a newly constituted Portuguese 
airborne brigade. This authorization, which in large part represented 
a reallocation of funds already authorized, was quickly approved by 
both Houses and was signed into law on April 30, 1977 (Public Law 
95-23). * 

The budget of the Ford administration for fiscal year 1978 proposed 
a military assistance program of $218.6 million to eight countries, 
five of which contained U.S. military bases. The eight were Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Jordan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand. As in fiscal year 1977, Jordan was again slated to be the 
largest recipient of U.S. grant military assistance. An additional 
$66 million was allocated for the management of the program and 
for the delivery of previously funded materiel to countries no longer 
receiving military aid. This military aid program of $284.6 million 
for fiscal year 1978 required the appropriation of $230 million in new 
obligational authority. In addition, $35.7 million was requested for 
the international military education and training (IMET) program 
for fiscal year 1978 to provide training to personnel from 46 countries. 
$710 million was requested to finance credit arms purchases from the 
United States. 

On March 28, 1977, President Carter transmitted his security 
assistance proposals for fiscal year 1978 to Congress. The new ad- 
ministration's request for military assistance was identical to the 
Ford budget request. However, the request for international military 

• Prepared by Herbert Y. Sohandler, Specialist in National Defense. 

1 U.S. Congress, i louse. Committee on International Relations. To Authorize Supplemental Military 
nice to Portugal for Fiscal Year 1977. Hearings. 95th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 1, 1977; S. Rep. No. 95-43, 
Mar. 9, 1977: H. Rept. No. 95-81, Mar. 15, 1977 . 

(70) 



71 

education and training was reduced by $700,000 for a total request 
of $35 million, and the request for the credit sales program was reduced 
by $2.75 million for a total request of $707.25 million to finance a 
credit sales program of $2,217.5 million. This downward adjustment, 
according to the President's message to the Congress, was made in 
the light of human rights situations in the countries involved, although 
no countries were specified in the message. 2 

Secretary of State Vance, in earlier testimony, had stressed that the 
fiscal year 1978 security assistance budget had not been originated by 
the Carter administration nor had the specific programs been designed 
by that administration. Nonetheless, the Secretary stated that review 
of these programs had convinced the new administration that they 
were, on the whole, wise and in the best interest of the nation. As the 
Secretary of State saw the situation, "abrupt actions by the United 
States in making major cuts in these programs would disrupt plans 
and programs which are now underway in foreign countries and could 
have serious adverse political consequences." 3 The cuts which had 
been made, the Secretary indicated, had been based upon human 
rights considerations concerning Ethiopia, Argentina, and Uruguay. 4 

Little change in these programs was made by the Congress. A total 
of $228.9 million was authorized for the military assistance program, 
a reduction of $1.1 million from the administration request. This 
amount, which was programed for supply operations for Ethiopia, was 
deleted by the House International Relations Committee "for reasons 
of gross and systematic violations of human rights and because of the 
Ethiopian Government's closing of the U.S. military mission and other 
U.S. facilities." This deletion was approved by the Conference 
Committee. 5 For international military education and training, $31 
million was authorized, and $677 million was authorized to support a 
foreign military credit sales program of $2,102.35 million. 6 The 
committees of both Houses, in their reports, indicated that these 
reductions in sales credits were to be applied to programs in Argentina, 
Ethiopia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Brazil, primarily because of 
human rights violations in those countries. 7 Military aid to Chile and 
Uruguay had been prohibited by legislation passed in 1976. Many of 
the Latin American countries earlier had responded to the State 
Department's criticism of human rights conditions in those countries 
by renouncing U.S. assistance in any case. 8 In addition, provision of 
that military assistance authorized for Turkey was prohibited until 
the President certified to the Congress that "substantial progress" 
had been made toward agreement regarding military forces in Cyprus. 



2 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act: Communication from the President of the United States. Mar. 28, 1977. H. 
Doc. No. 95-113, 95th Cong., 1st sess. 

3 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Relations and Related Programs 
ADpropriations, Fiscal Year 1978. H.R. 7797. Hearings. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. pp. 173-174. 

* Ibid., p. 196. 

5 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. International Security Assistance Act 
of 1977. Report on H.R. 68S4. H. Rept. No. 95-274, 95th Cong., 1st sess. May 9, 1977, p. 12; and U.S. Con- 
gress. House. International Security Assistance Act of 1977. Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 6884. 
Report No. 95-503. 95th Cong., 1st sess. July 15, 1977, p. 2. 

» H. Rept. No. 95-503, op. cit., pp. 7, 11. 

7 H. Rept. No. 95-274, op. cit., pp. 24-25; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The 
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1977. Report to Accompany S. 1160. S. 
Rept. No. 95-195. 95th Cong., 1st sess., May 16, 1977, p. 35. 

8 "Argentina and Uruguay Reject U.S. Assistance Linked to Human Rights," New York Times, Mar, 
2, 1977, pg. 10; "Brazil Cancels Military Aid Treaty Over U.S. Report on Human Rights," New York 
Times, Mar. 12, 1977, p. 1; " Guatemala Rejects Aid, Cites Rights Criticism," Washington Post, Mar. 17. 
1977, p. A14;"E1 Salvador Rejects U.S. Arms Aid," Washington Post, Mar. 18, 1977, p. A12. 



72 

Similarly, the appropriations committees made little change in 
security assistance programs, although certain prohibitions which had 
been suggested in the committee reports of the authorizing committees 
were made explicit in the appropriations process. Military assistance 
funds were reduced to $220 million. This reduction, according to the 
House Appropriations Committee, was "to encourage a further shift 
from a military grant program to cash or loan transactions. " 9 For 
Internationa] military education and training, $30 million was appro- 
priated, and $675.85 million was appropriated for the sales credit 
program. 

The appropriations bill (Public Law 95-148), however, contained 
specific prohibitions on the expenditure of these funds. International 
military education and training was specifically prohibited for Argentina. 
Military assistance, military training, and sales credits were prohibited 
to Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, and Guatemala, and specific limi- 
tation- were placed on the amount of military assistance, military 
training, or credit sales which could be provided to the Philippines. 10 

The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-329) made major changes in the statu- 
tory framework governing military assistance and sales programs. 
Thus, major new policies, procedures, or restrictions were not con- 
sidered necessary in 1977. In this regard, the House Committee on 
International Relations indicated in its report on security assistance 
authorizations for fiscal year 1978 that its bill reflected "the intention 
of the committee to adhere to and extend the reforms enacted last year 
in the areas of international security assistance and arms export 
control." " Similarly, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations saw 
substantial progress toward bringing about a more coordinated and 
coherent program of arms sales on the part of the administration while 
providing the Congress with a stronger voice in that program. 12 

However, some changes were made in the law at the request of the 
administration in order to ease certain administrative problems 
which had been encountered in implementing the procedures enacted 
in 1976. The management of the military assistance and sales pro- 
gram was modified. Military assistance advisory groups were specifi- 
cally authorized for 15 countries. The primary functions of these 
groups were designated to be logistics management, transportation, 
fiscal management, and contract administration. The sense -of-Congress 
was expressed that advisory and training assistance in the countries 
specified should be provided primarily by personnel who are detailed 
for limited periods to perform specific tasks. 

In countries not specifically authorized a military advisory group, 
three members of the armed forces were permitted to be assigned to 
perform accounting and other management functions with respect to 
international security assistance programs. At the request of the 
administration, existing legislation was also amended to allow mili- 
tary attaches to perform overseas management functions of the 



• U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Ap- 
propriation Bill, 1977. Report to Accompany H.R. 7797. H. Rept. No. 95-417. June 15, 1977, 9')th Cong., 
1st sess., p. 39; and U.S. Congress. House. Making Appropriations for Foreign Assistance and Related 
Programs for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1977. Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 7797. H. Rept. 
No. 95-701, Oct. 12, 1977, 95th Cong., 1st sess. 

io Public Law 95-148, Oct. 31, 1977. 

»' H. Rept. No. 9.5-274, op. eft., p. 8. 

» S. Rept. No. 9.5-195, op. cit., p. 10. 



73. 

security assistance program if the President determined (and promptly 
reported such determination to the Congress) that this wouJd be the 
most economic and efficient means of performing such functions. 13 

The International Security Assistance Act of 1977 (Public Law 
95-92) also modified the procedures for approval of transfers of U.S.- 
furnished weapons, equipment or services to third countries. Previ- 
ously, such transfers could be approved by the President subsequent to 
notifying the Congress of his intention to approve such transfers. The 
1977 act would permit such transfers only if Congress did not adopt 
a concurrent resolution disapproving of the transfer within 30 calendar 
days after notification. The legislation, however, allowed transfers of 
maintenance, repair, overhaul defense services, or of repair parts, or 
other defense articles used in furnishing such services, without regard 
to this restriction if the transfer would not result in any increase in 
the original military capability of the defense articles and services to 
be maintained, repaired or overhauled. Restrictions on transfers were 
also made nonapplicable to temporary transfers for the sole purpose 
of receiving maintenance, overhaul or repair, or to cooperative cross- 
servicing arrangements among members of NATO. Requiring the 30- 
day notification, administration witnesses had stated, frustrated 
maintenance cooperation and gave rise to unintentional violations. 14 

Similarly, at the request of the administration, authority was pro- 
vided for the commercial sale of major defense equipment in excess of 
$25 million to Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. Previously, commer- 
cial sales in this amount were allowed only to members of NATO. 

On April 28, 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance consulted with the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session concerning the 
forthcoming administration arms sales policy. During that consulta- 
tion, the committee expressed its concern that the new policy might 
discriminate against the State of Israel and thereby weaken its deter- 
rent capability, since Israel was not to be excepted from forthcoming 
Presidential controls on arms sales. 15 Consequently, the Subcommittee 
on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ap- 
proved an amendment that urged sympathetic consideration by the 
administration of requests by Israel for licenses to produce U.S. 
designated military equipment for use by the Israeli armed forces, or 
coproduction of military equipment with Israel. In a meeting with 
members of the subcommittee on May 12, and in a subsequent letter, 
President Carter urged that this not be "codified in legislation." 

The President stated: 

I recognize the special responsibilities the United States has toward Israel 
in this regard and the particular consideration that therefore must be given to 
our military arms and coproduction arrangements with Israel. * * * Legisla- 
tion including specific exceptions for Israel would have very unfortunate 
consequences. * * * 16 

The subcommittee accepted the President's assurances and sub- 
stituted the following amendment : 

In accordance with the historic special relationship between the United States 
and Israel and previous agreements and common understandings, the Congress 



Public Law 95-92, Aug. 4, 1977, sec. 7(a). 

14 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Security Assistance Authorization. Hearings 
on S. 1160. 95th Con?., 1st sess., pp. 13-14. 

15 Also see the discussion of the Middle East on pp. 196-204. (Ed.) 
» S. Rept. No. 95-195, op. cit., pp. 36-38. 

29-972—78 6 



74 

joins with the President in reaffirming that a policy of restraint in U.S. arms trans- 
fere, including arms sales ceilings, shall not impair Israel's deterrent strength or 
undermine the military balance in the Middle East. 17 

Although a similar amendment did not appear in the House bill, 
this policy statement was accepted by the Conference Committee 
and was enacted in the International Security Assistance Act of 1977 
(Public Law 95-92). 18 

On October 21, 1977, the President forwarded to the Congress pro- 
posed legislation which would grant him authority, until December 
31, 1982, to transfer to the Republic of Korea, without reimbursement, 
defense articles in the custody of U.S. Army units scheduled to depart 
from Korea and other defense articles from the stocks of the Depart- 
ment of Defense, along with the defense services (such as technical 
and operating training) directly related to the articles transferred. 19 
The value of the defense articles to be transferred was not specified. 
The President would be required, under this proposed legislation, to 
provide the Congress at the beginning of each fiscal year a report de- 
scribing the type, quantities, and value of defense articles furnished 
or intended to be furnished under this authority. 20 No congressional 
action was taken on this legislation in 1977. 

President Carter's arms sales policy 

On May 19, 1977, President Carter announced his administration's 
policy on arms sales. This policy was based upon the studies required 
by section 202(b) of Public Law 94-329, which had directed the follow- 
ing study requirement: 

The President shall conduct a comprehensive study of the arms sales policies 
and practices of the United States Government, including policies and practices 
with respect to commercial arms sales, in order to determine whether such policies 
and practices should be changed. Such study shall examine the rationale for arms 
sales, the risks to world peace as a result of such arms sales, trends in arms sales 
by the United States and other countries, and steps which might be taken by the 
United States to provide for limitations on arms sales. In addition, such study 
shall include an evaluation of the impact of United States arms sales policies on the 
economic and social development of foreign countries and consideration of steps 
which might be taken by the United States to encourage the maximum use of 
the resources of the developing countries for economic and social development 
purposes. 

The President was required to submit findings of this study to the 
Congress no later than June 30, 1977, along with recommendations 
for legislation as appropriate, as well as the efforts made by the United 
States during the preceding 5 years to initiate and otherwise en- 
courage arms sale limitations, and the efforts currently being made 
along those lines. 

Further, section 218 of the same act had directed the Secretary 
of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to conduct 
a comprehensive study of the effects of the provisions of the Arms 
Export Control Act with a view to determining their consequences 
on: (1) the foreign policy of the United States; (2) the balance of pay- 



" Ibid. 

»» H. Rept. No. 05-503, op. cit., p. 32; Public Law 95-02, sec. 26. 

i» Also see the discussion of U.S.-Korean relations in "Asia: Korea and Vietnam" on pp. 190-195. (Ed.) 

*• U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Special International Security Assistance 
Act of 1977. Communication from the President of the United States, Oct. 21, 1977. H. Doc. No. 95-247. 
6 pp. 



75 

merits of the United States; (3) trade with foreign countries; (4) un- 
employment in the United States; and (5) weapons procurement by the 
Department of Defense. This study, along with recommendations for 
appropriate legislation, was also required by June 30, 1977. One con- 
solidated study was submitted to the Congress on June 30, 1977. 21 

In his statement, the President indicated, "The virtually unre- 
strained spread of conventional weaponry threatens stability in every 
region of the world." The policy announced by the President con- 
tained two basic elements: 

The United States will henceforth view arms transfers as an exceptional foreign 
policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demon- 
strated that the transfer contributes to our national security interests. 

We will continue to utilize arms transfers to promote our security and the 
security of our close friends. But in the future, the burden of persuasion will be 
on those who favor a particular arms sale, rather than those who oppose it. 

In addition, the President indicated that despite unilateral U.S. 
restraint in the sale of arms, "Actual reductions in the worldwide 
traffic in arms will require multilateral cooperation * * * The United 
States will meet with other arms suppliers * * * to begin discussions 
of possible measures for multilateral action." 

To implement the first element of this policy — that of unilateral 
U.S. restraint in the sale of arms — the President established a set 
of six controls applicable to all future arms transfers "except to those 
countries with which we have major defense treaties (NATO, Japan, 
Australia, and New Zealand)." These controls are: 22 

(1) The dollar volume (in constant fiscal year 1976 dollars) of 
new commitments under the foreign military sales and military 
assistance programs for weapons and weapons-related items in 
fiscal year 1978 will be reduced from the fiscal year 1977 total. 
Transfers which can clearly be classified as services are not 
covered, nor are commercial sales, which the U.S. Government 
monitors through the issuance of export licenses. Commercial 
sales are already significantly restrained by existing legislation 
and executive branch policy. 

(2) The United States will not be the first supplier to introduce 
into a region newly developed, advanced weapons systems which 
would create a new or significantly higher combat capability. 
Also, any commitment for sale of coproduction of such weapons is 
prohibited until they are operationally deployed with U.S. 
forces, thus removing the incentive to promote foreign sales in an 
effort to lower unit costs for Defense Department procurement. 

(3) Development or significant modification of advanced 
weapons systems solely for export will not be permitted. 

(4) Coproduction agreements for significant weapons, equip- 
ment, and major components (beyond assembly of subcompo- 
nents and the fabrication of high-turnover spare parts) are pro- 
hibited. A limited class of items will be considered for coproduction 



n U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Arms Transfer Policy: Report to Congress. 
95th Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print, July 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
107 pp. 

22 White House Press Release, "Statement by the President: Conventional Arms Trans- 
fers Policy," May 19, 1977. 



76 

arrangements, but with restriction on third-country exports, 
since these arrangements are intended primarily for the co- 
producer's requirements. 

(5) In addition to existing requirements of the law, the United 
States, as a condition of sale for certain weapons, equipment, or 
major components, may stipulate that we will not entertain any 
requests for retransfers. By establishing at the outset that the 
Tinted States will not entertain such requests, we can avoid 
unnecessary bilateral friction caused by later denials. 

(6) An amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regula- 
tions will be issued, requiring policy level authorization by the 
Department of State for actions by agents of the United States or 
private manufacturers which might promote the sale of arms 
abroad. In addition, embassies and military representatives 
abroad will not promote the sale of arms and the Secretary of 
Defense will continue his review of government procedures, 
particularly procurement regulations, which may provide in- 
centives for foreign sales. 

President Carter's announcement of the administration's arms 
transfer policy, however, was followed by subsequent decisions to sell 
or to consider selling quantities of armaments to various nations. In 
the remaining months of fiscal year 1977 following the promulgation 
of the President's policy, some 46 separate arms sales notifications 
were forwarded to Congress. These involved 19 countries and pro- 
I sales of goods and services totaling some $4.5 billion. It was 
also announced during this period that the United States was prepared 
to offer substantial amounts of arms to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Chad, 
Sudan, Somalia (later withdrawn), and Korea. These actions led to 
early skepticism on the part of many in Congress concerning the 
effectiveness of the announced policy in restricting arms transfers as an 
instrument of U.S. foreign policy. In making public a Congressional 
Research Service study which analyzed the early implementation of 
the President's policy, Senator Humphrey stated his concern over the 
a]) parent inconsistency between the President's announced policy and 
actions that had occurred subsequent to the announcement of that 
policy. "As the current backlog of previously negotiated arms sales 
diminishes," he stated, "the Subcommittee [on Foreign Assistance], 
in its oversight role, will review each proposed sale with the President's 
May 19 policy statement in mind." 23 In commenting on the President's 
policy on the floor of the Senate on October 7, 1977, the majority 
Leader, Senator Robert C. Byrd, also indicated that he felt that the 
results of the President's policy up to that date "have been somewhat 
disappointing." 24 

Insofar as efforts toward multilateral restraint were concerned, the 
Minister of Defense of France, during a Washington visit in November, 
stated that his country "* * * will not sell weapons without reasons or 
without limitations. * * * France also subscribes to a policy of limita- 
tions of sales of armaments once it falls within an overall framework 
and constitutes a realistic solution to the problem." The British 



« U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Implications of President Carter's Conven- 
tional Arms Transfer Policy. Report by the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. December 1977. 95th 
Cong., 1st sess. Committee Print. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1977. 50 pp. 

" Congressional Record (daily edition), Oct. 7, 1977, p. S16620. 



77 

Ambassador to the United States indicated that the United Kingdom 
shared "* * * the United States' view that global expenditure on 
armaments is too high. * * * For any arms sales policy to be effective, 
the cooperation of the Soviet Union will of course be necessary." In 
that regard, the United States and the Soviet Union opened explora- 
tory talks in Washington on December 15 on the possibility of a Soviet- 
American agreement to limit weapons sales. However, sources indi- 
cated that these talks failed to find much common ground between 
the two countries on the issue of limiting the transfers of weapons. 25 

Arms sales 

AW ACS and Iran. — One significant contribution to the skepticism 
in Congress concerning the administration's dedication to implement- 
ing its own arms sale policy was the proposal to sell Iran seven airborne 
warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft at a cost of $1.2 billion. 
Formal notification of the proposed sale was provided to the Congress 
on July 7, 1977, under the provisions of section 36(b), Arms Export 
Control Act. Having been alerted earlier to the impending sale, Sena- 
tors Eagleton and Culver (and four other Senators) had asked the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) in May to analyze the admin- 
istration's justification for this sale. The GAO report, classified Secret, 
was provided on July 14. 26 The press quickly published what were 
reported to be details from the study. 27 The report, it was alleged, 
indicated that the sale had not been justified adequately. The admin- 
istration's study of Iranian defense needs, the study is reported to 
have concluded, had not considered all available alternative radar 
systems and had not considered the total cost of the AWACS-based 
defense system. In addition, the GAO report contained a letter from 
Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, to the 
effect that the sale posed a security risk and that the loss of a plane to 
the Soviet Union could cost the United States its lead over Russia in 
the technology of electronic warfare. Turner indicated that there was 
no way the risk could be reduced without removing from the planes 
so much sensitive electronic equipment as to make them ineffectual. 28 

In the House of Representatives, a resolution to disapprove the sale 
was introduced (H. Con. Res. 275) by Congressman Gerry E. Studds 
on July 11. This resolution was referred jointly to the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East and the Subcommittee on International 
Security and Scientific Affairs. GAO witnesses appeared before the 
two subcommittees on July 19 to summarize their report. Two days 
later, the subcommittees heard Admiral Turner, who reportedly 
1 'stuck unequivocally by his earlier statements" concerning the 
security risks inherent in the sale. 29 That same day, Erich von Marhod, 
Acting Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, attacked 
the GAO report before the subcommittees as l 'misleading and inac- 
curate." Many highly sensitive pieces of communications and coding 



25 Bradsher, Henry, S. "Arms Sales: U.S. Russia Still at Odds," Washington Star, Dec. 21, 1977, p. B2. 

28 U.S. General Accounting Office. Issues Concerning the Proposed Sale of the Airborne Warning and 
Control System E-3 to Iran. Secret. July 14, 1977. 

27 "CIA Raises Security Risks in Radar- Jet Sales to Iran," Washington Post, July 14, 1977, p. 3. 

** "CIA Raises Security Risks in Radar-Jet Sales to Iran," Washington Post, July 14, 1977, p. 3; "Turner 
Repeats Warning on Sales of Radar Jets," Washington Post, July 22, 1977, p. 3. 

» "Turner Repeats Warning on Sale of Radar Jets," Washington Post, July 22, 1977, p. 3. 



73 

gear that Admiral Turner had assumed would be on the Iranian planes 
would be removed, von Marbod testified. On July 28, the day the 
subcommittees were scheduled to vote on the resolution of disapproval, 
Senator Culver, who had introduced a resolution of disapproval in 
the Senate, testified before the House panels in opposition to the 
proposed sale. 

The von Marbod testimony was followed by that of Secretary of 
State Vance. Secretary Vance confirmed that this sale would be a 
specific exception to the recently announced Presidential policy that 
the United States would not be the first to introduce advanced 
weapons systems into an area. This exception was justified, he claimed, 
because Iran "must depend on advanced weaponry to offset quantita- 
tive and other disadvantages in order to maintain a regional balance." 30 
Subsequently, the committee voted, 19-17, to approve the resolution 
of disapproval. The questions which had been raised about the sale 
apparently had convinced many members that a great deal of uncer- 
tainty surrounded the issue and that, with the first AWACS not 
scheduled for delivery to Iran until 1981, more time was needed to 
sort out the facts. 

As indicated, Senator Culver (and 15 additional cosponsors) 
had introduced a resolution in the Senate to disapprove the sale 
(S. Con. Res. 36). The Foreign Assistance Subcommittee of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony form Senator Culver 
in opposition to the sale on July 18. Administration witnesses appeared 
before the Senate subcommittee on July 22. Von Marbod's testimony 
again undercut the "security risk" argument concerning this sale 
which had been raised by the GAO report. 31 

On July 22, Senate Majority Leader Byrd, in a letter to the Pres- 
ident, urged withdrawal of the proposed sale. The majority leader 
indicated that the demanding legislative schedule facing the Congress 
in the 2 weeks remaining prior to recess would make it difficult 
for Congress to act on the AWACS proposal within the 30-day statu- 
tory period. The majority leader, in addition, indicated his own 
serious reservations concerning the sale. 32 

On July 25, the President indicated to Senator Byrd that he had 
decided not to withdraw the notification. 33 On July 27, the Foreign 
Assistance Subcommittee voted to forward the disapproval resolution 
to the full committee ''without recommendation and without preju- 
dice." 34 The subcommittee also voted to draft a letter for delivery 
to the President asking him to withdraw the notification in order 
to allow more time for analysis of the issues which had been raised 
concerning the sale. "We do not want to put ourselves, if possible, 
into a position of confrontation with the President on this matter," 
Senator Humphrey stated, "yet, we have legitimate concerns, which 
the testimony has revealed. Similarity, we do not want any action 
on our part to be interpreted as antagonistic to Iran or inconsiderate 
of the needs of Iranian defense." 35 



» Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 22, 1077, vol. LXXVIT, p. 246. 

u U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. Sale 
of AWACS to Iran. Hearings. 95th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 34-35, 54-56. 

■ Ibid., p. 64. 

» Logan, Harold J., "Carter Plans Radar Sale To Iran Despite Opposition," Washington Post, July 
26.1977, p. A3. ' wu -" u "- 

34 Hearings. Sale of AWACS to Iran, op. cit., p. 70. 

» Ibid., p. 68. 



79 

The letter from the Senate subcommittee also asked the President 
for six assurances, if, after reviewing the alternatives, he decided to 
resubmit the AWACS sale to Congress. Among these assurances 
asked were : 

* * * that the planes would not include certain sensitive encipherment equip- 
ment; that security arrangements be developed to ensure adequate protection of 
the Iranian AWACS; that the AWACS be used only for defensive purposes; 
that the "multiplier" effect of AWACS be taken into account in considering future 
sales to Iran; that cadre training of Iranian crews take place entirely in the U.S., 
and no U.S. personnel would be on AWACS operational nights; and that a study 
be conducted on Iran's capacity to absorb high technology defense items. 36 

Senator Byrd appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee on July 28 and called for strong committee endorsement of the 
disapproval resolution. Before the committee could act, however, the 
House International Relations Committee had voted in favor of the 
disapproval resolution. Senator Humphrey, in another attempt to 
avoid a confrontation with the administration on this issue, tele- 
phoned Secretary of State Vance to attempt to convince the President 
to withdraw the notification for resubmission in September after con- 
gressional questions concerning the sale had been resolved. Humphrey, 
in this case, was successful and the notification of the proposed sale 
was withdrawn. In a letter to Senator Humphrey dated July 28, the 
President confirmed this withdrawal and indicated that "he was pre- 
pared to provide assurances with respect to six matters raised by the 
Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance." 37 

The proposed AWACS sale to Iran was resubmitted to the Congress 
by the administration on September 7. A resolution of disapproval 
(S. Con. Res. 48) was again introduced by Senator Culver (with 
21 cosponsors) on October 1. In hearings on this subject on September 
19, the administration told the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance 
that the assurances requested by the subcommittee had been met 
and, indeed, had been agreed to by the Government of Iran. 38 In 
a letter to all Members of the Senate, Senators Humphrey and 
Case indicated that "the President has been responsive to our con- 
cerns and the issues raised by the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee 
as a result of our hearings. Alternative systems have been evaluated 
and the assurances we requested have been agreed to. Therefore, we 
believe that the sale accompanied by the assurances should be 
approved." 39 

The subcommittee also stated its understanding, subsequently 
confirmed by the administration, that the AWACS sale to Iran would 
be counted in fiscal year 1978 totals for U.S. arms sales. This was 
important in that the President had, in his policy statement, indicated 
that sales in fiscal year 1978 would be lower than in fiscal year 1977. 
The subcommittee was concerned that, by counting this total in fiscal 
year 1977 figures, a higher figure from which to reduce fiscal year 1978 
sales would be established. With these understandings, the sale was 
allowed to proceed without further objection from the Congress. 

Aircraft sales to Egypt. — Aside from the AWACS sale to Iran, only 
one major arms sale attracted significant congressional interest in 



■ Ibid., pp. 87-88. 

J? Hearings. Sale of AWACS to Irani opi cit:, pi 84; also Department of ftate Bulletin, Augi 22, 1977, 
vol. LXXVII, p. 247. 
38 Ibid., pp. 90, 94-96. 

■ Ibid., p. 108. 



80 

1977. On September 7, 1977, the administration notified Congress 
of its intention to sell to Es:ypt 14 C-130 aircraft and a number 
of remotely piloted reconnaissance "drone" aircraft at a total cost of 
$250 million. Although resolutions of disapproval to block the sale 
were introduced in trie House, no action was taken on these sales 
because the material involved was not considered to have lethal or 
offensive capabilities. 40 

At die same time, the administration also notified the Congress 
of plans to have American technicians participate in the rebuilding 
and maintenance of Egypt's Soviet-supplied MIG-21 aircraft. Under 
the plan, American technicians from Lockheed and General Electric 
would be subcontracted by an unnamed European country to refur- 
bish the a ircrafts' engines. No American personnel would be stationed 
in Egypt under this program. In testimony before the Congress, the 
administration affirmed that this U.S. effort would not enhance or 
upgrade the capabilities of the Eygptian aircraft, but would merely 
arrest deterioration. The administration indicated that this stipu- 
lation would be contained in the contract. Consequently, there was 
no opposition to this program. 41 

( nngressional interest. — The AWACS incident, however, had in- 
.1 congressional dissatisfaction with legislative controls over 
the Nation's arms sales policies. On October 18, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee adopted a resolution which first commended 
the President's goal of reducing the conventional arms race, then 
strongly urged the President to stay within the framework of his arms 
transfer guidelines by limiting the transfer of sophisticated military 
equipment to the Persian Gulf region, and, finally, requested that 
the executive branch, in order to allow the Congress to pass appro- 
priately on requests for transfer of sophisticated technology to the 
Persian Gulf region, provide the Congress with "an adequate study 
of the military balance in the Persian Gulf region and the ability of 
countries in the area efficiently to absorb advanced U.S. military 
technology." 42 

On October 7, 1977, in a statement on the floor, Senate Majority 
Leader Robert C. Byrd also raised questions concerning "the appro- 
priate role of the Congress in the arms sales process." Senator Byrd 
indicated that present procedures, which presented the Congress with 
"essentially a take-it-or-leave-it proposition" concerning individual 
arms sales, with "no real opportunity for compromise * * * [and] no 
direct means for Congress to attach reservations or conditions to a 
proposed sale," were inadequate. The majority leader then outlined 
procedures which he believed should be instituted "to insure that the 
Senate does exercise its proper role." Among his recommendations 
were the following: 

(1) The executive branch should submit a detailed overall plan for arms sales 
for each fiscal year early in the congressional session. * * * 



40 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on international Relations. Proposed Sale of Military Equipment 
and Services to Egypt. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 15, 1977, pp. 15-16. U.S. Congress. Senate. Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations. Sale of C-130 Aircraft to Egypt. Hearing. 95th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 21, 1977, 
p. 20. 

« Ibid. 

« Congressional Quarterly, Oct. 22, 1977, p. 2258. 



81 

(2) Congress should * * * extend the period for congressional review of major 
arms sales. 

(3) As a general rule, the Executive should not submit notifications of proposed 
sales during extended congressional nonlegislative periods.* * * 

(4) The cumulative and long-term impact of arms sales must be given more 
thorough consideration.* * * 

(5) Consideration should be given to requiring explicit congressional approval — 
rather than a resolution of disapproval — for major arms sales.* * * 

(6) Finally, in the case of Iran, * * * I would suggest a moratorium on further 
sales in the near future.* * * 43 

Summary 

In 1977, many Members of Congress had expressed their support of 
the administration's willingness to seek restraint in the sales of con- 
ventional weapons and its willingness to consult with the Congress on 
this issue. A continuing problem, however, which had been accentuated 
by the controversy over the sale of AWACS aircraft to Iran, was the 
fact that Congress received notification of proposed sales on a piece- 
meal basis and then only after significant negotiation had been con- 
ducted with the prospective purchaser and a letter of offer was to be 
presented. Cancellation — or even major modification — of a negotiated 
sale at that point entailed possible damage to U.S. relationships with 
the purchasing country. 

Similarly, the piecemeal, one-at-a-time, notification system does not 
provide opportunity for congressional review of the entire program on 
an annual basis. To meet this problem, Senator Javits had proposed an 
amendment to the Arms Export Control Act which would have re- 
quired the executive branch, in its annual presentation to the Congress, 
to identify for each foreign country the total of aggregate dollar value of 
sales it intended to make that year and to identify the major defense 
equipment intended to be sold. By requiring the presentation of arms 
sales plans in this overall format, the amendment was designed to 
enable the Congress to exercise its policy-formation and oversight 
responsibilities in a coherent and deliberate manner. 

Senator Humphrey, the subcommittee chairman, in commenting on 
this amendment, stated that "the purpose of this amendment is fully 
within the purpose and statement of objectives of that particular 
piece of legislation." However, he requested that the amendment be 
withdrawn in view of the committee's decision to "note in precise 
language * * * the desire of the full committee to have the cooperation 
of the administration in the fulfillment of the directives of this amend- 
ment." Accordingly, the amendment was withdrawn. 44 

Thus, in the future, regardless of the effectiveness of President 
Carter's arms transfer policy, it is likely that the Congress will seek, 
either by working with the administration, or through legislation, 
to provide for an early overall view of the foreign military sales 
program on an annual basis in order to allow for a greater degree of 
congressional participation in the formulation of policy concerning the 
Nation's arms sales program. 



« Congressional Record (daily edition), Oct. 7, 1977, pp. S16616-21; 
« S. Rept. No. 95-195, op. cit., pp. 11-12. 



82 

References 

U.S. Congre>>. House. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and 

Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 1978, Report to Accompany H.R. 7797. 

Report No. 95-417. 95th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 1977. Washington, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1977. 
Committee of Conference. International Security Assistance Act of 1977. 

Report No. 95-503. 95th Cong., 1st sess., July 15, 1977. Washington, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Making Appropriations for Foreign Assistance and Related Programs 



for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1978. Report No. 95-701. 95th 
Cong., 1st sess., Oct. 12, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 

Committee on International Relations. Foreign Assistance Legislation 



For Fiscal Year 1978 (Parts 1-9). Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, February, March, April 1977. 

International Security Assistance Act of 1977. Report to Accompany 



H.R. 68S4. Report No. 95-274. 95th Cong., 1st sess., May 9, 1977. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Proposed Sale of Military Equipment and Services to Egypt. Hearing. 



95th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 15, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1977. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and 

Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 1978, Report to Accompany H.R. 

7797. Report No. 95-353. 95th Cong., 1st sess., July 18, 1977. Washington, 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
Committee on Foreign Relations. Arms Transfer Policy. Report to 

Congress. Committee Print. 95th Cong., 1st sess., April and May 1977. Wash- 
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Implications of President Carter's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy. 



Committee Print. 95th Cong., 1st sess., December 1977. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. 

The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 



1977. Report to Accompany S. 1160. Report No. 95-195. 95th Cong., 1st 
sess., May 16, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Sale of AWACS to Iran. Hearings. 95th Cong., 1st sess., July and Sep- 



tember 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Sale of C-130 Aircraft to Egypt. Hearing. 95th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 21, 



1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Security Assistance Authorizations. Hearings on S. 1160. 95th Cong., 



1st sess., April and May 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 



Nuclear Nonproliferation* 
overview 

As this report on 1977 activities in Congress was going to press, the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 was signed into law by President 
Carter. This legislation probably is the most significant statement of 
U.S. policy in the nuclear field since the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 
Its formulation and much of its legislative evolution — involving 
lengthy negotiations and much give and take among two admin- 
istrations, several congressional committees, and a whole range of 
private and governmental interests — took place in 1977 and is a major 
focus of this chapter. Other significant congressional activities — new 
legislation in the International Security Assistance Act that limits 
support to countries involved in certain transfers of enrichment 
equipment, materials, or technology, and consideration of two treaties 
designed to limit proliferation — are also considered. 

These activities need to be seen in the perspective of a long history 
of postwar efforts to limit the diffusion of nuclear weapons to increasing 
numbers of countries. As the "nu clear club" has slowly grown to 
include the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the People's Republic of 
China, France, and now India, national and international concern with 
the weapons proliferation danger has gone through several cycles of 
rising and falling intensity, reaching a high point with the signing of 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968. Thereafter, interest 
waned, only to be revived in 1974 by India's first nuclear explosions 
test. More recent developments — President Nixon's offer of nuclear 
reactors to Israel and Egypt, commitments by France and Germany to 
supply sensitive enrichment and reprocessing facilities and technology 
to Brazil and Pakistan, Iran's announcement of plans to acquire a 
massive nuclear power generating capacity, rumors that Israel may 
already have become a nuclear weapon state, export licensing contro- 
versies, and other events — have sustained that interest and led to a 
new round of nonproliferation activity in the executive branch and 
Congress. 1 

Efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons have always been 
complicated by the close technical relationship between the ' 'peaceful' ' 
and the "military" atom. Compelled by expectations of economic 
benefit, the scientific knowledge, technical know-how, and facilities 
that are the foundations of a nuclear energy industry have spread 
inexorably, containing in seed most of the essential elements needed 
to develop nuclear weapons. 

•.Prepared by Harry L. Wrenn, Analyst in International Relations. 

^See also the discussion of U.S. International Energy Policy on pp. 129-132. (Ed.) 

(83) 



84 

In April 1975, the Ford administration initiated a multilateral 
effort in conjunction with other supplier states to deal with this 
problem by reaching agreement on the application of additional 
safeguards bo the transfer of civil nuclear materials, facilities, and 
technology, a diplomatic undertaking that bore some fruit in Septem- 
ber 1 ( .»77, when the nuclear supplier's group agreed to new guidelines 
to cover exports. 

During the Presidential campaign of 1976, candidate Carter made 
an issue of the weapons proliferation danger. Following his assumption 
of office in 1977, new policy directives were issued to end government 
support for plutonium production, strengthen the capacity of the 
United State- to serve as a "reliable supplier" of enriched uranium, 
and tighten up export controls. Legislative proposals were also 
submitted to Congress. 

Meanwhile, Congress, which frequently has pla}^ed the leading 
role in determining U.S. atomic energy policy, already had embarked 
on important initiatives of its own. These efforts produced several 
important legislative enactments of limited scope in 1977, and com- 
prehensive new legislation in 1978. 

DISCUSSION 

Comprehensive nonproliferation legislation 

The major focus of congressional activity on the nonproliferation 
issue throughout 1977 and into the early weeks of 1978 was on efforts 
to enact a comprehensive legislative statement of U.S. policy. Two 
measures of this kind were introduced in early March: S. 897 in the 
Senate and H.R. 4409 in the House. An omnibus administration bill 
was introduced in both Houses in late April. Meanwhile, the Senate 
had already gone on record in favor of a vigorous U.S. antiproliferation 
policy when it passed Senate Resolution 40, which endorsed negotia- 
tions with world leaders to curb the spread of enrichment and re- 
processing facilities, achieve broader acceptance of international 
safeguards, explore means of providing international nuclear fuel 
services, agree on sanctions against nations seeking to acquire nuclear 
explosives, and strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agencv 
(IAEA). 

In the House, H.R. 6910, the administration's proposal, and H.R. 
4409, which was introduced by Representatives Bingham, Zablocki, 
and others, and was based on extensive congressional consideration 
of the proliferation issue in hearings, sponsored studies, and other 
forums going back to the 94th Congress, were both referred to the 
International Relations Committee. This referral was a result of 
changes made at the beginning of the 95th Congress, when the Inter- 
national Relations Committee acquired from the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy formal legislative jurisdiction over "export controls, 
including nonproliferation of nuclear technology and nuclear hard- 
ware" and "all (international) agreements for cooperation in the 
export of nuclear technology and nuclear hardware." 
t Subcommittee hearings were held in May, and extensive consulta- 
tions with administration officials entered into thereafter. The result 
was a subcommittee working draft incorporating elements from the 
two proposals, which, as a clean bill, H.R. 8638, was marked up and 



85 

ordered reported b}' the full committee on August 2. This bill was 
considered in the House and passed on a rollcall vote, 488-0, on 
September 28. 

In the Senate, S. 1432, the administration bill, was referred jointly 
to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Governmental Affairs, 
which already had before them S. 897, introduced in early March by 
Senator Percy for himself and others. In August, the joint referral 
was modified to include the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources as well. Following various hearings, consultations with 
executive branch officials, and discussions within and between com- 
mittees, S. 897 was reported out on October 3, with an amendment in 
the nature of a substitute proposed by the Governmental Affairs 
Committee, with amendments to this version proposed by the Com- 
mittee on Energy and Natural Resources, and with an amendment 
in the nature of a substitute proposed by the Committee on Foreign 
Relations. The Senate did not act on these various proposals during 
the remainder of 1977. 

Though the several versions of tins legislation differ in detail, and 
some of these differences ma}' be important, all set out the terms of a 
comprehensive new approach to the proliferation problem, based 
upon a combination of national and international efforts to impose 
more stringent nonproliferation conditions for international transfers 
of nuclear materials, facilities, and technology; to strengthen the 
IAEA and its system of safeguards; to promote safeguards training 
for foreign nationals; to confirm the position of the United States as a 
reliable supplier of nuclear fuels and services; and to renegotiate exist- 
ing U.S. agreements for cooperation. The congressional approach 
has differed from the one taken by the executive branch primarily in 
leaving somewhat less discretion to the President and executive branch 
officials in the formulation and execution of national nonproliferation 
policy, and in putting more stress on the need to make changes in the 
organization and procedures for negotiating and administering export 
licenses, agreements for cooperation, and other mechanisms of national 
control and regulation. 

Nuclear proliferation and foreign aid 

Meanwhile, as omnibus legislation underwent close congressional 
scrutiny, other generally less comprehensive attacks on the problem 
were also being considered in Congress and in some cases enacted into 
law. In June 1976, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 had been 
amended to require the withholding of military and economic assist- 
ance from an}' countr}- delivering or receiving reprocessing or enrich- 
ment equipment, materials, or technology without first having agreed 
to put all such items under IAEA safeguards and multilateral auspices 
and management where available. 2 These provisions were revised in 
1977 in the International Security Assistance Act, 3 which deals sepa- 
rately with the enrichment and reprocessing issues. This act requires 
that funds be cut off to any country delivering or receiving enrichment 
equipment, materials, or technology outside multilateral and IAEA 
management and safeguards, but permits the President to continue 
furnishing assistance if he determines and certifies to Congress in 



2 Public Law 94-.°,29. 
s Public Law 95-92. 



86 

writing that termination would have a serious adverse effect on vital 
U.S. interests, and further that he has received reliable assurances 
that the receiving state will not develop or acquire nuclear weapons 
itself or assist otln r countries in doing so. 

The art also requires that funds be cut off to any country delivering 
or receiving reprocessing equipment, materials or technology, or to any 
state not a nuclear weapon state under the nonproliferation treaty 
that detonates a nuclear explosive. The President may continue to 
furnish assistance if he determines and certifies to Congress in writing 
that termination would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of 
U.S. nonproliferation objectives or would otherwise jeopardize the 
national defense and security. Decisions by the President on these 
matters may be set aside by joint resolution. The act also prohibits 
the use of fiscal year 1978 funds authorized under the Foreign Assist- 
ance Act to finance the construction, operation, maintenance, or fuel 
supply of any nuclear powerplant under an agreement of cooperation. 

Funds were authorized or appropriated in 1977 for a study of the 
Barnwell Nuclear Fuels Plant in South Carolina to determine if that 
facility can be used in support of U.S. nonproliferation objectives 
and contribute to the International Nuclear Fund Cycle evaluation 
begun by President Carter in October 1977; 4 to strengthen nuclear 
safeguards programs and other activities of the IAEA; 5 and to carry 
out several studies relating to nuclear proliferation under the auspices 
of the Department of Energy. 6 In addition legislation was enacted to 
require that any Export-Import Bank loan or financial guarantee 
involving any export of nuclear power, enrichment, reprocessing, re- 
search, or heavy water production facilities lay before Congress for a 
25-day period before the Bank gives its approval. 7 The same legislation 
establishes a system whereby the Secretary of State is to report certain 
specific undesirable actions in the nuclear field taken by a foreign 
state, after which the Bank may not approve any transaction with that 
State unless the President determines that it is in the U.S. national 
interest. Congress must then be notified 25 da} T s in advance of Bank 
approval. Actions defined as undesirable under the act include viola- 
tion, abrogation, or termination of IAEA safeguards, or of the terms 
of a U.S. agreement for nuclear cooperation, or the explosion of a 
nuclear device by a nonnuclear weapon state. 

Test ban treaties 

Also before the Senate in 1977 were two treaties, the Threshold 
Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions 
for Peaceful Purposes (the PNE Treaty), intended to restrict under- 
ground nuclear explosions tests and peaceful nuclear explosions to a 
negotiated "threshold" of 150 kilotons. A major argument advanced 
in favor of the two treaties, as well as a proposed comprehensive test 
ban now bein^ negotiated by the United States, Great Britain, and 
the Soviet Union at Geneva, is that they would have an important 
impact on nuclear nonproliferation. Clearly, any state signing a com- 
prehensive treaty would be directly and formally precluded thereby 
from taking a crucial last step in the demonstration of a nuclear 



'Public Law 95-96. 
5 Public Law 95-108. 
8 Public Law 95-238. 
'Public Law 95-143. 



87 

weapons capability, which is testing. But beyond this, proponents 
urge, a comprehensive ban would also have an important psychological 
impact. For one thing, they argue, it would eliminate the inequality 
inherent in the nonproliferation treaty (NPT), which requires non- 
nuclear weapon signatories to give up the nuclear weapons option 
while allowing the nuclear weapon powers to continue perfecting 
their strategic arsenals and exploring civil engineering applications 
through testing. A comprehensive test cessation, it is said, would 
also serve to undermine the "legitimacy" of nuclear explosions tests. 
Presumably, a would-be nuclear weapon power would find it much 
more difficult to make the decision to test in a world in which no 
other power was testing than in one in which several other states 
routinely conduct such experiments. A comprehensive ban that en- 
compassed peaceful applications tests would be especially valuable, 
it is said, in that it would confirm the judgment that nuclear explosions 
have little real engineering potential, and thus would undercut the 
PNE rationale for testing devices that, by whatever name they are 
called, are technically and politically indistinguishable from nuclear 
weapons. 

Proponents of a comprehensive treaty have criticized the Threshold 
and PNE Treaties before the Senate on the ground that they do not 
contribute to this nonproliferation goal. It is obviously true that 
these agreements would not eliminate the inequities of the NPT, but 
the critics go further in arguing that while the treaties prohibit tests 
above 150 kilotons they legitimize them below that level. This fact, 
one critic has said, when considered alongside the observation that 
the 150-kiloton threshold bears no relationship to current verification 
capabilities, and is too high to impose significant restraints on weapons 
development, produces no support for U.S. antiproliferation policies, 
but "cynicism about American and Soviet interests in real arms 
control * * *" 

But would a comprehensive ban be any more effective in slowing 
the pace of nuclear weapons proliferation? Critics of a comprehensive 
test ban argue that there is no convincing evidence to indicate that 
the potential nuclear weapon states that have been so careful to keep 
their nuclear option open by refusing to sign the NPT would be at 
all likely to close it by signing a comprehensive test ban. They suggest 
further that protests concerning the superpower arms race and the 
inequities of the NPT notwithstanding, the decision by a potential 
proliferate- whether or not to go nuclear most likely will be based 
on a calculation of local security needs or more dubious considerations 
of prestige, and only marginally if at all on the larger dynamic of the 
superpower arms competition. If this should be the case, the non- 
proliferation rationale for a comprehensive test ban falls to the 
ground. 

President Carter was critical of the two treaties during the campaign, 
but his administration has since defended them before the Senate 
with the arguments that ratification would provide "a positive diplo- 
matic climate" for negotiating a comprehensive baD, or a "hedge" 
should those negotiations fail, while rejection would cast doubts on 
U.S. "reliability" as a negotiating partner with the Soviet Union. 
The Foreign Relations Committee recommended approval of the 
agreements on September 20, but the treaties have continued to 



88 

draw heavy fire from critics, largely for reasons already given, but 
also because it is felt that the agreements are more likely to retard 
than promote the negotiation of a comprehensive ban. Since most of 
this criticism comes from those who in other circumstances have 
been the most ardent supporters of arms limitation measures, there 
is little momentum for ratification at this time. 

Prospects jor 1978 

The Senate took up S. 897 in early February 1978. On February 7, 
by a vote of 88-3, it passed a Senate-amended version of H.R. 8638 
a^ a substitute for the Senate bill. The Senate amendments were 
accepted by the House on February 9, and the measure was signed 
into law as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 on March 10. 

The votes in the two Houses on the measure suggest that the 
approach embodied in the -act has broad congressional support, and 
the legislative history indicates that many of the major differences 
between Congress and the administration have been reconciled. 

References 
congressional publications 

U.S. Congress. House Committee on International Relations. Nuclear Antipro- 
liferution Act of 1977 (H. Rept. No. 95-587). Aug. 5, 1977. 43 pp. 

House Committee on Science and Technology. European oversight trip. 

Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 154 pp. At head of title: 
95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print. 

Senate ERDA Authorization Act of 1978 — civilian nuclear energy appli- 



cations. S. Rept. No. 95-328, June 30, 1977. 

Senate delegation report on American foreign policy and nonproliferation 



interest in the Middle East. Report pursuant to S. Res. 167, of May 10, 1977. 
June 1977. 55 pp. S. Doc. 95-47. 

Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Subcommittee on 



Energy and Natural Resources, Hearings on S. 897 and S. 1432. Hearings, 
95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
223 pp. 

Senate Committees on Energy and National Resources, and on Foreign 



Relations and Governmental Affairs. Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act of 1977. 
(S. Rept. No. 95-467). Oct. 3, 1977, 138 pp. 

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on Energy, 



Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Services. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 
1977. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 686 pp. 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

Breeder Reactors: The Clinch River Project. Issue Brief No. IB77088. [Period- 
ically updated.] 

Nuclear Policy: U.S. Agreements for Cooperation. Mini Brief No. MB78201. 
[Periodically updated.] 

Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Legislation for Policy and Other Measures. Issue 
Brief No. IB77011. [Archived.] 

Nuclear Weapons Proliferation. 95th Cong., 2d sess, 1978. Issue Brief No. IB78001 
[Periodically updated.] 



Arms Control Impact Statements* 
overview 

Public Law 94-141 amended the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Act to require the executive branch to submit, in connection with 
each defense budget request, a series of statements examining the 
potential impact on the Nation's arms control goals and commitments 
of certain categories of weapons and military programs for which re- 
search and development or procurement authorization or appropria- 
tion had been requested. The intent of this requirement was to pro- 
vide Congress with information on the arms control implications of a 
wide range of military programs. Receipt of this information was con- 
sidered necessary if Congress were to make informed budgetary 
decisions on specific military systems. In addition, by requiring such 
reports Congress hoped to induce the executive branch to take a more 
calculated and farsighted perspective on the interrelationship of 
arms control and military procurement programs. 

The first set of arms control impact statements (ACIS) was sub- 
mitted by the executive branch in August 1976. After a review by the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the staffs of the Senate 
Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees, 
Senator Humphrey and Congressman Zablocki advised Lt. Gen. 
Brent Scowcroft, the President's Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, that the statements were incomplete and not sufficiently 
analytical. In addition, Senators Sparkman and Case advised the 
executive branch that the ACIS did not comply with the law and were 
unacceptable. Both committees advised that future submissions must 
comply fully with the law. 

Thus, the issue before Congress in 1977 became the extent to which 
the ACIS submitted in connection with the fiscal year 1978 budget 
request would satisfy the intent of Public Law 94-141. 

DISCUSSION 

Congressional action 

On January 18, 1977, the executive branch submitted ACIS on 
26 weapons programs sponsored by the Defense Department and the 
Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA) and an overview 
statement which discussed the relationship of arms control objectives 
to other elements of U.S. national security policy, e.g., strategy, force 
posture, and diplomacy. The National Security Council transmitted 
declassified versions of the 26 statements on February 11, 1977. Later 
in the year, separate ACIS on the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) 
and the "enhanced radiation" warhead for the Lance missile were 
also submitted. 1 



* Prepared by Robert G. Bell, Analyst in National Defense. 

1 U.S. Congress. House: Committee on International Relations. Additional Arms Control Impact 
Statements and Evaluations for Fiscal Year 1978. Print; 95th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Dec. 1, 1977, 43 pp. 

(89) 
29-972—78 7 



90 

Under a procedure established in April 1976, the chairmen of the 
Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Com- 
mit tecs requested CRS assistance in reviewing the 26 ACIS sub- 
mit ted in connection with the fiscal year 1978 budget request. The 
(KS review concluded that from the viewpoint of their complete- 
ness and analytical quality, it was difficult to understand how the 
ACIS could assist Congress in making its own independent appraisal 
of the weapons systems or in making its constitutional input to 
foreign policy relating to arms control. 

On the basis of the CRS review and the analysis of its committee 
staff, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 25, 1977, 
advised Paul C. Warnke, Director of the Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency (ACDA), that the latest statements still did not 
comply with the law and were unacceptable as models for future 
submissions. The committee called Mr. TYarnke's attention to seven 
model impact statements prepared by CRS as a revealing contrast to 
the submissions on the same weapons systems provided by the execu- 
tive branch. The House International Relations Committee expressed 
the hope that the CRS analyses would assist the administration in 
preparing future ACIS fully and properly in compliance with the law. 
In an April 8, 1977, letter to Senator Sparkman, Mr. Warnke pledged 
to make every effort to insure that future ACIS would comply with 
the letter and spirit of the law. 

On July 13, 1977, the first of the ACIS to be submitted by the 
Carter administration was transmitted to Congress. The statement 
dealt with the arms control implications of the "enhanced radiation" 
warhead for the Lance missile. In response to a request by the House 
International Relations Committee, CRS reviewed this impact state- 
ment, using the same criteria previously employed in assessing the 
initial set of 26 ACIS. The CRS review concluded that although the 
statement did not address all possible arms control interests to the 
extent one might hope, it nonetheless marked a very laudable tran- 
sition from statements with little or no substantive content to one 
which provided a starting point for reasoned debate. In inserting 
the CRS analysis in the Congressional Record, Congressman Zablocki 
observed that the CRS evaluation made it clear that the adminis- 
tration was attempting to comply more completely with the letter 
and intent of the law. 2 This assessment was subsequently buttressed 
by the substantive ACIS submitted on the ALCM. 

Prospects for 1978 

^Yith regard to the ACIS process, the issue remaining before 
Congress in 1978 will be whether the improvement in the breadth 
and scope of impact statements indicated by the first two ACIS 
submitted by the Carter administration will be sustained in the set 
of statements submitted in connection with the fiscal year 1979 
budget request. Assuming the fiscal year 1979 ACIS provide the basis 
for informed and well-reasoned debate, an associated issue will be 
how and to what extent Congress utilizes the ACIS in the course of 
its budgetary considerations concerning military weapons and 
programs. 



1 Congressional Record, Aug. 3, 1977, p. II8498. 



91 



References 



U.S. Congress. Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations 
Committees. Analysis of Arms Control Impact Statements Submitted in Con- 
nection with the Fiscal Year 1978 Budget Request. Joint Committee Print, 
95th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 

16 1977, 414 pp. 

J House Committee on International Relations. Additional Arms Contro 

Impact Statements and Evaluations for Fiscal Year 1978. Committee Print, 
95th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, Dec. 
1, 1977, 43 pp. 

ie 

'. 

5- 
It 

38 

II 


I- 

(i 
II 

r. 



Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Salt)* 

overview 

In 1977 — a year during which SALT II came under the management 
of a new administration and progressed to the point of tentative agree- 
ment — Congress dealt with two principal SALT-related areas, one 
procedural, the other substantive. Procedurally, Congress sought a 
meaningful role as a partner in the SALT II formulation process. 
Substantively, different bodies of opinion within the Congress pur- 
sued various strategic- intended to influence specific SALT II outcomes 
consistent with their strategic views. 

DISCUSSION 

Wamke hearings 

The first occasion for significant SALT-related activity by the 
Congress in 1977 was the nomination of Paul C. Warnke to be Director 
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and chief 
negotiator for the U.S. SALT delegation. 1 Senate confirmation pro- 
ceedings became the forum for efforts by different bodies of opinion 
within the Congress to influence the outcome of the SALT II agree- 
ment to be negotiated by the Carter administration. 

Although President Carter was later to state that he did not believe 
that the exact vote in the Senate on Mr. Warnke's nomination to be 
the chief U.S. SALT negotiator would have "a major effect on future 
negotiations with the Soviet Union on SALT," 2 this view was strongly 
countered by those who reasoned that a vote in favor of confirmation 
by less than two-thirds of the Senate — the number required for rati- 
fication of treaties — would presage future difficulty were the President 
to submit a SALT II treaty to the Senate that reflected the relatively 
conciliatory views with which Warnke had been associated. The 
principal argument made by those voting against Mr. Warnke's con- 
firmation as chief SALT delegate was that his philosophy of arms 
control could lead to an agreement that would be militarily disad- 
vantageous to the United States. 

The jurisdiction for hearing testimony on Mr. Warnke's qualifica- 
tions for both the ACDA and the chief SALT negotiator posts lay 
with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the committee 
held hearings on February 8 and 9, 1977. 3 In its report to the Senate on 
the nominations, the committee endorsed Mr. Warnke as an "excel- 
lent choice" for both positions. 4 Responding to charges that Mr. 
Warnke's testimony was at variance with what many perceived to be 
his earlier "soft-line" approach to arms control and national security, 
the committee report concluded: 



• Prepared by Robert G. Boll, Analyst in National Defense. 

1 Also ^ee the discussion of U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union, on pp. 47-52. (Ed.) 

> Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. Vol. 13, No. 11, p. 331. 

> U.S. Contrross. Senate, rnmmittee on Foreign Relations. Warnke Nomination. Hearings, 95th Cong., 
It sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1**77. 

« r B. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Nomination of Paul C. Warnke. (Senate 
Executive Report 95-«) 95th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

(92) 



93 

Mr. Warnke's testimony reflected changes in his perceptions of America's 
national security requirements with the passage of time and events, but members 
believe that these changes reflect the honest reevaluation of an informed and intelli- 
gent person. 5 

Only two members of the committee voted against the nomination 
for the SALT position, and only one voted against the nomination for 
the ACDA directorship. 

With the agreement of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the 
Senate Armed Services Committee also held hearings on Mr. Warnke's 
nominations. 6 Although the committee did not issue a formal report, 
opposition to Mr. Warnke's nomination to the SALT position was far 
more pronounced in the Armed Services Committee than it had been 
in the Foreign Relations Committee. The focus of the Armed Services 
Committee hearings was on alleged changes in Mr. Warnke's views on 
national security and strategic hardware issues as well as on the 
associated question of whether such alleged alterations of view were 
likely to undermine his credibility as a senior administration official. 

The full Senate voted on the Warnke nominations on March 9, 
1977. The vote followed extensive lobbying efforts on Mr. Warnke's 
behalf by the administration and President Carter's reminder at a 
press conference that morning that he as President, and not Mr. 
Warnke, would have the final say on any decisions reached with the 
Soviet Union regarding SALT. The Senate vote in favor of Mr. 
Warnke's nomination as chief SALT delegate was 58-40, a clear 
majority but nonetheless nine votes short of the two-thirds majority 
that will be required for ratification of any SALT treaty. Mr. Warnke's 
nomination to be ACDA Director had not provoked strong opposition, 
and he was confirmed for this position by a 70-29 vote. 

Coordination with executive branch on SALT 

During 1977, Congress employed a number of fora to exercise a 
participatory role in the SALT formulation process. Members of the 
Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and the 
House Armed Services and International Relations Committees 
received detailed briefings by administration officials on the SALT 
negotiations. In addition, the Senate and House Armed Services and 
Appropriations Committees debated the implications for SALT of 
specific strategic weapons systems (and vice versa) proposed in the 
course of the normal budgetary cycle and in request for supplemental 
funding and recision authority. One committee, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, held hearings on the national security and arms 
control implications (including implications for the SALT negotiations) 
of current U.S. strategic options, 7 and the House Armed Services 
Committee began a broad review of the status of U.S. strategic forces. 

In addition to these committee-related activities, many individual 
Congressmen and Senators issued statements, authored articles, made 
speeches, or corresponded directly with the President in order to com- 
municate their views on SALT. A more formalized means of personal 
involvement was instituted in June 1977, when ACDA requested that 
each House designate a number of Members to serve as congressional 



5 U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations. Nomination of Paul C. Warnke. (Senate 
Executive Report 95-6); 95th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. iH 

6 Ibid. ""* 

7 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans 
and International Environment. United States/Soviet Strategic Options. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 187 pp. 



94 

advisers on SALT. Members of the House and Senate have been active 
in this capacity since August 1977. 

SALT verification 

Public Law 95-108, the Arms Control and Disarmament Act 
Amendments of 1977, added a new section 37 to the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Act expressing ''the sense of the Congress that adequate 
verification of compliance should be an indispensable part of any 
arms control agreement." The legislation declared that in dealing with 
the issue of verification, the ADCA Director "shall assume that all 
measures of concealment not expressly prohibited could be employed 
and that standard practices could be altered so as to impede verifica- 
tion." Section 37 also establishes a number of ACDA reporting re- 
quirements to Congress related to verification, although it expressly 
states that: 

Except as otherwise provided by law, nothing in this section shall be construed 
as requiring the disclosure of sensitive information relating to intelligence sources 
or methods or persons employed in the verification of compliance with arms 
control agreements. 

As expressed in the conference report on this legislation, Congress 
intent under section 37 of Public Law 95-108 was to emphasize the 
responsibility of ACDA and other executive branch agencies to keep 
Congress informed with respect to the verifiability of significant arms 
control proposals and to make clear ACDA's responsibility to conduct 
verification research. 8 The provision was not intended to interfere 
with the President's ability to conduct arms control negotiations. 

Congressional action with respect to the expiration of SALT I 

The SALT I interim agreement between the United States and the 
Soviet Union formally expired on October 3, 1977. At a meeting on 
May 25, 1977, with Secretary of State Vance, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee addressed the questions of whether some type of 
congressional authorization would be necessary for any extension of 
the agreement, and whether the executive branch intended to consult 
with the committee on this issue prior to the agreement's expiration 
date. 9 These issues had previously been raised in a Congressional 
Research Service report issued on May 16, 1977. 10 

On July 22, 1977, the committee advised the State Department 
that any formal agreement between the United States and the Soviet 
Union extending the term of the interim agreement would, under 
section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, require prior 
congressional approval. 11 Had such an agreement been submitted to 
the Congress for its consideration, one question which could have 
arisen would have been that of Congress power to modify or abrogate 
various provisions of the interim agreement, or to add new provisions. 
In short, it could have been necessary to clarify whether Congress 
possessed more than a simple "yes or no" approval authority. 



Congress. Committee of Conference. Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments of 1077. 
i. Rept. No. 95-563); 95th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977, p. 6. 

• U.S. ConsTss. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Concurrence of the Congress with Respect 
to Presidential Action Affecting the Limitation of Strategic Armaments (S. Rept. No. 95-499). 95th Cong., 
1st ^e??.. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. Oct. 17, 1977, p. 2. 

10 Boll. Robert Q., Implications of Extondinc the SALT T Interim Agreement. Congressional Research 
Service. Library of Congress (Multilith No. 77-12 IF), May 16, 1977. 76 pp. 
« S. Rept. 95-499, p. 4. 



95 

Rather than confront these procedural issues directly, the admin- 
istration elected to permit the agreement formally to expire; however, 
on September 23, 1977, 10 days before the expiration date, Secretary 
of State Vance issued the following statement : 

In order to maintain the status quo while SALT II negotiations are being 
completed, the United States declares its intention not to take any action incon- 
sistent with the provisions of (the interim agreement) and with the goals of these 
on-going negotiations provided that the Soviet Union exercises similar restraint. 13 

The Soviet Union issued a similar statement. 

In correspondence with the Foreign Relations Committee, the 
State Department indicated its opinion that the "circumstances" of 
the parallel but independent declarations lacked the essential ele- 
ments of an obligation or a binding agreement; i.e., there was no 
intent to be bound; either party could at any time independently 
cease acting in accordance with its declaration; and there would be 
no legal consequences if either so acted. 13 In brief, the position of the 
executive branch was that its action of September 23, 1977, did not 
require congressional approval under section 33 of the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Act. 

Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee agreed generally 
on the appropriateness of the approach chosen for dealing with the 
expiration of the interim agreement, not all members of the com- 
mittee were in agreement that the President's action did not require 
congressional approval. This disagreement focused on the questions 
of whether the United States was in fact bound by its declaration and 
whether the declaration constituted an "action" under the intent of 
section 33, and was stated as follows: 

Although the differences in view * * * could not be resolved, a large majority 
of the Members believe that the committee and the Congress should approve a 
resolution stating that the President is authorized to proceed in accordance with 
the unilateral statement of September 23, 1977. 14 

Senate Concurrent Resolution 56 passed by the Senate on October 
19, 1977, states that the President is "authorized to proceed" in ac- 
cordance with the September 23, 1977, declaration, and the Senate and 
House concur, provided that nothing in the resolution be construed to 
prohibit any weapons system development, procurement, or deploy- 
ment previously or subsequently authorized by the Congress. The 
resolution also resolved that the Secretary of State shall report to the 
Congress on the SALT negotiations every 6 months. Senate Concurrent 
Resolution 56 was referred to the House International Relations 
Committee on October 20, 1977, but was not reported to the full 
House during 1977. 

Conclusion 

After more than 5 years of participation in the SALT formulation 
process and diverse attempts to influence specific SALT II outcomes, 
Congress at the end of 1977 was poised to begin the debate on whether 
to accept, modify, or reject the product of the long SALT II 
negotiation. 



12 State Department Bulletin, vol. LXXVII, No. 2002, p. 642. 
» S. Rept. No. 95-499, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
" S. Rept. No. 95-499, pp. 9-10. 



96 

Although in the course of this debate Congress will take into account 
a wide range of strategic, diplomatic, and political considerations, 
one question which will be especially pertinent will be whether the 
proposed SALT II agreement meets the intent of Congress as ex- 
pressed in Public Law 92-448. Public Law 92-448, the legislative ve- 
hicle by which Congress in 1972 authorized the President to approve 
the SALT I interim agreement, "urges and requests the President to 
seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States 
to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits pro- 
vided for the Soviet Union." Thus, a central point of attention will 
likely be whether the proposed treaty embodies the principle of 
strategic equality. 

Should Congress in 1978 authorize the President to approve a 
SALT II agreement, both Houses would most likely return to the 
task of insuring congressional influence and participation in the 
formulation of the next round of SALT agreements. Should Congress 
not accept a proposed SALT II agreement, or should it so modify the 
proposed agreement that either the President or the Soviet Union 
would refuse to agree to bring it into force, congressional involvement 
in the formulation of national security and arms control policy would 
likely be dominated by an intense debate over the most appropriate 
course of action to take in the wake of the breakdown in SALT. 

References 

congressional publications 
Hearings 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Consideration of Mr- 
Paul C. Warnke to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency and Ambassador. Hearings Together with Individual Views, 95th Cong., 
1st sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office 1977. 

Committee on Foreign Relations. Warnke Nomination. Hearings, 95th 

Cong., 1st sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment. 



United States/Soviet Strategic Options. Hearings, 95 Cong., 1st sess., Wash- 
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Reports 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Concurrence of the 
Congress with Respect to Presidential Action Affecting the Limitation of Stra- 
tegic Armaments. Report Together with Supplemental Views to Accompanv 
S. Con. Res. 56. Oct. 17, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Nomination of Paul C. Warnke. Report. 95th Cong., 1st sess., Wash., D.C., 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Committee of Conference. Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amend- 



ments of 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

Bell, Robert G., Implications of Extending the SALT I Interim Agreement. 

Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Multilith No. 77-124F). 

May 16, 1977. 76 pp. 
SALT II: Problems and Prospects [by John M. Collins and Douglas D. Mitchell.] 

Issue Brief No. IB77030. [Updated periodically] 



INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE 

Bilateral Foreign Economic and Food Assistance* 

overview 

In anticipation of a major reassessment of bilateral aid programs 
during 1978, Congress took few major initiatives in this area during 
1977. A number of legislative actions and deliberations, however, 
modified existing legislation and suggest issues that will be significant 
in the near future. The first section of this chapter discusses the main 
authorizing legislation, the International Development and Food 
Assistance Act of 1977, amendments to Public Law 480, and bilateral 
assistance appropriations. Subsequent sections briefly summarize 
significant hearings on future directions for bilateral assistance and 
food-related assistance programs. 

Although the International Development and Food Assistance Act 
of 1977 (Public Law 95-88), amending the Foreign Assistance Act 
and Public Law 480, was passed in 1977, few major initiatives were 
taken in the area of bilateral food and economic assistance policy in 
1977 either by Congress or by the Carter administration. 

DISCUSSION 

Basic economic assistance legislation 

In mid-March, the House International Relations Committee 
held hearings on economic assistance the day before the official 
receipt of the President's foreign aid message. A draft bill containing 
no new program initiatives was submitted to Congress later in the 
month by the administration. In March and April, the full Inter- 
national Relations Committee and six subcommittees held hearings 
on various aspects of the administration's aid proposal. 1 

Following 6 days of open markup by the full International Rela- 
tions Committee, 2 a clean bill, H.R. 6714, authorizing funds for 
fiscal year 1978 was reported out of committee. 3 In accordance with 
the jurisdictional changes made in 1974, the International Relations 
Committee bill dealt with the international aspects of the Food for 
Peace Program, Public Law 480, as well as bilateral U.S. economic 
aid. For 1977, military assistance and security supporting assistance 
were considered and reported in a separate bill (H.R. 6884, which 



* Prepared by Theodor W. Galdi, Analyst in International Relations. 

1 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal 
Year 1978. Hearings. Parts 1-9. 95th Con?.. 1st sess. Feb. 22, 2.3; Mar. 3. 7, 9, 10, 14, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24. 28, 
29, 30, 31; Apr. 1, 5, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28; May 2. 3, 4. 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 2.029 pp. • 

a U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal 
Year 1978. Hearings, Part 8. Full Committee Markup and Subcommittee Recommendations. 95th Cong. 
1st sess. Apr. 20, 21, 25, 27, 28; May 2, 3, 4, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office 1977. 355 pp. 

3 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. International Development and Food 
Assistance Act of 1977. May 3, 1977. Report to accompany H.R. 6714. 95th Cong., 1st sess. H. R?pt. 95-240. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office 1977. 87 pp. 

(97) 



98 

became Public Law 95-92). H.R. 6714 was considered by the House 
and passed on May 12, 1977, with four floor amendments. 

Alter 3 days of hearings in March, the Foreign Assistance Sub- 
committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marked up 
the administration's draft bill on April 7, 1977. 4 A clean bill (S. 1520 
was reported to the full committee and marked up on April 19, 1977. 
The full Foreign Relations Committee ordered S. 1520 to be reported 
on April 26, 1977. 5 

Though S. 1520 as reported out of committee closely paralleled 
H.R. 6714 as passed by the House, it omitted any provisions relating 
to Public Law 480. In the Senate, all aspects of Public Law 480 lie 
within the jurisdiction of the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and 
Forestry Committee. On June 15, 1977, S. 1520 was considered on the 
floor of the Senate, amended, and passed. A total of 19 amendments 
were proposed, 16 of which were adopted. One of the amendments was 
an entire title II to the bill, proposed by Senator Talmadge, chairman 
of the Senate Agriculture Committee, which deals with the inter- 
national aspects of Public Law 480. 

The conference report on H.R. 6714 was ordered to be printed on 
July 14, 1977. 6 The House accepted the conference report on July 21, 
1977, and the Senate accepted on July 22, 1977. Public Law 95-88 
was signed into law on August 3, 1977. 

TABLE 1.— ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED FOR FISCAL YEAR 19781 
(In millions of dollars] 



Program 

Food and nutrition _ 

Population planning... _ _ 

Health 

Education and human resources development 

Technical assistance, energy research reconstruction, 

and selected development problems 

Sahel development program.. 

AID operational expenses 

International organizations 

Total 1,563.0 1,681.2 1,606.1 1,646.8 

i Source: Conference Report on H.R. 6714, International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977. H. Rept. 95-501. 

As the table above indicates, there were few major areas of diver- 
gence between the initial executive branch request and the amounts 
finally agreed to by Congress. Of the $83 million difference between 
the administration's initial request and Public Law 95-88, $60 million 
was accounted for by increases for food and nutrition and Italian 
earthquake relief and rehabilitation. 

In the area of foreign aid policy, major provisions of H.R. 6714: 

(1) made changes in existing language in the Foreign Assistance 

Act to indicate congressional desire that the Agency for Inter- 

* U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations and Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. 
Foreipn Assl lance Authorisation. Hearings, 95th Cong. 1st sess. Mar. 23, 24 and 25, 1977. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing OfTice 1977. 200 pp. 

( 'ongrc.^. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. International Development Assistance Act of 
1977. May 13, 1977. Report to accompany S. 1520. 95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. 95-161. Washington. U.S. 
Government Writing Office 1977. 45 pp. 

8 U.S. Cong] renee Committee. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977. 

July 14, 1!»77. Report to accompany II. R. 6714. 95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. 95-501. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. 45 pp. 



Executive 








branch 


House 


Senate 


Conference 


request 


bill 


amendment 


agreement 


550. 


613.2 


550.0 


580.0 


167.0 


181.0 


160.0 


167.0 


104. 9 


105.9 


109.5 


107.7 


84.4 


84.9 


84.4 


84.9 


100.0 


110.0 


100.0 


105.0 


50.0 


50.0 


50.0 


50.0 


220.2 


220.2 


220.2 


220.2 


254.0 


246.0 


252.0 


252.0 



99 

national Development (AID) increasingly concentrate develop- 
ment assistance on countries that would make the most effective 
use of that assistance to help the poor to a better life. It lists a 
series of criteria to be used in determining whether aid recipients 
were demonstrating concern and taking effective action to im- 
prove the lives of the poor and to allow the poor to participate 
in development; 

(2) amended section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which 
deals with human rights, to include the extent of a country's 
willingness to permit unimpeded investigations of alleged viola- 
tions of internationally recognized human rights as a factor to be 
taken into consideration when AID formulates U.S. development 
policy; 

(3) authorized $750,000 to be used for studies to identify and 
openly carry out programs and activities that would encourage 
or promote increased adherence to civil and political rights in 
countries eligible for U.S. bilateral assistance; 

(4) took cognizance of the need to help less developed countries 
to protect their environments; and 

(5) added a new section to the Foreign Assistance Act author- 
izing assistance to developing countries for renewable and un- 
conventional energy technologies, emphasizing small-scale, de- 
centralized, renewable energy sources suitable for rural areas. 

The only major new economic assistance program authorized by 
H.R. 6714 was a $200 million multiyear program for development of 
the Sahel region of Africa. An initial $50 million was authorized for 
the new program for fiscal year 1978. 

Public Law 480 amendments 

The basic authorization for Public Law 480 was extended until 1981 
in title XII of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 (Public Law 95- 
113). As noted above, title II of S. 1520, dealing with the international 
aspects of Public Law 480 was added to S. 1520 on the Senate floor in 
the form of an amendment. 

The most significant change made to Public Law 480 in 1977 was the 
addition of a new Title III : The Food for Development Program. The 
food for development program authorizes the President to allow local 
currencies generated by Public Law 480 sales in recipient countries to 
be accepted as repayment for the U.S. commodities provided the local 
currencies are used for agricultural and rural development programs 
that would otherwise not have been undertaken. Voluntary family 
planning, health, and nutrition were included in the definition of 
agricultural and rural development programs. The food for develop- 
ment amendments also set out requirements for multiyear use pro- 
posals, specific eligibility criteria, minimum amounts to be devoted 
to the program, reports required, and waiver criteria to be used in 
dealing with the least developed countries as determined by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 

Other amendments extended human rights language similar to 
that in section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act to Public Law 480, 
increased the minimum distribution of title II commodities to 1.6 
million tons, with not less than 1.3 million tons to be distributed 
through nonprofit voluntary agencies and the world food program, 



100 

and repealed provisions forbidding Public Law 480 transactions with 
Egypt and with countries that aided or traded with Cuba, Cambodia, 
or Vietnam. 

Bilateral foreign economic aid appropriations 

Final passage of the Fiscal Year 1978 Foreign Assistance and Re- 
lated Programs Appropriations Act, Public Law 95-148, was delayed 
until October 19, 1977 because of several unresolved controversies 
between the House and Senate and between Congress and the execu- 
tive branch concerning the multilateral development banks. The 
issuer involved in these controversies and their resolution are discussed 
in detail below. 

Title I of the art appropriated funds for Foreign Assistance Act 
act vities. In the table below, the amount> authorized for major 
Foreign Assistance Act programs in H.R. 6714 are compared with 
the amounts appropriated in H.R. 7797. 

TABLE 2.— AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED AND APPROPRIATED FOR BILATERAL ECONOMIC AID' 
[In millions of dollars] 

Program Authorized Appropriated 

Food and nutrition. 580 515 

Population planning 167 155 

Health 107 95 

Education and human resources 84 76 

Technical assistance, energy, reconstruction, selected problems 105 90 

Sahel development program 50 50 

AID operating expenses 220 213 

International organizations 252 231 

All programs 1,646 1,496 

i Sources: Public Laws 95-88 and 95-148. 

Three policy provisions in the appropriations bill deserve attention 
here : 

(1) For the first time, Congress specified repayment periods for 
development assistance loans authorized by sections 103-106 of 
the Foreign Assistance Act. Of the $310 million total, $75 million 
was earmarked for loans repayable within 40 years, $87 million 
for loans repayable within 30 years, and $148 million for loans 
repayable within 20 years. This provision marked the first time 
that Congress had allocated loan totals on the basis of repayment 
period, rather than overall amount. 

(2) The United States contribution to the Sahel development 
program was limited to 10 percent of the total amount pledged 
by all countries for the entire program. 

(3) None of the funds made available in the act were to be used 
for assistance to or reparations for the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, Cuba, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, or Angola. 

Unlike earlier years, the 1977 debate on passage of the Foreign 
Assistance Act was not a contentious one. Except for amendments 
reiterating congressional opposition to aid to certain countries and 
language barring tobacco sales under title I of Public Law 480, there 
was little serious controversy during the floor debate in either House. 



101 

Studies on the future course of U.S. aid policy 

Hearings were held by the full House International Relations 
Committee and the International Relations Committee Subcommittee 
on International Development to examine the conclusions of an AID 
Development Coordination Committee study, and the interim report 
of a Brookings Institution study on the future of U.S. foreign aid. 7 

At the hearings, testimony was received from John Gilligan, 
Administrator of AID, and Lester Gordon, principal investigator 
responsible for the Brookings study. Written answers to questions 
submitted by International Relations Committee Chairman Zablocki 
were included in the hearings report. The administration responses 
detailed the current thinking of AID concerning the requirements 
for implemention of the "New Directions' ' legislation mandated by 
Congress, proposed reorganizations, and the agency's efforts to carry 
out the requirements of the International Development and Food 
Assistance Act of 1977. In addition, International Development Sub- 
committee Chairman Michael Harrington included in the hearings 
report written comments on the interim Brookings study which he 
had received from several experts in the development field. 

Food and U.S. foreign aid programs 

Two hearings, chaired by Senator Hubert Humphrey, were held 
during the year on the role of food in U.S. foreign aid programs. The 
first, by the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Policy of the 
Senate Agriculture Committee, examined the current issues in the 
debate over the extension of Public Law 480 : The Food for Peace 
Program. 8 Witnesses from the Agency for International Develop- 
ment and the Department of State and Agriculture as well as private 
witnesses were heard. The latter included representatives of religious 
groups, a major grain exporting company, and the Brookings Institu- 
tion. 

The second hearing, by the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reviewed the status of 
the implementation of title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act. 9 
Title XII : Famine Prevention and Freedom from Hunger, was origi- 
nally included in the International Development and Food Assistance 
Act of 1975, Public Law 94-16. It authorizes cooperation between 
AID and U.S. land grant universities to facilitate international 
agricultural research and development. Witnesses at the hearing on 
title XII included AID Administrator John Gilligan and Clifton 
Wharton, president of Michigan State University and Chairman of 
the Board for International Food and Agricultural Development. 

The relative lack of major bilateral foreign economic aid legislative 
initiatives in 1977 can be attributed to several factors. Most promi- 
nent among these were; (1) the newness of the Carter administration, 



7 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, and Subcommittee on International 
Development. Rethinking U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the Developing World. Hearings. 95th Cong., 
1st sess. Aug. 4. Oct. 12, and Nov. 1, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office 1977. 137 pp. 

8 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry. Subcommittee on Foreign 
Agricultural Policy. Future of Food Aid. Hearings. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Apr. 4 and 5, 1977. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office 1977. 137 pp. 

8 Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. Implementation of Title XII 
of the Foreign Assistance Act. Hearing. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Apr. 27, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office 1977. 44 pp. 



102 

(2) expectations that a complete restructuring of the Foreign Assist- 
ance Act itself would be forthcoming for fiscal year 1979, (3) the 
general desire of Congress to consolidate and determine the effective- 
ness of the changes mandated by the "New Directions" legislation 
before undertaking additional tasks, and (4) the desire to examine 
the results of the studies of all U.S. aid policy by the Development 
Coordination Committee and the Brookings Institution before acting. 

Prospects jor 1978 

For 1978, Congress is expected to deal with recommendations to 
reorganize U.S. foreign aid programs. The primary vehicle for this 
reorganization, S. 2420, was submitted in January 1978 in the name 
of the late Senator Hubert Humphrey by Senator Sparkman. The bill 
envisions creation of a single Cabinet-level International Development 
Cooperation Administration to set policy for all aspects of U.S. 
bilateral and multilateral economic and food aid. 



Multilateral Assistance * 



OVERVIEW 



The Congress, in its consideration of a number of issues affecting 
U.S. participation in the multilateral development banks during 1977, 
reflected a number of contradictory approaches to key problems and 
came to no final position regarding a coherent U.S. policy toward 
these international institutions. 1 It authorizes the United States to 
join in a major expansion of the multilateral aid program, but it also 
approved a series of restrictive amendments which raised doubts 
about the continuity of the multilateral agencies. 

The Congress dealt with three main issues during the year. The first 
involved the pace and level of U.S. contributions. The Congress 
appropriated money early in the year to bring this country nearly 
up to date in its payments, and it authorized a major increase in new 
U.S. contributions to the multilateral program. In the final appropria- 
tions bill, though, Congress decided to support a lower rate of growth 
for U.S. to these agencies. 

The second question involved appropriations for pledges made 
earlier and raised the issue of the credibility of U.S. commitments. 
When the talks about a fifth replenishment of the International 
Development Association (IDA V) seemed ready to break down early 
in the year because other member countries doubted the credibility 
of U.S. promises to contribute, Congress approved a supplemental 
appropriation restoring the $55 million cut in fiscal year 1976 from 
the first U.S. payment to the fourth replenishment (IDA IV). 2 After 
the new IDA V agreement was approved, however, Congress decided 
not to provide money for the last two payments ($375 million each) 
for IDA IV. Other IDA donor countries were reportedly upset at 
this action. 

The last issue had to do with congressional efforts to influence bank 
operations. Keflecting concerns about loans to countries like Chile 

* Prepared by Jonathan E. Sanford, Analyst in International Relations. 

1 The United States is a member of four multilateral development agencies: the African Development 
Fund (AFDF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 
and the World Bank Group. The AFDF is the concessional loan affiliate of the African Development Bank 
(AFDB), an institution with only African members. The ADB has two loan accounts: ordinary capital 
(OC) for near-commercial loans and the Asian Development Fund (ADF) for concessional loans. The 
IDB also has two basic accounts: ordinary capital (OC) and the concessional Fund for Special Operations. 
The World Bank Group consists of three programs operating under the same managerial umbrella: the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), for near-commercial loans, the Inter- 
national Development Association (IDA), for concessional credits, and the International Finance Corpora- 
tion (IFC), for equity investments in Third World private firms. For additional information on these 
agencies see: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The United States and the Multilateral 
Development Banks. Committee Print. 93d Cong., 2d sess., March 1974. (Prepared by Margaret Goodman 
and Jonathan Sanford, Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service.) Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1974, 230 pp. 

2 The other donors had largely completed their contributions to IDA IV, while the United States had cut 
$55 million from its first payment and was also 2 years out of phase in its payments schedule, because it had 
exercised both the options in the IDA IV agreement letting it delay its first payment a year and allowing 
it to spread its payments over 4 rather than the regular 3 years. The Carter administration agreed to seek 
a supplemental appropriation restoring the $55 million and to bring the United States back into phase with 
the other donors by "doubling up" the U.S. payments for IDA IV and IDA V in fiscal years 1978 and 1979. 

(103) 



104 

and Argentina, Congress passed amendments requiring the adminis- 
d to oppose loan- to countries thai violate citizens' human rights 
and to encourage more Lending to countries that channel additional 
aid to the poor. Other amendments were designed to discourage bank 
Lending to countries like Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, and Cuba 
and to stop loan- for certain crops that compete with U.S. commodi- 
After a protracted struggle, Congress stopped just short of 
requiring restrictions that would have prohibited the banks from 
Lending to -even countries or Lending for palm oil, sugar, or citrus 
production projects, an action that would have risked the refusal of 
the hank- to accept any U.S. contributions. 

DISCUSSION' 

Thi> discussion of congressional action affecting the multilateral' 
assistance program in 1977 consists of two sections. The first analyzes 
the congressional debates about the proper size and level of U.S. 
contributions to the banks. The second reviews the issues in debate' 
concerning the way the Congress can best influence the banks' operat- 
ing policies. 

C<mgrt88 and U.S. contributions to the multilateral banks 

Congress considered three major bills in 1977 dealing with U.S.. 
contributions to the multilateral development banks) : the Fiscal Year 

1977 Supplemental Appropriations Act, the Omnibus International 
Financial Institutions Authorization Act, and the regular Fiscal Year 

1978 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. 

Fiscal Year 1077 Supplemental Appropriations Act. — The Carter 
administration submitted its fiscal year 1977 supplemental request 
for the multilateral banks soon after taking office, in hopes that Con- 
gress might restore some of the cuts the program had sustained in 
the fiscal year 1977 and earlier appropriation measures. Most of the 
money in the request — $460 million of the $540 million — was for the 
Inter- American Development Bank (IDB). 3 The most important 
single item, though, was probably the request for $55 million to restore 
the cuts in IDA IV appropriations, as discussed earlier. 

After examining the administration's proposal and eliminating 
$138 million for the IDB — over half of it callable capital — Congress 
agreed to provide $.*>96 million to bring the United States up to date in 
its commitments to all the institutions except the IDB. The House 
Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee initially approved 
a deeper cut in IDB funds, but its chairman, Representative Clarence 
Long, later arranged a compromise floor amendment when the bill 
came up March 16, restoring half the deleted IDB soft loan funds. 
The House tentatively passed another amendment dropping the $55 
million in IDA IV money from the bill, but it reversed itself on a 
separate vote after IDA's supporters argued that this appropriation 
wa- very important to IDA's future. 4 

I.'?? Omnibus Multilateral Bank Authorization Act. — The admin- 
istration submitted a series of requests for legislation authorizing over 



- e table l. 

' Public Law '*", _>6. Amendment by Represent alive Clarence Long. Congressional Record (dailv ed.), 
vol. i_'.'{. Mar. 16. 1'.'77. pp. 11:147-8. Amendment by Representative Bill Young, ibid., p. 112148. Debate 
on Yoii'ig amendment and separate vote, ibid., pp. II2i7o-:}. 



105 

$5.07 billion for the new U.S. contributions to the multilateral banks. 
Some of the proposals were introduced initially as separate bills 
(S. 871, S. 872) in the Senate. House Banking, Finance and Urban 
Affairs Committee Chairman Henry Reuss combined them all into 
H.R. 5262, the first omnibus multilateral aid authorization proposal 
since 1970. That bill became the focus of congressional action on the 
subject. The administration request was for the following: $2,400 
million for IDA; $1,568.9 million for the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); $111.5 million for the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) ; and $814.3 million for the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and $180 million for the Asian 
Development Fund (ADF) , its concessional affiliate. 

The House Banking Committee voted 35-7 on March 29 to report 
the omnibus bill favorably with several amendments, related mainly 
to policy issues which are discussed in the next section. A new title 
was added, responding to congressional concerns about U.S. Africa 
policy by authorizing $150 million (not requested by the admin- 
istration) for U.S. contributions to the next African Development 
Fund (AFDF) replenishment. 5 

The House considered the omnibus multilateral bank proposal 
April 6 and passed it 194-156. There was virtually no debate on the 
sections authorizing over $5.2 billion over the next 3 years for new 
U.S. contributions replacing the $150 million figure with authority 
for "such sums as may be necessary, consistent with, and after con- 
sultations with, the other nations involved'' and requiring the Treasury 
Secretary to seek changes making the AFDF voting system reflect 
actual contributions by member countries. 6 

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee added issues of its own 
concern to the bill and voted 12-0 on May 10 to favorably report the 
new legislation. 7 Its new version of the bill differed in many respects 
from the measure passed earlier in the House, with most of the again 
revisions relating to policy issues. The Senate panel retained the $150 
million figure for the AFDF. 

The Senate voted 59-30 on June 14 to approve the omnibus multi- 
lateral bank authorization bill. Most of the floor amendments dealt 
with policy questions, but a few did focus on contributions issues. 

Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., proposed an amendment to cut the 
authorizations in the bill from $5.2 billion to $2.9 billion, with most 
of the reduction coming from IBRD, IDA and AFDF funds. After 
a lengthy debate on the merits of the multilateral agencies, the Senate 
voted 29-63 to reject the Byrd amendment. 8 The proposed $150 
million AFDF contribution was cut to $50 million, but the require- 
ment for U.S. efforts to change the AFDF voting system was retained. 9 

The Senate also accepted an uncontroversial amendment st a ting- 
that the multilateral programs were important to the United States, 
but that future U.S. contributions to these agencies should not exceed 
25 percent of total contributions. Senator Schweiker said his amend- 



5 U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Banking, Ctirrency and Urban Affairs. International Financial 
Institutions. H. Rept. 95-154, accompanying H.R. 5262, Mar. 31, 1977. pp. 32, 38-9. 

6 Amendment by Representative Paul Tsongas. Congressional Record (daily ed.) vol. 123, Apr. 6, 1977, 
pp. H3118-9. Amendment by Representative Chalmers Wylie, ibid., pp. H3119-20. 

7 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Omnious Multilateral Institutions Act of 1977. 
S. Rept. 95-159, accompanying H.R. 5362, May 13, 1977, pp. 10-11. 

8 Debate on amendment by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., ibid., pp. S9718-34. 

9 Debate on amendments by Senators Dennis DeConcini and James Allen, ibid., pp. S9734-40. 

29-972—78 8 



106 

ment was a "guide, goal and objective," not a rigid limit on U.S. 
negotiators, and it did not apply to the IDB. 10 

All the major controversies in the House and Senate conference 
committee had to do with policy questions. The conferees agreed to 
include the Schweiker amendment in the final bill and authorized 
$50 million as an additional U.S. donation to the last AFDF replenish- 
ment. They also instructed the administration to begin talks with 
other contributors about a new AFDF replenishment and suggested 
that the total U.S. contribution would probably be in the $150 million 
ran ire. 11 

Fiscal Year 1978 Appropriations Act. — The administration's fiscal 
year 197S foreign assistance appropriations request included pro- 
posed payments for the first annual share of the funds authorized in 
the 1977 omnibus act, along with other payments for contributions 
authorized in earlier legislation. (See table 1.) The $1,175 million 
IDA figure included $375 for the third tranche of the 1974 IDA IV 
and $800 million for the first payment of the 1977 IDA V. 

TABLE 1.— 1977 APPROPRIATIONS FOR MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
[Dollar amounts in millions; amounts in parenthesis are share of ordinary capital to be paid in] 

Bank Request House Senate Final 

Fiscal year 1977 supplement (H.R. 8477): 

ADB/ADF $25.00 

IDB/OC (60) 260.00 

IDB/FSO 200.00 

IDA 55.00 

Fiscal year 1978 (H.R. 7797): 

AFDC. 10.00 

ADB/OC . (20) 203.57 

AD3/ADF 60.00 

IDB/OC. (40) 400.00 

IDB/FSO 200.00 

IBRD (52) 522.95 

IDA... 1, 175.00 

IFC 44.60 

i Committee recommended $120; raised by floor amendment. 

2 Reduced as a consequence of House amendment cutting total budget authority of all programs in bill by 5 percent. 

* Committee recommended $950; cut by floor amendment. 

The House Appropriations Committee made substantial cuts in 
the fiscal year 1978 appropriations figures for the multilateral pro- 
grams, as table 1 reveals, because of its stated concerns about the 
level of lending to countries with human rights problems, 12 its anxieties 
about the rapidity of growth in these organizations, its disapproval of 
the banks' salary levels and administrative costs, and its concerns 
about a need for more congressional control and oversight on these 
international programs. 13 Its bill (H.R. 7797) said the proposed $950 
million IDA contribution should be used to pay the amounts due 
for both the fourth and fifth replenishments, but it gave no indication 
as to how the $225 million shortfall should be allocated. 14 The House 
largely endorsed the committee's proposed contributions figures 
when it considered the bill June 22 and 23, rejecting an amendment 

10 See also the discussion of Latin America on pp. 180-189 in this volume. (Ed.) 

11 U.S. Congress. House. Committee of Conference. International Financial Institutions. Conference 
Report. II. Ropt. 95-644, accompanying H.R. 5262, July 28, 1977, pp. 9, 12. 

>'- Also see the discussion of Human Rights on pp. 142-152 in this volume. (Ed.) 

» U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs 
Appropriation Bill. 1978. H. Rept. 95-417, to accompany H.R. 7977, June 15, 1977, pp. 45-48. 
" Ibid., p. 50-1, H.R. 7977, p. 21, lines 6-12 (House version). 



$15.00 


$25.00 


$25. 00 


(36) 156.00 


(46) 166.00 


(36) 156.00 


i 160. 00 


160. 00 


160.00 


55.00 


55.00 


55.00 


10.00 


10.00 


10.00 


(16) 140.00 


(20) 203.00 


(17) 165.99 


60.00 


60.00 


49.51 


(40) 398. 00 


(40) 398. 00 


a (37) 365. 28 


125.00 


125. 00 


2 114.72 


(40) 400.00 


(40) 400.00 


« (38) 380. 00 


950. 00 


a 800. 00 


800. 00 


40.00 


44.60 


» 38. 00 



107 

which would have cut the IDA contribution to $473 million. 15 In its 
last action before the final 208-174 vote, however, the House approved 
an amendment which trimmed the total budget authority in the bill 
by 5 percent. 16 

The Senate Appropriations Committee also made significant 
reductions in the multilateral aid contribution figures, as table 1 
indicates, because of its stated concern that the banks' salary level 
and administrative costs were too high, its conviction that insufficient 
disclosure of bank information hampered congressional oversight, its 
dissatisfaction with levels of lending for mutual credit institutions, 
and its belief that the current U.S. share was too large in all these 
institutions. 17 Like its House counterpart, it also recommended $950 
million for the IDA, with no stipulation as to how it should be divided 
between the two replenishment accounts. 18 

The Senate made a significant change, however, in the fiscal year 
1978 appropriations bill on the floor agreeing to an amendment by 
Senator Harry Byrd, Jr., cutting the IDA figure to $800 million and 
earmarking it all for the fifth replenishment. The bill came to the 
floor on August 5, the day before the beginning of the August con- 
gressional recess, and some Senators indicated that they would propose 
a number of amendments and request unlimited debate unless the 
leadership supported the Byrd amendment and certain other changes 
in the bill. 19 An informal agreement was arranged to expedite action 
on the bill, and Senator Allen said in defense of the B}Td amendment 
that "* * * if this amendment is defeated, it would be the loss of an 
integral cog in the informal understanding that may well result in 
the passage of this bill before nightfall here in the Senate. But we go 
back to a catch-as-can basis if this amendment is defeated." 20 

Speaking in support of his motion, Senator Byrd claimed that $800 
million was more than enough for IDA and the United States had no 
real commitment to make any further contributions to IDA IV. "The 
fourth replenishment has already gone by the boards. A new replenish- 
ment * * * has now come to the fore and is before Congress for 
appropriation. The amendment * * * would eliminate $150 million 
for the fourth replenishment." 21 Senator Inouye said his committee 
had intended that $800 million of its proposed $950 million would be 
used for the fifth replenishment, and he accepted the Byrd amend- 
ment, saying that "if the Secretary of the Treasury * * * should feel 
sufficiently strong on insisting upon our contributing further to the 
fourth IDA replenishment, he has every right and authority to 
submit a supplemental request." 22 Senator Schweiker said the amend- 
ment showed the administration it must consult more carefully with 
Congress before agreeing to contribute money to the banks. "I think 
this is one way of giving a clear warning without wrecking anything 
because IDA V continues, IDA V we agree to, and every dollar of 



^Amendment proposed by Representative Bill Young. Congressional Record (daily ed.), vol. 123, 
June 23, 1977, pp. H6388-96. 

i« Amendment proposed by Representative Clarence Miller, ibid., pp. H6422-3. 

17 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs 
Appropriation Bill, 1978. S. Rept. 95-352, accompanying H.R. 7797, July 18, 1977, pp. 121-6. 

is Ibid., p. 135. 

19 Remarks by Senator Schweiker on the large number of amendments being proposed on the bill. Con- 
gressional Record (daily ed.), vol. 123, Aug. 5, 1977, p. S13884. Remarks of Senator Jacob Javits, ibid., p. 
S 13889; 

20 Remarks by Senator James Allen, ibid., p. S1388-1. Remarks of Senator Edward Brooke, ibid., p. S13888. 
2 » Remarks of Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., ibid., p. S13S83. 

22 Remarks by Senator Daniel Inouye, ibid. 



108 

IDA V is in there. So we are meeting the good faith of the 
administration." 23 

Senator Javits said, objecting to the amendment, that it would 
gravely damage U.S. credibility and injure the multilateral program 
if the 'United States defaulted on its pledge for IDA IV. "I think this 
is highly unwise for the United State-." M The amendment passed 
49 32. Tfce Senate later removed the House's overall 5-percent cut 
from the bill. 25 

The Souse and Semite Conference Committee was deadlocked on 
many of the differences in policy questions in the legislation. The 
contributions issues were more easily resolved, however, as the con- 
ferees agreed to and the Congress eventually passed, the compromise 
appropriation figures shown in table l. 26 All of the $800 million lor 
IDA was earmarked for tlie fifth replenishment's the Senate bill 
required. An overall 5-percent reduction was also levied, as the 
House bill demanded, and the cuts were distributed among the multi- 
lateral programs on a relatively even basis. 

Congress and multilateral bank policy 

As the multilateral banks have taken a more prominent role in 
world economic development and U.S. contributions have grown 
from a $990 million appropriation request for fiscal year 1975 to a 
$2,616 million proposal for fiscal year 1978, congressional interest in 
the multilateral agencies has correspondingly increased. Congress 
dealt with four basic policy issues in 1977 as it considered multilateral 
bank legislation: human rights, loans for the production of certain 
crops and other items that compete with U.S. products, loans to 
countries in current disfavor with the U.S. Government, and salary 
levels and administrative practices in the banks. All were questions 
that Congress had dealt with in some manner the previous year. The 
Congress also debated the proper techniques it should use in seeking 
to influence the banks on these issues. Three mechanisms were pro- 
posed: prohibitions blocking the banks from using U.S. -contributed 
funds for specific purposes, directives requiring the U.S. representa- 
tives to advocate certain policies in the banks, and requirements 
obliging the U.S. delegates to cast automatic "no" votes against 
certain types of loans. 

The House and Senate deadlocked in both their conferences on the 
omnibus authorization and the fiscal year 1978 appropriation bills, 
as each insisted on policy amendments the other could not accept. 
Ultimately, the conferees traded off these issues as they sought to 
devise compromise language to get the legislation passed. The basic 
issues were the same in both cases, and the intensity of the protracted 
deadlock on the second appropriations bill can be attributed partly 
to the results of the first conference. 

1077 Omnibus Authorization Act. — The House Banking Committee 
added two new titles (in addition to the AFDF contribution) as it 
marked up the administration's new authorization requests for the 
banks, directing the U.S. executive directors to use the U.S. "voice 



23 Remarks of Senator Richard Schweiker, ibid., p. S1&84. 

x Remarks of Senator Jacob Javits, ibid., p. S13889. 

J s Motion to tabic by Senator James Allen and vote on amendment ibid., pp. S13900-02. 

M U.S. Congress. House. Committee of Conference. Making Appropriations for Foreign Assistance and 
Related Programs for the Fiscal year Ending Sept. 30, 1978, Conference Report.il. Rept. 9&-701. accom- 
panying H.R. 7797, Oct. 12, 1977. 



109 

and vote" in the banks to encourage more emphasis on light capital 
technology — including energy-related technologies — in their loan pro- 
grams. The other title directed the U.S. delegates to use the U.S. 
voice and vote to advance the cause of human rights, discourage 
lending to countries with poor human rights records, and encourage 
more lending for projects which addressed basic human needs of 
people in recipient countries. The bill provided criteria for identifying 
human rights violators and added a measure repealing the Harkin 
amendment to the 1976 Inter-American Development Bank Act 27 
after rejecting a motion by Representative Badillo to retain the 
Harkin amendment and extended it to the other multilateral banks. 28 
Human rights policy and the best approach the United States should 
take in attempting to get the banks to limit their lending to countries 
with poor rights records was a major issue in floor debate on H.R. 
5262. Chairman Reuss and others claimed the committee bill would 
actually be more effective than the Harkin-Badillo approach, for the 
United States would have more impact on the international agencies 
if it set positive goals and required its delegates to actively discourage 
lending to rights violators than if it simply required the U.S. repre- 
sentatives to vote "no." They also claimed there were too many 
possibilities for abuse in the Harkin approach, for the administration 
could support loans to countries with poor rights records if the specific 
project was designed to mainly help the poor. 

Representative Badillo and others insisted, however, that Congress 
must take a strong position on human rights and not give the executive 
branch the flexibility to ignore congressional concerns in this area. 
After an extended debate, the House agreed on a voice vote to pass 
an amendment by Representative Badillo which substituted his 
revised Harkin amendment for the Reuss human rights language and 
directed the U.S. delegates at all the banks to oppose loans to human 
rights violators unless the aid was directed specifically to programs 
serving the basic human needs of people in the recipient country. 
After a brief discussion, the House also adopted a second Badillo 
amendment (endorsed by Chairman Reuss) directing the Treasury 
Secretary to begin consultations with other major democracies in 
order to bring about an international consensus on standards and 
methods for using economic interdependence to promote human rights 
around the world. 29 

The second major group of issues involved amendments proposed 
by Congressmen seeking to block certain types of multilateral bank 
loans. Chairman Dawson Mathis and Representative Henson Moore, 
of the Agriculture Committee's Subcommittee on Oilseeds and Rice, 
proposed an amendment — titled "Human Nutrition in Developing 
Countries" — which declared it U.S. policy that the banks should 
emphasize nutrition, the reduction in hunger and agricultural self- 
sufficiency, and required the U.S. executive directors to oppose any 
loans for palm oil, citrus, or sugar production if the United States 
produces a similar or competing agricultural product. 30 The proponents 

27 The Harkin amendment directed the U.S. delegates at the IDB and AFDF to vote against loans for 
countries with records of consistent gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, unless the 
aid specifically benefited needy people. 

28 House Banking Committee, H. Rept. 95-154, Mar. 31, 1977, pp. 33-37. 

29 Debate on amendments proposed by Representative Herman Badillo, Congressional Record, Apr. 6, 1976, 
pp. H3121-30. 

3° See also the discussion of U.S. international food policy on pp. 123-123 in this volume. (Ed.) 



110 

argued the amendment was needed to protect American farmers from 
overseas competition. The opponents claimed it would seriously 
hamper U.S. participation in the multilateral program without 
materially benefiting U.S. farmers. The House voted 218-145 to 
include the Mathis-Moore amendment in the bill. 31 The House 
defeated (loo-ISO) an amendment by Representative Clarence Miller 
that would have required the multilateral agencies to return any funds 
appropriated on account of this authorization bill if they made any 
to Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, or Vietnam. 32 It also rejected an 
amendment by Representative Garry Brown that would have re- 
quired the U.S. executive directors to oppose any loan which was not 
certified by the U.S. President as going to a country that met U.S. 
criteria for human rights and did not engage in discriminatory boy- 
cotts against other nations or -people on the basis of race, creed, color, 
or religion (i.e., the Arab boycott of Israel). 33 

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee rewrote H.R. 5262 and 
reported a bill whose policy sections were more like those in the orig- 
inal House Banking Committee bill than those in the final House 
measure. It rescinded the Harkin amendment from the 1976 IDB 
Act and deleted the Long amendment — which required U.S. repre- 
sentatives to vote against credits for countries that explode nuclear 
devices without signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) 34 — from the 1974 IDA Act. Instead, it directed the U.S. 
delegates at the banks to use the U.S voice and vote to channel aid 
to countries that do not engage in consistent gross violations of inter- 
nationally recognized human rights. It also directed the U.S. executive 
directors to consider four other criteria in the conduct of their duties: 
U.S. bilateral actions on human rights, the extent that needy people 
benefit from economic aid, 35 the fact that a recipient country has 
exploded a nuclear device and not signed the NPT, and whether aid 
for palm oil, cane sugar, or citrus crops competes with similar U.S. 
products so as to cause injury to U.S. producers. 36 

When it considered the omnibus measure, the Senate dealt with 
several policy issues in addition to the commitment issue and U.S. 
contribution levels. The first involved human rights. After a lengthy 
debate, the Senate voted 43-50 to reject an amendment by Senator 
James Abourezk which would have substituted the requirements of 
the House bill — the broadened Badillo-Harkin language — for the 
provisions of the Senate Committee bill. 37 It did adopt another amend- 
ment, though, directing the Secretary of the Treasury to begin talks 
with other democracies on ways for using economic cooperation to 
create viable standards for protecting human rights and meeting 
human needs. 38 

The second group of issues in the Senate debate involved efforts to 
restrict multilateral lending to specific countries. After tabling (58-34) 
a motion which would have required U.S. representatives to oppose 
loans for Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam until their governments 

31 Amendments proposed by Representatives Dawson Mathis and Hcnson Moore, ibid., pp. H3130-5. 

I of Asia: Korea and Viet nam on pp. 190-195 in this volume. (Ed.) 
33 Amendment proposed by Representative Garry Brown, ibid., p. 3137. See also the discussion of th« 
on pp. 196-204 In this volume. (Ed.) 

84 See also the discussion of unclear nonproliferatlon on pp. 83-88 in this volume. (Ed.) 

85 See also the discussion of bilateral foreign economic and food assistance on pp. 97-102 in this volume. 

36 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 8. Rept. 95-159, May 13, 1977, pp. 16-19. 

37 Amendment proposed by Senator James Abourezk, Congressional Record, June 14. 1977, pp. S9706-13. 
M Amendment by Senator Mark Hatfield and remarks by Senator Clifford Case, ibid., pp. S9747-8. 



Ill 

show they are not violating their peoples' basic rights, 39 the Senate 
voted 58-32 for an amendment by Senator Dole instructing them to 
oppose all multilateral loans to Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia and 
cutting the authorization for future U.S. contributions by whatever 
amount the banks lent the Indochinese states. 40 It also passed a 
motion by Senator Humphrey expressing the Senate's "sense of 
disgust for Idi Amin Dada," in lieu of a motion by Senator Helms to 
prohibit the banks from lending to Uganda. 41 

The last category of issued raises in the Senate related to manage- 
ment and salaries at the multilateral banks. Senator Helms proposed 
an amendment instructing U.S. representatives "to seek to reduce 
bank employee salaries comparable to those paid employees of the 
U.S. Government in comparable positions," on the grounds the 
American people should not pay their indirect employees in the 
banks more than they pay their direct employees in U.S. agencies. 
After Senator Case observed that the international agencies usually 
compete with private banks and industry, not the U.S. Government, 
as they search for good employees, though, Senator Helms altered his 
amendment to direct the U.S. delegates instead to seek salary limits 
similar to those paid "employees of private business and the U.S. 
Government in comparable positions," and the revised amendment 
was adopted without further debate. 42 

House and Senate conferees met several times to resolve their 
differences on the omnibus legislation. On June 17, the House defeated 
a motion (161-200) to instruct its conferees to insist on its own human 
rights language. 43 The conferees were then deadlocked on the bill, 
with each side insisting on its approach to the human rights and 
agricultural commodities issues and the House delegates pressing the 
Senate to drop its measure limiting multilateral loans to Indochina. 

The conferees agreed July 26 to a compromise bill which contained 
the following terms on disputed policy questions: (1) It recommended 
adoption of the Senate approach to human rights, directing the U.S. 
executive directors to vote in the banks to advance human rights. A 
negative vote on loans to human rights violators was required only 
"where other means have proven ineffective," unless the President 
certified that the cause of human rights would be better served by 
not voting against the loan or the loan was specifically designed to 
serve basic human needs in the recipient country. (2) The requirement 
that consultations be held on international standards protecting human 
rights was broadened from consideration of only industrial democracies 
(House version) or democracies (Senate version) to include ail foreign 
nations. (3) The Senate requirement for negative U.S. votes and 
reduced U.S. contributions if the banks lent to Vietnam, Cambodia, 
or Laos was dropped and replaced by compromise language directing 
the U.S. delegates to consider whether those countries were being- 
responsive to American efforts to get an accounting for the MIA's. 
(4) The House requirement that U.S. executive directors use their 
voice and vote in the banks to channel more aid to projects addressing 

39 Amendment proposed by Senator Orin Hatch, ibid., p. Q9714-16. 
*o Amendment proposed by Senator Robert Dole, ibid., pp. S9742-7. 

« Amendment proposed by Senators Jesse Helms and Hubert Humphrey, ibid., pp. S9696-9701. See also 
the discussion of Africa on pp. 172-178 in this volume. (Ed.) 

42 Amendment by Senator Jesse Helms and remarks by Senator Clifford Case, ibid., pp. S9071-6. 

43 Debate in House on instructing its conferees. Congressional Record (daily ed.) vol. 123, June 17, 1977, 
pp. H6077-81. 



112 

human needs was dropped in favor of the Senate language, 
which made direct benefits for the needy a criterion the U.S. delegates 
should consider in performing their duties. (5) The Senate condemna- 
tion of Idi Amin Dada was dropped because it had already been passed 
in other Legislation. (6) The conferees agreed to the Senate language 
ding the Long amendment's requirement that the U.S. delegates 
automatically vote "no" on IDA loans to countries which explode 
nuclear devices without signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) and -imply making this a criterion they should consider in 
performing their duties. (7) They agreed to the House proposal direct- 
mi:- the U.S. representatives to emphasize light capital technologies 
in the multilateral institutions. 

(S) They accepted the Senate amendment requiring the U.S. dele- 
gates !<> seek limits on bank salaries comparable to those paid in 
private industry and the U.S. Government. (9) The Senate conferees 
dropped their requirement that U.S. delegates need only consider 
the impact agricultural loans might have on U.S. production, and 
they accepted the House language stressing human nutrition, self- 
sufficiency, and U.S. opposition to loans lor palm oil, sugar, and citrus. 
The conferees agreed in their report that U.S. opposition could 
include votes of "present" or "abstain," as well as "no" votes. 44 

The Senate considered and agreed to the conference report July 26. 45 
The House considered the conference report September 16 and re- 
jected it 153-230. Representative Tom Harkin then proposed a 
preferential motion that the House recede from its disagreement if 
its original position on human rights were included in the measure. 
Specifically, he moved that the House drop the provision requiring 
the U.S. directors to oppose loans to rights violators only "where 
other means have proven ineffective" and eliminate the Presidential 
waiver on some negative votes. Responding to a question by Repre- 
sentative John Rousselot, Mr. Harkin said he thought there was no 
flexibility in the requirement for U.S. opposition to loans to rights 
violators, 46 and he agreed with Mr. Rousselot that "oppose" meant a 
"no" vote. 

The Senate considered the House change in the conference report 
September 21. Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator John 
Sparkman said the new House language was acceptable and the Senate 
should agree to the proposed changes in the text. He then observed 
that the requirement for U.S. opposition to loans to gross human 
rights violators did not necessarily mean a requirement that the U.S. 
representatives actually vote against those loans. "The distinction is 
a fine one but important because it provides the executive directors 
with some flexibility as they represent the United States in the inter- 
national financial institutions. The term 'oppose' is both broader and 
more flexible than a simple directive to vote against assistance." 47 
There was no objection to this interpretation of the measure, and the 
ie voted by voice vote without further debate to approve the 
House amendments to the conference report. 



** Conference Committee report on H.R. 5282, IT. Rept. 95-544, pp. 10-12. 

4S Donate and vote in the Senate on conference report, Congressional Record (daily ed.) vol. 123, July 27, 
pp. Sl2^71-2. 

4t Comments by Representatives Tom narkins and John Rousselot. Congressional Record (daily ed.) 
vol. 123, Sept. 16, 1977. pp. H9564 6, then agreed to the Harkin preferential motion by voice vote. 

47 Remarks of Senator John Sparkman. Congressional Record (daily ed.) vol. 123, Sept. 21, 1977, pp. 
815247-8. 



113 

Fiscal Year 1978 Appropriations Act. — The House Appropriations 
Committee recommended deep cuts in the administration's fiscal year 
1978 multilateral bank request, as noted earlier. The committee also 
reiterated in its report its strong support for light capital technologies 
and urged that "projects emphasizing rural, small-scale decentralized 
energy technologies be undertaken as rapidly as possible." The com- 
mittee also said it expected the administration to channel additional 
bank funds toward projects and policies that would directly benefit 
the needy. 48 

The House added a number of policy requirements to the fiscal 
year 1978 appropriation bill when it came to the floor. Representative 
Bill Young moved to add to the language prohibiting direct aid to 
Uganda, Cambodia, Loas, or Vietnam a stipulation prohibiting appro- 
priated funds from being used indirectly for such aid. Proponents 
of the Young amendment claimed it was needed to withhold U.S. 
funds from repressive regimes and to stop the administration from 
channeling money to them through international agencies. Opponents 
said the proposal violated the multilateral banks' basic rules and 
would prevent the banks from accepting U.S. contributions if 
Congress insisted on restricting use of those funds. The House voted 
295-115 to endorse the amendment. 49 It then passed (359-33) another 
motion by Representative Lester Wolff prohibiting use of any funds 
for reparations to Vietnam. 50 

Later, the House also agreed by voice vote to his amendment 
barring direct or indirect use of U.S. funds for aid to Mozambique 
and Angola because of the presence of Cuban troops in those lands. 51 
It also voted 274-112 for a motion b}^ Representative John Ashbrook 
prohibiting any direct or indirect aid or trade for Cuba. 52 It also 
voted (209-179) for an amendment by Representative Henson Moore 
prohibiting the banks from using any U.S. funds for loans for sugar, 
palm oil, or citrus crops, overseas, if the United States produces the 
same, similar, or competing crops. 53 

The Senate Appropriations Committee eliminated all the House- 
passed policy amendments from its version of the bill, dropping 
"indirecth'" from the prohibition on aid to the seven countries and 
eliminating the amendment prohibiting multilateral loans for certain 
crops. It printed language commending and encouraging the President 
for his stated determination to "reform * * * the policies which have, 
on occasion, awarded liberal grants and loans to repressive regimes 
which violate human rights." 54 To underscore its strong conviction 
that multilateral bank salaries were unjustifiably high, the Senate 
Committee put a limitation in the appropriation language for each 
bank, so that "no such payment may be made while the U.S. executive 
director is compensated by the bank at a rate in excess of the rate 
provided for an individual occupying a position at level IV of the 
executive schedule." 55 



48 House Appropriations Committee report, H. Rept. 95-417, June 15, 1977, pp. 45-6. 

49 Debate on amendment proposed by Representative Bill Young, Congressional Record (daily ed.) 
vol. 123, June 22, 1977, pp. H6346-51. 

5° Amendment proposed by Representative Lester WolfT, ibid., pp. H6352-54. 

si Amendment proposed by Representative Philip Crane, Congressional Record, June 23, 1977. pp. 
H6385-88. 

" Amendment proposed by Representative John Ashbrook, ibid., pp. 6421-2. Cuba is not currently a 
member of any multilateral bank. 

53 Amendment proposed by Representative Henson Moore, ibid., pp. 6413-14. 

54 Ibid., p. 21. 

ss Ibid., pp. 148-9. It also required the U.S. Alternate Executive Directors to received salaries no higher 
than level V of the Executive Schedule. 



114 

The Senate endorsed the appropriating committee's policy amend- 
ments when it considered the fiscal year 1978 appropriation bill, 
agreeing on a separate vote (47-29) to accept the committee amend- 
ment dropping the "indirect" restriction on loans to Uganda and 
the Indochinese countries 56 and accepting the amendments allowing 
"indirect" aid to Mozambique, Angola, and Cuba without debate. 57 
It later voted 11-56 to reject a motion by Senator Helms that would 
have barred any use of the funds for activities which adversely affected 
U.S. industry, agriculture, or employment. 58 

The House and Senate conferees resolved most of their major 
differences in the fiscal year 1978 appropriations bill but deadlocked 
on the question of prohibiting indirect loans through the multilateral 
banks to the seven countries and to producers of sugar, palm oil and 
citrus crops. The House delegates insisted that the House would never 
allow U.S. money to be used for those purposes. 59 The Senate delegates 
insisted that the banks could never accept such restricted funds and 
that such an action would effectively terminate U.S. participation in 
these international organizations. They cited a memorandum from the 
White House saying the President would veto the bill and a letter 
from World Bank President Robert McNamara saying his agency 
could not accept the money if the restrictions stayed in the final bill. 60 
After almost 2 months of discussion, the conferees issued a con- 
ference report that dropped the House-passed restrictions but in- 
cluded a note pledging the House conferees to move disapproval of 
those changes. 61 Two weeks later, the House summarily rejected the 
conference report by recommitting it without debate. 62 

Out of this seemingly irreconcilable conflict, a compromise was 
evolved through consultations between the executive branch and the 
House Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee. As Presi- 
dent Carter wrote in his subsequent letter to Chairman Long, he 
agreed to ''instruct the U.S. executive directors in the banks to oppose 
and vote against, throughout fiscal year 1978, any loans to the seven 
countries * * * [and] loans for the three commodities where such pro- 
duction is for export and could injure producers in the United States. 63 
Chairman Long then filed a new conference report October 12, drop- 
ping the House conferees' objection to the elimination of prohibitions 
on "indirect' ' loans. 64 The House agreed to the new conference report 
October 18 on a 229-195 vote 65 and the Senate accepted it October 19 
by a 53-33 margin. 66 



56 Debate and separate vote on Committee amendment deleting "indirectly" from prohibitions on aid 
to Uganda, Cambodia. Laos, and Vietnam. Coneressional Record, Aug. 5, 1977, pp. S13891-6. 

^ Son it e action on Committee amendments deleting " indirectly" from prohibitions on aid to Mozam- 
bique, Angola and Cuba, ibid., p. S13899. 

" Amendment proposed by Senator Jesse Helms, ibid., pp. S13917-19. 

58 See th<> colloquv between Representatives Clarence Long and Bill Young. Congressional Record (daily 
ed.) vol. 123. Sept. 15, 1977, p. H9486. 

80 Remarks of Senator Daniel Inouye, Congressional Record, Aug. 5, 1977, p. S13894. The White House 
memorandum is cited by Senator Robert Dole, ibid., p. S13892, and the letter from President McNamara to 
Treasury Secretary Blumenthal cited by Senator Dick Clark, ibid., p. S13895. 

81 U.S. Congress. House. Committee of Conference. Making Appropriations for Foreign Assistance and 
Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 1978. H. Rept. 95-633, Sept. 26, 1977, pp. 11, 17. 

82 Motion to commit conference report. Congressional Record (daily ed.) vol. 123, Oct. 12, 1977, pp. H10814- 
15. 

83 Text of the President's letter to Chairman Clarence Long. Congressional Record (daily ed.) vol. 123, 
Oct. 18. 1977, pp. H11191, 1111203, and II11204. 

84 U.S. Congress. House. Committee of Conference. Making Appropriations for Foreign Assistance and 
Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 1978. H. Rept. 95-701, Oct. 12, 1977. pp. 1C-11, 16-17. 

85 House action on the conference report. Congressional Record, Oct. 18, 1977, pp. H1119C-11205. 

88 Senate action on the conference report, Congressional Record (daily ed.), vol. 123, Oct. 19, 1977, pp. 
S 17351-58. 



115 

Several Republican Senators objected strongly to what they termed 
the President's "incredible" letter and his intervention in the con- 
ference process. "I cannot cast a vote against a letter from the Presi- 
dent of the United States to the chairman of a House committee," 
said Senator Case. "So I will vote for this conference report. However, 
if that agreement were part of the legislation which we consider today, 
I would vote against that legislation." 67 Some of the Senate conferees 
expressed their judgment that the Senate might have eventually 
gotten its way if they had been able to continue bargaining with the 
House. 68 

1978 prospects 

Reports from executive branch leaders and committee aides suggest 
that most or all of these issues will arise in 1978 when Congress again 
considers appropriations for the multilateral banks. Two major issues 
likely to be centers of debate are: (1) whether to reverse the fiscal 
year 1978 action terminating (or defaulting on) U.S. payments to 
IDA IV and (2) whether to impose restrictive amendments barring 
indirect use of U.S. bank contributions for loans to certain countries 
and relating to certain agricultural crops. The relationship between 
the U.S. Government and these banks could be fundamentally altered 
as a result of congressional action on these and related policy issues 
that are likely to arise in 1978. 

References 

hearings 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1978. 
Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 16, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. 

Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on 

International Development Institutions and Finance. International Develop- 
ment Institutions Authorization — 1977. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 22, 
23, and 24, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations, Fiscal 
Year 1978. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 10 and Mar. 2, 1977. Washing- 
ton, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. 

International Financial Institutions. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 9 
and 10, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa and Foreign 



Relations. Joint Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 18, 1977. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. 

reports 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Supplemental Appropria- 
tions Bill, 1977. H. Rept. 95-68, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 11, 1977. Wash- 
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 1978. H. 

Rept. 95-417, 95th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 1978. H. 



Rept. 95-633, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 26, 1977, Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 



67 Remarks of Senator Clifford Case, ibid., p. S17356. 

«8 Remarks of Senators Richard Schweiker and Edward Brooke, ibid., pp. S17352-3, S17454-5. 



116 

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 1978. H. 

Rept. 95-701, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Oct. 12, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 

Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. International Finan- 



cial Institutions. II. Rept. 95-154, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 31, 1977. Wash- 
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

International Financial Institutions, Conference Report. II. Ropt. 95-544, 

95th Cong., 1-t Bess., July 28, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Oflico, 1977. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Supplemental Approoria- 
tions Bill, 1977. S. Rept. 95-64, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 24, 1977. Wash- 
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Foreign Assistance and Related Program^ Appropriation Bill, 1978. S. 

Rept. 95 352, 95th Cong., 1st sess., July 18, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Priming Office, 1977. 

Committee on Foreign Relations. Omnibus Multilateral Development 



Institutions Act of 1977. S. Rept. 95-159, 95th Cong., 1st sess., May 13, 1977. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

OTHER DOCUMENTS 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Policy and the 
Multilateral Banks: Politicization and Effectiveness. Staff report to the Sub- 
committee on Foreign Assistance, by Jonathan E. Sanford, Foreign Affairs and 
National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Con- 
gress, May 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Congressional Budget Office. International Financial Institutions: 

Background and Budget Options for Fiscal Year 1978. Staff report prepared by 
Sheila K. Fifert and C. R. Neu. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 



THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 

Congress and North-South Negotiations* 
overview 

At the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assem- 
bly in May 1974, the Group of 77 less developed countries (LDC's) 
approved two major documents on economic relations between de- 
veloped and less developed countries. A declaration on the establish- 
ment of a new international economic order, and a programme of 
action. In December 1974, the United Nations General Assembly 
approved a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. The 
demands for a new international economic order incorporated in 
these documents involved far-reaching claims by LDC's relating to 
sovereignty over natural resources, preferential trade and monetary 
arrangements, increased aid flows, debt moratoria or cancellations, 
commodities arrangements, and an increased role in world economic 
decisionmaking? 

Since December 1974, many conferences and meetings dealing with 
new international economic order issues have taken place both 
among LDC's and between LDC's and developed countries. In 1977, 
the north-south dialog consisted of the last of the series of Con- 
ferences on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) and the first 
two of a scheduled three U.N. Negotiating Conferences on a Common 
Fund for Commodities. 

DISCUSSION 

Conference on International Economic Cooperation 

The first Conference on International Economic Cooperation 
(CIEC) was held in December 1975. l At that time, four functional 
commissions were established to discuss, respectively, energy, raw 
materials and trade, development, and finance. Twenty-seven 
countries participated in the conference — 19 developing countries and 
8 representatives of the industrialized countries. The participants 
were chosen to give a wide geographic representation and to reflect 
different economic situations. 

Beginning in February 1976, commission working groups met ap- 
proximately every month. The sessions of the first months were 
devoted to an analysis of the issues outstanding in each of the func- 
tional areas, while the end of the year was devoted to the formulation 
of specific proposals which would be presented to senior ministers for 
consideration and approval. The concluding CIEC ministerial meeting 
was orginally planned for December 1976, but was postponed to allow 
more work to be done on possible final proposals and also to allow the 
Carter administration to participate — since many LDC diplomats be- 
lieved that the new administration would be more sympathetic to 
their claims. 

•Prepared by Theodor W. Galdi, Analyst in International Relations. 

1 For background on the first conference, see Congress and Foreign Policy— 1975, pp. 92-94. 

(117) 



118 

The final C1EC conference was held in Paris from May 30 to June 
2, 1977. A joint communique was issued following the final session 
setting out 20 topics on which the participants were able to agree and 
21 topics on which they could not agree. The major points of agreement 
and disagreement are set out below. 

(1) In the Energy Commission, it was recognized that adequate and 
stable supplies were necessaiy for global growth and that all nations 
had a responsibility to insure that such supplies were made available. 
The depletable nature of oil and gas was recognized. It was agreed to 
recommend that the World Bank increase priority for energy develop- 
ment loans in LDC's. Agreement was also reached on the need for in- 
creased conservation, for a new bilateral and multilateral effort to 
transfer energy technology to LDC's, and to increase energy research 
and development cooperation between developed and less developed 
countries. 

The Energy Commission did not agree to continue consultations 
between energy producers and consumers — a major U.S. goal in the 
entire CIEC process. Agreement was also not reached on guaranteeing 
the value of the accumulated financial reserves of the oil producers or 
on indexation of energy prices to LDC import prices — two goals of the 
oil producing countries. 

(2) In the Commission on Raw Materials agreement was reached to 
undertake negotiations to establish a Common Fund for Commodities. 
The purpose of the Common Fund would be to finance, potentially, 
18 separate commodity agreements. It was agreed that the purposes, 
constituent elements, and objectives of the Common Fund would be 
further negotiated at UNCTAD in Geneva. Reaching an agreement 
to negotiate the Common Fund had been a major goal of the LDC's. 
Previously, the Ford administration had refused, preferring instead to 
examine each proposed international commodity agreement and its 
financing on an ad hoc basis. Agreement was also reached on certain 
measures to assist LDC's in diversifying from heavy reliance on a few 
indigenous natural resource exports, and on the importance to LDC's 
of natural raw materials that were in competition with synthetics. 
Agreement to encourage the international financial institutions to in- 
tensify their efforts in the raw materials area was also reached. 

The Raw Materials Commission did not reach agreement on the 
same language for further measures of compensatory finance for short- 
falls in LDC export receipts due to price fluctuations in raw materials, 
to control further synthetics production in developed countries, or to 
the same language on the degree of nonreciprocity for LDC's in the 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva. The Commission also did 
not agree upon the appropriate regime for controlling further invest- 
ment in raw materials in LDC's, or on indexation of raw materials 
prices. 

(3) In the Development Commission, donor countries agreed to sub- 
stantially increase their levels of official development assistance. It 
was also agreed that negotiations for a general capital increase in the 
World Bank should begin. A $1 billion special action program of assist- 
ance to the poorest LDC's was agreed to, as was the need for creation 
of a 500,000-ton emergency grain reserve and for early negotiations 
on an international grain reserves system. Finally, it was agreed to 



119 

recognize the importance to the LDC's of progress in the Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations (MTN) . Related to this was recognition of (a) the 
need for special treatment for LDC's in certain areas of the MTN 
negotiations, (b) improvement of the system of generalized tariff pref- 
erences, and, (c) recognition of the importance of the Multifiber 
Agreement to the LDC's. 

The Development Commission did not agree on a debt moratorium 
for all LDC's, on guaranteed access measures to developed country 
markets for LDC manufactures and semi-manufactures, on the treat- 
ment of multinational corporations, or on setting goals for the trans- 
fer of industry from developed to less developed countries. 

(4) The Finance Commission agreed to general language on the 
role that private capital could play in the development process, on 
the relationship between investment flows and the investment climate, 
and on outlines of language on the essential elements of what con- 
stituted a favorable investment climate. All parties pledged to sup- 
port efforts to expand LDC access to private capital markets. The 
Finance Commission also agreed to strongly support the creation of 
the IMF Supplementary Financing Facility and to recognize that 
control over inflation was an important condition for steady economic 
growth. 

The Finance Commission did not agree on criteria for compen- 
sation, transferability of capital and income, or standards for settle- 
ment of disputes which might arise between LDC's and foreign in- 
vestors. It also did not agree on what measures to take against infla- 
tion — the LDC's insisted that the only matter of concern was inflation 
caused by increasing import prices while the developed countries 
insisted that inflation was largely of domestic origin and required 
appropriate monetary and fiscal policies as demand management 
measures. 

Role of Congress. — Of the measures agreed to at CIEC, those of 
particular interest to Congress were the proposal to create a Common 
Fund for Commodities, promises to increase bilateral and multi- 
lateral aid, and support for the Supplementary Financing Facility 
of the IMF. All of these initiatives would require congressional 
approval or appropriations. 

Hearings on north-south issues by JEC. — On April 23, prior to the 
final CIEC session, the Joint Economic Committee devoted the last 
of 3 days of hearings to issues arising from the North-South dialog. 2 
Public witnesses included Lawrence Krause of the Brookings Institu- 
tion, Annie Krueger of the University of Minnesota, John P. Lewis of 
Princeton University, and Shridath Eamphal, Commonwealth Secre- 
tary General from London. The entire range of new international eco- 
nomic order issues was discussed, with particular attention devoted to 
commodities matters. No administration witnesses testified. 

Following conclusion of the CIEC, the Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Economics of the Joint Economic Committee held a hear- 
ing on the results of the conference. 3 Under Secretary of State Richard 



2 U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Issues at the Summit. Hearings. 95th Cong., 1st sess. 
Apr. 20, 21, and 22, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 226 pp. 

3 U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on International Economics. Issues in 
North-South Dialog. Hearing. 95th Cong., 1st sess. June 21, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 110 pp. 



120 

X. Cooper testified on what was accomplished — and not accom- 
plished — at CIEC. Secretly Cooper discussed the continuity and 
change between the Carter and Ford administrations regarding 
north-south matters and the locus and future U.S. expectations 
regarding north-south negotiations. On the latter, he noted that 
the wide range of matters covered under the CIEC umbrella would 
DOW be taken up by other, preexisting:, forums. Raw materials and 
commodities would be dealt with in the U.N. Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). Trade matters would be discussed 
in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The IMF/World Bank Development 
Committee would be expected to examine many of the issues raised 
by the Development Commission, and monetary matters raised at 
I would be considered by the IMF Interim Committee. 

However, there did not exist — just as was the case before CIEC — 
any continuing body responsible for discussion between producers and 
consumers of energy. Included in the record of the JEC hearing was 
the text of the annex to the final report of the CIEC, setting out in 
detail what had been resolved — and not resolved — in each Commission. 

Negotiations on a Common Fund for Commodities. — In December 
1974, the Secretariat of UNCTAD released a proposal which, in all 
essential respects, was the basis for the UNCTAD Integrated Pro- 
gramme for Commodities (IPC). The goal of the IPC was to mitigate 
wide fluctuations in commodity prices and supplies. Creation of the 
IPC was adopted as a key policy goal by the Group of 77 LDC's at the 
UNCTAD IV conference held in Nairobi, Kenya in May 1976. 

The core of the IPC is the establishment of a series of international 
commodity agreements holding buffer stocks to absorb commodities 
during periods of surplus and to dispose of them in times of scarcity. 
A total of 18 commodities is included in the current version of the IPC, 
The 10 "core" commodities — cocoa, coffee, cotton, hard fibers, jute, 
sugar, tea, rubber, copper, and tin — are the most suitable for stock- 
piling. Eight other commodities — bauxite, iron ore, manganese, 
phosphate, tropical timber, vegetable oil and oil seeds, meat, and 
bananas — would require additonal or other control measures. 

According to the IPC, creation of the buffer stocks of commodities 
in the program would be financed from a Common Fund established 
by contributions from member government capital subscriptions, 
contributions from international organizations, and borrowings from 
private capital markets. In the first phase of the Common Fund pro- 
gram, it was expected that available capital would be $1 billion in 
subscription capital and $2 billion in borrowing authority. A provision 
made for an additional $1 billion in subscription capital and $2 billion 
in borrowing authority brought the total financing available for the 
Common Fund to S6 billion. A proposal submitted by the Group of 
77 recommended a financing formula that would put about 30 
percent of the financial burden on the LDC's and 70 percent on the 
developed countries. While unspecified in their draft proposals, the 
position of the Group of 77 has been that decisionmaking should be 
based on the principle of one nation/one vote — giving control over the 
Common Fund to the LDC's. 

The first U.N. Negotiating Conference on a Common Fund Under 
the Integrated Program for Commodities was held in March 1977. The 



121 

United States and other industrialized nations were unwilling to enter 
into any substantive negotiations unless the demands of the Group of 77 
were spelled out in much greater detail. The United States was not 
prepared to make any commitments before knowing what form the 
Common Fund might take and which commodity agreements might 
be included. Following the London Economic Summit Conference held 
May 7-8, 1977, the United States and other major industrialized 
countries modified their position to support negotiations intended 
to create a Common Fund. As noted above, this decision was announced 
at the final CIEC session. 

The Second Negotiating Conference on the Common Fund was 
scheduled to be held from November 7 through December 2, 1977. 
Though no final agreement was expected at the second conference, 
it was hoped by some that most of the basic principles would be agreed 
upon. A third, and final, conference on the Common Fund would then 
negotiate a detailed agreement in 1978. However, the second con- 
ference was suspended by the LDC's the day before its scheduled con- 
clusion without any specific date set for resumption of negotiations. 
Spokesmen for the Group of 77 claimed that the industrialized coun- 
tries lacked the political will to negotiate a Common Fund agreement. 

At the November meeting, the LDC's presented a more detailed 
version of their earlier proposal, while the industrialized countries — 
for the first time — presented a formal proposal for a Common Fund. 

The proposal of the developed countries stated that any Common 
Fund had to be economically and financially viable. Its primary pur- 
pose would be to facilitate the financing of buffer stocks operated by 
the individual international commodity agreements. Each commodity 
agreement would be responsible for obtaining its own financing. Use 
of the Common Fund would be only for the purpose of buying com- 
modities, and not for marketing, diversification, or other measures. 
The industrialized countries' Common Fund would be financed by 
individual commodity agreements depositing stated maximum 
amounts of cash. The commodity agreements could than draw from 
the Fund that amount plus a specified amount of additional credit. 
If needed, the Common Fund could obtain additional financing in 
world capital markets. 

The main points of disagreement at the November negotiating 
session between the developed countries and the Group of 77 con- 
cerned how the Common Fund would be financed, what tasks the Fund 
would undertake, who should participate, and its relationship to what- 
ever commodity agreements were created. There were other points 
of disagreement — notably decisionmaking — but because even the 
initial points of disagreement were never resolved, the others were 
not addressed at all. 

Congress and the Common Fund For Commodities 

The Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the House Bank- 
ing Committee held a hearing in June 1977 on international commodity 
agreements. 4 Assistant Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs 



4 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on Economic 
Stabilization. International Commodity Agreements. Hearing. 95th Cong., 1st sess. June 8, 1977. Wash- 
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 89 pp. 



29-972—78- 



122 

C. Fred Bergsten, and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and 
Business Affairs Julius L. lvatz testified on U.S. policy toward com- 
modity agreements. The hearing focused on the nature of the changes 
in U.S. policy under the Carter administration (as compared with the 
Ford administration), the rationale for the changes, and the future ex- 
pectations of the administration in the commodities field. Because the 
hearing was held immediately after the end of the last CIEC session, 
and the change in an administration policy favoring commodity agree- 
ments had just been announced, there was no discussion of possible 
United States positions for the second Common Fund negotiations. 

The House International Relations Committee issued a comprehen- 
sive committee print which contained the report of a staff study mission 
that had attended the second Common Fund negotiating conference in 
Geneva. 5 The first part of the staff study contained a historical 
background on the Common Fund, a description of the proposals of 
the Group of 77 and the industrialized countries, and an explanation 
of the reasons for these proposals. The second part of the report 
examined in some detail the 18 commodities proposed for financing 
by the Common Fund. The major producers, the size of the export 
market, United States interest in the commodity, and the status of 
any commodity agreement negotiations were presented for each 
commodity. 

Future north-south negotiations and the role of Congress 

As indicated by Assistant Secretary of State Cooper in the Joint 
Economic Committee hearing, north-south negotiations will now con- 
tinue in preexisting institutions— GATT, UNCTAD, the IMF/World 
Bank Development Committee, etc. The Law of the Sea Conference 
due to resume in the spring of 1978 should also be considered part of 
the north-south dialog. In the wake of the collapse of the Common 
Fund negotiations, the exact status of relations between the industrial- 
ized countries and the LDC's on economic issues is unclear. The out- 
come of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the Law of the Sea 
Conference will provide major indicators of the state of relations be- 
tween the two groups of countries. Because the Senate will have to 
approve any Law of the Sea treaty and Congress will have to ap- 
propriate funds to finance creation of a Common Fund, congres- 
sional interest will most likely be high. 



8 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Progress report on the north-south 
dialog: the Common Fund and commodities, report of a staff study mission to the November 1977, 
meeting of the Second United Nations Negotiating Conference on a Common Fund Under the Integrated 
Program for Commodities. Committee Print. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1978. 
61pp. 



Congress and U.S. International Food Policy* 

overview 

The United States experienced near record harvests of wheat, feed 
grains, and soybeans in 1977. Exports of U.S. agricultural commodities 
exceeded $21 billion for the fourth year in a row. And, except for the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, foreign producing 
areas also experienced good yields. U.S. carryover stocks of wheat and 
feed grains increased again in 1977. It was against this background of 
relative abundance in international food markets that Congress 
dealt with certain aspects of U.S. international food policy. 

DISCUSSION 

International grain reserves 

The main focus of congressional activity was the Food and Agri- 
culture Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-113). As noted earlier in this 
committee print, the Food and Agriculture Act was the vehicle for 
extension of basic Public Law 480 authority through 1981, while the 
Intsrnational Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977 made 
several changes in Public Law 480 policy. 

Section 102 of the Food and Agriculture Act, Emergency Inter- 
national Food Reserve, added a new section 111 to the Agricultural 
Act of 1949 encouraging the President to enter into negotiations with 
other nations to develop an international system of food reserves 
for humanitarian food relief needs. 

The language in the Food and Agricultural Act was the result of a 
conference committee compromise between a much more extensive 
version of grain reserves language in the Senate bill (S. 275) and the 
House bill (H.R. 7171) which, as reported from the House Agriculture 
Committee, had no grain reserves language at all. 

In the Senate, Title X: Grain Reserves, of S. 275 as reported by the 
Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee on May 16, 
1977, authorized three distinct reserve facilities. 1 The bill would have 
established : (1) a producer storage program for wheat, (2) the creation 
of a domestic disaster reserve, and (3) an International Emergency 
Farm Reserve. 

Seetion 102 of the committee bill authorized the President to 
negotiate an international system of food reserves for humanitarian 
relief and to maintain a food reserve in the United States as a con- 
tribution to the system. The Secretary of Agriculture was authorized 
to acquire a minimum of 2 million tons of food for the International 
Emergency Farm Reserve, and to increase that minimum to not more 
than 6 million tons under the terms of any international agreement 



* Prepared by Theodor W. Galdi, Analyst in International Relations. 

1 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry. Food and Agriculture Act 
of 1977. May 16, 1977. Report to accompany S. 275. 95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. 95-180. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, 431 pp. 

(123) 



124 

on food reserves that might be negotiated. Use of food from the 

re was to be limited to foreign countries which suffered major 

disasters and to assisting less developed countries that experienced 

shortfalls in production. 

During the debate on the Senate floor, Senator Bellmon, concerned 
that transactions by the Secretary of Agriculture related to the Inter- 
national Farm Reserve would depress grain prices in the United 
Stat s, moved to strike all of section 106. However, after discussing 
his amendment with Senator Humphrey, Senator Bellmon agreed to 
language that made clear the Senate's intention that any grain 
included in the international reserve would not be withdrawn except 
for emergency use overseas unless the exact amounts removed were 
immediately replaced — thereby leaving grain prices unaffected. 
No other changes were made in the food reserves section of S. 275 on 
the Senate floor. 

Though H.R. 7171, as reported from the Agriculture Committee, 
contained no grain reserves provisions at all, two amendments related 
to grain reserves were proposed on the floor. 2 One by Representative 
Weaver of Oregon directed that the Secretary of Agriculture "shall 
establish" a domestic grain reserve of 25-35 million tons of wheat and 
feedgrains. The second, by Representative Foley, contained exactly 
the same language as the Weaver amendment except that it gave the 
Secretary of Agriculture the option ("may establish") of establishing 
a grain reserve of 25-35 million tons. Neither House amendment 
referred to an international grain reserve system and, in fact, in 
offering his amendment, Representative Weaver noted that it did not 
deal at all with the question of international reserves. Interestingly, 
both amendments were accepted in order, it was claimed, to give the 
House e.oni'erees latitude in conference. 

As the Food and Agriculture Act emerged from conference on 
September 12, 1977, Title XI: Grain Reserves, contained most of the 
Senate version of the producer storage program for wheat and food 
grains and also the Senate provision for a domestic disaster reserve. 3 
However, the House conferees were opposed to the international 
grain reserve provisions of the bill and, as a result, the general language 
encouraging the President to enter into negotiations with other nations 
to develop an international food reserve system was agreed to. Some 
of the House conferees were opposed to the Senate provision, not 
because they were against the idea of international grain reserves — 
just the opposite in fact — but because the question had not thoroughly 
been examined in hearings. They felt that such a far-reaching pro- 
posal ought to be examined closely by Congress before it was 
implemented. 

U.S. proposal for an international grain reserve system. — In October, 
1977, the House International Relations Committee issued a com- 
mittee print, "The U.S. Proposal for an International Grain Re- 
serve System-II." 4 The print contained the report of a committee 

1 U.S. Congress, nouse. Committer on Agriculture. Agricultural Act of 1977. May 16, 1977. Report to 
accompany U.K. 7171. 95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Kept. 95-348. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 372 pp. 

» U.S. Congress. Conference Committer Food and Agriculture Act of 1977. Sept. 21, 1977. Report to 
accompany S. 275. 95th Cong., 1st sess. 11. Rept. 95-599. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 217 pp. 

« U.S. Congress. House. Committee? on International Relations. The U.S. proposal for an international 
frain reserves system-II; report of a staff sludv mission to the Sept. 28-Oct. 3, 1977, meeting of the Inter- 
national Wheat Council preparatory group. Committee Print. [Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office] October 1977. 18 pp. 






125 

staff study mission to the International Wheat Council (IWC) 
Preparatory Group meeting held from September 28 to October 3, 
1977 in London. The purpose of the meeting had been to receive the 
most recent U.S. proposal for the creation of an International Grain 
Reserve System. 

Under the proposed system, nations which agreed to participate in 
it would agree to establish and manage certain identifiable wheat 
stocks as reserves. The amount of reserves to be held would depend 
upon such factors as the volumes of wheat production, consumption, 
and trade, and per capita GNP. One of the most important character- 
istics of the proposed system is that it was designed to discourage 
wheat prices from rising above a specified high trigger level, or from 
dropping below a specified low trigger level. At the high trigger price, 
participating countries would sell wheat from reserves on commerical 
markets to drive down prices. At the low trigger price, they would buy 
wheat for their reserves. The U.S. proposal also specified further 
temporary measures to be taken if world market prices went above or 
below the trigger levels. Specific details of a possible reserve system 
were left open for subsequent discussion. Thus, recommendations 
concerning the overall size of the system, individual national holdings, 
specific trigger prices, and the cost of the system, were not made by 
the United States. 

Compared to the 1975 U.S. grain reserves proposal to the Inter- 
national Wheat Council, the 1977 proposal relied upon prices, not 
quantities, as the trigger for action by the reserve system. And the 
1977 proposal emphasized curbing excessive prices swings, whereas 
the earlier proposal emphasized the physical availability of grains in 
times of shortage. 

According to the staff report, the preliminary reaction of the other 
members of the IWC was not enthusiastic. The staff report concluded 
that the U.S. proposal faced many difficulties, not least of which was 
negotiation of the many details that would be crucial to the success 
of the proposal. 

As of the end of 1977, the Carter administration had not submitted 
any draft legislation to Congress to establish an international grain 
reserve system. And, while the President had been given the authority 
by the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 to enter into negotiations to 
create such a system, formal negotiations had not been started. 

Commission on Domestic and International Hunger and Malnutrition 

On September 27, 1977, Representative Richard Nolan of Minne- 
sota introduced House Resolution 784, expressing the sense of the 
House that the President should establish a temporary Commission on 
Domestic and International Hunger and Malnutrition. The resolution 
was cosponsored by over 250 other Members of the House, including 
38 members of the House Agriculture Committee. House Resolution 
784 was jointly referred to the Committees on International Relations 
and Agriculture. 

A hearing was held on the measure by the House Agriculture Com- 
mittee on October 20, 1977. In addition to receiving testimony from 
seven House Members, the National Farmers Organization, the Na- 
tional Farmers Union, and other public witnesses, administration 
officials representing the Departments of State and Agriculture testi- 
fied on U.S. efforts at combating world hunger and malnutrition. 



126 

In the Agriculture Committee report 5 on the measure, it was stated 
that the sponsors expected the ( Commission would not simply study the 
problem of world hunger in general, but rather compare and evaluate 
the numerous studies and reports which had already been done on the 
subject. One goal of the Commission would be to develop for the Presi- 
dent and Congress specific recommendations for policies and legislation 
to reduce significantly hunger and malnutrition. The Commission was 
expected to make an interim report after 6 months and a final report 
after 1 year. Following the transmittal of the final report, the Com- 
mission was to assist for 1 year in the implementation of its recom- 
mendations and in conducting an educational program disseminating 
its findings to the public. 

The measure was considered by the House Agriculture Committee 
and reported out on October 26, 1977. The House International Rela- 
tions Committee considered the resolution the next day, made two 
minor amendments, and reported it favorably to the floor. 6 On Novem- 
ber 1, 1077, House Resolution 784 was passed in the House by a vote 
of :J64 to 38. 

Agricultural exports and the Export Control Amendments of 1977 

As a result of the reaction to the 1973 soybean embargo and the 
grain sales moratoriums against the Soviet Union and Poland in 1974 
and 1975, there was a good deal of support in Congress for changes in 
the Export Administration Act. The 1974 extension of the Export Ad- 
ministration Act of 1969 was to expire on September 30, 1976. Both 
the Senate and the House had passed extension bills during the 94th 
Congress, but both bills died when no Senate conferees were appointed 
before final adjournment. 

In the first session of the 95th Congress, the House and Senate 
considered and passed Export Administration extension bills in 
April and early May respectively. A conference report 7 was issued 
in mid-May, and the extension became Public Law 95-52 on June 22, 
1977. 

Two provisions of the bill are of particular importance to U.S. 
international food policy. Both, in some form, had been in the bills 
that died at the adjournment of the 94th Congress. 

Congressional review of export controls of agricultural commodi- 
ties. — As reported by the International Relations Committee, section 
105 of the House bill extending export controls, H.R. 5840', provided 
for a congressional veto of any export controls placed on agricultural 
commodities for foreign policy reasons. 8 The vehicle for the exercise 
of this veto was to be a concurrent resolution of disapproval passed 
by ( ongress during a 30-day period following receipt of the President's 
report on instituting the controls. 

On the floor of the House, Representative Skubitz of Kansas pro- 
posed an amendment which stated that any controls placed on the 



: 0.8. Congress. House. Committee on Agriculture. Commission r.n Domestic and International Hunger 
and Malnutrition. Oct. 28, 1977. Report to accompany H. Res. 784. 95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. 95-780 
pt. 2. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 5 pp. 

3. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Commission on Domestic and Inter- 
national Huneer and Malnutrition. Oct. 31, 1977. Report to accompany H. Res. 784. 95th Cong., 1st sess. 
H. Rept. 95-780 pt. II. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 5 pp. 

7 U.S. Coi gress. House. Conference Committee. Export Administration Amendments of 1977. May is, 
M77. Report to accompany H.R. 5840. 95th Cong., 1st BBSS. H. Rept. 95-354. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 58 pp. 

Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Export Administration Amendments 
of 1977. Apr. 6, 1977. Report to accompany H.R. 5840. 95th Cong. 1st sess. H. Rept. 95-190. Washington, 
rj.fl. Government Printing Office, 1977. 58 pp. 



127 

export of agricultural commodities for foreign policy reasons would 
expire at the end of 30 days unless Congress adopted a concurrent 
resolution approving the controls. The Skubitz amendment was 
agreed to by voice vote. 

In the Senate, section 105 of the export control extension as reported 
by the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (S. 69), 
contained exactly the same language as section 105 of H.R. 5840 
as reported from the International Relations Committee. 9 

On the Senate floor, Senator Dole offered an amendment to section 
105, the effect of which would be to allow a congressional veto of 
export controls imposed on agricultural commodities for short supply 
as well as foreign policy reasons. The Dole amendment was agreed to 
by a voice vote. 

In conference, the conferees adopted the Senate version of section 
105; that is, export controls for either foreign policy or short supply 
reasons would cease to be effective within 30 legislative days after 
they were reported to Congress if Congress adopted a concurrent 
resolution of disapproval. 

Storage of agricultural commodities in the United States. — The 
second relevant provision of the Export Administration Act extension 
concerns allowing storage of U.S. agricultural commodities purchased 
by foreigners for eventual export. This issue was felt to be particularly 
important in light of U.S. actions during the 1973 soybean embargo 
when the Japanese, who had purchased significant amounts of soy- 
beans for food, were unable to export their soybeans from the United 
States because of the embargo. 

In H.R. 5840 as reported from the International Relations Com- 
mittee, section 104 provided that U.S. agricultural commodities that 
had been purchased by foreigners, but stored in the United States, 
would be exempt from any future export controls on agricultural 
commodities upon findings by the Secretary of Commerce that the 
commodities would eventually be exported and that storage in the 
United States would not unduly limit the space available for 
domestically owned stocks. The International Relations Committee 
bill required the Secretary of Commerce to make his findings within 
30 days of application, failing which, approval would be deemed to 
have been given. 

Section 104 of S. 69 as reported by the Senate Banking Committee 
contained similar language except that no time limit was imposed 
upon the Secretary of Commerce and, in addition to the findings 
required in section 104 of H.R. 5840, the Senate bill required the 
Secretary of Commerce to find that neither the sale nor the export 
of the agricultural commodities would result in an excessive drain of 
scarce mateiials or have a serious domestic inflationary impact. In 
addition, the Secretary of Commerce had to find that the purpose of 
the storage in the United States was to establish a reserve for later 
use, which use did not include resale by the original buyer or sale to a 
third country. Neither the House nor Senate committee version of 
section 104 was amended on the floor. In conference, the confeiees 
accepted the Senate version of this section of the export administra- 
tion extension amendments. 



» U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Export Administration 
Amendments of 1977. Apr. 26, 1977. Reoort to accompany S. 69. 95th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. 95-104. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Olflce, 1977. 82 pp. 



128 

Hearings on I.S. agricultural trade. — Two oversight hearings were 
held during the year on l T >. International agricultural trade. In the 
House, the Subcommittees on Oilseeds and Rice, and Livestock and 
Grains of the House Agriculture Committee held joint hearings on 
ih« i export of U.S. agricultural commodities. 10 

Testimony was received from two administration witnesses, Agri- 
culture Secretary Bergland and James Starkey, Senior Agricultural 
Adviser of the Office of Special Trade Representative, as well as 
public witnesses representing corn, rice, wheat, peanut, cotton, citrus 
and soybean producer groups. Major issues covered included the 
reaction of the witnesses to the agricultural issues at the Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations in Geneva, and specific foreign competitive 
situations. 

In the Senate, the Subcommittee on International Trade of the 
Senate Finance Committee held hearings on problems in international 
agricultural trade. 11 For the administration, Agriculture Secretary 
Bergland and Assistant Secretary of State Katz testified. Public 
witnesses from groups representing the entire range of agricultural 
commodities exported by the United States gave the committee their 
views on agricultural trade problems. 

Prospects jor 1978 

Of the issues facing Congress for 1978 in the area of U.S. inter- 
national food policy, the most immediate would involve implementing 
any international grain reserves system that had been negotiated by 
the executive branch. U.S. accession to such a system and the es- 
tablishment of the system domestically would require action by 
Congress. A second issue of concern for 1978 is likely to be over how 
U.S. agricultural interests fare at the Multilateral Tjade Negotiations 
(MTN) presently underway in Geneva. A favorable MTN outcome 
would help insure high levels of U.S. agricultural exports. An un- 
favorable outcome could have very serious consequences for U.S. 
farmers, who are heavily dependent on income from exports. 



w U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Agriculture. Subcommittees on Oilseeds and Rice and Li restock 
and Grains. Export of U.S. Agricultural Commodities. Hearing. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Oct. 12, 1977. Wash- 
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 130 pp. 

11 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. Subcommittee on International Trade. Problems in 
International Agricultural Trade. Hearings 95th Cong., 1st sess. July 13, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 107 pp. 



U.S. International Energy Policy* 

overview 

During the year under review, in effect, the larger international 
energy problems were not decisively affected by either Presidential 
policy or congressional action. OPEC continued to control the price 
and supply of oil, monetary problems created by high oil costs were 
unresolved, the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation was not 
further checked, and the hope for international cooperation in energy 
affairs faded with the closing of the Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation in June 1977. Some of these problems were 
beyond the powers of the President and/or the Congress to solve — oil 
prices, for example — while others — such as international cooperation — 
were not addressed by either the executive or the legislative branches. 

DISCUSSION 

Congressional interest in energy matters focused on the President's 
National Energy Plan, announced on April 20, 1977, and the legisla- 
tion introduced subsequently to implement the plan. The President 
called for an energy conservation program that ultimately would 
reduce oil imports to a level of 6 million barrels per day (MMb/d) by 
1985 (the April 1977 rate was 8.4 MMb/d projected at current rates 
to rise to 12 MMb/d by 1985). Most energy experts, both in the United 
States and overseas, expected such a drop in U.S. oil imports to reduce 
demand pressures for future price increases, to ease international 
supply constraints since the United States would not be taking such 
a large proportion of the world's available oil, to reduce the U.S. 
vulnerability to embargoes or other politically motivated supply in- 
terruptions and consequently ease the political pressures on all the 
oil consumers, and to reduce the U.S. deficit in its balance of payments, 
a factor which was weakening the dollar and the world's monetary 
system. But those same energy experts also expressed doubt that the 
President's energy plan would be passed by the U.S. Congress. The 
House of Representatives considered and passed the National Energy 
Act, H.R. 8444, which included most of the President's proposals. 
The Senate divided the President's proposals among several bills. 
Congressional conferees began meeting in October 1977 to resolve 
differences between the House bill, H.R. 8444, and several Senate 
bills, which would implement the President's plan, but the first 
session ended without agreement. 

Neither the executive branch nor Congress took direct action to 
lower energy resource imports. The proposed conservation program 
included in the National Energy Plan would indirectly reduce imports 
of oil and natural gas. One proposal included in H.R. 8444 and the 
Senate bills was a crude oil equalization tax, which would raise the 

* Prepared by Clyde R. Mark, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs. 

(129) 



130 

price of domestically produced crude oil to the world price level by 
adding a tax equal to the difference between the two prices. In theory, 
the higher price of all oil would be an incentive to conserve oil. The 
equalization tax is one of the proposals that was -till at issue in House- 
Senate conference negotiations at year's end. 

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (S. 9/H.R. 1614), held in the 
House Rules Committee awaiting passage of H.R. 8444, will, if passed 
into law, establish Federal procedures for siting, construction, and 
operation of terminals for importing liquefied natural gas (LNG). 
The bill does not specify whether the Department of Transportation, 
the Department of Energy, or some other agency would regulate the 
LNG ports. Such regulation at present is left to local authorities. 

The Alaskan Natural Gas Transportation System Approval (Public 
Law 95-158, November 8, 1977) authorized the trans-Canada pipeline 
route for transporting natural gas to the lower 48 States from the 
North Slope fields of Alaska. Design, construction, financing, 
regulation, and other problems are still to be resolved. 

The 95th Congress dealt with several other international energy 
issues during the first session. The Department of Energy was created 
with the passage of the Department of Energy Organization Act 
(Public Law 95-91, August 4, 1977). Under the law, the new Depart- 
ment is charged with formulating U.S. policy in international 
energy affairs, although it is apparent that the Departments of State, 
Defense, Transportation, Treasury, and other executive agencies would 
continue to be involved in international energy policy matters. For 
example, in November 1977, it was the Department of State that 
arranged and announced the sale of nuclear fuel to Brazil. Also under 
the law, the Department of Energy is charged with managing the 
Naval Petroleum Reserves, formerly under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Defense. 

U.S. policy toward nuclear power remained cloudy and confused, 
both in its domestic application and for the export of nuclear fuels, 
powerplants and associated technology and materials. At issue for 
domestic nuclear power were questions about nuclear powerplant 
safety, nuclear waste disposal, nuclear powerplant efficiency, and the 
possible theft of enriched uranium or plutonium for weapons fabrica- 
tion. At issue for international nuclear power was its relation to the 
further spread, or proliferation, of nuclear weapons and the control of 
U.S. nuclear exports. 1 On April 7, 1977, the President announced that 
the Clinch River, Tenn. plutonium breeder demonstration would 
be terminated and that the United States would impose new non- 
proliferation conditions on future exports of enriched uranium. 
Apparently, the President reasoned that commercial use of breeder 
reactors and loosely regulated exports of enriched uranium increased 
the risk of proliferation. 

Congress disagreed with the President's decision on the breeder 
reactor and passed the Energy Research and Development Authoriza- 
tion Act of 1977 (S. 1811) which contained funding for the Clinch 
River project. The President vetoed S. 1811 on November 5, 1977. 
But the appropriation for the Energy Research and Development 
Administration (ERDA) contained $80 million to continue the Clinch 
River demonstration plant, money which the Comptroller General of 



1 See the discussion of nuclear nonproliferation on pp. 83-88. (Ed.) 



131 

the United States has advised cannot be used for terminating the 
project. Thus, the future of Clinch River, and the issue of breeders and 
nonproliferation, remains uncertain. 

The House of Representatives passed the Nuclear Anti-Prolifera- 
tion Act of 1977 (H.R. 8638) in September which would have per- 
mitted U.S. nuclear exports subject to several conditions, including an 
ultimate requirement for the recipient nation to place all of its nuclear 
facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The 
conditions would have been imposed by the renegotiation of agree- 
ments for cooperation and as regulatory criteria for individual nuclear 
exports. The Senate had not completed action on a companion bill by 
the end of the first session. 

Meanwhile, other U.S. actions appeared to be inconsistent with the 
policy directions being considered by Congress and the executive 
branch. On September 22, 1977, the United States participated again 
in the so-called London nuclear suppliers group of 15 nations in 
establishing a "code" for the international transfer of nuclear ma- 
terials. On the surface, the London nuclear suppliers group has the 
appearance of a cartel, which in theory the United States should 
oppose in the same manner that it opposes OPEC. How the "code" 
will compliment the IAEA or the nuclear export controls under con- 
sideration in the United States remain to be seen. 

On October 19, President Carter proposed the creation of an inter- 
national nuclear fuel bank, which while apparently inconsistent with 
his intention to reduce the use of nuclear power was consistent with his 
nonproliferation policies. The international fuel bank is designed to 
prevent the diversion of nuclear materials for weapons manufacture. 
On November 16, the State Department announced that the United 
States would furnish enriched uranium to Brazil. Previously, the 
United States opposed the expansion of the Brazilian nuclear program 
to include reprocessing and held a series of diplomatic meetings with 
the West Germans, Brazil's partner, to dissuade the Germans from 
supplying sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology to Brazil. 
At year's end, the President and the Shah of Iran reached an agreement 
that would allow the sale of six to eight nuclear power plants to Iran, 2 
and the President signed an agreement in India to supply that coun- 
try with nuclear fuel despite the U.S. -Indian disagreement over ap- 
plication of nuclear safeguards. 

References 
congressional publications 

U.S. Congress. Congressional Budget Office. President Carter's Energy Proposals: 

A Perspective. Washington, CBO, June 1977. 133 pp. 
-General Accounting Office. An Evaluation of the National Energy Plan: 

A Report to the Congress. EMD 77-48 (B-178205). Washington, GAO, July 25, 

1977. various paging. 

House of Representatives. Ad Hoc Committee on Energy. National 



Energy Act. A Report on H.R. 8444. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Report number 
95-543. 2 vols. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, July 27, 1977. 
vol. I, 304 pp., vol. II, 620 pp. 
-Committee on Interstate Commerce. Subcommittee on Energy and Power, 



and, U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 
* See the discussion of the Middle East on pp. 196-204. (Ed.) 



132 

Project Interdependence: U.S. and World Energy Outlook Through 1990. 
Prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. 
95th Cong., 1st - «s. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, November 
1977. 939 pp. 

-Senat . Agreement with Canada Concerning Transit Pipelines. 95th Cong. 



1st sess, Ex< cutive F. M< ssage of the President of the United States. Washing- 
ton. U.S. Government Printing Office, Mar. 30, 1977. 9 pp. 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

isan \l. Environmental and Natural Resources Reorganization. Issue 
Brief No. 77106 (Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Major 
Issues System):. Updated periodically. 

Donnelly, Warren H. Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 
1978. issue Brief No. 78001 (Library of Congress, Congressional Research I 
S (rvice. Major Issue System). Updated periodically. geD 

Gulick, Frances A. National Energy Plan: Overview of the President's Proposals. ftI]l 
Issue Brief No. 770(10 (Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service 
Niajor Issuee System). Updated periodically. 

Hughes, H. Steven. Environmental, Energy, and Natural Resources Issues Con- the 
sidered During the 95th Congress: A Summary of Enacted and Pending Legis- 
lation. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. Washington, 
Jan. 9, 1978. 32 pp. 

Rothberg, Paul F. Liquefied Natural Gas: Hazards, Safety Requirements, and 
Policy Issues. Issue Brief No. 76065 (Library of Congress, Congressional Re- 
search Service, Major Issues System). Updated periodically. 

Segal, Migdon. Nuclear Enrichment and Reprocessing. Issue Brief No. 77126 
(Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Major Issues System). 
Updated periodically. 

Smith, Marcia. Breeder Reactors: The Clinch River Project. Issue Brief No. 
77088 (Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Major Issues 
System). Updated periodically. 



GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND ISSUES 
U.S. Participation in the United Nations System* 

overview 

Congressional attitudes in 1977 toward the U.N. system continued 
generally to be supportive of U.S. participation in the United Nations 
and its agencies and programs. However, Congress was concerned with 
certain specific practices and agencies and in a few instances reduced 
the requested funds for U.S. contributions. 
Thus, Congress 

— voted down amendments that would have reduced U.S. con- 
tributions to the U.N. system; 
— appropriated contributions to UNESCO for only 2% years, 
instead of the 4 years requested, urging that the executive 
branch strengthen U.S. participation on UNESCO and work 
to counter politicization of actions taken by UNESCO bodies; 
— authorized $10 million more than requested for the U.N. de- 
velopment program (UNDP) but appropriated $15 million less, 
rejecting an amendment to reduce the amount further; 
— rejected amendments to remove the technical assistance portion 
from U.S. regular budget contributions in spite of its concerns 
over increasing U.N. agency budgets and their use for technical 
assistances ; 
— continued its refusal to fund U.S. contributions to United Na- 
tions University (UNU) and reduced by half the U.S. con- 
tribution to the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control 
(UNFDAC) ; 
— supported Carter administration initiatives in support of the 
U.N. system, including naming of Andrew Young as U.S. 
representative, but also supported U.S. withdrawal from the 
International Labor Organization (ILO). 
In addition, Congress and its committees indicated support of United 
Nations reform by 

— making recommendations for change during a review of U.S. 

participation in international organizations ; 
—requesting executive branch consideration and recommendation 
of proposals for reform of the United Nations. 

DISCUSSION 

Financing contributions to the U.N. system 

During 1977, Congress appropriated approximately $204 million 
for U.S. 1978 contributions to the regular budgets of the United Na- 
tions and its agencies and approximately $251 million for U.S. 1978 
voluntary contributions to the numerous special programs of the U.N. 
system. The first group of appropriations — for assessed contributions 



'Prepared by Marjorie Ann Browne, Analyst in International Organizations. 

(133) 



134 

to regular budgets — was authorized in the Foreign Relations Authori- 
zation Act, Fiscal Year 1978, ' and appropriated in the Department of 
State Appropriations Act, 1978. 2 

During consideration of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
the House, by a 149-257 vote, rejected an amendment that would 
have substantially reduced U.S. contributions to the regular budgets 
of the United Nations and its specialized agencies by basing that 
annual contribution on the ratio of the U.S. population to the total 
population of all members of the United Nations. Amendments similar 
to this proposal have been submitted, considered, and rejected, in 
Congress for a number of years. 3 Voluntary contributions were 
authorized in the International Development and Food Assistance 
Act of 1977 4 and appropriated in the Foreign Assistance and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act, 1978. 5 

United Nations development program (UNDP) 

The largest element in the international organizations and programs 
section of the authorization and appropriations legislation for volun- 
tary contributions was for U.S. contributions to the UNDP. The fol- 
lowing chart identifies the UNDP figures at various stages of congres- 
sional consideration: 








1977 
estimates 


1978 
request 


House 
committee 


House 


Senate 
committee 


Senate 


Public law 


Authorization. 


$100 


$130 
130 


$140 ... 
120 


("')" 


$140 .. 
110 .. 




$140 
115 


Appropriation- 


100 



i On June 22, 1977, the House, by a vote of 232 against to 182 in favor, rejected an amendment cutting $31,000 000 
from the $120,000,000 recommended by the Committee for UNDP. 

While both policy committees approved spending for UNDP at a 
level $10 million higher than that requested by the executive branch, 
the appropriations committees viewed U.S. contributions to UNDP 
from a more negative perspective. The House International Relations 
Committee observed that the $140 million recommended would 
amount to 22 percent of contributions from all countries for 1978, less 
than the 25 percent limit established by Congress for U.S. assessed 
contributions. 6 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recalled that 
the $140 million level would still "represent a reduction in the U.S. 
share from the 35 percent level in 1970." 7 On the other hand, the 
appropriations committees focused on the capabilities of the UNDP to 
operate efficiently. The House Committee report questioned whether 
"efficient administration" were possible with "such an immense 
operation" and expressed the belief that, "if the UNDP could slow 
down its operation and concentrate on a number of good projects, the 
needs of the poor would be better served." 8 

The Senate Appropriations Committee, in deleting $20 million from 
the UNDP request, criticized the so-called U.N. development system 

i Public Law 95-105, approved Aug. 17, 1077. 
2 Public Law 95-86, approved Aug. 2, 1077. 
I Sop Congress and Foreign Policy— 1076, p. 155. 
< Public Law 95-88, approved Aug. 3, 1977. 
* Public Law 95-148, approved Oct. 31, 1977. 
Ml. Kept. No. 9.5-240, p. 38. 
'S. Rept. No. 9.5-161, p. 40. 
» H. Rept. No. 95-417, p. 27. 



135 

which is, according to the committee report, "under the control 
of 40 separate governing bodies." The committee asserted that — 

Almost ton years after the United Nations recognized the need for consolidation 
of control and direction of its assistance programs, there is still no effective 
coordinating unit. Indeed, if anything, there has been an increase in the frag- 
mentation of the system. Within that system, the UNDP has lost much of its 
authority as the specialized agencies have increased their autonomy by increasing 
their assessed budgets. UNDP activities are now duplicated or supplanted by the 
specialized agencies in many instances. 

* * * The Committee recognizes the improvements made in UNDP programs 
and administration * * * [by] Mr. Bradford Morse, but we question whether the 
UNDP * * * can effectively implement * * * [so large an effort]. 

* * * Until the UNDP becomes, in fact and not just in theory, the central 
coordinator and funder of UN development assistance, it will have neither institu- 
tional stability nor authorit^y. In short, until the UN development system under- 
goes fundamental structural reform, the UNDP will not be able to manage its 
myriad technical assistance projects effectively and efficiently. 9 

Technical assistance 

As mentioned in the previous discussion of UNDP, the practice of 
funding technical assistance through the regular budgets of the 
United Nations and its specialized agencies has been increasing. The 
Senate Appropriations Committee focused attention on this issue in 
its consideration of the State Department appropriations for contribu- 
tions to U.N. agency regular budgets. In fact, the committee recom- 
mended deletion from the U.S. contribution to the budgets of the U.N. 
and its agencies of a portion estimated to fund technical assistance. 
This recommendation was accepted by the Senate but deleted by the 
conferees who noted that — 

Approval of such funding * * * does not mean that the conferees condone the 
present situation with respect to such funds. 

The conferees are concerned over the growing tendency of United Nations 
specialized agencies to increase their assessed budgets to finance technical assistance 
programs. 

* * * Technical assistance activities should be voluntarily financed by the 
United Nations Development Program. 

* * * The conferees instruct the Department to report on how it intends 
to deal with this problem in the next budget cycle. 

These comments should serve as a warning to the UN and other international 
agencies that the continuation of current funding trends threatens to call into 
doubt the basic understandings necessary to preserve the willingness of large 
donors to honor assessed contributions. 9a 

The State Department submitted such a report on March 3, 1978. 
United Nations University 

Another contribution that is becoming a perennial issue in Congress 
each year is that of U.S. money for the U.N. University (UNU), 
which became operational in 1975, has a U.S. national as rector, but 
has not received any U.S. funding for its endowment. While $10 mil- 
lion was authorized in 1977 for U.S. contributions to UNU, this 
money was not appropriated. The House supported appropriation 
of the $10 million but the Senate, by a vote of 50 in favor to 35 against, 
adopted a committee amendment prohibiting the use of funds for 
U.S. contributions to UNU. The Senate prohibition was retained in 
conference. 

• S. Rept. No. 95-352, pp. 59, 60. 
»» H. Rept. No. 95-476, pp. 5-6. 



136 

United Nati<>/ts Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) 

In 1976, the Senate Appropriations Committee warned the execu- 
tive branch that it would limit funds for U.S. contributions for 
UNFDAC if the CJ.S. share of funding was not reduced. The commit- 
tee report even indicated the committee's willingness to "document 
the case for United States withdrawal from the fund." 10 Referring 
to its past views on UNFDAC, the committee in 1977, reduced the 
$6 million request for 1978 by half. "Since its inception in 1971, the 
Fund," According to the committee, "has received contributions from 
the international communitv totaling $22,550,168. The United States 
contributed $1N,000,000 or 79.8 percent of that total." " 

U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization {UNESCO) 
As in previous years, Congress gave specific consideration to U.S. 
contributions to UNESCO. 12 On January 20, 1977, Congress received 
President Ford's December 29, 1976, certification that the actions of a 
"primarily political character" that had been taken by the UNESCO 
General Conference in 1974, leading to a congressional cutoff of fund- 
ing for UNESCO, had been changed by the organization. Ford re- 
quested that Congress authorize and appropriate funds to pay arrear- 
ages as well as assessments for 1977 and 1978. 13 President Carter 
agreed with the Ford certification and a request for $69.3 million to 
pay for calendar years 1975, 1976, and 1977 contributions was consid- 
ered by Congress in supplemental legislation. The Congress author- 
ized funds for U.S. contributions for 1975 and 1976 and approximately 
half of 1977 ($60 million), 14 but appropriated funds only for the 1975 
and 1976 assessments ($43.1 million). 15 During the House International 
Relations Committee's consideration of the supplemental authoriza- 
tion, the State Department enumerated "future steps the USG plans 
to counter those trends in UNESCO which remain objectionable to us." 
They included 

— strengthened U.S. representation; 

— a fair share of Americans in Secretariat; 

— a balance in UNESCO expert bodies; 

— promotion of further depoliticization: 

—an end to interference by UNESCO with NGO's; 

— cleaning the slate of arbitrary actions against Israel. 16 
Funding of contributions to UNESCO was also considered in the 
regular fiscal year 1978 Department of State authorization and appro- 
priation legislation. Only a little more than half of the 1977 assess- 
ment ($17 million) was authorized and appropriated, leaving a total 
of S37.4 million unpaid for the rest of calendar year 1977 and all of 
calendar year 1978 contributions. 

International T^abor Organization (ILO) 

On November 1, 1977, President Carter announced that the United 
States would withdraw from the International Labor Organization, 
effective November 5, 1977. This was the first time the United States 



*• See Congress and Foreign Policy— 1976, pp. 157-1.58. 
» S. Rept. No. 95-352, pp. 78. 79. 

" See Congress and Foreign Policy— 1976, p. 156, and Congress and Foreign Policy— 1975, p. 116. 
" H. Doc. No. 95-63. 

» Department of State. Arjpropriat ion authorization, fiscal year 1977, Public Law 95-45, approved June 15, 
1977. 
15 Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1977, Public Law 95-26, approved May 4, 1977. 
»• II. Rept. No. 9.5-84, pp. 5-6. 



137 

had withdrawn from an agency of the U.N. system, a step some viewed 
as a dangerous precedent for the role of the United States in interna- 
tional organizations. Two years earlier, the United States had submit- 
ted its letter of intention to withdraw from the ILO as required by the 
ILO Constitution and, on the date of its withdrawal, the United 
States was current in its regular budget contributions to the organiza- 
tion, as also required by the ILO Constitution. 17 

On October 27, 1977, a few days before the November deadline, 
Senator Dole had introduced Senate Resolution 301, calling for ter- 
mination of U.S. membership in the ILO, pending a congressional 
determination that the ILO had returned to its basic principles and 
purposes of promoting unity among workers, employees, and govern- 
ments throughout the world. In the light of the President's action, 
this resolution was not considered. 

Congressional recognition of U.N. conferences 

It appears that Congress, in legislation, is recognizing some impor- 
tance in U.N. -sponsored conferences and is requesting that the execu- 
tive branch respond effectively in preparing for such conferences. At 
the same time, this is another way in which Congress may influence the 
foreign policy positions taken by the U.S. Government at these 
meetings. In the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1978, for 
example, Congress — 

(1) urged the President to take appropriate steps to insure 
that, at all stages of the U.N. Conference on Science and Tech- 
nology for Development (to be held in 1979), representatives of 
the United States place important emphasis on the development 
and use of light capital technologies; and 

(2) requested the Secretary of State report to the appropriate 
committees on the procedures of the executive branch in prepara- 
tion for the special session of the U.N. General Assembly on 
Disarmament in spring 1978. 

Finally, the House and Senate each adopted a resolution urging the 
U.S. delegation to the U.N. General Assembly to promote the con- 
vening of a World Assembly on Aging and to schedule a World Year 
on Aging. 18 The General Assembly, on November 16, 1977, adopted a 
resolution requesting the views of U.N. member states on this pro- 
posal and the Assembly will consider such a year and conference in 
1978. 

Views of the new administration on U.S. participation in the U.N. 

The nomination by President Carter of then Representative 
Andrew Young to be U.S. representative to the United Nations was 
and has continued to be controversial. The Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee, after hearings on January 25, 1977, quickly voted in favor of 
Young's confirmation and he was sworn in by the end of the month. 
As the first black U.N. representative from the United States, Young 
played a role in opening contacts with the Third World and, in partic- 
ular, with African nations. Young made substantive, though not 
overwhelming, changes in personnel at the U.S. mission to the U.N. 

17 See Congress and Foreign Policv — 1976, p. 156, and Congress. and Foreign Policy — 1975, p. 117. 

i* S. Res. 238 was agreed to by the Senate on Oct. 5, 1977, and H. Res. 736, by the House, on Oct. 31, 1977. 



29-972—78 10 



138 

in New York, and created, for the first time a special staff in Washing- 
ton, in the State Department's Bureau of International Organization 
Affairs. The Washington Office of the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. 
is to work closely with the Department, in particular the Office of 
( tongressiona] Relations and the Bureau of International Organization 
Affairs, and is to assist Young in his participation in Cabinet and 
National Security Council meetings. 

However, some Members of Congress and the media have viewed 
Young, and more particularly some of the public statements he has 
made, as irresponsible and inappropriate. A House floor amendment 
to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act to delete the funding for 
the staffing of Young's Washington office was considered but rejected 
by a vote of 318 nays to 91 yeas. 19 Also pending in the House, but 
not considered, was a resolution to impeach Ambassador Young 
"for high crimes and misdemeanors." Thus, efforts to restrict or 
discredit Young were defeated in Congress and he continued to work 
in the United Nations and on the role of the United States in the 
United Nations. 

The policy of strengthening the role of the U.S. in the U.N. was 
one which received Presidential backing when Carter chose to deliver 
his first major foreign policy address as President of the United States 
to a meeting in the United Nations General Assembly Hall before the 
delegations of the U.N. membership on March 17, 1977. Toward the 
end of the year, in October, during the 32d session of the General 
Assembly, President Carter spent 2 days at the United Nations 
meeting with delegates from other countries as well as with U.N. 
officials. He also signed two human rights treaties at U.N. head- 
quarters. These face-to-face actions were apparently intended to 
illustrate both to other nations and to the U.S. public the President's 
commitment to the United Nations as a viable international 
organization. 

United Nations reform 

In February 1977, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee 
released a report wdiich reviewed U.S. participation in international 
organizations, especially the organizations of the United Nations 
system. 20 The report addressed in detail five broad areas of difficulty: 

(1) political trends in international organizations; 

(2) overlap between international organizations; 

(3) assessing the effectiveness of international organizations; 

(4) U.S. participation in international organizations; 

(5) personnel in international organizations. 

This report was the product of a year-long study 21 during which 
committee staff reviewed replies to questionnaires sent to 33 Federal 
agencies involved in the making of U.S. policy toward 65 inter- 
national organizations (IO's) , visited the headquarters of a number of 
organizations located in Geneva, Rome, and New York, and inter- 
viewed numerous other officials and outside experts. 

19 The vote on this amendment was viewed by its proponents as a vote for or against Young and his 
statements. 

20 See end of section for citation. 

» See Congress and Foreign Policy— 1976, p. 160. 



139 

The committee's report identified challenges confronting these 
international organizations and problems facing U.S. policymakers 
in meeting these challenges. The "challenges" included: 
— trends toward politicization; 
— rapid and unsystematic growth in number of IO's, leading to 

duplication; 
— absence of effective overall coordination within U.N. system; 
— an increasing trend toward fragmentation; 
— the slowness with which IO's have adopted procedures for 
independent and continual evaluation of their activities and 
programs ; 
— the failure to adopt modern management techniques; 
— excessive salary levels. 
The problems facing U.S. policymakers included — 
— failure to determine specific reasons for U.S. participation 
in each organization or to establish specifically the goals the 
United States hopes to achieve in each. Need for periodic reas- 
sessments by Congress and executive branch of costs and bene- 
fits of U.S. participation in each 10; 
— inability of the State Department to provide effective, overall 

coordination of U.S. participation in many IO's; 
— inadequate level of resources devoted to U.S. evaluation of 

budgets and program effectiveness; 
— limited diversity of people in private sector who serve on 
advisory committees and delegations utilized for formulation 
and implementation of U.S. policy toward IO's; 
— deficiencies in system of laws governing U.S. participation 

in IO's; 
— failure of U.S. to have as many nationals working as employees 
of IO's as it should. 
The release of this report in February was followed in May 1977 by 
the release by the General Accounting Office of five reports prepared 
for the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on U.S. participation 
in the World Health Organization, the ILO, the World Food Program, 
and Food and Agriculture Organization, and on U.S. Government 
efforts to recruit qualified candidates for employment by U.N. organi- 
zations. 22 Each of the reports identified areas for improvement both 
in the international organizations and by the U.S. Government. 

Last, the committee, in June 1977, held a symposium on the role 
of the United States in specialized agencies. 23 A panel of six experts, 
including the new Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organization Affairs, C. William Maynes, joined in an open exchange 
of views with the Senators and committee staff present on a number 
of issues addressed in the committee report. 

In addition, Congress, in section 503 of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act of 1978, required the President to submit a report 
offering recommendations for reform of the United Nations. The 
legislation included a minimum listing of issues which the report should 
address. In the Senate, section 503 originated with a recommendation 
of Senators Howard Baker and George Mc Govern, as a result 
of their participation on the U.S. delegation to the U.N. General 
Assembly in 1976. 24 Both the House and Senate committees recom- 

n See pp. 14C-141. for citation. 
13 See pp. 14C-141. for citation. 

84 See p. 140 for citation to report of Senators Baker and McGovern on their participation on the U.S. 
delegation. 



140 

mended similar language on the U.N. reform section, thereby indicat- 
ing a degree of consensus in Congress on the need for the United 
States to develop concrete proposals for reform and to promote these 
proposals at the United Nations. 25 

Future congressional concerns 

( m the broad question of continued U.S. participation in specific 
U.X. system agencies, opportunities are likely to arise in 1978 for 
congressional review of two organizations. First, Congress will have 
before t in L978 a supplemental request for funding U.S. contributions 
to UNESCO for half of 1077 and all of 1978, as well as a fiscal year 
1979 request for contributions to the calendar year 1979 budget. A 
UNESCO General Conference — the biennial policy-se ting meeting 
of the total UNESCO membership — will meet in Paris n October/ 
November 1978. During its budget review, the appropriate committees 
of ( 'ongress nay wish to inquire as to the progress made in implement- 
ins: the steps identified to the House Committee on International 
Relations in early 1977. The General Conference may be a testing 
ground for the success of these steps. 

The second agency that may be subject to congressional review is 
the International Labor Organization. While the administration has 
not requested funds for U.S. contributions to ILO, since the United 
States is no longer a member of that organization, the U.S. withdrawal 
might not necessarily be viewed as permanent. Some in Congress 
might consider it proper to review the organization and its operations, 
in the light of the reasons for the U.S. withdrawal, with some con- 
sideration pven to a possible return to the organization by the United 
States. 

The U.S. budget review will undoubtly include a reexamination 
of (1) the question of the capability of the UNDP to coordinate U.N. 
development assistance, and (2) the trend toward tk^ use of regular 
budgets for the financing of the technical assistance. A State Depart- 
ment report on the second question was completed in March 1978. 
In addition, the sources of continued increases in the budgets of 
these organizations, and especially the salaries portion of these budgets, 
will continue to be an issue of concern to many in Congress. 

Finally, several different reports and recommendations were made in 
Congress in 1977 or submitted to Congress in early 1978, on the ques- 
tion of reform of the United Nations and the U.N. system and of the 
participation of the U.S. Government in international organizations. 
If those in Congress are serious in their interest in working together with 
the executive branch to strengthen both the U.N. s}^stem and U.S. 
participation of the U.S. Government in international organizations, 
then extensive steps — both legislative and oversight — in this area 
may have to be taken. 

References 

congressional publications 

McGovern, George and Howard Baker. The United Nations, 1976; report to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate — on their serv- 
ice as members of the United States Delegation to the 31st General Assembly 
of the United Nations. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, 
29 pp. (9f)th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.) 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee 
on International Operations. Department of State fiscal year 1977 supplemental 
authorization. Hearings and markup, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Feb. 17 and Mar. 18, 
1977, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, 131 pp. 

»* The Presidont transmitted the report required by sec. 503 to the Congress on Mar. 2, 1978. 



141 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on 

International Operations. Fiscal year 1977 State Department supplemental. 

Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Mar. 21. 1977. Washington, U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1977. 68 pp. 
Public attitudes toward the U.N. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. July 

27, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 41 pp. 
Nomination of Hon. Andrew Young as U.S. Representative to U.N. Hearing, 

95th Congress, 1st sess. Jan. 25, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 1977. 58 pp. 

Committee on Governmental Affairs. Symposium on the role of the United 



States in specialized international organizations. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. 
June 15, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 86 pp. 
Committee on Government Operations. U.S. participation in international 



organizations. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 140 pp. 
(95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print; also printed as 95th Cong. 1st sess. 
S. Doc. No. 95-50) 

U.S. Department of State. United States contributions to international orga- 
nizations; report to the Congress for fiscal year 1975. Washington, 1977. 124 pp. 
^ (95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Doc. No. 95-11) 

U.S. General Accounting Office. Greater U.S. Government efforts needed to 
recruit qualified candidates for employment by U.N. organizations. Depart- 
ment of State and other Federal agencies; report to the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs by the Comptroller General of the United States. Wash- 
ington, 1977. 43 pp. (ID-77-14, May 16, 1977) 

Need for U.S. objectives in the International Labor Organization. De- 
partments of State, Labor, and Commerce; report to the Senate Committee 
on Governmental Affairs by the Comptroller General of the United States. 
Washington, 1977. 54 pp. (ID-77-12, May 16, 1977) 

The United States should play a greater role in the Food and Agriculture 



Organization of the United Nations. Departments of State and Agriculture and 
other Federal agencies ; report to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
by the Comptroller General of the United States. Washington, 1977. 66 pp. 
(ID-77-13, May 16, 1977) 

U.S. participation in international organizations. Department of State 



and other Federal agencies; report to the Congress by the Comptroller General 
of the United States. Washington, 1977. 38 pp. (ID-77-13, June 24, 1977) 
U.S. participation in the World Health Organization still needs improve- 



ment. Departments of State and Health, Education, and Welfare, Agency 
for International Development; report to the Senate Committee on Govern- 
mental Affairs by the Comptroller General of the United States. Washington, 
1977. 52 pp. (ID-77-15, May 16, 1977) 

The world food program — how the U.S. can help improve it. Depart- 



ments of Agriculture and State, Agency for International Development; report 
to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs by the Comptroller General 
of the United States. Washington, 1977. 40 pp. (ID-77-16, May 16, 1977) 



CRS PUBLICATIONS 



Collier, Ellen, Marjorie Niehaus and Carol Capps. United States participation 
in international organizations: an introductory overview and selected basic 
data. Mar. 3, 1977. 447 pp. (Multilith 77-29-F) 

McHugh, Lois. International Labor Organization: issues of U.S. membership. 
Issue Brief No. IB77033. [Periodically updated.] 



Hum ax Rights* 
overview 

During 1977 human rights was a pervasive theme in congressional 
debate on almost every topic relating to foreign affairs. It was raised 
as an issue to be considered in deciding whether to approve ratification 
of the Panama Canal Treaty; it was raised as an important factor in 
discussions of moves toward normalization of relations with Cuba, 
Vietnam, and the People's Republic of Ch na; it was raised in debates 
over President Carter's granting of most favored nation trading terms 
to Romania; and it was an important component of the congressional 
debate on U.S. withdrawal from the International Labor Organization. 

Discussions of human rights situations in given countries or of U.S. 
policy on human rights were daily occurrences in the Congressional 
Record during 1977. Provisions relating to human rights were in- 
corporated into almost every major piece of legislation relating to 
foreign relations. Existing human rights legislation was amended, 
expanded, and tightened. Debate and action on human rights legisla- 
tion revealed, however, sharp differences not only within the House 
and the Senate, and between the legislative and executive branches, 
but also between the two legislative bodies. 

Congressional views on human rights and U.S. foreign policy 

Congressional debates on human rights reveal views on human 
rights ranging from the position that the United States has no business 
meddling in the internal affairs of another country, to the other ex- 
treme that the United States should refrain from any relations with 
countries violating the basic rights of their own citizens. The majority 
of congressional views, seem, however, to lie between these two ex- 
tremes — most members seem generally to favor some U.S. activity 
in the international human rights area. 

There are, however, differences in congressional opinion about such 
activity. Some feel that U.S. human rights advocacy in 1977 has been 
too selective; that rightist governments often friendly to the United 
States — such as Chile, Brazil, the Philippines, and South Korea — 
have received a disproportionate share of criticism, while human 
rights violations in Communist countries — such as Vietnam, Cuba, 
the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China — have hardly 
been mentioned. In this view U.S. human rights policy has been pre- 
occupied with relatively minor abridgements of certain rights in au- 
thoritarian states while overlooking massive violations in totalitarian 
states. Concern has also been expressed that U.S. policy has been so 
preoccupied with human rights violations in southern Africa, that little 
has been done about the reported gross violations in such countries 
as Uganda and Guinea. 



•Prepared by Vita Bite, Analyst in International Relations. 

(142) 



143 

On the other side of this position are those who say that U.S. con- 
cern for human rights in particular countries is expressed in inverse 
proportion to the closeness of U.S. relationship or prospective relation- 
ship to that country. Thus, in this view, it is easy to express concern 
for the human rights of Jewish and other minorities in such a tradi- 
tional "enemy" state as the Soviet Union, while little public concern 
is expressed about human rights situations in such friendly, client or 
allied states as the Philippines, South Korea, or Iran. 

Congress differed as well on how much leeway the executive branch 
should be allowed in implementing human rights policy legislated by 
Congress. Some Members felt that Congress could give the executive 
branch no flexibility in implementing its intentions by requiring, 
for example, a mandatory "no" vote in the international financial 
institutions on loans to countries deemed human rights violators. 
Others satisfied with President Carter's expressions of commitment 
to human rights abroad felt that the Executive should be given some 
discretion in implementing the human rights policy set down by 
Congress. 

DISCUSSION 

Foreign assistance legislation 

International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978 (Public 
Law 95-88). — Addititional human rights provisions, incorporating 
both House and Senate versions, were added to U.S. foreign economic 
assistance programs by the International Development and Food 
Assistance Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-88). l Section 111 of this act 
amended section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by revising 
subsections (c) and (d) and adding a new subsection (e). Revised 
subsections (c) and (d) required that in determining whether assist- 
ance was to be provided, the Administrator of the Agency for Inter- 
national Development (AID), in consultation with the State Depart- 
ment Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 
was to consider "specific actions which have been taken by the 
President or Congress relating to multilateral or security assistance 
to a less developed country because of human rights practices or 
policies in such country." 

The existing reporting requirement was also revised, mandating 
that the Secretary of State transmit by January 31 of each year a 
full report on the status of basic human rights in countries receiving 
U.S. development assistance, including the steps the Administrator 
has taken to alter U.S. programs in any country because of human 
rights considerations. 

The new subsection (e) earmarked $750,000 of development assist- 
ance funds for studies to identify and carry out programs which 
will encourage or promote increased adherence to civil and political 
rights, as enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
None of these funds were to be used directly or indirectly to influence 
elections in another country. A House International Relations Com- 
mittee report (H. Rept. 95-240) pointed out that while the major 
emphasis of AID's programs was in the area of economic and 
social rights, this small amount was to be set aside to further civil 



See Congress and Foreign Policy for 1975 and 1976 for discussion of existing human rights legislation. 



144 

and political rights. Moreover, unlike most other human rights 
legislation, it did not respond to human rights situations in terms of 
-auctions or threats, but rather affirmatively encouraged greater 
adherence to international human rights standards. 

Section 203 as enacted added a new section 112 to title I of the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public 
Law 480). It would prohibit entry into an agreement under that title 
to finance the sale of agricultural commodities to the government 
of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of human rights 
violation, unless such agreement would directly benefit the needy 
people in that country. The new section also provided that the 
House International Relations Committee or Senate Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry might require the President 
to submit in writing information demonstrating that a particular 
agreement would directly benefit the needy in a country. 

As already provided in existing legislation, in determining whether 
a government was engaging in a consistent pattern of gross violations 
of human rights, consideration was to be given "to the extent of 
cooperation of such government in permitting an unimpeded investiga- 
tion of alleged violations by various international organizations such 
as the Red Cross, the United Nations or the Organization of American 
States. 

Finally the President was required annually to transmit to Congress 
a report on steps that had been taken to carry out the provisions of 
this section. 

International Security Assistance Act (Public Law 95-92.) — Legisla- 
tion enacted during the 94th Congress amending section 502B of the 
Foreign Assistance Act already required that serious consideration 
be given to human rights situations in implementing security assist- 
ance programs. The International Security Assistance Act enacted 
during 1977 added certain human rights provisions relating to specific 
countries. 

An amendment offered by Senators Kennedy, Church, Abourezk, 
McGovern, and Anderson and modified by Senator Humphrey and the 
Conference Committee, prohibited the furnishing to Argentina after 
September 30, 1978, of any military assistance, security supporting 
assistance, international military education and training credits or 
loan guaranties, and sales of defense articles or services, and pro- 
hibited the issuance to or for the Argentine Government of export 
licenses under the Arms Export Control Act. 2 

Section 8(d) as finally adopted contained a Senate provision ex- 
pressing the sense of Congress that the United States supports "an 
internationally recognized constitutional settlement of the Rhodesian 
conflict leading promptly to majority rule based upon democratic 
principles and upholding basic human rights," 3 

As reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (S. 
Rept. 95-195) the measure had included a provision prohibiting 
any military assistance to Ethiopia because of consistent and gross 
violations of human rights, 4 among other reasons. The Conference 
Committte (H. Rept. 95-503) deleted this prohibition; authoriza- 
tion for funding for Ethiopia was deleted from the bill, however. The 



2 See also the discussion of Latin America on pp. 180-189. (Ed.) 

8 See also the discussion of Africa on pp. 173-179. (Ed.) 

4 See also the discussion of conventional arms transfers on pp. 70-82. (Ed.) 



145 

Conference Committee also stated that it understood the policy of the 
United States to be that defense articles and defense services would 
not be provided to Ethiopia. Should such a policy change, the com- 
mittee expected the executive branch to consult with Congress before 
implementation. 

_ The House version of this bill also amended section 502 of the For- 
eign Assistance Act of 1961 to prohibit military assistance and sales 
which would directly or indirectly aid the efforts of foreign govern- 
ments to repress the legitimate rights of their citizens contrary to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The provision was deleted 
by the Conference Committee, which felt that the language would have 
had such a broad application as to be ''impractical and impos- 
sible to implement." In addition the committee felt that section 502B 
already provided for serious consideration of human rights situations 
in implementation of security assistance programs. 

Authorization for international financial institutions (Public Law 95- 
118). — The Carter administration differed with Congress, and the 
two Houses of Congress differed with one another, on other human 
rights provisions enacted during the 95th Congress. The best U.S. 
approach to encouraging multilateral banks to limit lending to coun- 
tries with poor human rights records was a topic of major congressional 
debate during consideration of authorizations for international 
financial institutions. 5 

The House agreed by voice vote to a Badillo amendment that 
directed the U.S. representatives at all the banks to oppose loans to 
human rights violators unless the credit was directed specifically to 
programs which serve the basic needs of the citizens of the recipient 
country. The House also adopted a second Badillo amendment direct- 
ing the Secretary of the Treasury to begin a wide consultation begin- 
ning with the industrialized democracies in order to develop a standard 
for meeting basic human needs and protecting human rights, and a 
mechanism for insuring that the rewards of international economic 
cooperation go to those countries subscribing to such standards. 

The Senate, however, accepted human rights provisions that 
directed U.S. representatives to use their voice and vote to seek 
to channel assistance to countries other than those that show a 
consistent pattern of human rights violations. The Foreign Relations 
Committee (S. Rept. 95-1 59f felt that directives should "not be 
issued which would place the United States in a position of a man- 
dated 'no' vote, thus obviating U.S. negotiating strength and 
influence in an institution," and that the stated objective was to 
improve human rights, rather than concentrate on punitive measures 
toward countries committing violations. This approach was also fa- 
vored by the President, who in an April 18 letter to Senator Humphrey 
expressed (a) support for such a human rights provision, and (b) 
opposition to the House-passed provision which required the United 
States to vote against any loan to a country in which human rights 
are violated. 

The Conference Committee remained deadlocked for a long time on 
this issue as each side insisted on its approach to human rights. As 
finally enacted, U.S. executive directors were authorized and instructed 



• See also the discussion of multilateral assistance on pp. 103-116. (Ed.) 



146 

to oppose loans, financial assistance or technical assistance to countries 
violating human rights unless such assistance would serve basic human 
needs. The reouired consultations on a viable international standard 
protecting human rights were broadened beyond "industrial democra- 
cies" (House version) or "democracies" (Senate version) to include 
all countries. 

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1978 
(Public Law 95-148). — A similar divergence in congressional and 
executive views arose over provisions n the Foreign Assistance and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1978. The House voted on 
dune 23 to prohibit international financial institutions from using U.S. 
funds for assisting Uganda, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Ajigola, 
Mozambique, and Cuba, because of their poor human rights records, 
among other considerations. In August, after World Bank President 
McNamara stated that the institution would not accept U.S. funds 
under the restrictions specified by the House-passed measure, the 
Senate deleted such a provision from the bill. After a House-Senate 
conference was unable to resolve the issue, President Carter in an 
effort to find an alternative to the House version, met with 
congressional leaders on September 31 to work out a compromise. 

On October 6, the President wrote a letter to Congressman Clarence 
Long, chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House 
Appropriations Committee. In the letter Carter promised to instruct 
U.S. representatives to international lending institutions to oppose and 
vote against any loans to the seven named countries during fiscal 
year 1978. The legislation as finally enacted prohibited "direct" aid to 
Uganda, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos (section 107); to Angola and 
Mozambique (section 114); and to Cuba (section 506). 

The measure as enacted into law a 1 so contained a number of other 
human rights provisions. Title I barred military education and training 
funds for Argentina. Section 503 A prohibited military assistance, 
international military education and training, or foreign military credit 
sales to Ethiopia and Uruguay. Section 503B prohibited foreign military 
credit sales to Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador and Guatemala. Section 
503C limited appropriations for the Philippines to $18,000,000 for 
military aid, $1,850,000 for military credit sales, and $700,000 for 
training. 

Section 113 prohibited security assistance to any country if it would 
aid directly the efforts of the government of such country to repress the 
legitimate rights of the population of such country contrary to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Section 507 expressed the 
sense of Congress that U.S. representatives to nternational financial 
institutions should oppose loans and other aid to nations systematically 
violating human rights, except when the President determined that 
rights would be better served by not voting against such assistance or 
when the aid was intended to go directly to the impoverished majority 
of the country. 

Other legislation 

Section 109(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 1978 
(Public Law 95-105) elevated the State Department Coordinator for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to Assistant Secretary 
status. It also required the Secretary of State to transmit to Congress 



147 

by January 31, 1978, a comprehensive report on the office of the new 
Assistant Secretary "including its current mandate and operations, the 
mandate and operations of its predecessor offices, and proposals for 
the reorganization of the Department of State that would strengthen 
human rights and humanitarian considerations in the conduct of U.S. 
foreign policy." 

The measure as enacted also contained a Senate provision calling 
on the United States to make a major effort toward reforming and 
restructuring the U.N. system, including consideration of various 
proposals which would improve coordination of and expand U.N. 
activities on behalf of human rights. 6 

Section 502 (an amendment introduced by Senator Brooke) ex- 
pressed the finding of Congress that the Belgrade Conference on the 
Helsinki accords provides the United States an important forum to 
press its case for human rights and that the emphasis should be trans- 
lated into concern for specific individuals. 7 In particular, the U.S. 
delegation was urged to express concern for Anatoly Shcharansky. 

Section 511(b) (part of an amendment introduced by Senator Dole, 
as modified on the Senate floor) expressed the sense of Congress that 
Cuba's disrespect for individual human rights must be taken into 
account in any negotiations toward normalization of relations with 
that country. 

During Senate debate on this measure, Senator McClure introduced 
an amendment which broadened the definition of human rights in sec- 
tion 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act. The amendment denned 
human rights as including but not being limited to: consent of the 
governed, as evidenced by freely contested, periodic elections and the 
right of opposition parties to operate without hindrance; the rule of 
law; individual freedom; and minority rights. The Senate agreed to 
this human rights provision, but it was deleted by the Conference 
Committee. 

Other legislation enacted during 1977 amended the Export-Import 
Bank Act of 1945 (Public Law 95-143) to include human rights provi- 
sions. Section 2 of that legislation required the Board of Directors to 
"take into account, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the 
observance of and respect for human rights in the country to receive 
the exports supported by a loan or financial guarantee and the effect 
such exports may have on human rights in such country." During 
March 1977 both Houses agreed to amend the U.N. Participation Act 
of 1945 to halt the importation of Rhodesian chrome (Public Law 
95-12). Rhodesia, the only state against which the United States 
currently imposes economic sanctions, was considered by many to be 
guilty of violating human rights in its opposition to self-determination 
for its black majority population. The enactment of this legislation 
returned the United States to adherence to the Security Council sanc- 
tions by effectively repealing section 513 of the Military Procure- 
ment Act of 1972 (the Byrd amendment), which had permitted U.S. 
importation of Rhodesian chrome. 8 



» See also the discussion of U.S. participation in the United Nations system on pp. 133-141. (Ed.) 

7 See also the discussion of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on pp. 37^*2. (Ed.) 

8 See also the discussion of Africa, pp. 173-179. (Ed.) 



14S 

Congressional resolutions 

In addition to the Legislation already described, Congress passed a 
numb( r of resolutions expressing its view and recommending certain 
executive branch actions on specific human rights issues. Several 
resolutions expressed congressional concern about compliance with the 
human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords. 9 In March both 
Houses; Concurrent Resolution 7 expressing congres- 

sional resolve that the sustained interest of the American people be 
conveyed to the Soviet Government regarding adherence to the 
Helsinki Declaration, especially relating to freedom of emigration. 
The House International Relations Committee had earlier consid< red 
and reported a similar measure, House Concurrent Resolution 97, 
expressmg the concern of Congress regarding harassment of Soviet 
Jews and other minorities. Similarly House Concurrent Resolution 
249, passed by both Houses on June 15, expressed the sense of Congress 
that the U.S. delegation to the Belgrade meeting should make every 
effort to insure that a proper, straightforward and serious exchange 
of views take place among the participating states on the application 
of the principles of the Final Act of the Helsinki Accords, and that 
the exchange of views also cover compliance and noncompliance with. 
the Final Act's provisions, especially those relating to universal 
humanitarian ideals. 

The House on October 31 also agreed to House Concurrent Resolu- 
tion 387, reaffirming the commitment of the United States to obtain 
full compliance with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final 
Act, and expressed congressional support for the President's efforts 
to advance human rights in the international community and to press 
for a global commitment to human rights. The Senate has not acted 
on such a measure, but on July 12 agreed to its own Senate Resolution 
198, expressing the sense of the Senate that the U.S. representative 
to the Helsinki Accords Review Conference should indicate to the 
Soviet Union and other states represented there the concern of the 
United States over treatment of Anatoh' Shcharansky, Yuri Orlov, 
and others. 

House Concurrent Resolution 388, expressing concern about the 
recent acts of repression by the Government cf South Africa and also 
noting concern about the death of black leader Steve Biko, was agreed 
to by the House on October 31 but has not yet been acted on by the 
Senate. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had reported Senate 
Concurrent Resolution 60 on November 1 relating to Biko's death. 
The Senate agreed in May to Senate Resolution 175, expressing the 
sense of the Senate that the conduct of the current Ugandan regime 
deserves condemnation b}* the world community and that the U.S. 
representative should request a U.N. investigation of the situation 
in Uganda. 

The House on September 27 agreed to House Resolution 724 ex- 
pressing its deep concern about the disregard of basic human rights in 
( Jambodia and called upon the President to seek international coopera- 
tion in an effort to bring violations of internationally recognized human 
rights in Cambodia to an end. 

Hearings 

Human rights issues were a common theme in the 1977 congressional 
hearings on foreign assistance authorizations and appropriations. 

• See also the discussion of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union on pp. 47-52. (Ed.) 



149 

Executive branch witnesses, especially State Department represent- 
atives, were extensively questioned both about U.S. human rights 
policy generally and as it related to specific regions and countries. 
The Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee held 2 days of hearings on March 4 and 7 
specifically on human rights issues and their relationship to foreign 
assistance programs. 

The Executive-Legislative Commission to monitor the implementa- 
tion of the Helsinki Final Act (established by Public Law 94-304) be- 
came a focal point of congressional attention to human rights in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during 1977. 10 The Commission held 
hearings on human rights on February 23 and 24 and on human contacts 
on March 15 and 16, and issued a report in August critical of the 
Soviet Union's and other countries' implementation of the Helsinki 
Accords. 

The Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House 
International Relations Committee continued its long-term study of 
international human rights and U.S. foreign policy. During 1977 
the subcommittee held a total of 24 hearings relating to human rights 
and U.S. foreign policy in 10 different countries. Specifically the 
subcommittee held hearings on Presidential elections and religious 
persecution in El Salvador, on human rights in East Timor, Cambodia, 
Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Iran, and the Israeli-occupied 
territories as well as the question of self-determination in the Western 
Sahara. The subcommittee also held hearings to review the 33d 
session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, on human rights 
issues at the Seventh Regular Session of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) General Assembly, and to review the administration's 
record on human rights and U.S. foreign policy. 

Human rights treaties 

On May 23 President Carter sent a message to the Senate recom- 
mending approval of the U.N. International Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Executive 
Order 81-17). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 2 days 
of hearings on the Convention on May 24 and 26. The committee 
considered it on July 12 and August 2 (and had a procedural discussion 
on September 28 and October 18), but did not issue a report. The 
Convention has already been reported four times in the years since 
its first submission to the Senate in 1949. 

President Carter signed the OAS American Convention on Human 
Rights on June 1 and the U.N. Covenants on Civil and Political Rights 
and on Economic, Social and Political Rights in October. These three 
human rights treaties, as well as the U.N. International Convention 
oh the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, were 
transmitted to the Senate for its approval to ratification on Februarv 
23, 1978. 

Executive branch response to congressional human rights initiatives 

In fulfillment of the congressional requirement in section 502B of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (by section 301 of 



,D See also the discussion of tho Commission's activities elsewhere in this volume. (Ed.) 



150 

Public Law 94-329) that human rights reports be transmitted annually 
as part of the presentation materials for countries which are to receive 
security assistance, reports on the human rights situation in 82 
countries were submitted to Congress in March. The reports, trans- 
mitted by the Carter administration but largely compiled by the 
previous administration, were criticized by human rights activists 
as too cautious and bland. Nevertheless, in response to the reports, 
a number of Latin American countries — Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, 
Uruguay, and El Salvador (the last acting also in response to the 
House International Organization Subcommittee's hearings on human 
rights in El Salvador) — renounced U.S. military aid to protest the 
State Department reports. 

In order to cany out the human rights initiatives of President 
Carter and to fulfill the human rights responsibilities mandated by 
( Congress (including compilation of the annually required human rights 
reports), the State Department during 1977 restructured its institu- 
tional human rights apparatus. Congress had since 1974 been recom- 
mending and legislating institutional changes in the State Department 
to insure that serious attention would be given to human rights as a 
factor in foreign policy considerations. 11 

As already mentioned above, section 109 of Public Law 95-105 
upgraded the rank of Coordinator from Human Rights and Humani- 
tarian Affairs to that of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs. At the beginning of his administration, 
President Carter designated Patricia M. Derian to the post of Co- 
ordinator of Human Rights and Humanitatian Affairs. During the 
early months of 1977, even before being confirmed by the Senate, she 
testified frequently at hearings on human rights, economic assistance, 
and refugee problems. After a brief hearing before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on May 25, Ms. Derian was confirmed by the 
Senate as Coordinator and became Assistant Secretary after enactment 
of the 1978 Foreign Relations Authorization Act. 

Consistent with the upgrading of the status of the Human Rights 
Coordinator and with the encouragement of Congress, an independent 
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was established, 
with three component divisions: the Office of Human Rights, the 
Office of Refugees and Migration Affairs, and a separate section respon- 
sible for POW/MIA's. The Office of Human Rights has 13 officers and 
support personnel, including a Deputy Assistant Secetary for Human 
Rights. The Bureau coordinates human rights policy for the Depart- 
ment and makes recommendations to the Secretary designed to insure 
that human rights are a central element of U.S. foreign policy. The 
required report on the mandate and operations of the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 
submitted to Congress on January 31, 1978 as rquired by section 109 
of Public Law 95-105 stated that "we believe that the operations of 
the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs clearly 
respond to the intent of Congress." 12 

An executive branch Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights 
and Foreign Assistance, popularly termed the Christopher Committee 



" Sop the human rights sections in Congress and Foreign Policy volumes for 1975 and 1976 for development 
of congressional action in this area. 

" Senator Kennedy inserted the report in the Congressional Record (daily ed.) vol. 123, Feb. 7, 1978, 
pp. S1422 <;. 



151 

(for its chairman, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher) was 
established to examine the human rights aspects of all AID budgetary 
program decisions and the U.S. position on loans awaiting action in 
the international financial institutions. The committee reportedly 
was also responsible for delaying decisions on the U.S. Public Law 480 
food program, while reviewing the human rights situations in the 
receiving countries (as Congress required by section 203 of Public Law 
95-88). The delay was apparently ended after a number of Senators 
in a letter to Senator Herman Talmadge, chairman of the Senate 
Agriculture Committee, expressed ''distress." 13 

Prospects jor 1978 

During 1978 human rights will most likely continue to be an issue 
of major congressional concern. Scrutiny and discussion of the 
President's human rights policies is likely to be as persistent in con- 
gressional forums as during the past year. Human rights will also 
continue to be an area of serious disagreement within Congress and 
between Congress and the Executive, as already manifested in con- 
troversy over House acceptance of a human rights provision to a bill 
on a new International Monetary Fund program (H.R. 9214). 

Careful congressional monitoring of executive branch compliance 
with congressional human rights directives and implementation of 
recently enacted human rights provisions can be expected. The re- 
quired executive branch reports to Congress on the status of human 
rights in countries receiving U.S. assistance, on the mandate and 
operations of the Department of State's Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, on U.S. 
proposals for U.N. reform in the human rights area, and on the im- 
plementation of human rights provision in Public Law 480 programs 
will be submitted to Congress for its review. 

Human rights issues and policies will again be major themes in 
congressional foreign assistance hearings. Based on its findings as to 
the human rights situation in given countries, Congress may have to 
make difficult decisions on whether to grant, deny, or limit assistance 
to specific countries. The Senate may begin consideration of whether to 
approve ratification of the U.N. and OAS human rights treaties which 
the President transmitted in February 1978. 

References 
congressional publications 

Humphrey, Hubert. Congress and the administration act on human rights policy. 

Congressional record [daily ed.] v. 123, Dec. 7, 1977: S19420-S19422. 
U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Basket three: Im- 
- plementation of the Helsinki Accords. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Feb. 23 

and 24 and Mar. 15 and 17. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1977. 233 pp. 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee 

on International Organizations. Human rights and United States Foreign 

Policy: a review of the administration's record. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. 

Oct. 25, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 74 pp. 
Human rights in Cambodia. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. May 3, 1977. 

Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 70 pp. 

Human rights in Cambodia. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. July 26, 1977. 



Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 25 pp. 



>s Washington Post, Nov. 22, 1977. 



152 

Human rights in Bast Timor. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Juno 28, 

and July 19, 1077. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 80 pp. 
Human rights in Mast Timor and the question of the use of U.S. equipment 



by the Indonesian Armed Forces. Hearing. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Mar 23, 1977. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.84 pp. 

Human rights in Indonesia: a review of the situation with respect to the 



long-term political detainees. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Oct. 18, 1977. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.36 pp. 

Human lights in the international community and in U.S. foreign policy, 



1945 7;,. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 58 pp (95th 
Cong., 1st sess., Committee print). 

Human rights in Iran. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Oct. 26, 1977. 



Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 43 pp. 

Human rights in Taiwan. Hearing, 95th Cong. 1st sess. June 14, 1977. 



Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 110 pp. 

Human rights in Thailand. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. June 23 and 30, 



L977, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 104 pp. 

Human rights in Vietnam. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. June 16, 21, and 



•Inly 26, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 229 pp. 
Human rights at the Seventh Regular Session of the Organization of 



American States General Assembly. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Sept. 15, 
1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 30 pp. 

The Question of self-determination in Western Sahara. Hearing, 95th 



Cong., 1st sess. Oct. 12, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 82 pp. 

The recent Presidential elections in El Salvador: Implications for U.S. 



foreign policy. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Mar. 9 and 17, 1977. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 9£ pp. 

Religious persecution in El Salvador. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. 



July 21 and 29, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Office, 1977. 85 pp. 

Review of the United Nations 33d Commission on Human Rights. Hear- 



ing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. May 19, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, 1977. 35 pp. 

The status of human rights in selected countries and the U.S. response. 



Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 79 pp. (95th Cong., 1st 
sess., Committee print). 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Genocide Convention. 
Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. May 24 and 26, 1977. Washington, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, 1977. 154 pp. 

Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. Human Rights. Hearings, 95th 

Cong., 1st sess. Mar. 4 and 7, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 104 pp. 

Human rights reports prepared by the Department of State in accordance 



with sec. 502 (B) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended. March 1977. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 143 pp. (95th Cong., 1st 
sess., Committee print). 

Committee on Government Operations. Permanent Subcommittee on 



Investigations. 

International human rights: selected statements and initiatives. Wash- 



ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 46 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess., 
Committee print). 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

Genocide Convention [by Vita Bite], Issue Brief No. IB 74129 [Periodically 

updated]. 
Helsinki Final Act and the Belgrade Meeting: Congressional Oversight [by Francis 

Mido], Issue Brief No. IB 76068 [Periodically updated]. 
Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy [by Vita Bite], Issue Brief No. IB 77056 

[Periodically updated]. 
Republic of Korea: U.S. Commitments and the Question of Human Rights [by 

Larry Niskch] Issue Brief No. IB 74115 [Periodically updated]. 
Soviet- American Relations: Human Rights [bv Joseph Whelan] Issue Brief No. 

IB 77031 [Periodically updated]. 



Congress and U.S. International Oceans Policy* 

overview 

In recent years, Congress has become increasingly concerned with 
oceans-related issues. Several of these issues have significant inter- 
national implications, including the following: U.S. participation in 
the complex, many-faceted U.N. Law of the Sea Conference (LOS) 
negotiations; the threat to certain fishery populations and the U.S. 
fishing industry due to overfishing by highly mechanized foreign 
trawler fleets; the problems associated with the construction of con- 
troversial deepwater terminals and ports for supertankers; the in- 
creasing number and ecological significance of tanker accidents, oil 
spills, and oil pollution; the further increase of ocean pollution from 
such sources as land runoff and the exploitation of the offshore seabed 
energy sources; and problems related to deep seabed mining. 

Despite the attention that Congress has paid to these and other 
oceans-related problems, it has not yet devised a comprehensive 
national oceans policy. Furthermore, the administration, though it is 
actively involved with various aspects of oceans policy at operational 
and diplomatic levels, has done even less to define the interrelation- 
ships among oceans-related issues, and propose a national oceans 
policy. Except for expressing concern over oil pollution prompted by 
several serious oil spills from tankers of foreign registry late in 1976 
and early 1977, and a cargo preference bill (which ultimately was not 
passed), the President has made relatively few public statements in 
1977, either on the law of the sea negotiations in particular, or on 
oceans-related issues in general. 

A considerable amount of oceans-related legislation with potentially 
profound impact on U.S. foreign policy has been introduced and 
managed in congressional committees other than the Senate Foreign 
Relations and the House International Relations Committees. On 
occasion, the House International Relations Committee has moved 
to have certain oceans-related bills referred to it in order to hold 
hearings. And some legislation — such as the Clean Water Act of 1977, 
which is primarily a domestic bill but includes provisions that could 
have far-reaching implications for U.S. foreign policy and evolution of 
international law — was not considered by these two committees. 

Since its beginning in 1973, six sessions of the Third Law of the Sea 
Conference have taken place. 1 Certain Members of Congress have been 

* Prepared by Marion M. Montague. Analyst in U.S. Foreign Policy. The author acknowledges the assist- 
ance of Marjorie Ann Browne. Analyst in International Relations, in the writing of this chapter. 

1 The First Law of the Sea Conference in 1958 drafted four international conventions: The Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the High Seas, the Convention on Fishing 
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. 

The Second U.N. Law of the Sea Conference in 1960 failed to reach agreement on delineation of the terri- 
torial sea and establishment of a fishing zone. 

The Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference held an organizational session (New York, 1973) and five 
substantive sessions (Caracas, 1974; Geneva, 1975; New York, spring and fall 1976; and Geneva, 1977). 

The next session was held Mar. 28-May 19. 1978. The main issues before it were: deep seabed mining, the 
legal status of the economic zone waters, claims of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states 
dispute settlement, marine pollution, and marine scientific research. 

(153) 
29-972—78 11 



154 

involve*! in law of the sea negotiations from the outset. Many hearings 
have been held over the years by several congressional committees 
concerning the progress of the Conference and U.S. policy in relation 
to the numerous issues before it. Legislation pertaining tc certain 
aspe< ts of the Conference has either been passed or considered. At the 
same time, however, there has been increasing impatience and frus- 
tration in Congress over the failure of the Conference to conclude a 
treaty or at least agree on certain key issues. 

As a result of provisions unacceptable to the United States relating 
to ocean mining contained in the Informal Composite Negotiating 
Text at the conclusion of the Sixth Session (May 23, to July 15, 
1977) of the Conference, frustration was also publicly voiced by the 
administration. Its attitude toward the international negotiations 
stiffened, and its position concerning the idea of U.S. deep seabed 
mining Legislation changed. At the suggestion of the U.S. Representa- 
tive to the Law of the Sea Conference, Elliot Richardson, the Presi- 
dent initiated a continuing overall review of U.S. oceans policy. The 
administration also reversed its longheld position of opposing uni- 
lateral passage of domestic legislation to protect U.S. mining interests 
in the dec]) seabed, though it objected to certain provisions of the 
legislation currently before Congress. 

The major oceans-related issues with foreign relations aspects before 
the first session of the 95th Congress included the Law of the Sea Con- 
ference negotiations in general, deep seabed mining, oil pollution, and 
cargo preference. Hearings were held and legislation on these issues 
was considered. Congress also carried on its oversight role relating to 
the implementation of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
of 1976, and considered other legislation aimed at protecting the U.S. 
fishery industry. This chapter summarizes recent discussions and ac- 
tion in the first session of the 95th Congress related to these major 
issues. 

DISCUSSION 

Law oj the Sea Conference 

Hearings on the Law of the Sea Conference were held in 1977 by 
the House International Relations Committee; the Subcommittee on 
Domestic and International Scientific Planning, Analysis and Coopera- 
tion of the House Committee on Science and Technology; the Subcom- 
mittee on Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources; and the Subcommittee on Arms Con- 
trol, Oceans and International Environment of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. The Conference was also discussed in the course 
of the many hearings in various committees on deep seabed mining 
legislation. 2 

At the end of the Sixth Session of the Conference, the probability of 
the conclusion of a comprehensive law of the sea treaty appeared to be 
more remote than ever. In statements on July 25, 1977, before the 
International Relations Committee, and October 4, before the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology and the Subcom- 
mittee on Public Land- and Resources of the Senate Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources, Ambassador Richardson pointed out 
that the session had had mixed results. While progress had been made 



' See end of this section for citation to hearings. 



155 

in a number of areas, the proposed articles on deep seabed mining in the 
new Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), which had re- 
sulted from the session, were fundamentally "unacceptable to the 
United States." 

In addition, the Subcommittee on Domestic and International 
Scientific Planning, Analysis and Cooperation of the House Science 
and Technology Committee, in a 3-day hearing, examined in par- 
ticular the "application of science and the technology" relative to the 
issues before the Law of the Sea Conference, 3 While the subcommittee 
focused its attention on deep seabed mining, it also discussed other 
concerns of the U.S. scientific community over the provisions of the 
treaty texts being developed by the Conference on the question of 
oceanographic research and transfer of technology. The report of the 
subcommittee offered several recommendations as a result of its 
review of the Conference. With respect to protection of scientific 
freedom within the 200-mile economic zone generally agreed to by the 
Conference, it suggested that 

* * * The U.S. Delegation should make every attempt to insure maximum 
marine scientific freedom within coastal waters, including freedom of publication 
of research results. 

In addition, the United States should actively seek the establishment of co- 
operative agreements with other nations regarding marine science to facilitate the 
freedom essential to the completion of successful oceanographic projects. The 
LOS Conference offers one such vehicle through which to reach agreement. 

The Subcommittee also considered recommendations for the use of bilateral 
agreements concerning the conduct of marine science within the economic zone 
in lieu of an LOS treaty, but concluded that such a course should be followed as 
the primary means of securing cooperation only in the event of a Conference 
failure. And it is agreed that certain bilateral agreements and the service of various 
international organizations * * * could be useful even if a treaty is successfully 
negotiated. 3 

Deep seabed mining 

The momentum that developed during the 94th Congress toward 
unilateral U.S. legislation on deep seabed mining continued during 
the first session of the 95th Congress. The fact that the successful 
negotiation of a law of the sea treaty did not appear imminent ; that 
development of deep seabed mining technology had reached the point 
at which mining companies were ready to proceed with prototype 
operations; and, more recently, that the administration had shifted 
from its previous position of opposition to one favoring interim deep 
seabed mining legislation, provided stronger impetus to the 95th 
Congress to consider such legislation. 

Six major bills concerning deep seabed mining were introduced, 
and hearings were held in five different committees during 1977. Of 
these bills, only one was reported out of committee — H.R. 3350, the 
Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act. On August 9, the House 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries reported out H.R. 3350, 
as amended (H. Rept. 95-588, part I), and on October 26 it was re- 
ported out of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
as amended and filed November 7, 1977 (H. Rept, 95-5S8, part II). 4 



3 Review of the Third Law of the Sea Conference, pp. 3-4. See end of this section for complete citation 
to report. 

* Hearings on H.R. 3350 were held by the House International Relations Committee Jan. 23-:?5, 1978, 
and the bill as amended was reported out of that committee Feb. 7, 1978. (H. Rept. 95-5S8, pt. III). H.R. 
3350 was also considered and approved by the House Ways and Weans Committee on Apr. 27, 1978. 



156 






The general purpose of these bills is to provide interim legislation 
until a law of the sea treaty has entered into force for the United States, 
at which time such legislation would be superseded by the treaty. 
The legislation is designed to encourage, regulate the development of, 
and protect deep seabed mining in a manner that would protect the 
marine environment. 

As reported out of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee 
on August 9, 1977, H.R. 3350 would require mining companies to 
obtain licenses to explore the deep seabed and permits to recover 
minerals. Mining companies would be forbidden to interfere with the 
exercise of high seas freedoms by other countries, take actions that 
would conflict with any U.S. international obligations, or pose an 
unreasonable threat to the quality of the ocean environment. The 
legislation, which w T ould be administered by the Department of Com- 
merce, includes provisions to cover the prototype stage of mineral 
recovery and subsequent commercial recovery as well. It would provide 
for investment guarantees in the event of losses resulting from U.S. 
ratification of an international treaty — a provision the committee 
deemed necessary as an incentive to the deep seabed mining industry. 
In such a contingency, any eligible licensee or permitee would be 
entitled to payments from the Federal Government covering 90 
percent of nonrecoverable losses, or up to $350 million per mining 
site. Only those companies, however, that contributed to an Ocean 
Mining Fund would be eligible for investment guarantees. 

H.R. 3350 also directs the Secretary of Commerce to license U.S. 
firms to mine specific 60,000-square-kilometer blocks of the ocean 
floor in waters beyond the range of national jurisdiction. Other 
significant provisions of the bill included the stipulation that facilities 
for processing seabed nodules must be located in the United States, 
and require the harmonization of U.S. regulations with those of 
reciprocating states in order to avoid possible conflict. 

While there was general agreement in Congress that ocean mining 
legislation should be interim in character and provide regulations 
protecting the environment and governing the issuance of licenses 
to mining companies prior to their engaging in mining operations, 
there was considerable disagreement over other provisions in the 
bills under consideration. 

The most controversial issue concerned investment guarantees. 
This concept, which was central to H.R. 3350 and approved by the 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, was opposed by the 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, the House International 
Relations Committee, and the administration. Opponents of the 
concept maintained that such a guarantee would establish an un- 
desirable precedent of the U.S. Government insuring private com- 
panies against their own actions. The Interior and Insular Affairs 
and International Relations Committees, however, did support a 
policy statement that U.S. negotiators would work for a "grandfather 
clause" in any law of the sea treaty to insure that mining already 
underway would be allowed to continue uninterrupted. 

Other areas of controversy included the degree of specificity of the 
assignment or allocation of mining sites for exploration; whether the 
legislation should address in detail only the exploratory stage of ocean 
mining or should also encompass a framework for regulating the longer 



157 

range exploitation stage; whether processing plants should be located 
exclusively in the United States; and which U.S. agency should have 
primary jurisdiction for administering the deep seabed legislation. 

The administration objected to the provisions of H.R. 3350 con- 
cerning the first three points. On October 4, 1977, Ambassador 
Richardson outlined the main elements of a framework the admini- 
stration could support for ocean mining legislation to the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology, and the Sub- 
committee on Public Lands and Resources of the Committee on 
Energy. He explained that provisions characterized as site-specific 
could be perceived as undercutting the U.S. claim that it was proceed- 
ing to mine on the basis of high seas rights — rights which do not 
permit the extension of sovereignty or exclusive jurisdiction to the 
high seas. 

With regard to exploration and exploitation of seabed minerals, 
the administration favored dealing in detail only with the former. 
Given the expected pace of deep seabed mining development, the 
administration did not deem it either necessary or wise to prescribe 
a regime for exploitation in specific terms. 

The administration also opposed any legislative requirement with 
respect to the location of processing plants on the grounds that it 
could, in certain circumstances, impose an economic burden on U.S. 
mining companies and was in general contrary to the basic principles 
of free international trade. 

The executive branch did not take a position concerning the adminis- 
tration of the deep seabed mining legislation, but the Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries Committee, which oversees the Department 
of Commerce, maintained that that agency should have jurisdiction, 
while the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs which oversees 
the Department of the Interior, and the Committee on International 
Relations maintained that the latter agency should have jurisdiction. 

All three committees, however, supported an international revenue- 
sharing fund in the event that a treaty should be signed requiring 
contributions from seabed mining companies, and all three would 
have the administration submit separate legislation to establish it. 

Marine pollution and cargo preference 

The numerous oil tanker accidents late in 1976 involving tankers of 
foreign registry, and the concern over possible damage to American 
and international waters intensified concern in both the legislative 
and executive branches about means of limiting damage to American 
and international waters from associated oil spills. 

More than 40 bills were introduced in the 95th Congress that 
pertain to marine oil pollution, liability compensation, and tanker 
standards. These bills address such issues as efforts to regulate foreign 
tankers entering U.S. coastal waters, financial incentives for tanker 
safety improvement, the establishment and structuring of a national 
liability and compensation program, the adequac}^ of international 
oil spills conventions, the desirability of cargo preference legislation 
as a means of controlling oil pollution, and, crew manning and training 
criteria and programs. 

On March 21, 1977, President Carter transmitted a series of diverse 
but interrelated measures to Congress designed to: (1) reduce oil 



15S 

pollution caused b\ r accidents and by routine operational 

rom all vessels; (2) improve U.S. ability to deal swiftly 

and effectively with oil spills when they did occur; and (3) provide 

full and dependable com]) >nsation to victims of oil pollution damage. 

To these ends, the President recommended the ratification of the 
; national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(November 2, 1973), the reform of ship construction and equipment 
standards, the improvement of crew standards and training, the devel- 
opment of a tanker boarding program and U.S. Marine Safety 
Information System, the approval of the comprehensive oil pollution 
liability and compensation legislation, and the improvement of 
Federal ability to respond to oil pollution emergencies. 

Currently, only two international conventions regarding preventa- 
tive measures for tanker accklents are in effect: the International 
Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Casualties (November 29, 1969); and the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (May 12, 
1954). Amendments to the latter Convention were proposed in 1969 
and 1971, and Congress enacted implementing legislation for both 
sets of amendments (Public Law 93-119) but neither set is in force 
internationally. 5 

On July 25, 1977, the President transmitted to Congress the Pro- 
tocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Marine 
Pollution by Substances Other than Oil, 1973. This Protocol comple- 
ments the 1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention 
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties by providing that 
under certain circumstances, governments may take action on the high 
seas to protect the interests of their coastal areas from marine pollu- 
tion caused by substances other than oil. 

Neither the above mentioned Protocol nor the International Con- 
vention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships were acted upon 
during the first session of the 95th Congress. Ratification of the Con- 
vention is complicated by unresolved issues in the law of the sea 
negotiations concerning the right to establish and enforce more strin- 
gent domestic regulations. 

No matter how stringent preventive measures might be with regard 
to marine pollution, oil spills will occasionally occur. A number of 
domestic programs and international conventions have been estab- 
lished to provide liability and compensation for cleanup costs and 
damages incurred by oil spills. 

Currently pending before the Senate are two conventions: The 
1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage; and the 
1971 Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. The Liability Convention, 
which is in force internationally, provides for suits against vessel 
owners for oil-spill damages up to a specified limit, and the Fund 
Convention would provide additional protection up to a higher limit. 
The terms of both conventions limit their coverage to damage in the 
territorial sea or territory of a state. Neither convention has been 
ratified by the United States. 



5 The 1969 amendments, which eliminate various exemptions under previous legislation including ballast 
discharg The 1971 amendments, which would establish tank arrange- 

ments and design limitations, await ratification by other signatories. 






159 

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 
(Public Law 92-500) is the primary U.S. law concerned with oil spill 
cleanup and establishing limits of liability. In connection with amend- 
ing this law during the first session of the 95th Congress, the most 
significant legislation relating to marine pollution — the Clean Water 
Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-217) — was passed. Moreover, the passage 
of this legislation, signed on December 27, 1977, has significant rami- 
fications not only in terms of U.S. foreign policy, but in terms of 
international law as well. 

This act was considered by the House Committee on Public Works 
and Transportation and the Senate Committee on Environment and 
Public Works. In a declaration of goals and policy, the act states that 
its objective is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and 
biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In order to achieve this 
objective it lists among the goals and policies "consistent with the 
provisions of the act" that — 

(6) it is the national policy that a major research and demonstration effort be 
made to develop technology necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants 
into the navigable waters, waters of the contiguous zone, and the oceans. 

In this connection the act provides for certain standards and enforce- 
ment relating to international pollution abatement, and oil and hazard- 
ous substance liability, as well as for permits and licenses pertaining 
to ocean discharge criteria. 

Of particular relevance to U.S. foreign policy are the amendments 
to the section on oil and hazardous substance liability (sec. 311). 
Section 311 requires the U.S. Government to penalize domestic and 
foreign vessels that dump oil or other hazardous materials within 200 
miles of the U.S. coasts. In amending the section to include those 
waters "under the exclusive management authority of the United 
States (including resources under the Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976)" among those areas where it is U.S. policy 
that there should be no discharge of oil or hazardous substances and 
where if such action should occur under certain conditions punitive 
measures are to be taken, Congress has extended U.S. jurisdiction in 
this regard from the original 12 miles to 200 miles offshore. In so doing, 
it has expanded the applicability of the 200-mile limit to include not 
only exploitable resources as provided in the Fisheries Conservation 
and Management Act, but navigation as well. This is directly contrary 
to the position held by the administration. Former Ambassador at 
Large, T. Vincent Learson, Special Representative of the President 
for the Law of the Sea Conference, pointed out on January 11, 1977, 
in hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce on recent 
tanker accidents: 

We have recognized for some time that the present international regime for 
vessel-pollution prevention is inadequate and that further action is needed. 

In determining our position for the lav/ of the sea negotiations, we had several 
factors in mind. First, we recognized a clear need for increased protection for 
the marine environment. Second, we wanted to preserve freedom of navigation on 
the high seas, including the area within the proposed 200-mile economic zone. 
Consequently, we felt that coastal-state rights of action beyond the territorial 
sea should be limited so as not to allow foreign nations discretional rights 
to interfere with navigation in the open ocean. 

The Clean Water Act of 1977 poses important questions in terms of 
international law and U.S. security. It is possible that in response to 



160 

this new precedent, other nations might retaliate by placing various 
restrictions on foreign activities within their 200-mile coastal zone. 
This could pose a serious threat to U.S. security. It is also possible 
that enforcement of this new law could affect the law of the sea 
negotiations, in which the United States has been insisting upon 
freedom of navigation on the high seas and endeavoring to prevent the 
inclusion of restrictions on marine scientific research within the 
200-mile economic zone as sought by certain coastal states. 

Still another complicating factor in preventing oil spills and one 
which has >orious foreign policy implications, is the large percentage 
of U.S. oil imports carried in ships of foreign registry, limiting U.S. 
control over tanker safety and crew capability. In 1975, over 60 
percent of the tankers entering U.S. ports were under a foreign flag 
(although many of these were U.S. -owned), and over 95 percent of 
U.S. -imported oil is transported by ships of foreign registry. 

Ships are registered under foreign "flags of convenience" for a 
variety of reasons — primarily financial. A ship under a U.S. flag, for 
instance, must be built in the United States and must carry a U.S. 
crew at an average annual cost of around $1.7 million as compared to 
as little as $300,000 for a non-U.S. crew. Moreover, foreign taxes are 
usually more favorable and inspections and regulations more lenient 
than those of the United States. 

For several years the U.S. shipping industry and the maritime unions 
have sought an increase in the use of U.S. -flag vessels, and a number of 
so-called cargo preference bills have been passed or considered by the 
Congress. Congress passed the Energy Transportation Security Act of 
1974, which would have required up to 30 percent of U.S. oil imports 
to be carried in U.S. vessels. Former President Ford pocket-vetoed this 
measure. A similar bill — H.R. 1037, the Energy Transportation 
Security Act of 1977 — was voted down by the House in October 1977. 

Such bills have been opposed by executive agencies including the 
Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce. Objections include 
their highly inflationary potential, the fact that such laws would 
violate certain treaties to which the United States is a signatory, and 
that they would be highly protectionist in favor of the U.S. Merchant 
Marine and thus be likely to invite retaliation. 

Although a cargo preference bill was not passed by the first session 
of the 95th Congress, it is probable that such legislation will again be 
proposed in the Congress. 

Implementation oj the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 
1976 

Congressional activities during 1977 concerning fisheries concen- 
trated primarily on implementing the new and complex Fishery Con- 
servation and Management Act of 1976, and reviewing a number of 
outstanding foreign policy-related issues concerning the fishing in- 
dustry. Congress also passed legislation extending and amending the 
Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, and authorizing appropriations 
for the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975. Legislation intended to 
ease the continuing tuna-dolphin controversy was also considered. 

On March 1, 1977, the provisions of the Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976 (FCMA) (Public Law 94-265), relating to 
the establishment of a 200-nautical-mile fishing conservation zone and 
exclusive U.S. authority and enforcement within the zone, took effect. 



161 

The Act authorizes foreign fishing for species and resources under the 
exclusive fishery management authority pursuant to Governing In- 
ternational Fishery Agreements (GIFAs). No foreign vessel, however, 
may engage in such fishing unless it has a valid permit on board, issued 
by the Secretary of Commerce, through the Secretary of State. 

The enactment of the FCMA by no means ended all international 
fishing problems. Initially, there were serious transitional problems not 
anticipated in the Act. The Department of State had less than a year 
in which to negotiate the required GIFAs that acknowledge U.S. 
fishery jurisdiction and completely restructure U.S. relationships with 
a number of foreign countries. Moreover, in view of the statutory 
requirement (Sec. 203 of the Act) that no GIFA shall become effective 
before the close of 60 calendar days of a continuous session of the Con- 
gress after the President transmits such agreement to the Congress, no 
agreement could take effect until well into March 1977. Early in 1977, 
it appeared that, due to the complexities of some of the negotiations 
(such as those with Japan and the Common Market), it would not be 
possible to conclude all agreements before the March 1 deadline, much 
less go through the other steps required by the statutory process to 
bring them into effect on schedule. In addition, it seemed unlikely 
that the eight newly-established regional management councils charged 
primarily with implementation of the domestic features of the Act 
would have time to complete their required review of the applications 
for foreign fishing permits or that the fee schedule, which had not yet 
been worked out, would be approved in its final form by March 1. 

These difficulties, in turn, created logistical and economic problems 
for foreign fishermen who not only had to wait for congressional ap- 
proval of the GIFAs but also for receipt of the necessary fishing 
permits that were to follow before they could fish within the 200-mile 
fishing zone. 

These transitional problems were discussed at hearings held early 
in the 95th Congress by both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
(February 3) and by the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife 
Conservation and the Environment of the Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries (February 7, 22, 23, 28, and March 17, 1977). 

On February 21, 1977, the Fishery Conservation Zone Transition 
Act (Public Law 95-6) became law. This act in effect shortened the 
period required for congressional oversight specifically with regard to 
the six already negotiated GIFA's (those for Bulgaria, China, the 
German Democratic Republic, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Po- 
land), and provided for congressional approval effective February 21. 
The act also amended the FCMA by adding a new section (sec. 206) 
concerning transitional provisions. The above-described procedure 
was restricted to the six GIFA's listed in section 2 of the Transition 
Act "or pursuant to any amendment of section 2 if the effective date 
of such amendment is not later than February 28, 1977." 

A little over a week later (March 3) a related law (Public Law 95-8) 
was signed, amending the Fishery Conservation Zone Transition Act 
to bring additional GIFA's (those for the European Economic Com- 
munity, Japan, Korea, and Spain) within its purview. The effective 
date of these agreements was February 27, 1977. 

Thus, a total of 10 Governing International Fishery Agreements 
were approved in the first session of the 95th Congress. In addition, 



162 

agreements were signed with Mexico and Cuba, sent to Congress, and 
entered into force pursuant to the FCMA, without further congres- 
sional action. 6 A Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement between the United 
States and Canada was approved by the House and Senate April 25 
and Julv 12, 1977, respectively and signed into law July 26, 1977 
(Public Law 95-73). 

Besides the statutory difficulties concerning the Fishery Conserva- 
tion and Management Act, Congress considered a number of other 
foreign-policy related fishery issues. A development with potential 
for serious international repercussions concerned the repeated viola- 
tions of the FCMA by certain foreign trawlers which fished illegally 
within the 200-mile zone. For example, on April 11, 1977, the Soviet 
trawler Taras Shevchenko and its 93-member crew were detained in 
Boston for illegally taking fish inside the U.S. 200-mile limit. In the 
first court action pursuant to the 1976 Fishery Conservation and Man- 
agement Act, a U.S. District Court in Boston on May 2, sentenced 
the captain of the trawler, fining him $10,000 and giving him a 9- 
month suspended prison sentence. The captain was released upon 
pleading guilty, and the Soviet Union agreed to pay $240,000 in 
civil penalties levied against the ship and the $10,000 fine against 
the captain. Between the time of the detention of the Soviet trawler 
and its release, the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on 
April 21, held an executive hearing on violations of the 200-mile 
fishery zone. While this Soviet incident was the first case to be pros- 
ecuted pursuant to the FCMA, there were other incidents through- 
out 1977. 

Other problems included the continuing damage to fishery gear by 
foreign vessels (discussed below within the context of the Fishermen's 
Protective Act of 1967). There were also complaints from the fishing 
industry that more attention was being paid to the convenience of 
foreign fishermen than to that of domestic fishermen. There was con- 
cern that foreign investment in the American fishing industry might 
be a means of circumventing the FCMA — a problem complicated by 
the fact that though American fishermen opposed such investment, 
the U.S. fish processing industry welcomed it. 

Hearings were held which touched on all of these issues. The Sub- 
committee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environ- 
ment of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee held further 
hearings on the implementation of the 200-Mile Fishing Zone Act 
April 14 and 15, 1977. On July 18, it held hearings on H.R. 2564, 
H.R. 4165, and H.R. 4166— bills addressed to amending the FCMA 
in order to clarify the definition therein of vessels of the United States 
and to require the Secretary of Commerce to prepare an annual report 
regarding foreign investment in the U.S. fishing industry. The Com- 
mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation also held a hearing 
on August 20 on the Fishery Conservation and Management Act. 

Other fishery and oceans-related actions 

In October 1977, the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 was due to 
expire. This act provides for reimbursement of U.S. fishermen who 
are seized by any foreign country on the basis of jurisdictional claims 



• See the discussion of U.S. Relations with Cuba in the section on Latin America on pp. 186-1S9 in this 
volume. (Ed.) 



163 

in ocean waters not recognized by the United States. Under such cir- 
cumstances the Secretary of State reimburses (pursuant io secticn 3) a 
fishing vessel owner for any fine, license fee, registration fee, or any 
other direct charge assessed by the foreign country against the vessel. 

Bills (H.R. 4140 and S. 1184) to amend the act were referred to 
the Committees on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, respectively. As amended, an act to 
extend until October 1, 1978, the provisions of the Fishermen's 
Protective Act of 1967, relating to the reimbursement of seized com- 
mercial fishermen, became law November 18, 1977 (Public Law 
95-194). In addition to being extended another year, the Fishermen's 
Protective Act was amended to provide a loan program for the owner 
or operator of any U.S. vessel if the Secretary of Commerce "reason- 
ably determines that such vessel, or its fishing*gear, was lost, damaged, 
or destroyed by any vessel (or its crew or fishing gear) of a foreign 
nation operating within the fishery conservation zone established by 
sections 101 and 102 of the Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act of 1976 * * * ;" and the amount of such loss, damage, or destruc- 
tion exceeds $2,000. 

It should be noted that the amendment does not concern the roles of 
the Secretar}^ of State concerning illegal seizure of U.S. vessels, etc. 
The purpose of the amendment is directed primarily at assisting fisher- 
men whose vessels or gear are lost, damaged or destroyed by foreign 
fishing activity, within the U.S. 200-mile fishery zone. 

The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (Public Law 92-522) 
had imposed certain restrictions on the U.S. tuna fleet that did not 
apply to foreign fishermen. The law was intended to protect porpoises 
and dolphins accidentally snared in tuna nets and killed. There has 
been considerable controversy over the limitations imposed by this 
bill and subsequent rulings on the U.S. tuna fleet. The fleet refused to 
sail from April 15 to May 15, but resumed operation after the choir- 
man of the House Merchant Marines and Fisheries Committee 
promised to work for a reduction of the 1977 dolphin quota. 

The House passed a pro-industry bill (H.R. 6970) on June 1, 
originally reported out by the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Com- 
mittee (H. Kept. 95-355) in late May. This bill set forth reduced 
annual quotas for killing or injuring dolphins. Its foreign policy 
aspect involved instructions to the Secretaries of State and Commerce 
to begin immediate negotiations with foreign governments to permit 
U.S. observers aboard foreign-flag ships fishing for tuna. In addition, 
the bill would ban transfer of U.S. -owned vessels to foreign registry 
unless the new owner agreed to comply with U.S. tuna fishing regula- 
tions and deposited a performance bond. Xo further action was taken 
during the first session. 

Congress also considered legislation to amend the Atlantic Tunas 
Convention Act of 1975. On May 13, 1977, the Committee on Com- 
merce, Science, and Transportation reported favorably without 
amendment H.Ft,. 6205 to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 
1978, 1979, and 1980 to carry out the Atlantic Tunas Convention 
Act of 1975. That act implements an international convention which 
governs fishing for tuna and tunalike species in the Atlantic Ocean. 



164 

The bill, which was signed May 26, 1977 (Public Law 95-33), amends 
the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975 to extend it for an addi- 
tional 3 years, until September 30, 1980. In addition it redefines the 
term ''fisheries zone" as used in the act to give it the same meaning 
as defined in the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. 

The Inteinational Navigational Rules Act of 1977, H.R. 186, a 
bill to implement the Convention on the International Regulations 
for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, was signed into law (Public 
Law 95-75) on July 27, 1977. The Convention brings the Inter- 
national Rules of the Nautical Road in line with modern maritime 
practices and technology. The Convention, which has been approved 
by the Senate, became effective for its international signatories, 
including the United States, on July 15, 1977. The enacting legislation 
implements the Convention fully for U.S. vessels. 

At the time President Carter signed the bill, he stated that although 
he had signed it, he wanted to make clear that he had serious con- 
stitutional reservations about section 3(d). That section permits 
Congress, by concurrent resolution, to disapprove a proposed amend- 
ment to the Convention. The President pointed out that the Congress 
concurrent resolution would not be presented to the President for 
approval or veto, and that this may violate article 1, section 7 of the 
Constitution. 

Issues before Congress in 1978 

Perhaps the most significant oceans issue pending before Congress 
is the legislation that would establish an interim domestic regime for 
the exploration and possible exploitation of hard minerals from the 
deep seabed. House-sponsored legislation had not reached the floor 
before the convening of the 7th session of the Law of the Sea (LOS) 
Conference in March 1978. While three committees of the House had 
already considered and reported favorably some version of H.R. 3350, 
it appeared that a fourth committee would be given an opportunity 
to consider this bill, thus further delaying floor consideration. In the 
Senate a chief sponsor and spokesman for similar legislation, Senator 
Lee Metcalf, died between the two sessions of Congress and the 
momentum gained from the hearings held in September and October 
was lost. It is anticipated, however, that a bill will be reported in the 
Senate during the second session of the 95th Congress. 

A major factor in congressional consideration of deep seabed mining 
legislation is the change in the position of the administration on 
congressional passage of such legislation. During the past several 
years, when similar legislation has been pending before Congress, the 
executive branch has annually pleaded that Congress not pass such 
legislation because of its effect on the LOS Conference. This position 
was reversed in 1977 by Carter adminstration spokesman Elliot 
Richardson, who presented legislative proposals to committees 
considering the issue. It has even been suggested that House passage 
of legislation before the convening of the 1978 session of the Confer- 
ence would be welcomed by the administration as a means of 
strengthening the U.S. negotiating position at the Conference. 



165 

Other issues, discussed in this section, which may be before Congress 
in 1978, include 

— continued oversight of the FCMA; 

— further consideration of tuna-porpoise legislation; 

— establishment of a liability fund for oil pollution damage, 
possibly sufficient to implement international conventions 
on the same issue. 

Also pending, but not likely to be considered any further, is cargo 
preference legislation, which was defeated in the House in 1977. 

References 
congressional publications 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on 
Government Activities and Transportation. Coast Guard efforts to prevent oil 
pollution caused bv tanker vessels. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Mar. 21, 
23, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 551 pp. 

■ — ■ Committee on International Relations. Law of the Sea Conference: 

status report. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. July 25, 1977. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1978. 25 pp. 

-Subcommittee on International Organizations. Deep seabed minerals: 



resources, diplomacy, and strategic interest. Mar. 1, 1978. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1978. 123 pp. (95th Cong., 2d sess. Committee 
print.) 

Prepared by Alva N. Bowen, Marjorie Ann Browne, and Marion M. 
Montague, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division; Warren E. Farb, 
Economics Division; James E. Mielke, Science Policy Research Division; 
and Franklin P. Huddle, Senior Specialist in Science and Technology, Congres- 
sional Research Service, Library of Congress. 

Deep seabed mining and the law of the sea. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st 



sess. May 17-18, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
114 pp. 



ommittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Subcommittee on Coast 
Guard and Navigation. Oil pollution liability. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. 
Feb. 24, 25, and Mar. 10, 23, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 217 pp. "Serial No. 95-2." 

-Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environ- 



ment. Fisheries miscellaneous. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fisheries 
and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment and the Subcommittee on 
Merchant Marine, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 309 pp. "Serial No. 95-16." 

International fishery agreements. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., on H.J. 



Res. 240, H.R. 2081, H.R. 3753, and H.R. 4954. Mar. 17, 1977. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 298 pp. "Serial No. 95-1." 

200-mile fishery oversight — joint ventures. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st 



sess., on implementation of the 200-Mile Fishing Zone Act and joint ventures, 
H.R. 2564, H.R. 4165, and H.R. 4166. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 332 pp. "Serial No. 95-19." 

-Subcommittee on Oceanography. Deep seabed mining. Hearings, 95th 



Cong., 1st sess., on H.R. 3350, H.R. 3652, and H.R. 6784. Mar. 17, 18: Apr. 
19, 26, 27, Mav 11, and 20, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 570 pp. "Serial No. 95-4." 

Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on Domestic and 



International Scientific Planning, Analysis and Cooperation. Law of the Sea 
Conference. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Apr. 26, 27, 28, 1977. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 326 pp. 

Review of the Third Law of the Sea Conference; special oversight report 



together with dissenting views. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office 
1977. 29 pp. (Committee Print.) 



166 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. Implementation of the Fishery 
Conservation and stent Act. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Jan. 24-25, 

1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 127 pp. "Serial No. 
94-6." 

• Recent tanker accidents. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Jan. 11 and 12, 

1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 497 pp. 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and National 

Ocean Policy Study. Congress and the oceans: marine affairs in the 94th 
Congress. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. (95th Cong., 
1st sess. Committee Print.) 

Prepared by Ocean Coastal Resources Project, Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress. 

Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 197G. Hearing, 95th Cong., 



1st Bess. Aug. 21), 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
12] pp. "Serial No. 95-45." 

Implementation of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act. 



Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Apr. 20, 1977. Pt. 2. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 129-172 pp. "Serial No. 95-6." 

Committee on Commerce, -Science and Transportation. Oil spill liability 



and compensation. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 121, S. 182, S. 687, 
S. 898 and S. 1189. June 9-10, and 20, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. 346 pp. "Serial No. 95-27." 

Recent tanker accidents: legislation for improved tanker safety. Hearings, 



95th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 182, S. 568, S. 632, S. 715 and S. 898. Mar. 15, 16, 
and 18, 1977. pt, 2. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
1027 pp. "Serial No. 95-4." 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Treaties and 



other international agreements on fisheries, oceanographic resources, and 
wildlife involving the United States. Oct. 31, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 1201 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.) 
Prepared by Marjorie Ann Browne and Thomas Moore, Foreign Affairs 
and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress. 

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Subcommittee on Public 



Lands and Resources. Mining of the deep seabed. Joint hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Public Lands and Resources and the Lands and Resources 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 
95th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 2053, Sept. 19-20 and Oct. 4, 1977. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 513 pp. "Publication No. 95-78." 

Status report on Law of the Sea Conference. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st 



sess. July 26, 1977. Pt. 6. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 1958-1989 pp. 

Committee on Foreign Relations. Need for congressional approval of 



governing international fishery agreements. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. 

Feb. 3, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 51 pp. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Results of the Third Law of the Sea Conference, 

1974 to 1976. Department of State. Report to the Congress by the Comptroller 

General of the United States. Washington, 1977. 34 pp. "ID-77-37, June 3, 

1977." 
U.S. President, 1977 (Carter). International Convention for the Prevention of 

Pollution from Ships, with annexes and protocols; message. Washington, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1977. 108 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. Senate. 

Executive E.) 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

Browne, Marjorie Ann. Law of the Sea Conference. Issue Brief No. IB74104. 

[Periodically updated.] 
Justus, John R. Deep seabed hard mineral resources. Issue Brief No. IB74024. 

[Periodically updated.] 
Mielke, James E. Ocean affairs: U.S. issues and policy options. Issue Brief No. 

IB74015. [Periodically updated.] 
Reisch, Mark and James E. Mielke. Oil spills in the marine environment. Issue 

Brief No. IB77014. [Periodically updated.] 



Space* 

overview 
Introduction 

The technical and scientific uses of outer space have created a num- 
ber of opportunities for international cooperation. In the past, how- 
ever, the exploration, use, and exploitation of outer space have often 
been conducted on a national basis. Yet, full application of certain 
new outer space activities may require new international approaches, 
because of the political problems that purely national or even regional 
approaches generate, because of technical requirements inherent in 
fully and efficiently utilizing the potential of outer space technologies, 
which by their very nature transcend national boundaries, and because 
the cost of exploring space has become prohibitively expensive. 

In fact, at present there is significant international cooperation in 
outer space. The United States is committed by statute to the ad- 
vancement of the peaceful uses of outer space for the benefit of all 
mankind, and to conduct its civil space activities in cooperation with 
other nations and groups of nations. 1 Pursuant to this mandate, it has 
developed an effective and ongoing program of international coopera- 
tion in space research and development. The United States is party to 
four international space treaties, and the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) has agreements with some 60 nations 
covering various space activities. 

During 1977 the foreign policy aspects of outer space programs 
attracted little direct congressioual attention. Congressional subcom- 
mittees specifically concerned with space activities did hold a number 
of hearings on various programs that do have international signifi- 
cance. However, except for the deletion by the House of Representa- 
tives of funding for the joint U.S.-Canadian-European Aerosat pro- 
gram, there was little legislative activity having a direct bearing on 
international space concerns. 

DISCUSSION 

General congressional activities 

A waning of congressional interest in space programs was generally 
reflected in the 1977 reorganization of Senate committees, during which 
the separate Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee was 
abolished. It was absorbed into the Committee on Commerce, Sci- 
ence and Transportation under a Subcommittee on Science, Tech- 
nology and Space. 2 



* Prepared by Vita Bite, Analyst in International Relation*. 

i Public Law 85-568 (sec. 205 of 72 Stat. 426), approved July 29, 1958. 

2 Senator Schmitt, a former astronaut, briefly introduced and then withdrew an amendment, which would 
have created a Subcommittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. (See debate in Congressional Record 
[daily edition], vol. 123, Feb. 4, 1977: pp. S2287-92.) 

(167) 



168 

As requested by Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, passed by the 
94th Congress, the President on July 11, 1977, issued a proclamation 
designating the period July 16 through July 24 as "United States 
Space Observance" and calling for appropriate observance. Despite 
the fact that Congress initiated this observance, there is no further 
mention of it in the Congressional Record. 

An expression of congressional disenchantment directly relating to 
an international space program was acceptance by the House of 
Representatives on March 25, 1977, of an amendment by the Com- 
mittee on Science and Technology to H.R. 3965 (authorizing appro- 
priations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for Research 
and Development (R. & D.). The amendment deleted requested fund- 
ing of $15,562,000 for fiscal year 1978 for the Aerosat program, and 
authorized $1,500,000 for areevaluation of that program and consider- 
ation of other alternatives. The committee based its position on the 
following factors: that changing conditions of transoceanic aircraft 
travel had eliminated the original rationale for the program; that the 
total cost of the program was far above earlier projections: and that 
funding for Aerosat was adversely affecting other more critical FAA 
R. & D. programs. 

The Aerosat program was originally designed to be a cooperative 
United States-European-Canadian program to develop an aeronautical 
communications satellite system for an improved transoceanic com- 
munications link between aircraft and air traffic control centers. The 
Federal Aviation Administration signed a Memorandum of Under- 
standing establishing a joint Aerosat program in 1974. Since that time 
the Europeans and Canadians have operated on the assumption that 
the United States was committed to the program. U.S. failure to fund 
Aerosat for fiscal year 1978 raises the issue of the impact of such an 
action on relations with other countries — specifically how such a 
decision might affect other joint programs and future agreements on 
space activities. In contrast to action on the Aerosat program, Con- 
gress during 1977 did indicate support for certain other space programs 
of international significance by continuing funding for the space 
shuttle, the space telescope, and the Jupiter-Orbiter probe, for 
example. 

The 20th anniversary of the launching of the first artificial satellite 
to be launched into orbit around the Earth (the Soviet Sputnik), was 
duly marked by statements in both Houses of Congress by members 
of the Subcommittees on Space on October 4 and 5. 

Remote sensing 

The experimental Landsat satellites which form the major part of 
the U.S. Earth Resources Survey experiment have in 6 years de- 
veloped into a system with major potential for application in agricul- 
ture and associated fields, mineral exploration, water resources 
management, land use, coastal zone monitoring and mapping as well 
as in oceanography, environmental quality of land and water, 
meteorology and marine resources (fishing for example). At the same 
time, however, some observers fear that Earth resources satellite 
pictures taken from outer space could be used by the launching nations 
or private companies to exploit the natural resources of other states. 



169 

While there has been widespread endorsement and international co- 
operation in the U.S. program for the development of remote sensing 
technology (some nations already operate or intend to acquire Landsat 
Earth stations of their own), some nations have expressed concern 
about data secured over their territories, and the U.S. policy of 
unrestricted availability of such data to all who wish to have it. 

During 1977, legislation (S. 657) was introduced to establish an 
operational Earth resources and environmental information system 
based on the remote-sensing experimental satellite (Landsat) systems 
developed by NASA. The legislation specified that the data and in- 
formation derived from such a system would be available to all users, 
foreign and domestic, on the same basis. During hearings whose pur- 
pose was to gather facts necessary to perfect the legislation by the 
Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, administration 
witnesses spoke against enactment of such legislation, viewing a com- 
mitment to an operational system as premature. Witnesses pointed 
out that any action to establish an operational remote sensing system 
would inevitably have significant international consequences, and 
would raise questions relating to formal international relationships, 
such as ownership of such a system, voting and investment patterns, 
long-term commitments, design criteria, international operating 
agencies, frequency allocations, and rules for information acquisition 
and dissemination. The State Department witness, Assistant Secre- 
tary Patsy Mink, pointed out that the Department (which is not 
mentioned in the legislation as introduced) should be involved in all 
matters dealing with foreign governments. WTiile not supporting the 
establishment of an operational system at this time, the State De- 
partment witness did suggest the need, at some point, for a U.S. 
declaration of policy to the effect that the remote sensing system will 
be continued. Such a policy statement was viewed as especially vital, 
if demands of users in the developing world are to be increased, since 
many of these countries cannot make the enormous user investment 
required if the data is not to be available on a long-range, continuing 
basis. 

In June the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the 
House Committee on Science and Technology also held 3 -day 
hearings on an Earth resources information system. 

Telecommunication s 

International telecommunications policy was the subject of hear- 
ings by several congressional subcommittees during 1977. The Sub- 
committee on International Operations of the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee held 3 days of hearings on international communi- 
cations and information. During the hearings there was discussion of 
the international problems raised by the technical feasibility of satellite 
transmission directly into home receivers of radio or television signals 
which could bypass any intermediary relay stations controlled by the 
country receiving that signal. Also discussed were the fears of develop- 
ing nations that developed nations such as the United States with 
immediate demands for technological facilities and communications 
would monopolize the available radio frequency spectrum and facilities 
leaving little spectrum space for the developing countries to grow into 



29-972 — 7S 12 



170 

at some later date. Several witnesses suggested that the U.S. Govern- 
ment does not have an international telecommunications policy, nor 
is there a single agency which coordinates U.S. efforts internationally, 
and recommended that such a policy and agency be established. 

The Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation also held an oversight 
hearing on international telecommunications. 

In addition, the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Subcom- 
mittee on Communications held two series of hearings of relevance to 
this discussion. Between March 15 and 23, the subcommittee spon- 
sored 4 days of hearings on the need for an improved and expanded 
system of international telecommunications. Testimony from a wide 
variety of government, private industry, multinational corporations, 
and foreign telecommunications officials was heard. The same sub- 
committee held hearings May 25-27 that dealt in large part with 
U.S. preparations for the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference 
(WARC). Some witnesses were critical of the manner in which dele- 
gations to previous WARC's had been selected, urging that foreign 
policy considerations be weighed as heavily as economic and technical 
requirements. Witnesses also suggested that U.S. preparations be 
accelerated, if this country's delegation was to be adequately briefed 
and ready to anticipate foreign demands and proposals. 

In 1979 a general WARC will be held under the auspices of the Inter- 
national Telecommunication Union (ITU), to review the international 
radio regulations and all radio frequency assignments. This review 
will cover all uses of the frequency spectrum, ranging from radio and 
television to satellite and cable communication, data transmission, 
and various kinds of fixed and mobile communication systems. The 
head of the U.S. delegation to WARC 79 will probably have ambassa- 
dorial rank and that appointment would require Senate confirmation 
if it is for longer than a 6-month period. 

References 

congressional publications 

Hearings 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee 
on Space Science and Applications. Earth Resources Information System. 
Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. June 21, and 23, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 

Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation, and Weather. 1978 FA A 

R. & D. Authorization. Hearings, 95th Cong. 1st sess. Feb. 22 and 24, 
1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

■ Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Subcommittee on 

Communications. 

International communications services. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. 
"Serial No. 95-50." 

Hearings held Mar. 15-23, 1977. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Science, Earth Resources and 
Environmental Information System Act of 1977. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st 
sess. on S. 657. May 24, 25; June 13 and 14, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office. 1977. 

National Climate Program Act. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. on S. 

421 and S. 1G52. June 8, 9, 10, and July 5, 6, and 8, 1977. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on International Opera- 



tions. International communications and information. Hearings, 95th Cong., 
1st sess. June 8, 9, and 10, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 



171 

Reports 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Authorizing 
appropriations to the Federal Aviation Administration for research and de- 
velopment. Report together with additional views to accompany H.R. 3965. 
Mar. 18, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 

Worldwide space activities. Prepared for the Subcommittee on Space 

Science and Applications by the Science Policy Research Division, Congres- 
sional Research Service, Library of Congress, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Subcommittee on 



Communications. Options Papers. Committee Print 95-13. 95th Cong., 1st 
sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. [Esp. Paper 6 

international telecommunications]. 



CONGRESSIONAL IMPACT ON REGIONAL ISSUES 

Africa* 
overview 

As open warfare and Communist intervention in Africa intensified, 
two schools of thought evolved with respect to U.S. policy toward 
Africa. One school asserts the primacy of African relations and U.S. 
interests as the basic determinant of policy, and considers world com- 
petition with the Communists to be of secondary importance. The 
other emphasizes the East-West conflict and focuses on competition 
with Communist states for influence in Africa as the basic determi- 
nant of policy. Those with an East- West approach view African issues 
primarily from the perspective of how a policy or program would affect 
U.S. interests vis-a-vis its Communist competitors. Access to raw ma- 
terials and sea lanes and influence with the governments which control 
them, and denial of these factors to the Soviets determine their policy 
recommendations. 

The East-West group tends to be suspicious of Marxist govern- 
ments, while the Africa-oriented group demonstrates less concern about 
the ideological orientation of a government than with how its per- 
formance relates to purely African issues. The Africa-oriented approach 
is believed to have been the dominant approach taken by the Carter 
administration, at least until late 1977 when Ethiopia, backed by 
Soviet weaponry and Cuban personnel, prepared to launch a counter- 
offensive against Somalia. This conflict over the Ogaden region (and 
Eritrea) will likely prove to be major testing grounds for the Carter 
administration's African policy in 1978. 

The maelstrom of events and actors in the nearly 50 states of sub- 
Saharan Africa provoked sometimes conflicting expressions of admin- 
istration policy which did not provide clear guidelines to the Congress 
as to the most appropriate policies and programs to pursue with respect 
to Africa. Despite the variety of opinion reflected in congressional 
statements, certain patterns have emerged: (1) caution with respect to 
becoming involved in African wars or guerrilla conflict, (2) dissocia- 
tion from the white minority regimes of southern Africa, and (3) con- 
troversy over the application of human rights criteria. 

These patterns are reflected in the three major legislative concerns 
of Congress, with respect to Africa, in 1977: (1) security supporting 
assistance, (2) southern Africa, and (3) development aid. 

DISCUSSION 

Southern Africa 

The Congress took a number of actions that served to dissociate 
the United States from the white minority regimes of Rhodesia and 
South Africa and to align this country more closely with the aspirations 
of the majority who seek political representation. These actions in- 



'Prepared by William N. Raiford, Analyst in Foreign Affairs. 

(173) 



174 

eluded enactment of (1) a ban on the importation of Rhodesian chrome, 
(2) a security supporting assistance program designed to give relief 
to countries suffering from the conflict in southern Africa, and (3) 
resolutions condemning the violations of human rights in South Africa. 

Ban on imports of Hhodesian chrome. — The clearest signal of con- 
gressional intent to move away from accommodating white minority 
regimes in southern Africa was the passage of H.R. 1746, a bill which 
banned the importation of Rhodesian chrome or of processed products 
containing chrome of Rhodesian origin, effectively repealing the Byrd 
amendment. 1 

Since 1971 various attempts had been made to repeal that amend- 
ment. On one such attempt a bill did reach the floor of the House 
(1975) but it failed to pass by a vote of 187-209. 

The Ford administration had favored the bill but some observers 
felt that its support was weak._ 2 The Carter administration, however, 
committed itself to the repeal of the Byrd amendment. 

H.R. 1746 and S. 174, to prohibit the importation of Rhodesian 
chrome, were immediately introduced in the 95th Congress. Sup- 
porters of the legislation, led by administration witnesses, argued that 
passage would (1) be important to administration efforts in seeking 
majority rule in Rhodesia, (2) be a clear signal to Ian Smith of the 
unequivocal support of the U.S. Government for majority rule in 
Rhodesia, (3) return the United States to a position of compliance 
with international law, and (4) remove an element of friction with 
African states. Some representatives of industries, which had sup- 
ported the Byrd amendment earlier, noted also that technological 
developments had made imports of Rhodesian chrome less important. 
Opponents of the bills argued that (1) the proposal implied an incon- 
sistent application of the principle of human rights, (2) it could violate 
U.S. treaty commitments under GATT, (3) Rhodesian chrome was 
still important to the United States, and (4) natural resource avail- 
ability was important to the economic structure of the United States. 

The bill was approved by the Senate (66-26) and the House (250- 
146) and was signed by the President (Public Law 95-12) on March IS, 
1977. The President remarked that the act could help resolve southern 
African issues, particularly those relating to Rhodesia. 

South Africa. — The first session of the 95th Congress took greater 
notice of South Africa than had earlier sessions. Hearings were held 
to assess U.S. policy on arms sales to, and on nuclear cooperation 
with, South Africa. Numerous resolutions were introduced denouncing 



1 In 1965 the Government of Rhodesia issued a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) from droit 
Britain. Since that time the rebel government has been considered illegal by Great Britain, the United Na- 
tions, the United States, and most of the world community. These entities have applied economic sanctions 
against Rhodesia in an attempt to force that government back under (temporary) British jurisdiction. At 
the request of the British Government the United Nations Security Council, in 1966, voted mandatory 
sanctions against imports of all Rhodesian products. 

President Johnson, in 1967 and 1968, issued Executive orders that mandated U.S. compliance with the 
United Nations sanctions. However, in 1971, the Congress approved a military authorization bill which 
contained an amendment that had the effect of exempting Rhodesian chrome and fcrrochrome imports to the 
United States from the U.N. sanctions. Supporters of the amendment (the so-called " Byrd Amendment"). 
argued that Rhodesian chrome imports were important to U.S. industry and a denial of these imports would 
make the U.S. more reliant upon chrome imports from the Soviet Union, a major supplier of chromium orr>. 

After 1971, a growing body of persons concerned with African affairs worked for repeal of the Byrd amend- 
ment. They noted that the Byrd amendment was in direct contravention of U.N. sanctions that were legally 
accepted by the United States. They further argued that the amendment (1) had the effect of encouraging 
the "illegal" government of Rhodesia in its defiance of the United Nations and Great Britain, and (2) that 
it was viewed by many, particularly in Africa, as an example of the ambiguity of U.S. policy with respect to 
its objections to white minority government in southern Africa. 

2 U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. Congress and Foreign 
Policy— 1975. 94th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Ofhce, 1976, pp. 175-76. 



175 

repression in that country, bills designed to restrict the commercial 
relationship between the United States and South Africa were intro- 
duced, and a group of House Members formed an Ad Hoc Committee 
on South Africa to monitor events in that country. 

These actions arose from a human rights concern over the South 
African policy of "apartheid," or separate development. 3 Apartheid 
was manifest in 1977 in a variety of ways: the creation of a second 
black 4 "homeland" (Bophuthatswana), the banning of black and 
white moderates, the closing down of newspapers and organizations 
and, most prominently, the death of black nationalist leader Steve 
Biko while in police custody. The latter, in particular, contributed to 
the passage of House Concurrent Resolution 388 in the House and 
approval of Senate Concurrent Resolution 60 by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. These substantially similar resolutions identi- 
fied Biko's death and the repressive measures of the South Africa 
Government as being gross violations of human rights. 

U.S. commercial relations with South Africa may become more of 
an issue in 1978. The U.S. Government has only limited relations with 
the South African Government but private U.S. investment in South 
Africa is substantial. Studies done under the auspices of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee demonstrated a linkage between the 
$1.7 billion in U.S. direct investment and the $2.2 billion in U.S. 
commercial bank loans to South Africa and South Africa's increased 
economic and strategic self-sufficiency. Hearings have been scheduled 
for the second session of the 95th Congress to examine the role of the 
Export-Import Bank in its trade promotion activities in South Africa, 
and it is possible that United Nations moves to prohibit investment 
in South Africa will also be raised by a Congress which, in 1977, was 
clearly on record in its opposition to apartheid. 

Security supporting assistance: The Southern African Special 
Requirements Fund. — The administration's proposed programs for 
security assistance for African countries were relatively small compared 
to the Middle East, but a number of countries in southern Africa were 
involved. The administration requested SI 00 million for a Zimbabwe 
Development Fund designed to ease the anticipated transition to 
independence in Rhodesia. The House International Relations Com- 
mittee rejected this recommendation and proposed instead that $100 
million be authorized for the "countries of southern Africa to address 
the problems caused by the economic dislocation resulting from the 
conflict in that region, and for education and job training assistance 
for Africans from Namibia [South- West Africa] and Zimbabwe." 
The committee report noted that the $100 million was for majority 
ruled governments in southern Africa but not South Africa, Rhodesia, 
Malawi, and Zaire. 

" On the House floor, an amendment to eliminate the $100 million 
fund was narrowly defeated (208-204) after arguments which described 
the guerrilla groups battling the Rhodesian Government as based on 
"tribal" culture and assertions that frontline states were responsible 



3 Also see the discussion of human rights on pp. 142-152 in this volume. (Ed.) 

« The first such "homeland"— the Transkei— had been established in 1976 as part of a master plan which 
would ultimately deprive all South African blacks of their present citizenship and replace it with nationality 
based on tribal affiliation. 



176 

for the conflict in the region. The House deleted the term "majority 
ruled" from the legislation and added Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, 
and Tanzania to the list of countries to be denied funds. This prohibi- 
tion could be waived by the President if he determined that such 
assistance would further the foreign policy interests of the United 
States. 5 

The Senate approved the President's promotion of a Zimbabwe 
Development Fund but denied funds until progress toward an inter- 
nationally recognized settlement was achieved. It authorized $80 
million for a number of southern African countries, prohibited the 
use of such funds for "military, guerrilla, or paramilitary activities" 
and heard arguments that the issue in Mozambique and Angola was 
Communism, rather than racism. 

The Conference Committee accepted the $80 million authorization 
and the reorientation of aid toward countries whose economies were 
suffering from the conflict in southern Africa. In accord with this 
principle, and in contrast to the bill's prohibition on aid to Zambia, 
the committee report noted that "although no funds had been ear- 
marked for Zambia * * * (it) intends that up to $30 million of the 
overall program funds be spent on Zambia." The Conference Com- 
mittee also adopted a Senate provision that up to $1 million of the 
$80 million authorization be used "for a comprehensive study of 
southern African development needs in order to develop a coordinated 
foreign assistance strategy." The President was required to notify 
Congress before obligating funds for specific program or projects. 

Given the nature of debate on the Southern African Special Require- 
ments Fund and the failure to reach an internationally acceptable 
settlement in Rhodesia, aid to that region will again be an issue in 
1978. It is possible that events in southern Africa will lead to a sharper 
division between those in the United States who see the East-West 
conflict elements of the issue as being primary, and those who are 
more concerned with the Africa-centered human rights issues. 

Arms sales 

Secretary of State Vance stated in mid-1977 that "arms sales to 
Africa will be an exceptional tool of our policy and will be used only 
after the most careful consideration." 6 Traditionally, arms sales to 
Africa have been neither large nor contentious. Major recipients 
have been Morocco 7 and Ethiopia, both of which harbored U.S. 
security facilities, and Zaire, whose central location and pro-Western 
orientation were viewed as important to U.S. interests. These countries 
remain at the center of arms sales considerations, although they 
provoked greater controversy in 1977 than they had in earlier years. 

The President's requests $30.2 million for Foreign Military Sales 
credits for Zaire was cut by $15 million by the House International 
Relations Committee, to equal the fiscal year 1977 figure. According to 
Representative Charles Whalen, a member of the House International 
Relations Africa Subcommittee, the purpose was to convey two political 
messages to Zaire: one, that the United States would continue to give 



5 Also see the discussion of bilateral economic assistance on pp. 97-102 in this volume. (Ed.) 

8 Al^o see the discussion of conventional arms transfers on pp. 70-82 in this volume. (Ed.) 

7 Also see the discussion of Morocco in the Middle East chapter elsewhere in this volume. (Ed.) 



177 

support to Zaire, which was considered a friendly country; and two, 
to indicate that the United States would not be drawn further into 
the Zaire conflict. 8 The House accepted the committee recom- 
mendation but only after defeating attempts both to raise and to 
eliminate the authorization. The Senate also reduced the adminis- 
tration request by $15 million. 

To further insure that the United States not become unnecessarily 
involved in the Zaire conflict, the House International Relations Com- 
mittee added an amendment to the International Security Assistance 
Act which prohibited assistance to Zaire that could promote or aug- 
ment military or paramilitary operations in that country. The Senate, 
by floor amendment, accepted this policy statement. 

Accelerating political and military conflict in the Horn of Africa 
caused some controversy with respect to military sales in 1977 and 
will likely again do so in the future. Ethiopia, formerly one of the 
major African recipients of U.S. military sales credits, but now under 
a radical Marxist government, was denied "military assistance, inter- 
national military education and training, or foreign military credit 
sales" under the Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropria- 
tions Act. This measure was initiated by the House, deleted by the 
Senate, and then restored in conference. 

In addition, members of a number of congressional committees 
visited Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977 in an attempt to sort out the 
parties and issues and to determine what role the U.S. should play in 
the region. 

Given the apparent commitment of the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and the 
PRC to increase their influence in Africa through military assistance 
programs, and the degree of internal conflict on the continent, it 
is likely that a variety of parties to conflicts will call upon the United 
States for arms sales or other forms of military assistance. Under such 
conditions the Carter administration's commitment to restraint of 
arms sales is likely to be tested and the Congress will be presented with 
an increasingly important, and possibly, divisive, issue. 

Economic assistance 

Economic assistance for Africa was not a very controversial issue 
for 1977. The very low standard of living in most African countries 
qualified them for moneys under AID's "New Directions Programs;" 
a concept which emphasizes basic human needs such as food and 
nutrition, health, population planning, and education. Approximately 
$180 million was requested, authorized, and appropriated for Africa 
under these categories. $200 million was authorized under the Sahel 
regional program; $50 million to be appropriated in fiscal year 1978 
and the remainder to be available until expended. The administration 
made no request for a contribution to the African Development Fund 
but the House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on 
International Development Lending Institutions and Finance added 
a new title to H.R. 5262 authorizing a $150 million contribution. The 
Conference Committee set the final sum at $50 million. 9 The Foreign 



» In March 1977 the Shaba (formerly Katanga) province of Zaire was invaded from Angola by Katangese 
who had fled to Angola after the unsuccessful attempt by Katanga to remove itself from the authority of 
the (then) Government of the Congo. The invasion was repulsed after several months of fighting. 

9 See the discussions of bilateral assistance on pp. 97-102 and multilateral assistance on pp. 103-116 
in this volume. (Ed.) 



178 

Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act (Public Law 
95-14S), instructed the U.S. representative to the African Develop- 
ment Fund to oppose loans and assistance to countries that systemati- 
cally violate fundamental human rights. 10 

Uganda 

Congressional condemnation of reported atrocities in Uganda in 
1977 was evidenced by several actions. The Senate passed Senate 
lution 175, condemning the regime of Idi Amin Dada, urging 
bo stop supplying lethal arms to Uganda and calling for a 
U.N. investigation. Foreign as [stance to Uganda was forbidden under 
Public Law 95-14S. Numerous pieces of legislation have been intro- 
duced in both Houses to prohibit trade between the United States and 
Uganda, to close the Ugandan Embassy in the United States, and to 
prohibit military coopsration with, or arms exports to, Uganda. 
Pressure may mount in 1978 to prohibit the import of Ugandan coffee 
into the United States, as it is the principal source of foreign exchange 
for Uganda. This, of course, will conflict with the U.S. Government's 
residual, but not categorical, commitment to free trade principles. 
Some of these bills will be the subject of hearings, and possible action 
in 1978. 

References 

hearings 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on 
Africa. Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1978. Hearings, 95th 
Cong., 1st sess. Part 3, Economic and Military Assistance Programs in Africa. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Subcommittees on Africa and International Organizations. The Rhodesian 

Sanctions Bill. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. on H.R. 1746. Feb. 24, 1977. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Subcommittee on Africa. United States Policy Toward Southern Africa. 



Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 

Subcommittees on International Organizations and on Africa. The Ques- 



tions of Self- Determination in Western Sahara. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. 

Oct. 12, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Ambassador Young's 

African Trip. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. June 6, 1977. Washington, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1977. 
Andrew Young Nomination. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Jan. 25, 1977. 

Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Subcommittee on African Affairs. African Development Fund. Hearings, 



95th Cong., 1st sess. on H.R. 5262. Apr. 18, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 

•Recent Events in South Africa. Hearing, (Executive session). Oct. 27, 1977. 



95th Congress., 1st sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 



REPORTS 



U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Amending the 
United "Nations Participation Act of 1945 To Halt the Importation of Rho- 
in Chrome. Report to accompany H.R. 1746. Mar. 7, 1977. 95th Cong. 
1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 



i° See, U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Policy and the Multilateral Banks: 
Politicization and Effectiveness. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 



179 

International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977. Report to 

accompany H.R. 6714. May 3, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. 

International Security Assistance Act of 1977. Report to accompany H.R. 

6884. May 9, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 

Conference Report on International Security Assistance Act of 1977. 

Report to accompany H.R. 6844. July 15, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washing- 
ton, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Expressing Concern About the Recent Acts of Repression by the Govern- 



ment of the Republic of South Africa. Report to accompanj' H. Con. Res. 3$ 

Oct. 28, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 1977. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Rhodesian Sanctions. 

Report to Accompany S. 174. Mar. 3, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
International Development Assistance Act of 1977. Report to accompany 

S. 1160. May 16, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1977. 

Recent Deaths in Uganda. Report of S. Res. 175 May 19, 1977. 95th 



Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Subcommittee on African Affairs. Africa. Report by Senator Dick Clark, 



chairman. July 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

Rhodesia: International Problems [by Susan Mowle]. Issue Brief No. IB76023 

[Archived 3/28/77]. 
Rhodesia: U.S. Imports of Chrome Ore [by Susan Mowle]. Issue Brief No. 

IB74031 [Archived 3/21/77/]. 
Somalia and Ethiopia : International Conflict in the Horn of Africa [by Raymond 

Copson]. Issue Brief No. IB78019 [Periodically updated]. 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe: Government in Transition [by William N. Raiford] Issue 

Brief No. 1B70844 [Periodically updated]. 



Latin America * 
overview 

Congressional activity on Latin America in 1977 generally paralleled 
the interest expressed the preceding year with the predominant focus 
on the Panama Canal treaties, and major interest expressed on Cuba 
and human rights. 1 Congressional and administration initiatives re- 
sulted in sanctions against military assistance to several Latin 
American nations. 

Additional congressional attention was directed toward the issue 
of narcotics traffic and the exchange of prisoners, principally with 
Mexico and Bolivia. Several delegations from the House and the Senate 
traveled to Latin America, especially to Panama, during the year. 

DISCUSSION 

Panama Canal treaties** 

During 1977 the Carter administration concluded two new treaties 
with Panama and launched an uphill campaign to win congressional 
and public approval for the controversial pacts. The Congress, under 
considerable public pressure, subjected the negotiations and the com- 
pleted treaties to intense scrutiny and criticism. When serious ques- 
tions about U.S. defense rights under the treaties were raised during 
congressional hearings in the fall, making Senate approval doubtful, 
President Carter was forced to meet with General Torrijos to issue a 
clarifying statement of understanding. While this action improved 
the prospects for Senate consent to ratification by the required two- 
thirds vote, it was still unclear at the end of the year whether the two 
treaties would receive the necessary approval when the Senate takes 
final action on the pacts in early 1978. 

Reactions to negotiations. — When the new administration took office 
the negotiations with Panama had been underway intermittently since 
1973. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker had then been designated as chief 
negotiator, preparing the way for Secretary of State Kissinger's visit 
to Panama in February 1974 to announce a joint statement of prin- 
ciples. The principles committed the United States to conclude a new 
treaty with a fixed expiration date (replacing the "in perpetuity" 
concept of the 1903 treaty), after which Panama would assume sole 
control of the Panama Canal and the contiguous Canal Zone. The 
treaty talks languished during 1975 and 1976, however, in part because 
of congressional opposition as expressed in the Snyder amendments and 
the Thurmond resolutions, and in part because the negotiations, under 



•Prepared by Barry Sklar and K. Larry Storrs. 
••Prepared by K. Larry Storrs, Analyst in Latin American Affairs. 

1 Also see the discussions of human rights on pp. 142-152 and conventional arms transfers on pp. 70-82 in 
this volume. (Ed.) 

(180) 



181 

attack by Ronald Reagan, became an important issue in the 1976 
Presidential campaign. 2 

Early in the year the Carter administration, removing doubts linger- 
ing from the campaign, indicated plans to pursue vigorously negotia- 
tions for a new treaty arrangement with Panama in keeping with the 
1974 principles. Along with Ambassador Bunker, Sol Linowitz was 
designated as conegotiator to undertake the accelerated treaty talks. 
After inconclusive negotiations in February and a breakthrough in 
May based on Panama's willingness to accept a U.S. defense role after 
the termination of a new treaty and U.S. willingness to set the year 
2000 as the date for termination of the new treaty, it was reported 
in June that the parties had agreed on substantial portions of two new 
treaties. At that point, extensive consultations with Congress were 
initiated. 3 

During the course of the negotiations, considerable opposition was 
expressed in Congress. Shortly after the 95th Congress convened, 
Representatives Ashbook and Flood introduced House Resolutions 
14 and 92, respectively, stating the sense of the House of Representa- 
tives that the United States should retain unimpaired its sovereign 
rights over the Canal and the Canal Zone. More than 25 similar 
measures, with numerous cosponsors, had been submitted by mid-year. 
On the Senate side, however, it was notable that Senator Thurmond 
failed to submit a comparable resolution although such a resolution 
submitted during the 94th Congress, had been cosponsored by more 
than a third of the Senate. 

In February, Ambassador Linowitz came under attack in Congress 
because he had been given a temporary 6-month appointment, thereby 
avoiding the Senate's advice and consent, and had remained a mem- 
ber of the board of directors of Marine Midland Bank, which was 
part of a consortium of banks that had granted loans to the Republic 
of Panama. While the State Department responded to the charges, 
Ambassador Linowitz felt compelled to resign as a director of Marine 
Midland in mid-March to avoid "even the slightest suggestion of a 
conflict of interest," after he was questioned in a closed session of 
the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. 

In May and June, amendments were offered in the House in opposi- 
tion to the treaty negotiations. On May 4, 1977, while the House was 
considering the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1978 (H.R. 6689), Representative Dornan offered an amendment — 
similar to the Snyder amendment which passed twice in 1975 before 
being softened in conference — to forbid the use of funds "for the 
purpose of negotiating the surrender or relinquishment of the Canal 
Zone or the Panama Canal." Representative Buchanan countered 
with a substitute amendment, similar to recent conference compro- 
mises, providing that any new treaty or agreement "must protect the 
vital interests of the United States" in the Canal and the Canal Zone. 
After debate, the Buchanan substitute passed 220-182 and was 
incorporated in the bill which passed the House that day, becoming 
law (Public Law 95-105) after Senate approval and the signature of 
the President. 



3 For background on these events, see Congress and Foreign Policy— 1975, pp. 168-172; and Congress and 
Foreign Policy— 1976, pp. 197-200. . . M x . _ XT . . 

3 William J. Lanouette. The Panama Canal Treaties— Playing in Peoria and in the Senate. National 
Journal, vol. 9, No. 41, Oct. 8, 1977, pp. 1556-62. 



182 

In a similar move, Representative Snyder proposed, on June 10, 
1977, to add an amendment to the State Department appropriations 
bill (II. R. 7556), stating that : "None of the funds appropriated herein 
ma} r be used to implement any new treaty with the Republic of 
Panama which surrenders or relinquishes United States sovereignty 
over and control of the Canal Zone and Panama Canal." Representa- 
tive Snyder argued that his amendment was necessary to prevent the 
completion of a treaty to give away the canal and Canal Zone, 
while opposing .spokesmen argued that the language of the bill, 
similar to previous years' compromises, was adequate. After debate, 
the Snyder amendment was rejected by an unrecorded vote. 

Meanwhile, when the treaty negotiators turned, in July 1977, to the 
issue of financial arrangements, it appeared that they were far apart. 
U.S. negotiators were prepared to oner Panama $30 million to $50 mil- 
lion in yearly compensation from tolls, thereby avoiding any need 
for congressional appropriations, but Panama initially demanded a $1 
billion lump-sum downpayment, plus $150 million to $200 million per 
year for the rest of the century. To break the statemate, President 
Carter met with Panamanian and American negotiators on July 29, and 
sent General Torrijos a personal letter asking him to understand that 
the latest U.S. economic proposals ' 'represent the most that we could 
undertake to do, based on our consultations with Congress." 

From that point on, the treaty negotiations moved rapidly toward 
conclusion. On August 10, the two countries' negotiators announced 
in Panama agreement "in principle" on two new treaties which 
remained to be drafted. On September 6, 1977, the completed treaties 
were initialed, and they were signed the following day, September 7, 
by President Carter and General Torrijos at a Washington ceremony 
attended by representatives of over 26 Western Hemisphere nations. 

Under the Panama Canal Treaty, the United States would retain 
control of the operations and defense of the canal until December 31, 
1999, after which Panama would assume sole control. Panama, under 
the treaty, would assume civil jurisdiction over the present Canal 
Zone after a 30-month transition period, would take over about 60 
percent of the Canal Zone not needed for the operation and defense 
of the canal, and would receive about $50 million to $70 million per 
year in compensation from canal toll revenues. Outside the treaty ar- 
rangement, the United States also pledged its best efforts to arrange 
economic loans, loan guarantees and credits of up to $300 million for 
Panama. Under the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality 
and Operation of the Panama Canal, the United States and Panama 
agree to permanently maintain a regime of neutrality and non- 
discriminatory operation, and war vessels of the United States and 
Panama are granted the right to transit the canal expeditiously. 
President Carter transmitted the treaties to the Senate for its advice 
and consent on September 16, 1977. 4 

Hearings on the new treaties. — During the year, various congres- 
sional committees held hearings on the Panama Canal treaties, com- 
piling a massive record of testimony covering a wide range of ques- 



* U.S. Congress. Senate. Panama Canal Treaties: Message from the President of the United States Trans- 
mitting Hip I'anama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation 
of the, Panama Canal. 95th Congress, 1st Session, Executive N, Sept. 16, 1977. Washington, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, 1977. 



183 

tions. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to which the two 
treaties were referred, conducted extensive hearings from September 
26 to October 19, 5 and the House International Relations Committee 
held hearings from September 8 to October 20. 6 The Subcommittee 
on the Panama Canal of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
Committee held hearings in July 7 and late November, 8 while the 
full committee held a hearing on August 17, 1977. 9 The Subcom- 
mittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
held various hearings in July, September, October, and November 
on the question of disposal of U.S. property, 10 and the House Armed 
Services Committee held hearings on October 20. u 

Led by Secretary of State Vance and conegotiators Bunker and 
Linowitz, treaty supporters argued in the hearings that the new 
treaties would adequately protect U.S. national interests since the 
United States would continue to operate and defend the canal until 
the year 2000, and thereafter would have the permanent right to 
maintain the neutrality of the canal. Secretary of Defense Brown and 
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed that use of the canal, 
not ownership or control, was the prime military interest of the United 
States and that it was best assured by a new treaty arrangement with 
Panama. Proponents also argued that a more "modern" relationship 
with Panama in keeping with present-day realities, would significantly 
improve our relations with Latin America. 

Opponents of the treaties, stressing the military and commercial 
importance of the canal, argued that continued U.S. sovereignty over 
the area was the only way to safeguard U.S. interests, particularly 
when dealing with the Torrijos government which was characterized 
as a left-leaning, pro-Castro dictatorship with a poor human rights 
record. 

As hearings progressed, congressional consideration of the treaties 
fell roughly into four stages, to be discussed below: (1) initial concern 
over the disposal of property question, (2) the emergence of a move- 
ment to add amendments or reservations to the treaties, (3) concern 
with apparent discrepancies between U.S. and Panamanian inter- 
pretations of key provisions of the Neutrality Treaty, leading 
eventually to the Carter-Torrijos statement of understanding of 
October 14, 1977 and, (4) a gradual shift by a number of Senators 
toward support for the treaties after visiting Panama. 



6 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Panama Canal Treaties. Hearings, 95th Cong., 
1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. Part 1— Administration Witnesses; Sept. 26, 
27, 29 and 30. and Oct. 19, 1977; Part 2— Congressional Witnesses, Oct. 4 and 5, 1977; Part 3— Public Wit- 
nesses, Oct. 10, 11, 13 and 14, 1977. 

« U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Proposed Panama Canal Treaties. 
Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Sept. 8, 14, 15, 20, 26, 28 and Oct. 11 and 20, 1977. Washington; U.S. Govern- 
ment Pringing Office, 1977. 

7 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Subcommittee on the Panama 
Canal. U.S. Interest in Panama Canal. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess, July 25, 26, 27, 1977. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. Serial No. 95-10. 

« U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Subcommittee on the Panama 
Canal. Economic and Financial Ramifications of the Proposed Panama Canal Treaties. Hearings, 95th 
Cong., 1st sess. Nov. 30 and Dec. 1, 1977. 

9 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. New Panama Canal Treaty. 
Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Aug. 17, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. Serial 
No. 9.5-13. 

10 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Separation of Powers. Panama 
Canal Treaty (Disposition of United States Territory). Part 1, July 22, 1977; Part 2, July 29, 1977; Part 3 
Sept. 8, Oct. 13 and 28, Nov. 3 and 15, 1977. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. 

" U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Panama Canal Treaties. Hearing, 95th Cong., 
1st sess., Oct. 20, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. H.A.S.C. No. 95-34. 



184 

One question of early and continuing concern has been Congress 
role in the disposal of U.S. property or territory. Even before President 
Carter sent the treaties to the Senate for its advice and consent, many 
Members of Congress, particularly those in the House, argued that 
both the House and the Senate must play a specific role in the disposal 
of any U.S. territory or property under article IV, section 3, clause 2 
of the Constitution. This clause provides that "The Congress shall 
have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations 
respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United 
States." This question was the focal point of the hearings beginning 
in July by the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on 
Separation of Powers, chaired by Senator Allen, as well as the hearing 
on August 17, 1977, by the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
Committee. The matter was also addressed in the hearings by the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International 
Relations Committee. Speaking lor the administration, Attorney 
General Bell and State Department Legal Adviser Hansell argued 
that the treaty power was a concurrent power and therefore that 
disposal of property could be effected by treaty alone without specific 
authorization by both Houses of Congress. At the same time, it was 
noted that other implementing legislation covering, for example, the 
creation of the Panama Canal Commission to operate the canal until 
the year 2000, would be submitted to both Houses of Congress for 
enactment. 

Given the Carter administration's failure to grant a role to the 
House in the disposal of Canal Zone propertv, numerous resolutions 
(e.g., H. Con. Res. 346 and 347) and several bills (e.g., H.R. 8790) 
were introduced to require a House role and, on October 3, 1977, 
51 Members of the House of Representatives joined in a suit in 
district court to obtain a court order requiring House action on the 
matter. By the end of the year, however, the court had not made a 
decision, and no action was taken on the bills and resolutions. 

By mid-September a movement emerged to add amendments or 
reservations to the treaties to correct alleged deficiencies. In a speech on 
the Senate floor on September 23, 1977, Senator Robert Dole proposed 
six amendments and two reservations to the treaties addressed to the 
main areas of concern. His amendments would have allowed the 
United States to negotiate with any country for the right to build a 
sea-level canal, reduced the economic payments to Panama by about 
one-half, retained U.S. criminal jurisdiction over U.S. citizen em- 
ployees until at least 1990, permitted the United States to intervene 
militarily to maintain the neutrality of the Panama Canal, and pro- 
vided U.S. warships with "privileged passage" during time of war. His 
reservations would have made ratification to the treaty subject to the 
reservations that Panama make significant improvement in its human 
rights record, and that the transfer of property be contingent on 
enactment of legislation by both Houses of Congress. 

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began its hearings on 
September 26, against the background of the Dole amendments, and 
most of the committee's attention quickly turned to apparent con- 
flicts in interpretation of the Neutrality Treaty by the American and 
Panamanian negotiators. While Secretary of State Vance and co- 
negotiators Bunker and Vance argued that article IV of the treaty 



185 

gave the United States the unilateral right to take whatever action 
was necessary to defend the neutrality of the canal, and that article 
VI granted United States warships "head-of-the-line" passage in emer- 
gencies, Senators Baker and Stone questioned whether Panama shared 
this interpretation, pointing to conflicting comments by Panamanian 
treaty negotiator Romulo Escobar. Escobar was quoted as saying, in 
comments he made on August 19 and 22, that Panama was "not giving 
the United States the right of intervention," and that expeditious 
passage should not be construed to mean "preferential rights." In 
response to these queries, Ambassador Linowitz indicated that the 
administration was disturbed by the comments and had received 
assurances that such statements would not be made in the future. 

The issue was revived the following week, however, when Senator 
Dole released the text of a confidential State Department cable from 
Panama which stated that Dr. Carlos Lopez Guevara, one of the 
treaty negotiators, was disturbed by administration statements to 
the effect that the Neutrality Treaty granted the United States a 
right to "intervene" in Panama, and gave the United States preferen- 
tial treatment. When Senator Dole testified before the committee on 
October 5, 1977, several members of the committee stated that the 
conflicting interpretations would have to be cleared up before the 
Senate would approve the treaties. President Carter met with a group 
of influential Senators to assess the situation on October 11 and he 
was told that the treaties were in serious trouble, leading the ad- 
ministration to initiate discussions with Panama to clarify the dis- 
puted provisions. 

Shortly thereafter, on October 14, 1977, President Carter met with 
General Torrijos in Washington, after which the two leaders issued a 
clarifying statement of understanding. It provided, with regard to 
defense rights, that "each of the two countries * * * shall have the right 
to act against any aggression or threat directed against the canal or 
against the peaceful transit of vessels through the canal," but these 
rights were not to be interpreted, according to the statement, "as 
a right of intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of 
Panama." With regard to expeditious passage rights granted to U.S. 
and Panamanian war vessels, the statement provided that such vessels 
would be permitted to transit the canal "as quickly as possible, with- 
out any impediment, with expedited treatment, and in case of need 
or emergency, to go to the head of the line of vessels in order to transit 
the canal rapidly." 

While the statement was immediately viewed as improving the 
chances for Senate approval of the treaties, when Ambassadors 
Bunker and Linowitz returned to the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee for explanations on October 19, questions were raised about 
the status of the unsigned statement and several committee members 
indicated that the statement of understanding might be incorporated 
as an understanding in the Senate's resolution of ratification. In 
Panama, a full explanation of the statement of understanding was 
made on October 18, several days before Panamanians approved the 
pacts by a 2 to 1 margin in the October 23 plebiscite. With approval 
still uncertain in the U.S. Senate, the Congress adjourned without 
taking action on the treaties and the debate was put off until 1978. 

While Congress adjourned without completing action on the 
treaties, a number of important congressional visits were made to 

29-972—78 13 



186 

Panama toward the end of the year, including two delegations led by 
Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd and Minority Leader Howard 
Baker, respectively. The delegation of seven Senators, Led by Senator 
Byrd, was in Panama November 9-12, 1977, and the three-man dele- 
gation led by Senator Baker visited from January 3-7, 1978. Both 
delegations met with U.S. and Panamanian officials, Canal Zone 
residents, officials of the U.S. Southern Command, and private citi- 
zens from both countries. Both delegations also spent considerable 
time with General Torrijos exploring various questions. 

At the end of the Byrd delegation visit, General Torrijos promised 
to repeal various repressive laws and to improve the human rights 
conditions in the country. He also assured the Senators that he fully 
supported the October 14 statement of understanding. During the 
Baker delegation visit, Senator Baker reportedly informed General 
Torrijos that he could not support the treaties unless the Senate 
added the language of the statement of understanding to the treaties 
as an amendment or reservation. Torrijos reportedly did not object 
to such a change since the statement of understanding had been fully 
discussed in Panama prior to the October 23 plebiscite. While mem- 
bers of both delegations were reported to be more optimistic about 
the chances for Senate approval of the treaties at the end of the visits, 
whether the growing support for the treaties would be sufficient for 
passage remained uncertain at the end of the year. 

Cuba* 

The Congress became more active on the issue of normalization of 
relations with Cuba in the first session of the 95th Congress, both in 
reaction to and in concert with administration policy. In contrast to 
the relative inactivity on the issue in the preceding year, due mainly 
to Cuban involvement in Angola, important legislative activity was 
conducted in 1977. More Members of Congress visited the island than 
in the past years, reflecting increased interest. 

Congressional interest in Cuba during 1977 developed in the context 
of the Carter administration's initiatives toward Fidel Castro's gov- 
ernment, as well as Cuban responses to both executive and legislative 
moves. There was an early indication of the new Carter policy on Cuba 
in January when then Secretary of State-designate Cyrus Vance, 
during his confirmation hearings, called the U.S. embargo on Cuba 
"ineffective." Later in the month, he expressed the hope that the 
United States "could begin the process of moving toward normaliza- 
tion." After an exchange of conciliatory statements by the U.S. and 
Cuban leaderships, and after receiving word from the Cubans that 
they wanted to talk about fishing boundaries, Secretary Vance, in 
early March, proposed that the United States and Cuba enter into 
discussions on the wide range of issues without preconditions. 

That same month, the United States lifted the longstanding ban 
on U.S. citizen travel to Cuba; the United States and Cuba began 
discussions in New York on fishing rights and maritime boundaries; 
and the administration lifted the ban on spending of U.S. dollars in 
Cuba. In April, U.S. diplomats traveled to Havana for the first time 
in 16 years, completed negotiations on the fishing question, and opened 
way for discussions on the other major issues between the two nations. 



•Prepared by Barry A. Sklar, Specialist in Latin American Affairs. 



187 

In May, President Carter, in his message transmitting the fishing 

and maritime agreements to the Congress for approval, stated 
favorable action by the Congress would constitute a tangible step in 
the improvement of U.S.-Cuban relations. 

It was announced in June that through U.S. initiatives the United 
States and Cuba would exchange midlevel diplomats in order to 
establish "interests sections" in Havana and Washington. The sec- 
tions, physically located in each country's former chancery building, 
were formally opened on September 1. In August, it was announced 
that the United States and Cuba were exchanging information on 
terrorist activity. 

As in past years, resolutions reflecting basic schools of congres- 
sional opinion on either side of the issue were introduced. Resolutions 
in favor of normalization generally advocated lifting or otherwise 
modifying the embargo against Cuba. Resolutions generally regarded 
as against normalization called for the satisfaction of certain conditions 
before relations could be normalized: compensation for expropriated 
property, release of U.S. prisoners, withdrawal of Cuban troops from 
Africa, assurances of cooperation on hijacking, future security of the 
Guantanamo Base, no disruption of the American sugar market, and 
satisfaction of human rights concerns. 12 

Action taken on Cuba-related amendments to major legislation 
indicated mixed congressional attitudes toward the apparent change 
in Cuba policy. In support for the movement toward Cuba, the House 
rejected an amendment to the international lending institution author- 
ization bill (H.R. 5262) which sought to prohibit the financial institu- 
tions from using U.S. moneys for any assistance to Cuba (also Cam- 
bodia, Laos, and Vietnam.) 13 In the Senate, an amendment which 
nstructed U.S. delegates to international lending institutions to 
oppose any assistance to Cuba (also Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) 
w T as tabled. Section 620(a) of the International Development and 
Food Assistance Act of 1977 was revised to remove restrictions on aid 
to countries that trade with Cuba (and Vietnam). The House rejected 
an amendment to the foreign assistance appropriations bill which 
sought to include Cuba in a list of countries prohibited from receiving 
funds for direct U.S. assistance. 14 Finally, the House rejected an 
amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act which would 
have denied funds for the purpose of negotiating the resumption of 
diplomatic relations with Cuba. 

Other congressional action, however, reflected an attitude of opposi- 
tion to the moves toward Cuba. The International Development and 
Food Assistance Act of 1977 contains a House-initiated provision 
stipulating that there be no aid or trade with Cuba. Again through the 
initiative of the House, the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act 
(Public Law 95-148) prohibits the use of funds for any form of aid of 
trade with Cuba. In the Senate, an amendment proposed by the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the Foreign Relations Author- 
ization Act, which called for partial lifting of the embargo to allow 
Cuba to purchase U.S. food and medicines was withdrawn on the 
floor because it did not reflect the original intent of its sponsor, Senator 



12 See also the discussion of human rights on pp. 142-152 in this volume. (Ed.) 

11 See also the discussion of multilateral assistance on pp. 103-116 in this volume. (Ed.) 

»« See also the discussion of bilateral assistance on pp. 97-102 in this volume. (Ed.) 



188 

McGovern. In its place, the Senate passed a Cuba provision sponsored 
by Senator Robert Byrd as a substitute to a harsher measure proposed 
by Senator Dole. The Byrd resolution expressed the sense of the 
Congress that negotiations should take place with Cuba on a reciprocal 
basis and that such negotiations should be related to the protection of 
U.S. interests and property. It further stipulated that Cuban military 
policies and human rights posture should be taken into account in 
negotiations. 

During the year, the following Members of Congress, most of whom 
had long discussions with President Castro, visited Havana: Senators 
McGovern, Church, and Abourezk, Representatives Bingham, Aspin, 
Dellums, Richmond, and Nolan, and members of a delegation led by 
Representative Henry Ruess, chairman of the House Banking and 
Currency Committee. 

Increased Cuban military activity in Africa, and U.S. reaction to 
it most likely will result in a decrease in congressional moves toward 
normalization during the first part of 1978. 15 It also could result in 
initiatives in the Congress to harden the U.S. position relating Cuban 
activities in Africa supporting Soviet international interests. 

References 

CONGRESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS 

House of Representatives 

Committee on Armed Services. Panama Canal Treaties. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st 
sess., Oct. 20, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
H.A.S.C. No. 95-34. 

Committee on International Relations. Proposed Panama Canal Treaties. Hear- 
ings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 8, 14, 15, 20, 26, 28 and Oct. 11 znd 20, 1977. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 

The Panama Canal and United States-Panamanian Relations: Report of 

a Study Mission to Panama, Mar. 17 to 20, 1977. Committee Print, 95th Cong., 
1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 

-Toward Improved United States-Cuba Relations: Report of a special mis- 



sion to Cuba, Feb. 10-15, 1977 by Representative Jonathan Bingham, May 23, 
1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 73 pp. 

Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. New Panama Canal Treaty. 
Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Aug. 17, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. Serial No. 95-13. 

Subcommittee on the Panama Canal. U.S. Interest in Panama Canal. 

Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., July 25, 26, 27, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. Serial No. 95-10. 

Senate 

Report of the Senatorial Delegation to the Republic of Panama, Nov. 9-12, 1977, 
Senator Robert C. Byrd, Chairman. 95fch Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 95-79. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 

Panama Canal Treaties: Message from the President of the United States Trans- 
mitting the Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Concerning the Permanent 
Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal. Executive N, 95th Cong., 1st 
sess., Sept. 16, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Committee on Environment and Public Works. The Panama Canal — A Reexami- 
nation: A Report by Senator Mike Gravel. Committee Print, 95th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1977. 



14 See also the discussion of Africa on pp. 173-179 in this volume. (Ed.) 



189 

Committee on Foreign Relations. Background Documents Relating to the 

Panama Canal. Committee Print, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 1977. Washington, 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
A Chronology of Events Relating to the Panama Canal. Committee 

Print, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 1977. 

Panama Canal Treaties. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Part 1 — Admin- 



istration Witnesses, Sept. 26, 27, 29 and 30, and Oct. 19, 1977; Part 2— Congres- 
sional Witnesses, Oct. 4 and 5, 1977; Part 3— Public Witnesses, Oct. 10, 11, 13 
and 14, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Delusions and reality — the future of United States-Cuba relations. A 



report by Senator Frank Church on his trip to Cuba, Aug. 8-11, 1977. Wash- 
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1977. 
Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Separation of Powers. Panama 
Canal Treaty (Disposition of United States Territory). Hearings, 95th Cong., 
1st sess. Part 1, July 22, 1977; Part 2, July 29, 1977~; Part 3, Sept. 8, Oct. 13 
and 28, Nov. 3 and 15, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

Basic Treaties and Documents Concerning the Panama Canal. CRS Multilith 

77-218 F, September 1977. 
A Collection of Major Statements on the Question of U.S. Sovereignty in the 

Panama Canal Zone. CRS Multilith 77-219, October 1977. 
Consideration of Various Options Available to the House of Representatives in 

the Matter of the Panama Treaty. CRS Report, Nov. 1, 1977. 
Current Information on the Republic of Panama, the Panama Canal, and the 

Panama Canal Zone. CRS Multilith 77-255, December 1977. 
The Normalization of Relations with Cuba. CRS Issue Brief No. IB75030. [Up- 
dated periodically.] 
Panama Canal Treaties. CRS Issue Brief No. IB77042. [Updated periodically.] 
The Panama Canal and Canal Zone: Some of Their Contributions to Strategic 

Mobility and Logistic Support. CRS Report, Dec. 19, 1977. 
The Treaty Porver and Congressional Power in Conflict: Cession of United 

States Property in the Canal Zone to Panama. CRS Report, Aug. 4, 1977. 



Asia: Korea and Vietnam * 
overview 

Korea and Vietnam dominated the attention Congress gave Asian 
issues in 1977. 1 The Korea issue had two aspects: (1) President Carter's 
announced plan to withdraw American ground forces from South 
Korea by 1982, and (2) investigations of alleged South Korean influ- 
ence buying in Congress. Vietnam became an issue as a result of 
renewed demands by the Hanoi regime that the United States grant 
it large-scale reconstruction aid or "reparations" as a condition for the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Washington. 

The Korea troop withdrawal issue received considerable congres- 
sional attention in 1977. On April 25, 1977, the full House of Repre- 
sentatives debated and rejected (301-88) an amendment to the De- 
partment of Defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1978 that would 
have mandated a reduction of active duty military strength by 50,000 
personnel, of which 17,000 would come from troops stationed overseas. 
The debate clarified the fact that most of the 17,000 would have been 
U.S. personnel in Korea. 

The House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee held hear- 
ings on the administration's troop withdrawal policy in May, June, 
and July 1977. Among those testifying were Gen. John Singlaub, 
who had been relieved of his Korean Command following his open 
criticism of Carter's troop withdrawal policy; Gen. George Brown, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Gen. Bernard Rogers, 
Chief of Staff of the Army. The subcommittee examined Singlaub's 
contentions that the Carter withdrawal plan might lead to war in 
Korea and that the administration had not asked for the views of 
U.S. commanders in South Korea before deciding upon the with- 
drawal policy. 

The House Asian and Pacific Subcommittee also received testimony 
on these questions from General Brown and Under Secretary of State 
Philip Habib on June 10, 1977. 

Major legislative initiative on the troop withdrawal question was 
taken in considering the Foreign Relations Operations authorization 
bill (H.R. 6689). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's version 
of the bill contained language affirming support for the President's 
withdrawal plan. In extensive floor debate in the full Senate, the^ lan- 
guage was amended to state that U.S. policy toward South Korea 
should be decided by both the President and Congress and that imple- 
mentation of the President's plan was to be "carried out in regular 
consultation with Congress" with reference to U.S. interests in Korea 
and Japan. The language was incorporated into the fiscal year 1978 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act (Public Law 95-105). 



•Prepared by Larry A. Niksch, Specialist in Asian Affairs. 

i Also see the discussion of U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China on pp. 53-56 in this vol- 
ume. (Ed.) 

(190) 



191 

By the second half of the 1977 session of Congress, the role of the 
Congress in U.S. Korea policy was dominated by allegations and 
revelations concerning attempts by the South Korean Government 
to influence Members of Congress through illegal or unethical means. 
Two House committees, the Ethics Committee and the Subcommittee 
on International Organizations, held a series of hearings on this 
question and conducted ongoing investigations; and the International 
Organizations Subcommittee also examined general activities of the 
Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the United States. At these 
hearings, a number of defectors from the South Korean Government 
described these operations. The wives of two House Members also 
gave testimony. Also affecting the issue were a grand jury investigation 
of Korean influence buying (which issued several indictments) and a 
Justice Department investigation which, by the autumn of 1977, 
had concentrated attention on negotiations with the South Korean 
Government to secure the return to the United States of Korean 
businessman Tong Sun Park. Park had been named a primary figure 
in the influence securing operations. 

The adverse effect of the influence buying question on U.S. -South 
Korean relations in general and, specifically, on the administration's 
"strategy of reassurance" was clearly discernible. In October 1977, 
the Carter administration asked Congress to approve the transfer of 
about $800 million of weapons and equipment from U.S. forces in 
Korea to South Korean forces over the 5-year troop withdrawal 
period. This proposal would be the first installment of the compensa- 
tory security assistance promised by Secretary Brown to the South 
Korean Government in July 1977. 

In October, House and Senate leaders clearly indicated not only 
that Congress would not consider the President's proposed $800 
million weapons transfer proposal because of the scandal but also 
that the scandal had jeopardized any future congressional approval 
of this proposal and future compensatory security assistance requests. 
On October 31, the House approved (407-0) a resolution calling on 
South Korea to "cooperate fully and without reservation" with the 
Ethics Committee investigation "so that the historic alliance of the 
United States and the Republic of Korea may persevere." 

Major legislation in 1977 reinforced the existing prohibition on U.S. 
bilateral aid to Vietnam. The major acts containing such provisions 
were the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 
1977 (Public Law 95-88) and the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act, fiscal year 1978 (Public Law 95-105). 

The House of Representatives also attempted to restrict U.S. 
funds channeled to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia through inter- 
national lending agencies. The House version of H.R. 7797 (Foreign 
Aid Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978) prohibited the World Bank 
and other financial institutions from using U.S. funds for assisting seven 
countries, including Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, on the grounds that 
these states significantly violated the human rights of their citizens. 
After a House-Senate conference failed to win Senate approval of this 
provision, President Carter facilitated an agreement by writing House 
Foreign Operations Subcommittee Chairman Representative Clar- 
ence [Long that he would instruct U.S. officials assigned to the 



192 

lending institutions to oppose and vote against loans to the seven 
countries. 2 

Congress also showed a continuing interest in the status of Ameri- 
cans missing in action in Vietnam. The International Development 
and Food Assistance Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-88) and the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978 (Public Law 95-105), 
both stated that the President "shall continue to take all possible 
steps" to obtain a full accounting of missing in action personnel. 

The House Subcommittee on International Organizations devoted 
particular attention to East Asian countries in its hearings on human 
rights in 1977. The subcommittee held hearings on Indonesia, Thai- 
land, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Taiwan. 

DISCUSSION 

Korea 

President Carter's plan to withdraw American ground forces from 
South Korea by 1982 has initiated a new and uncertain period in 
U.S.-Korean relations with implications for the structure of great 
power relations in Northeast Asia. The plan originated during Jimmy 
Carter's Presidential campaign. Carter raised the issue as early as 
January 1975 and discussed it with academies and staffs of several 
"think tanks" during this period. The plan was quickly incorporated 
into actual policy once President Carter took office. The President 
stated in his March 9, 1977, news conference that he would remove 
all ground troops over a 4- to 5-year period. He promised that the 
United States would consult closely with both South Korea and 
Japan and that U.S. air units would remain "over a long period of 
time." 

The period after the March 9 news conference saw substantial 
criticism of the plan arise in the United States and East Asia. Basically, 
the criticisms were: (1) that the plan would weaken the deterrent to 
North Korea and lead to a Communist attack on South Korea; (2) 
that the plan was adopted by the Carter administration from the 
campaign proposal without any substantive analysis of it by experts 
in the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA; (3) that the 
plan was presented to Japan, the chief U.S. ally in East Asia, as a 
fait accompli without any prior consultation with the Japanese; 
and (4) the plan was part of a general pattern of U.S. disengagement 
from the East Asian region. 

The criticism reached its zenith in the wake of the "Singlaub 
affair" in May 1977. Gen. John Singlaub, third-ranking U.S. officer 
in South Korea, stated in a press interview that President Carter's 
plan could result in a new Korean war. President Carter responded 
by transferring Singlaub to a stateside post. The "Singlaub affair" 
produced instant headline-making controversy over the troop with- 
drawal plan, which continued into June and encompassed congres- 
sional hearings and floor debates. 

Following the "Singlaub affair," the administration noticeably 
shifted its strategy. For the first time since candidate Carter proposed 
the plan, he gave a public rationale for it. In a May 26 news confer- 



See more complete discussion in multilateral assistance chapter, p. 103a 



193 

ence, he asserted that U.S. ground forces no longer were required to 
maintain an effective deterrent because of South Korean military 
and economic strength; a continued and clear U.S. defense commit- 
ment to South Korea under the 1954 defense treaty; changing great 
power relationships in Northeast Asia; and the planned retention of 
a naval-air U.S. residual force in South Korea. Carter put special 
emphasis on South Korean strength and the credibility of the U.S. 
defense commitment. 

One month later, at the end of July, Secretary of Defense Brown 
visited Seoul and Tokyo, bearing additional reassurances and new 
forms of commitment to South Korea. The United States pledged 
both to provide South Korea with "compensatory security assistance" 
(about $1.9 billion) over the 5-year troop withdrawal period and 
that "compensatory measures will be implemented in advance of or 
in parallel with the withdrawals." 

The themes of reassurance and credibility stood out in other 
statements made by Brown in Seoul and Tokyo. Japanese officials 
questioned whether Congress would approve compensatory security 
assistance for South Korea, and Brown assured the Japanese that 
Congress would likely support the administration's proposals. Japa- 
nese Defense Agency Director Mihara stated in mid-August that 
the Brown visit signaled a shift in U.S. policy toward a more cautious 
and realistic position. 

The administration's "strategy of reassurance" may have reassured 
some critics, it has also stimulated the emergence of criticism from 
another direction. Some individuals and groups, including some 
Members of Congress who originally supported the President's plan, 
had apparently perceived the plan as a first step toward total U.S. 
military disengagement from South Korea. Subsequent to administra- 
tion elaborations on it, they became either uncertain or concluded 
that the administration does not intend to move in that direction. 
Open criticism occurred at the U.S. -Japan Parliamentarians' Con- 
ference on Korea held in Washington during September 1977. Several 
American speakers attacked the administration's policy as nothing 
new or a version of the Nixon Doctrine, and they proposed policies — 
including direct U.S.-North Korean negotiations — leading toward 
total U.S. military withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula. They also 
opposed "compensatory" security assistance to South Korea. 

There now exist within the Congress three fairly distinct schools 
of thought concerning the American military role in Korea. The 
positions they support can be briefly summarized in the following 
terms. 

(1) American ground forces should be retained in South Korea. — This 
viewpoint places primar}^ emphasis on the deterrent effect that U.S. 
ground forces, particularly the 2d Infantry Division, has on North 
Korean calculations. It is argued that withdrawal of ground forces 
would sharply increase the possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula 
with all of its ramifications for great power relations in Northeast 
Asia. 

(2) Withdraw U.S. ground forces but retain air units and provide 
extensive security assistance to South Korea in line with President 
Carter's plan. — This school of thought offers the Carter administra- 



194 

tion's rationale that South Korean military and eeonomic strength 
coupled with a credible U.S. defense commitment will provide an 
adequate deterrent once ground forces are removed. However, some 
congressional supporters offer additional rationale; that the policy 
reduces the likelihood of another ground war on the Asian mainland, 
it would improve flexibility in responding to a North Korean attack, 
and it would reduce U.S. visibility in relation to the authoritarian 
South Korean Government. 

(3) Adopt policies leading toward a total U.S. military disengagement 
from South Korea at an early date. — This school of thought urges 
direct U.S. -North Korean negotiations aimed at a total U.S. troop 
withdrawal from South Korea; but it also holds open unilateral U.S. 
action as an alternative approach. Proponents of this view are opposed 
to the President's proposed compensatory security assistance to South 
Korea, and some oppose existing levels of security assistance. They 
argue that total withdrawal would prevent the United States from 
being drawn into another Asian war and would disassociate the 
United States completely from a South Korean Government that 
they view as oppressive. 

Most immediately, Congress will decide in 1978 whether or not to 
approve or even consider the administration's $800 million arms 
transfer proposal. In making this decision, it will have to weigh the 
importance of this measure to the administration's ability to manage 
its troop withdrawal policy against the effect of the South Korean 
influence-buying scandal on Congress. In a broader sense, the manner 
in which Congress deals with both the scandal and the arms transfer 
proposal will definitely affect (1) the climate of American public 
opinion toward the future U.S. military role in Korea and (2) Korean, 
Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese perceptions of the future direction of 
American policy toward Korea. 

Vietnam 

Congress also has taken actions that have been in conflict with the 
Carter administration's Vietnam policy. In the first half of 1977, 
the administration attempted to reach an early agreement with 
Vietnam on normalization of relations. To facilitate such an agree- 
ment, the administration made a number of conciliatory gestures 
including a reversal of the practice of vetoing U.N. membership for 
Vietnam; limited relaxation of trade and travel restrictions on Viet- 
nam; an offer to lift the trade embargo once diplomatic relations were 
established; and statements and policy moves suggesting that the 
missing in action question was no longer a major issue of contention 
between the United States and Vietnam. 

During negotiations in May and June 1977, the administration 
expressed the hope that Vietnam would accept these policy changes 
and agree to drop the question of bilateral aid until after diplomatic 
relations were established. The administration apparently presented 
a scenario to the Vietnamese in which the climate for bilateral aid 
within Congress and the American public would improve once nor- 
malization of relations had taken place. 

Vietnam, however, responded that the United States must pledge 
large-scale bilateral aid as a condition for normalization. Congress, 



195 

too, has shown some displeasure at the administration's approach 
with legislation (cited earlier) barring bilateral aid and reemphasizing 
the missing in action question. In an interview in the Far Eastern 
Review (November 18, 1977), Assistant Secretary of State Richard 
Holbrooke pointed to the strong contradiction between Vietnamese 
demands for aid and congressional and American public opposition 
to such aid as the main factor preventing normalization of relations. 

References 

congressional publications 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relatione. Subcommittee on 
A-ian and Pacific Affairs. Security assistance to Asia for fiscal year 1978: report 
of a special study mission to Asia, Apr. 8-21, 1977. Washington: U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 59 pp. 

Subcommittee on International Organizations. Human rights in Cam- 
bodia. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. May 3, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 70 pp. 

Human rights in East Timor. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. June 28 and 



July 19, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 80 pp. 

Human rights in Indonesia: a review of the situation with respect to the 



long-term political detainees. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Oct. 18, 1977. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 36 pp. 
Human rights in Taiwan: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st sess. June 23 and 30, 1977. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Ofiice, 1977. 104 pp. 

Human rights in Vietnam. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. June 16, 21, 



and July 26, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 229 pp. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. MIA's in South- 
east Asia. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Apr. 1, 1977. Washington, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, 1977. 25 pp. 



CRS PUBLICATIONS 



Niksch, Larry A., Trends in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and their implications for United States policy. July 21, 1977. [CRS Report] 

The United States role in Korea: trends and issues. Nov. 16, 1977. [CRS 

Report] 

Republic of Korea: U.S. commitments and the question of human rights. 



Issue Brief No. IB 74115. [Periodically updated] 
U.S. policy toward the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, [by Marjorie Niehaus] 
Issue Brief No. IB 77018. [Periodically updated] 



Middle East* 
overview 

The Middle East in 1977 furnished a complex backdrop to the 
relationship between the new administration of President Jimmy 
Carter and the 95th Congress in the formulation of U.S. foreign 
policy. After a loss of pace that always accompanied Presidential 
elections, the attention of the new administration and Congress 
focused on one of the principal and perennial foreign policy challenges 
facing the United States — seeking a gain in momentum toward an 
overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict which affected virtually 
every issue of major U.S. concern in the Middle East. Events through- 
out the year, however, emphatically demonstrated the region's com- 
plex and often ambiguous nature. In light of this, the 95th Congress 
maintained a continuing interest in the course of negotiations toward 
a Middle East settlement and reviewed administration policy per- 
taining to U.S. regional commitments, interests, and assistance. 

Congress also acted on legislation which would have considerable 
impact on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Among the subjects 
considered by the Congress relating to the region were foreign assist- 
ance, arms transfers, human rights, and the Arab boycott of Israel. 
In addition, numerous congressional study missions visited Middle 
Eastern countries during the year. 

Periodic briefings of the Secretary of State and other key executive 
branch officials were held during the year to provide information to 
Congress of regional developments. There was, however, some con- 
gressional criticism over a lack of timely and adequate consultation 
by the administration on Middle East developments. Moreover, 
some observers attributed the emergence of particular problems 
affecting executive-legislative relations on Middle Eastern issues to 
the new administration's inexperience and its unfamiliarity with the 
interrelationship between international issues and national institutions, 
particularly Congress. Others questioned the competence and ex- 
perience of Presidential advisers with respect to the complexities 
of Middle Eastern issues and suggested that these limitations reflected 
particularly in the use — or misuse — of the language of diplomacy, 
hampered the administration's efforts, both in international negotia- 
tions and in Congress. 

From the outset, the Carter administration reiterated the tradi- 
tional U.S. commitment to Israel's survival and security. At the 
same time, it continued the policy initiatives of its predecessors of 
endeavoring to improve the U.S. position in the Arab world, with 
particular emphasis on relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as 
well as with Muslim Iran. Middle East developments of the preceding 



* Prepared by Richard M. Preece, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. 

(196) 



197 

2-year period still had an impact on the climate in which U.S. foreign 
policy would be formulated: the improvement of relations between 
Syria and Jordan, the Egyptian-Israeli Sinai interim agreement of 
September 1975, the Syrian initiative on behalf of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) in the Security Council, cancellation 
of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, a 
serious deterioration in Lebanon's civil war with Syrian intervention 
in April 1976, and polarization of Syria and the PLO, a meeting of 
the Palestine National Council, and the launching of a new [U.S. 
initiative toward a Middle East settlement. 

Soon after his inauguration, President Carter conferred with 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the leaders of Egypt, 
Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. He indicated that he subscribed to a 
broad consensus that had emerged during the latter half of 1976 
calling for a new attempt to negotiate a comprehensive Arab-Israeli 
settlement at a reconvened Geneva Conference in 1977, in place of 
the step-by-step approach of former Secretary of State Henry Kis- 
singer, The President advocated a peace plan that would permit 
Israel to have "defensible borders;" on March 16, at a Clinton, 
Mass., citizens' meeting, Carter revealed he favored a Palestinian 
"homeland;" and subsequently, he indicated that there should be 
either a Palestinian state or, at least, "a Palestinian entity voluntarily 
federated with Jordan." In an interview given to a group of news 
editors and directors in June, President Carter stated that "Mr. 
Kissinger's position was to deal with the Middle East questions in a 
step-by-step incremental way," whereas the hope of his administration 
was that "we can have a settlement by the participants without delay, 
hopefully this year, and that once a settlement is reached, then step- 
by-step implementation * * * is the best way to go about it." 

Three developments during 1977 affected the course of U.S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East. The first was the formation of a Likud 
coalition government in Israel under Menachem Begin, who won the 
May 17 general elections from the Labour Alignment that had led 
Israel since its independence in 1948. Prime Minister Begin declared 
in June that nothing was "nonnegotiable" with respect to negotiations 
toward a peace settlement. He also stated, however, that there 
were two points on which he felt there existed a national consensus 
in Israel: "First, under no condition will Israel be able to withdraw 
to the borders of 4 June, 1967, and it will not do so. Second, under no 
conditions will we agree to a state called Falastin [Palestine] being 
set up in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] and in Gaza." 

The second development was the U.S. -Soviet Declaration on the 
Middle East of October 1 which called for a comprehensive Middle 
East settlement at a Geneva Conference to start "not later than 
December 1977," and established the following principles: (1) with- 
drawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories ; (2) resolution of the 
"Palestinian question" that would insure "the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people;" (3) termination of the "state of war" and 
"establishment of normal peaceful relations" between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors; (4) establishment of demilitarized zones to assure 
"security of borders," with possible guarantees; (5) United States 



198 

and Soviet willingness to participate in guarantees; and (6) the in- 
volvement of "all parties and all questions" in a comprehensive 
settlement. 1 

The third development was Egyptian President Anwar al -Sadat's 
visit to Jerusalem and his speech before the Knesset on November 20. 
Al-Sadat's dramatic initiative appeared to have taken the Carter 
administration by surprise and it exacerbated intra -Arab differences 
to the extent of postponing any immediate hope of a reconvened 
Geneva, Conference. A resolution passed by the House and Senate on 
November 29 commended the Egyptian and Israeli leaders for their 
"courageous face-to-face negotiations in the context of a Geneva 
Conference." The principal gains from this initiative were psycho- 
logical in that the Egyptian leader met criteria upon which Israel 
repeatedly had insisted — a readiness for face-to-face discussions, and 
acknowledgement of the existence of the State of Israel. Al-Sadat 
also conveyed the concept of full peace; i.e., not merely an end to 
belligerency, but rather diplomatic relations and open borders for 
the passage of people, goods, and ideas. In his speech before the 
Knesset, however, al-Sadat did not waiver from moderate Arab 
principles for an overall peace settlement: 

(1) Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories to the pre- 
June 1976 borders; (2) Arab recognition of Israel's sovereignty and its 
need for security, (3) the creation of a Palestinian state; and (4) 
access to Arab Jerusalem. It should be noted that al-Sadat, in his 
speech, did not refer explicitly to an acceptance of the PLO as the 
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 

The Carter administration initially indicated its concern that the 
al-Sadat initiative would endanger the chances for a reconvened 
Geneva Conference through a separate peace agreement between 
Israel and Egypt. In the face-to-face discussions between Egyptian 
and Israeli officials, however, Egypt's articulation of the basic princi- 
ples it considered necessary for negotiations toward an overall settle- 
ment dispelled U.S. concern over a separate Egyptian-Israeli deal, 
and the administration hastily rallied to support the efforts of 
Egyptian President al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin. 

President Carter earlier in the year had evoked considerable criti- 
cism from domestic supporters of Israel for having voiced U.S. support 
for the rights of displaced Palestinians to a territorial entity of their 
own. In October, he was criticized by domestic, Israeli, and moderate 
Arab circles for his insistence upon Soviet involvement in any negotia- 
tions toward a Middle East settlement. Indeed, Egyptian President 
al-Sadat, who had been consistent in his objections to superpower 
collusion, launched his November initiative in an anti-Soviet context. 
And when the Soviet response to his Jerusalem visit was hostile, he 
closed the Soviet consulates and cultural missions in Eg3 r pt. By the 
year's end, the Soviet Union was lending its support to the "steadfast 
front" Arab States and the PLO objecting to the al-Sadat initiative. 
At the same time, the Al-Sadat-Begin personal diplomacy that had 
appeared to give a genuine promise of peace in the Middle East 
revealed that both parties remained far from any agreement, princi- 



1 See also discussion of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union on pp. 47-52 in this volume. (Ed.) 



199 

pally because of differences over Israel's settlement policy in occupied 
Arab lands, Benin's proposals for the West Bank, and a lack of any 
resolution of the Palestinian question. 

DISCUSSION' 

Foreign assistance 

Congress, on July 22, cleared for the President a bill (II. R. 6884, 
Public Law 95-92) authorizing $3,196 billion for foreign military 
and security assistance aid for fiscal year 1978. 2 Approximately 65 
percent of the total authorization in the bill was allocated for the 
Middle East, assistance viewed by the administration as essential 
toward achieving a lasting peace in the region. U.S. national interests 
related to a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to oil supplies 
which, if disrupted again by the outbreak of new hostilities, would 
cost the United States billions of dollars and severely damage the 
economies of Western Europe and Japan. 3 The maintenance of stability 
in the region was regarded by both the administration and Congress 
as of critical importance to U.S. national security. 

As in recent years, Israel received the largest amount: $785 million 
in security assistance and $1 billion in military credit sales, of which 
$500 million was a grant. 4 Egypt was allocated $750 million in security 
supporting assistance, and the bill provided that the Secretary of 
State review the U.S. security assistance program for Egypt and 
develop a plan for a revision of U.S. aid legislation and suggest future 
development projects for Egypt. Syria was allocated $90 million in 
security assistance, Lebanon $20 million, and Jordan $93 million; 
Jordan also was allocated $55 million in military assistance. In 
addition, the bill authorized up to $12.2 million for continuation of 
the Sinai support mission. 

Public Law 95-92 provided that no military assistance advisory 
groups (MAAG's) could operate overseas unless specifically authorized 
by Congress. It authorized "overseas management teams" for the 
purpose of performing administrative functions relating to fiscal 
year 1978 U.S. military assistance, training, and arms sales programs 
for the Middle East countries of Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, 
and Saudi Arabia, and it permitted the President to assign up to six 
military personnel to any country to perform management duties 
relating to security assistance programs. The total number of in- 
dividuals assigned overseas worldwide under these two management 
programs was limited to 865 during fiscal year 1978. 

Funds authorized for security supporting assistance for the purpose 
of meeting U.S. national security interests had few guidelines to 
govern their use. The types of programs varied from balance-of- 
payments support for Israel to development projects in Syria. Some 
members expressed serious reservations over Syria's plan to use two- 
thirds of its fiscal year 1978 security assistance allocation to improve 
a coast highway. In the main, however, Congress viewed economic 
supporting assistance as a useful instrument to help stabilize the 
Middle East region until a final peace settlement could be achieved. 



2 See also discussion of bilateral assistance on pp. 97-102 in this volume. (Ed.) 

3 See also discussion of U.S. international energy policy on pp. 129-132 in this volume. (Ed.) 
* See also the discussion of conventional arms transfers on pp. 70-82. (Ed.) 



200 

Arms transfers. — President Carter announced his administration's 
overseas arms sales program on May 19, stating that the United 
States, as the largest weapons supplier, had ' 'special responsibilities" 
to control the world arms traffic. 

H.R. 6884, as cleared for the President, declared that the U.S. 
policy of restraint in arms sales "shall not impair Israel's deterrent 
strength to undermine the military balance in the Middle East." 
President Carter, before the announcement of his arms sales policy, 
had written the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that he had 
not placed Israel in the category of special treatment in arms sales 
given U.S. allies because "we believe it goes without saying that the 
United States will do everything necessary to insure Israel's security." 

U.S. arms sales policy in general, and arms exports to the Middle 
East in particular, were subjects of congressional debate in 1977. A 
significant number of Members were determined to cut back on arms 
sales to the region, and several expressed concern over the general 
policy of sales to Iran. Under section 36(B) of the Foreign Military 
Sales Act, the Congress could block arms sales of more than $25 
million by concurrent resolutions within 20 legislative days — subse- 
quently increased to 30 days — of the date the President formally pro- 
posed the sale to Congress. By informal agreement, the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Inter- 
national Relations received prenotification of proposed sales 20 days 
in advance of the formal notification. 

AW ACS. — President Carter on June 16 sent prenotification to 
Congress of a proposed sale of $1.2 billion for seven airborne warning 
and control systems (AW ACS) aircraft to Iran to be delivered beginning 
in 1981. Formal notification was to follow on July 7. Opposition to 
the AW ACS sale in Congress reflected increasing concern that sales 
of sophisticated weapons systems to Iran were out of control, and 
that current orders already were outstripping that country's capabil- 
ities to operate, maintain, and manage the equipment. In addition, 
the resultant dependence of the Iranian Armed Forces on U.S. supplies 
and expertise could entangle the United States in Iran's foreign policy 
decisions. There was also the danger that classified U.S. equipment 
could end up in Soviet hands through accident or defection by Iranian 
personnel. 

Senate Majority Leader Byrd requested the President to withdraw 
the notification of the sale and resubmit it at a later date, explaining 
that many members had serious questions concerning the matter. On 
July 28, the House Committee on International Relations adopted 
a disapproval resolution. Facing the virtual certainty of similar 
disapproval in the Senate, President Carter withdrew his notification. 

The administration resubmitted formal notification of the AW ACS 
sale to Iran on September 7 accompanied by a number of assurances 
that had been requested by Congress. The issue of the AW ACS 
sale pointed to the trend in Congress toward a more assertive role in 
foreign policy oversight in the area of arms sales. House Members, 
while assessing the potential damage to U.S. -Iranian relations, had 
voted to block the transaction when the administration refused to 
withdraw the July notification. 



201 

Human rights 5 

Iran. — Comptying with laws enacted by the Congress in 1976 to 
encourage U.S. aid recipients to observe internationally recognized 
human rights standards, the State Department had published in 
December 1976 a report on alleged abuses in six countries, including 
Iran. It had recommended a continuation of U.S. arms sales to Iran 
in light of that country's strategic location and its role as an oil 
supplier to the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and Israel. 
During the visit of the Shah of Iran to Washington in November 1977, 
President Carter assured the Iranian leader that the United States 
would continue to assist Iran in meeting its ''security needs" and 
fulfilling its "economic and social development programs." 

Israel. — Following allegations of hum an rights abuses by Israel in 
reports by domestic and foreign media and such organizations as the 
Swiss League on Human Rights, the administration received criticism 
from Congress of inconsistencies in its rights policy. A hearing was 
held in October by the Subcommittee on Immigration and Natural- 
ization of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Israeli treatment 
of Arabs in the occupied territories and on Israel's policy of settle- 
ments in the occupied lands. 

Arab boycott 

The 95th Congress considered controversial legislation aimed at 
curbing U.S. responses to the Arab League boycott of Israel and 
revising U.S. export policies. The principal problem facing Congress 
was to draft an antiboycott bill that would protect U.S. business 
interests in the Middle East and, at the same time, adhere to anti- 
boycott provisions demanded by Jewish organizations in the United 
States. On June 10, Congress cleared for the President the Export 
Administration Amendments bill of 1977 (H.R. 5840 — Public Law 
95-42) which, in the words of President Carter in signing the legis- 
lation on June 22, represented, from a broad perspective, a first 
attempt by the United States to limit an internationally applied 
economic sanction on behalf of free trade, U.S. sovereignty, and 
human rights. 

With respect to antiboycott laws, the Export Administration 
Amendments of 1977 presented a compromise that permitted an 
Arab country to select the manufacturer of some of the components 
of its choice, such as the brand of tires on a truck, but not less identi- 
fiable items, such as nuts and bolts, so long as the request was not 
based on race, religion, sex, or national origin of the producer. A 
Senate statement indicated that : 

* * * the real test of the bill will occur long after its enactment. It will occur when 
the government is faced with the decision of whether to file a complaint under the 
act. * * * To the degree that we have given business precise guidance as to what 
actions are acceptable and what are not, we will have written a strong bill. 

The antiboycott provisions were intended to provide a stronger 
stand against" U.S. compliance with the Arab boycott of Israel than 
had been possible under existing amendments^ to export control 
legislation which simply stated that it was U.S. policy to oppose 
bovcotts against other countries friendly to the United States. 



* See also the discussion of human rights on pp. 142-152. (Ed.) 
29-972—78 14 



202 

Prospect jor 1978 

Middle East issues during 1978 will continue to command the 
attention of Congress and the administration. Of prime importance 
will be U.S. policy options in maintaining progress in negotiations 
toward an overall Arab-Israeli settlement. Associated issues will 
involve American foreign assistance in support of U.S. policy, includ- 
ing security supporting assistance to Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, 
and continued reconstruction aid to Lebanon. In the event of forward 
progress in Arab-Israeli negotiations, consideration would need to 
be given to the issues involved in implementing the various elements 
of a settlement, such as guarantees relating to Israel's security, 
economic assistance, and an interim solution to the problem of the 
West Bank and Gaza. 

Other issues affecting U.S. relations with regional countries will 
include arms sales and transfers T particularly with respect to Israel, 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran; human rights questions; the supply 
and pricing of Middle East oil; U.S. trade in the Middle East; foreign 
investment in the United States; and refugee relief programs. 

References 

hearings 

A. Foreign assistance 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Supplemental appropria- 
tions for fiscal vear 1977. Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. 1,000 pp. 

Committee on International Relations. Foreign assistance legislation for 

fiscal year 1978 (Part 1): The Presidential report: public witnesses. Hearings, 
Mar. 16, 17, 22; and Apr. 18, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. 419 pp. 

Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. Foreign assistance 



legislation for fiscal vear 1978 (Part 5) ; Economic and military aid programs in 
Europe and the Middle East. Hearings, Feb. 22, 23; Mar. 3, 7, 9, 14, 16, 21; 
Apr. 21 and 27, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. 419 pp. 

Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs. Foreign 



Assistance legislation for fiscal year 1978 (Part 2) : Policy on arms transfers and 
military assistance programs. Hearings, Mar. 30, 31, and Apr. 19, 20, 1977. 
95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
185 pp. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on 
Foreign Assistance, Subcommittee on Africa, and Subcommittee on Arms 
Control, Oceans, and International Environment. Security assistance author- 
ization. Hearings, Apr. 21, 22, 25, and 28; and May 2, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st 
sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 265 pp. 

B. Arms transfers 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on 
Europe and the Middle East. Proposed sales of militar}^ equipment and services 
to Egypt. Hearing, Sept. 15, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. 32 pp. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on 
Foreign Assistance. Sale of AWACS to Iran. Hearings, July 18, 22, 25, 27 and 
Sept. 19, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 109 pp. 

Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Subcommittee on Near Eastern 

and South Asian Affairs. Sale of C-130 aircraft to Egypt. Hearing, Sept. 21, 
1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 20 pp. 



203 

C. Human rights 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommiu 
International Organizations. Human rights in Iran. Hearing, Oct. 26, L977. 
95th Cong., 1st sess. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 43 pp. 

Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration and 

Naturalization. The colonization of the West Bank territories by Israel. 1 1 
ings, Oct. 17 and 18, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1978. 184 pp. 

D. Arab boycott 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs- 
Subcommittee on International Finance. Arab boycott. Hearings, Feb. 21, 22, 
and 28; Mar. 15, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 1977. 616 pp. 

E. Other 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on 
Europe and the Middle East. Review of recent developments in the Middle 
East. Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 128 pp. 

■ Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern 

and South Asian Affairs. Middle East problems. Hearings, May 18 and 19, 
1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 79 pp. 

Middle East strategic problems. Hearing, Oct. 3, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st 



sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 128 pp. 

REPORTS 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and 
related programs appropriations bill, 1978; report to accompany H.R. 7797, 
June 15, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 96 pp. 

Committee on International Relations. International Security Assistance 

Act of 1977: report of the Committee on International Relations together with 
supplemental and additional views (including cost estimate of the Congressional 
Budget Office) on H.R. 6885, May 9, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. 52 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. 95-274.) 

International Security Assistance Act of 1977: conference report (to ac- 
company H.R. 6884), Julv 15, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 33 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. 95-503.) 

Human rights practices in countries receiving U.S. security assistance: 

report submitted to the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives by the Department of State in accordance with section 502(b) 
of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, Apr. 25, 1977. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. pp. 31-33. (95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee 
Print.) 

The prospects for peace in the Middle East: a firsthand report; report of 



factfinding mission to Israel, June 30 to July 7, to the Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations, Aug. 15, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. 18 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee Print.) 

The Middle East at the crossroads: Report of a study mission to Israel, 



Egypt, Syria and Jordan, Julv 5-15, Nov. 9, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1977. 38 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee Print.) 
United States arms policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea areas: past, 



present and future; report of a staff survey mission to Ethiopia, Iran and the 
Arabian Peninsula pursuant to H. Res. 313, December 1977. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. 181 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee 
Print.) 

Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. United States military 



installations and objectives in the Mediterranean: report prepared by the 
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Serv- 
ice, Library of Congress, Mar. 27, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. 95 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee Print.) 

Subcommittee on International Organizations. Human rights in the 



international communitv and in U.S. foreign policy, 1945-76: report prepared 
by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, Julv 24, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. (95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee Print.) 



204 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The International 
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1977: report to accompany 
S. 1160. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 62 pp. (95th 
Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. 95-195.) 

The Middle East, June 1977: report to the Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions by Senator Richard Stone, Florida, Chairman, Near East and South 
Asian Affairs Subcommittee. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977. (95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee Print.) 

The West Bank: A key element in the search for peace in the Middle 



East, by Senator Claiborne Pell, October 1977. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. (95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee Print.) 

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Access to oil — the United 



States relationships with Saudi Arabia and Iran, printed at the request of 
Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, December 1977. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. 113 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee Print.) 

Select Committee on Intelligence. Subcommittee on Collection, Produc- 



tion, and Quality. U.S. intelligence analysis and oil issue, 1973-74: staff report, 
December 1977! Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 6 pp. 
(95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee Print.) 

Senate delegation report on American foreign policy and nonproliferation 



interests in the Middle East: report pursuant to S. Res. 167 of May 10, 1977; 
prepared for the consideration of the United States Senate, June 1977. Washing- 
ton, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 55 pp. (95th Cong., 1st sess. 
Committee Print.) 

U.S. General Accounting Office. Egypt's capacity to absorb and use economic 
assistance effectively. [Washington] Sept. 15, 1977. 47 pp. 

Perspectives on military sales to Saudi Arabia. [Washington] Oct. 26, 

1977. 50 pp. 

CRS PUBLICATIONS 

Arab-Israeli settlement: the issues. Issue Brief No. IB 74107. [Periodically 

updated.] 
Palestine and the Palestinians. Issue Brief No. IB 76048. [Updated 1/16/78.] 



Western Europe* 



overview 



As the focus of U.S. foreign policy has shifted away from Vietnam 
and Southeast Asia in general, the strength and stability of America's 
West European allies continued in 1977 to concern both the Congress 
and the administration. This readjustment of priorities was demon- 
strated by President Carter's and Vice President Mond ale's trips to 
Europe in the first 6 months of 1977, and by the President's return 
trip to several European countries, originally scheduled for November 
1977, but delayed until January 1978. 

One of the major concerns of Congress and the administration in 
West Europe in 1977 has been "Eurocommunism," and especially the 
debate over the influence that Communist Party participation in 
West European governments would have upon the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and other U.S.-West European relation- 
ships. By the end of 1977, however, it appeared that congressional 
anxieties on this issue had waned, due in part to the split between the 
Socialists and Communists in France, which diminishes the prospect 
of Communists entering a government in Paris; and in part to in- 
creased awareness that if a Communist Party were to participate in 
any government in Europe, there would be strong restraints placed 
upon its policies by the realities of economic and security interdepend- 
ence with other West European countries and the United States. 

The other major area of congressional concern in 1977 has been 
supplementing the strength of the NATO alliance. Since the with- 
drawal of troops from Vietnam, the United States has been strengthen- 
ing its force presence in Europe. Currently, U.S. combat strength in 
Europe has been increased to the highest level since the early 1960's. 
1977 also witnessed further concentration of efforts to enhance 
conventional capabilities by modernizing tanks, air warning tech- 
niques and weapons systems. In the past year Congress has continued 
to study standardization and interoperability as means of both 
strengthening the alliance and providing the Europeans with a greater 
share of the responsibilities of the alliance. 

Although Congress showed great interest in these and other develop- 
ments in Europe in 1977, congressional activity was limited to several 
tangential issues related to its general intent to support democratic 
governments and to protect U.S. security interests in the area. 
Specific areas of congressional activity in 1977 included international 
terrorism, supplemental military assistance to Portugal and the defense 
cooperation agreement with Turkey. 



Prepared by Charlotte A. Phillips, Analyst in West European Affairs. 

(205) 



206 

DISCUSSION 

NATO issues 

Congressional interest in NATO affairs was reflected by the number 
of studies and hearings conducted on various NATO topics including 
standardization, the tank issue, the cruise missile and the neutron 
bomb. 

Standardization and the tank controversy. — In its efforts to 
strengthen the conventional capabilities of the NATO alliance, the 
Congress focused its attention on the decision of the United States to 
develop and deploy its own XM-1 battle tank instead of building the 
German Leopard 2 tank, and on the choice of gun to be mounted 
on the tanks. 1 The administration has an unequivocal commitment 
to increase its procurement of European weapons systems, and feels 
the need to make gestures for standardization. Therefore it is looking- 
for a compromise solution to the tank controversy in the form of 
maximizing the commonality of tank components. One of the ways 
to do this would be to employ the German 120-mm gun. With regard 
to the German gun, the executive branch had not yet made a com- 
mitment because it feared congressional disapproval. 

By the close of 1977 there was no consensus in the Congress that the 
German gun was militarily superior to the existing 105-mm gun. The 
House version of the DOD Appropriations Authorization Act, 1978 
(Public Law 9579), included a section prohibiting the installation of a 
120-mm gun in any XM-1 tank full-scale engineering development 
vehicle until after a reasonable period for congressional review. 2 

The House also expressed its intent that any effort to install a 120- 
mm gun on any XM-1 tank without a reprograming request or new 
legislative authority would be considered a violation of the intent of 
Congress. The Senate version of the act contained no restrictive 
language; however, in conference the Senate reluctantly agreed to an 
amendment with the understanding that comparative testing would 
be conducted as scheduled with a recommendation by the Secretary 
of the Army on the gun selection to be made no later than February 1, 
1978. 

Cruise missiles. There is a strong body of opinion in the Congress, 
represented primarily by Members traditionally associated with 
strong support for NATO, that the cruise missile could have great 
utility for the alliance; this position is generally shared by the Euro- 
peans as well. Proponents of this view therefore have sought to insure 
that the U.S. development of ground- and sea-launched versions of 
the cruise missile is not precluded by the SALT agreements. 3 

Neutron bomb. — In 1977, Congress passed the Energy Research and 
Development Administration Authorization Act of 1977 and 1978 
Military Applications (Public Law 95-183) and the Public Works for 
Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriation 



1 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Armed Services, Subcommittee on Investigations. Oversight 
Hearings on the Status of the Army XM-1 Tank program. Report. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Sept. 23, 1977. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

2 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. DOD Appropriations Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1978. Report. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Apr. 7, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977. pp. 137-138. 

3 See also the discussion of SALT on pp. 92-96 in this volume. (Ed.) 



207 

Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-96), to provide the necessary funds for 
continued development of the neutron bomb, provided the President 
certify that production of the bomb is in the national security interest 
of the United States. 4 In late 1977, the German Government an- 
nounced a willingness to study the deployment of the neutron bomb 
on German soil as a part of the NATO defense system. This announce- 
ment should give the President some additional reinforcement to 
return to Congress in 1978 requesting additional funds for the system's 
deployment. 

Eurocommunism. — Although Congress has not enacted legislation 
in 1977 dealing with Eurocommunism, the issue was the focus of 
testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East in July 1977. In addition, a major 
committee print on the subject was released by the Senate Appropria- 
tions Committee in June 1977. 

Congress has been concerned with the dangers inherent in Euro- 
communism, both for the national security of the European nations 
themselves and for U.S. relations with them. There are still marked 
differences of opinion among Members about the true nature of Euro- 
communism and its significance and implications for U.S. -West 
European relations. Thus far, however, the administration has not 
repeated the aggressively worded warnings frequenth T voiced by 
Henry Kissinger during the Nixon and Ford administrations. Instead, 
President Carter has chosen to emphasize the assurance that the 
United States would not interfere in the internal affairs of European 
governments. 

Military assistance. 5 — Congress approved legislation, Public Law 
95-23, which provided the Government of Portugal with $32,250,000 
of supplementary military assistance for 1977. In addition, the Inter- 
national Security Assistance Act of 1977, Public Law 95-92, which 
amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, added several new 
sections alloting funds for a number of West European countries. 
Section 497 of the act recognized the established interest of the 
United States in fostering democratic government in Portugal, main- 
taining the strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and 
supporting European economic recovery. In light of these objectives, 
Congress authorized the President to make balance of payments 
support loans to Portugal in the development and implementation 
of a program to gain financial stability and economic recovery. The 
act further authorized and appropriated $300 million for fiscal year 
1978 to carry out the purposes of this section. 

Finally, section 504A of the International Security Assistance Act 
amended the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act by providing military 
assistance for fiscal year 1978 to Greece ($33 million), Portugal 
($25 million), Spain ($15 million), and Turkey ($45 million). 

International terrorism 

In view of multiple outbreaks of political murder, hijackings, fire 
bombings and other acts of political violence in Europe in 1977, Con- 



« Hearings on authorization were held February 28, March 1, April 2o, 26 and 27 before the Nuclear Energy 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on appropriations were held before 
the Subcommittee on Appropriations, and published as Part 6 of the ERDA bill (Public Works for Water 
and Power Development and Energy Research). 

6 See also the discussion of conventional arms transfers on pp. 70-S2 in this volume. (Ed.) 



208 

gress and the administration have attempted to cooperate and to 
support efforts by the West European authorities to combat terrorism. 

In the case of Northern Ireland, the Congress introduced several 
resolutions applauding the efforts of the Women's Peace Movement to 
end the sectarian violence that has terrorized the area in the past 
several years (H. Con. Res. 143; H. Res. 415; H. Res. 416 and H. Res 
511). Moreover, the House resolved that the International Relations 
Committee conduct hearings to determine if any officials, agencies or 
instrumentalities of the U.S. Government are directly or indirectly 
involved in the hostilities in Northern Ireland. At present the resolu- 
tions to hold hearings have been referred to the Committee on Rules. 

The other congressional action on terrorism relating to Europe 
was a resolution (S. Res. 48) passed by the Senate in January 1977, 
with respect to the release by the Government of France of Abu 
Daoud, a known terrorist, accused of having planned the murder of 
the Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich in 1972. The Senate condemned 
the release as being harmful to the effort of the community of nations 
to stamp out international terrorism. The resolution further stated 
that the United States should consult with France and other friendly 
nations to seek ways to prevent a recurrence of situations in which 
terrorists are released from detention without facing criminal charges 
in a court of law. 

Military assistance to Turkey and the U.S. -Turkish Defense Cooperation 
Agreement 6 
The controversy over military assistance to Turkey is one example 
of the rise of congressional influence over foreign policy in recent 
years. Despite President Carter's determination to convince Congress 
that the sale and financing of certain defense articles to Turkey in 
fiscal year 1977 was necessary to enable Turkey to fulfill its obligations 
as a member of NATO, he has not been able to win sufficient support 
from the Congress to implement his policy. At present, it appears to 
be the sense of Congress that the Defense Cooperation Agreement 
(DCA) with Turkey should not be approved until noticeable progress 
toward a solution of the Greek-Turkish stalemate over Cyprus has 
been achieved. Moreover, there is still considerable debate in Con- 
gress, as demonstrated by congressional refusal to grant supplemental 
military assistance to Turkey, over the administration's efforts to 
lift the arms embargo — in effect since February 1975 — on the transfer 
of military and defense articles to Turkey by the United States. 

Other issues 

In other areas, Congress expressed concern over some problems 
relating to U.S. trade with members of the European Economic 
Community (EEC). For example, Senate Resolution 76, House 
Resolution 238 and House Resolution 320 stated that the President 
should employ all means to remove restrictive measures imposed by 
the EEC on certain special U.S. agricultural products, such as dried 
prunes and walnuts, which are alleged to interfere with acceptable 
trade patterns. 



• For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see the discussion of overseas commitments and bases on 
pp. 67-G9 in this volume. (Ed.) 



209 

With regard to landing rights for the Anglo-French Concorde 
supersonic transport (SST) plane, the House passed U.K. 7557, 
helping to clear the way for France and Great Britain to land SST' 
at J. F. Kennedy airport in New York. On October 19, 1977, the first 
SST landed there, thus removing an irritant in U.S. -French/British 
relations. 

The fiscal year 1978 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (Public 
Law 95-105) changed previous policy on admitting certain categories 
of foreign visitors by making it the rule rather than the exception that 
visas would be granted to foreign Communist Party members, provid- 
ing they were eligible on other grounds. This change made it possible 
for prominent European figures such as Spanish Communist Party 
leader Santiago Carrillo to visit the United States. 

Finally in 1977, international fishery agreements were approved 
by Congress with the EEC, West Germany and Spain. 

Issues facing the second session of the 95th Congress 

In 1978, Congress will again take up the question oT supplementary 
military aid to Portugal and additional funds for the development of 
the neutron bomb. The choice of gun to be mounted on the XM-1 
battle tank also remains to be decided, and Congress will be called 
upon to appropriate funds for whichever gun the ad tion 

selects. Although developments in Italy and Northern Ireland are 
likely to be topics of concern for the second session, perhaps the most 
significant issue in U.S.-Western European relation-, in which the 
Congress will play a direct role, will be the Greek and Turkish Defense 
Cooperation Agreements. 

References 

congressional publications 

Hearings 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on 
Europe and the Middle Ease. To Authorize Supplemental Militi . Assi tanoe 
to Portugal for Fiscal Year 1977. Hearing. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Mar. 1, 1977. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Recent Developments in Europe. Hearings. 95th Cong., 1st sess. May 23, 

24, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Man- 
power and Personnel. NATO Posture and Initiatives. Hearing. 95th Cong., 
1st sess. Aug. 3, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Reports 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. NATO Standard- 
ization: Political, Economic, and Military Issues for Congress. Report prepared 
by the Congressional Research Service. 95th Cong., 1 iar. 29, 1977. 

Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. U.S. Military Installa- 
tions and Objectives in the Mediterranean. Report prepared by the Cob 
sional Research Service. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Mar. 27, 1977. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Additional Arms Control Impact Statements and Evaluations for Fiscal 



Year 1978. Report by the National Security Council together with Evaluations 

prepared by the Congressional Research Service. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Dec. 1, 
1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 



210 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. West European Communist 
Parties. Report prepared by the Congressional Research Service. 95th Cong., 
1st sess. June 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. 

Implications of President Carter's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy. Report 
prepared by the Congressional Research Service. 95th Cong., 1st sess. December 
1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 

Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy. U.S. Foreign Economic Policy 



Issues: The United Kingdom, France and West Germany. A staff report fore- 
word by Senator Frank Church. 95th Cong., 1st sess. March 1977. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 



CRS PUBLICATIONS 



Cyprus as an Issue in Greek-Turkish Relations. Issue Brief No. IB74128. [Periodi- 
cally updated.] 

Cruie Missiles (Subsonic) : U.S. Programs. Issue Brief No. IB7G018. [Periodically 
updated.] 

XM-1 Main Battle Tank Program. Issue Brief No. IB75052. [Periodically 



CONCLUSION 

The 95th Congress (First Session) and Foreign Policy: A 

Summing Up* 

As was noted in the 1976 edition of Congress and Foreign Policy, 
it is difficult to sum up all the foreign policy activities of an entire 
congressional session and somehow do justice to all aspects. This 
chapter, therefore, is an attempt to highlight activities and events 
discussed earlier in greater detail, and to comment on their possible 
significance in terms of the role of Congress in the making of foreign 
policy. 

After 8 years in which Democratic Congresses challenged Republican 
Presidents with a growing array of legislative tools on a widening 
range of foreign policy issues, speculation had arisen as to how an 
even more overwhelmingly Democratic Congress would relate to a 
President of the same party. Yet, the first session of the 95th Congress 
saw no diminution in the trend that had been developing during the 
past decade toward a more active foreign policy role for the legislative 
branch. 

Although the majorities in both Houses and the President were of 
the same political party for the first time in 8 years and U.S. foreign 
policy in general provoked much less public outcry than in recent 
years, relations between the two branches were far from harmonious 
on certain issues. Moreover, it should be remembered that President 
Carter had not received an overwhelming electoral mandate, the 
principles of his foreign policy were not always clearly understood, 
and most Members of Congress were elected by wider margins than the 
President. 

The 1977 edition of Congress and Foreign Policy suggests some 
explanation for this continuing phenomenon of congressional- 
executive conflict in the area of foreign policy. 

Areas of support for the President 

While the adversary relationship between Congress and the execu- 
tive branch has frequently been cited by observers of the domestic 
U.S. political scene, there have also been instances in which 
congressional-executive agreement on an issue has resulted in the 
enactment of necessary legislation. Examples in the foreign policy 
field included action to provide the President the authority he wanted 
to halt U.S. imports of chrome from Rhodesia. Congress also approved 
essentially the same level of defense spending requested by the 
President, although there were individual items in dispute. Legislative- 
executive relations were also harmonious with regard to the operation 
of the Joint Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

In the area of executive reorganization, Congress approved of 
President Carter's plan to restructure the foreign information and 



Prepared by Joel M. Woldman, Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy. 

(211) 



212 

cultural exchange programs formerly operated by the U.S. Informa- 
tion Agency (USIA) and the State Department, under a new Inter- 
national Communication Agency. The new agency will emphasize 
communication, mutual understanding, and long-term objectives, 
rather than the tactical foreign policy goals sometimes pursued by 
USIA during the past. 

Areas of qualified support 

Yet even when a majority in Congress favored certain Presidential 
policies, they sometimes expressed a distinctive congressional perspec- 
tive that could result in actual opposition. The most prominent 
example of such agreement in principle but opposition in detail was 
human rights. The human rights theme permeated much of the 
conflict between the two branches during 1977. 

Some observers have called human rights the "motherhood" issue 
in foreign policy. Everyone could support human rights because it 
could mean something different to each of its champions. While many 
Members favored Presidential initiatives in this field, others succeeded 
in turning it against the administration. Conservatives could claim 
that the liberals cared about violation of these rights only in right- 
wing dictatorships and that they did not pay equal attention to human 
lights violators in Communist or neutralist states. Liberals wrote 
human rights requirements into various kinds of legislation that — 
from the executive branch perspective — unduly complicated U.S. 
relations with various governments. 

Areas of congressional independence 

In addition to these areas of qualified support, there have been 
notable areas of congressional independence in foreign affairs during 
the 1977 session. This may be as much a result of the dynamic power 
relationship between the legislative and executive branches as a 
reflection of the distinctive character of Congress and its need to be 
responsive to the perceptions of its many constituencies. Because 
members of the House and the Senate represent better defined and 
smaller constituencies than the President, they often respond to 
foreign policy problems in different ways. Moreover, most Members 
of the 95th Congress received more dramatic individual electoral 
mandates than the President. 

Examples of continuing congressional independence in foreign policy 
include the Panama Canal issue, resumption of more normal "ties with 
Cuba and Vietnam, and U.S. Middle East policy. Small, one-issue 
organizations can form alliances with other pressure groups and exert 
a kind of veto power on public policy. In the case of Cuba, the argu- 
ments of opponents of normalization were strengthened by the 
Cubans themselves, who have stymied progress toward any resolution 
of differences by their continued presence in Africa. 

Opponents of the Panama Canal Treaties have launched an all-out 
offensive against their ratification, and additional conditions to the 
treaties imposed by Congress have added an entirely new dimension 
to the negotiating process and to U.S.-Panamanian relations. The 
issue is extremely complex and emotional. Congress has effectively 
reflected the fact that many Americans do indeed perceive of the 
ultimate transfer of the control over the Canal and the Canal Zone 



213 

to Panama as a "giveaway" and as an instance of a large and powerful 
country "knuckling under" to a "banana republic dictator." In many 
ways, the Panama^Canal issue epitomizes the difficult and ambiguous 
nature of international relationships in the 1970's. Congressional 
responses to such problems are as much an indication of the state 
of U.S. public opinion as of the nature of the political process in 
post-Vietnam America. 

Congress is sensitive to its constitutencies and reacts in ways that 
sometimes seem intractable from the bureaucratic perspective of the 
executive branch. Similarly, the initiatives, behavior and programs 
of the executive branch often perplex Members and committees of 
Congress. Examples include questions of any kind of aid to Communist 
countries, constraints on international bank loans to human rights 
violators of the left and right, and foreign arms sales — also linked to 
human rights considerations in many cases. These questions often also 
have domestic economic components reflected in the concerted efforts 
of Members to support programs that will strengthen or protect spe- 
cific economic sectors or locally important economic enterprises. 

Similarly, a number of Members who argue that U.S. foreign policy 
should reflect our political values, have been especially outspoken on 
the continuing large-scale arms transfers to conservative, apparently 
"stable" Middle East governments like Iran and Saudi Arabia, or to 
suggestions that the United States become involved in new arms 
supply programs in Africa. 

Another foreign policy area in which Congress has asserted its 
independence is that of senior executive nominations. While Paul 
Warnke, the President's nominee as chief SALT negotiator and Direc- 
tor of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, faced considerable 
opposition before he was ultimately approved, the first nomination 
for Director of Central Intelligence, that of Theodore Sorensen, had 
to be withdrawn after Members of the Senate indicated that he would 
be unacceptable. In a related move that would affect both domestic 
and foreign affairs agencies, the Senate is considering the establish- 
ment of an Office of Nominations, which would permit more deliberate 
and systematic review of executive nominations than is currently 
possible. 

Of the 223 public laws enacted by the 95th Congress during 1977, 
approximately 45 have a foreign policy dimension. While the primary 
focus of the first session of the 95th Congress, as of many previous 
Congresses, has been on the domestic policy front, the trend toward 
congressional assertion noted in earlier editions of Congress and 
Foreign Policy continues. This is clearly evident in such actions as the 
President's compromise with insistent Senate and House conferees 
on restrictions on aid to certain Communist countries in order to break 
an impasse over the foreign aid bill. Congress also forced the President 
to revise his plan to sell Iran seven sophisticated jet planes armed with 
sensitive electronics (AW ACS) equipment and to provide assurances 
that certain changes would be made and conditions set before the 
sale could take place. 

In finally summarizing the performance of the first session of the 
95th Congress in foreign policy, it would appear that the trend toward 
an activist or adversarial role has tended to dominate congressional- 



214 

executive relations. In a certain sense, such a role is dictated by both 
the nature of separation of powers and the checks and balances 
built into the system by the Constitution. Although the power of the 
executive branch had been in the ascendancy during the years follow- 
ing the Second World War — and is still formidable — the experience of 
Vietnam internationally and Watergate domestically has prompted a 
resurgence in congressional initiative and assertiveness and in public 
participation in the form of interest group pressures. Once accustomed 
to such a more activist role, Congress will not easily forget its own 
considerable strengths, even when its leadership shares party alle- 
giances with the President. 

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